PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF LANGUAGE POLICY IN KAZAKHSTAN

by

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Bachelor of Arts, University of North Dakota, 2000

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the
University of North Dakota
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of
Master of Arts

Grand Forks, North Dakota
December
2003
This thesis, submitted by Aliya S. Kuzhabekova in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts from the University of North Dakota, has been read by the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done and is hereby approved.

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Department Linguistics

Degree Master of Arts

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my thanks to several people for their assistance in creation of the thesis. I begin with Dr. David Marshall without whose guidance and patience this project would not be possible. His steadfastness and confidence in me were of tremendous help in completing both this project and my degree.

Special thanks to the staff of the UND International Center, whose friendship, encouragement and advisement permitted me to complete my education away from home; to the staff of the UND Women’s Center for their compassion and empowerment; to my Higher Educational Leadership advisor Donald Lemon, who has patiently supported me in my search for understanding of this world and most importantly myself from the very beginning of my graduate study at UND.

Finally, and most lovingly, my appreciation to my family in Kazakhstan whose encouragement, love, understanding and patience mean more to me than they will ever know.
ABSTRACT

This study is an analysis of the historical preliminaries, current state and directions of further development of the language policy in the former Soviet and presently independent Republic of Kazakhstan. Such an analysis is of special interest for sociolinguistic theory. The uniqueness of the linguistic situation challenging contemporary Kazakhstani language policy-making consists in the fact that Kazakh, the native tongue of the ethnic majority and the de jure state language of the independent Republic of Kazakhstan, is too lexically underdeveloped to successfully compete in most of the communicative domains with Russian, the state language of Soviet Kazakhstan and the alternate present official language. Regardless of the goals (building of a multiethnic Kazakhstani nation or a multinational Kazakh state) of the nationality policy assumed by the government, the stability of interethnic communication in Kazakhstan and the success of an important (Russian) aspect of its foreign policy depend on the legislative decisions and practices aimed at the development and promotion of the Kazakh language without undermining the status of Russian or disregarding the languages of numerous ethnic minorities/nationalities.

This study attempts to conduct a diachronic and synchronic analysis of multilingualism in Kazakhstan, to trace the history of language legislation and political practices throughout the duration of existence of Russian-Kazakh diglossia, to evaluate contemporary language-related governmental efforts from the point of
view of officially formulated goals, and to identify possible directions of the policy’s further development. The findings of the investigation are presented in the form of a proposal for a strategy for future legislation and policy implementation.

The analysis is based on the results of an extensive review of four sources of literature: official documents pertaining to language policy; publications in professional journals specializing in history, linguistics, education, sociology, philosophy and politics, as well as similar publications elsewhere; articles in newspapers and magazines; and classic and contemporary fiction and editorials.

The study should serve as a demonstration of professional knowledge and masters level research skills, its end product being a contribution to the field of language planning. The final proposal is expected to serve as a "white paper" suitable for reference by Kazakhstani and other language planners, educators, politicians, journalists and academics.
This thesis is dedicated to the people of independent Kazakhstan
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

This study attempts to make a contribution to and suggest a resolution of a language-related problem faced by the newly independent Central Asian nation of Kazakhstan. The Republic of Kazakhstan was formed in 1991 as a result of the dissolution of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. One of the problems that it inherited from the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics was the problem of nation building in a multiethnic state and the related problem of language planning in the conditions of multilingualism and diglossia.

Kazakhstan is the home to people of more than 100 different nationalities and ethnicities, the biggest of which are Kazakhs (Qazaqs) 53.4%, Russians 30%, Ukrainians 3.7%, Uzbeks 2.5%, Germans 2.4%, and Uighurs 1.4% (1999 census). At the time of dissolution, most of these people felt about themselves as belonging not only to their ethnic groups, but also, as a result of continuous efforts of Soviet nationality-policy-makers, to a supra-ethnic unity of the Soviet people. In 1991, the Soviet state, which formed the foundation for the sense of common identity, disappeared from existence. Providing its culturally diverse and otherwise completely unrelated citizens with a common ground not conflicting with their national identity became one of the most important areas of concern for the
country which emerged on the territory of the former Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. The negative experience of their Soviet predecessors, especially the nationality crisis of the 1990s manifested in the high incidence of interethnic conflicts and the rise of nationalist fronts, as well as the uncontrollable wave of immigration of ethnic minorities out of the country during the first years of independence, demonstrated to Kazakhstani policy-makers the danger of disregarding the importance of nationalism in political decision-making. They seem to realize that the relative political stability in the country and the success of economic and political reforms depend on how fast the new supra-ethnic identity is cultivated. They also seem to understand the crucial role that language plays in the formation of national identity and, consequently, in the resolution of problems of cultural pluralism.

The uniqueness of the linguistic situation challenging contemporary Kazakhstani language policy makers consists in the fact that Kazakh (spoken by 64.4% of the population according to 2001 estimate), the native tongue of the ethnic majority and the de jure state language of the independent Republic of Kazakhstan, is de facto too lexically underdeveloped to successfully compete in most of the communicative domains with Russian (spoken by 95% of the population), the state language of the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan and the alternate present official language. Thus, the formation of the new common Kazakhstani identity is complicated by the necessity of the development of the state language, which is supposed to be one of the major forces of unification and which happens to be the language of ethnic majority, whose support can be easily
confused with the attempt of building a monoethnic state, a perception which counteracts the efforts of the cultivation of identity.

Purpose, Methodology, and Anticipated Results of the Study

This study has been an attempt to conduct a diachronic and synchronic analysis of multilingualism in Kazakhstan with the intention to

1) trace the history of language legislation and political practices throughout the duration of existence of Russian-Kazakh diglossia;

2) evaluate contemporary language-related government efforts from the point of view of what is desirable for success in nation building and what is officially proclaimed as a goal;

3) identify possible directions of the policy’s further development.

The findings of the investigation have resulted in a set of proposals for a strategy for future legislation and policy implementation.

The analysis is a product of an extensive review of four sources of literature:

- official documents pertaining to language planning and nationality policy;
- publications in professional domestic and international journals specializing in history, linguistics, education, sociology, philosophy and politics;
- articles in newspapers and magazines;
- classic and contemporary fiction and editorials which discuss the problem under consideration in indirect, but nevertheless valuable, ways.

The study has been organized in five parts. First, basic concepts have been defined and available findings of research on nationalism and language planning
based upon international experience have been investigated in a literature review section. Next, a diachronic analysis of the linguistic situation in Kazakhstan has been presented. This analysis is expected to serve as a source for subsequent formulation of a language-planning model optimal from the point of view of the nationality policy and conditions of the current economic environment. Further, a synchronic analysis of contemporary language-related legislation and practices has been undertaken in order to evaluate them with respect to the previously formulated model. Afterwards, an attempt has been made to identify possible directions of the policy’s future development. Finally, a set of proposals for legislators, researchers and practitioners has been suggested.

The study’s end product being a contribution to the field of language planning, the resulting set of proposals constitute a "white paper" suitable for reference by Kazakhstani and other language planners, educators, politicians, journalists and academics. If accepted and implemented, the end product is anticipated to contribute to the successful resolution of the nationalism/multilingualism problem in the republic. The accompanying insights are expected to contribute to linguistic theory by improving our general understanding of bilingualism/diglossia phenomena and language-planning practices.

Underlying Assumptions

A number of assumptions have been made at the start of this study. The first is that all sources of information used in the study are trustworthy. The second is that the existing theory accurately explains reality. The third assumption is that
language planners, researchers and practitioners in the new state, the Republic of Kazakhstan, are sincere in their desire to improve the existing linguistic situation and that in their effort they are committed to act in the interest of all the citizens of an independent Kazakhstan. The last assumption is that a set of meaningful proposals based upon a literature review rather than results of a polling experiment can be of value in the actual practice of language planning.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

The Role of Language in Nationism and Nationalism

Since multilingualism is one of the outcomes of ethnic diversity, it would be helpful for further discussion to define the notion of *ethnicity* and the related notions of *nationality* and *nation* before we proceed with the actual analysis. A widely recognized definition of the terms in relation to one another was given by Joshua Fishman (1968, 39-52). Following is a summary of Fishman’s ideas.

The notions of *ethnicity* (alternatively: *ethnic group*) and *nationality* refer to two levels of sociocultural organization. Both terms denote “a group of people who think of themselves as different from other groups.” The difference between them is determined on the basis of whether or not the group identity is localistic, i.e. whether a territorial association is necessary for the members to experience the feeling of group belonging. In this respect, ethnicity is localistic, while nationality is not (Fishman, 1968, 41-2). Thus Russian people comprise a nationality. A Russian is likely to claim his Russian national identity even when not residing in their Motherland. A small people of Chuvashia, representing one of the Russian minorities, form an ethnicity. A Chuvash is more likely to assimilate with Russians if (s)he lives away from the Chuvash Autonomous Republic.
The concept of *nation* refers to “any political-territorial unit, which is largely or increasingly under the control of a particular nationality”. An example of a nation is Spain which is under control of the Spanish nationality. Unlike a state, polity or country, a nation is necessarily independent of external control. Thus, a colony cannot be a nation. Unlike a state, it is also under control of a single nationality (Fishman, 1968, 42). For example, a state, which has been experiencing a prolonged war between two conflicting nationalities, is not a nation.

If the pairs ethnicity/nationality and nation/state are combined, they could be placed on a continuum, such that, on the one hand, there will be *multinational states* and, on the other, *multiethnic nations*. The first structure exists when “sociocultural groups in a country feel that they themselves are a nationality, who merely happen to live under someone else’s governing control”; while the second structure exists when “the members…feel that they are simultaneously citizens of the nation they live in and members of their particular group”. The two structures differ in the degree of political stability with a multiethnic nation being more stable. There is also a third possibility, one where “ethnic groups have no interest whatsoever in the country they live in, either as its loyal citizens or as an oppressor to be resisted”. If all the groups in the country with the exception of the controlling nationality were of this type, the country would be a *multiethnic nation* (Fishman, 1968, 45-7).

Language performs different and, in fact, conflicting roles in nationism and in nationalism. Nation building requires unimpeded communication, especially, in the areas of government interaction and education. It encourages the use of a single
language that everyone in a nation can understand. Nationalism, on the other hand, requires language as an important component of a group identity in the same way as it does with culture, religion and history. As such, language plays a major role in the contrastive self-identification of a nationality. In fact, a distinction between nationality and ethnicity can be based on the degree to which a group maintains and advocates the use of its language. Elimination of a language is thus dangerous for existence of a nationality, and, consequently, multinational states almost never tolerate monolingualism (Fishman, 1968, 48-51).

**Multilingualism as a Problem and as a Resource**

Multilingualism can serve both as a problem and a resource in nation-building and nationality policy.

Ralph Fasold enumerates a number of problems that multilingualism poses for nationalism (Fasold, 1-34). The most straightforward one is difficulty in communication that can act as an impediment to commerce and industry and can be socially disruptive. A subtler problem with multilingualism is that it acts against nationalism. Given the importance of language for nationalism, it is more difficult for multilingual states than for monolingual ones to develop a sense of common group identity. For such a sense to be formed, a multilingual state either has to attempt to develop a national language or try to develop a group identity on a ground other than language. The former route leads immediately to the problem of selecting the national language, promoting its acceptance by those who are not its native speakers, and, often, developing the language itself so that it could appropriately serve the needs of the state (Fasold, 4).
The problems posed for nationism are pragmatic rather than symbolic in character. As a result, a solution to a nationalist problem may create a nationist problem. Fasold explains the discrepancy with an example of a choice of language of government communication for a former colony. He reasons that …on pragmatic grounds, the best immediate choice for the language of government in a newly independent colony might be the old colonial language. The colonial governing institutions and records are already in place in that language and those nationals with the most government experience already know it. But the colonial language is usually a terrible choice on national grounds. For a nationality, which has just acquired its own geographical territory, the last language it would want as a national symbol would be the language of the state that had denied it territorial control. (Fasold, 4)

He also mentions the existence of a similar discrepancy for the language of education. On practical grounds, the best strategy is to use the languages of the various ethnic groups, which serve as the children’s mother tongues. However, when children receive education in their ethnic languages, “these may increase in importance and become symbols of contra national nationalism” (Fasold, 5).

Multilingualism can be also seen as a resource. First of all, it can be a temporary solution to a nationist-nationalist problem, if during the transition to a new official language the previously colonial (for nationist reasons) and the national tongue (for nationalist reasons) are used simultaneously. In education, the conflict between using ethnic languages as media of instruction for nationists
reasons of efficiency versus using the national language for nationalist reasons of unity can be resolved by using the ethnic languages for initial instruction and the national language for advanced education. At the individual level, multilingualism provides a multilingual speaker with a greater variety of interactional resources whose use is differentiated by communicative situations. In addition, societal multilingualism can contribute to a more dynamic society with a multiplicity of life-styles and worldviews (Fasold, 8-9).

Taking the problems and advantages suggested by multilingualism, one can conclude that an ideal multilingual society is “a multiethnic nation where sociocultural groups are aware of their cultural and linguistic identity at the local level, but still consider themselves part of the nation as a whole” (Fasold, p.9).

Diglossia

As has been mentioned before, in the situation of societal multilingualism the participating languages are often assigned different communicative functions. The distribution of communicative roles between several languages in a particular society is referred to as *diglossia*. The concept of diglossia was first proposed by Charles Ferguson in 1959 (1972, 232-50) and was further developed by Joshua Fishman (1967, 29-38) and Ralph Fasold (1985, 1-37).

Ferguson defined diglossia as

… a relatively stable linguistic situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically
more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation. (Ferguson, 1972, 245)

He called the codified variety High (H) and the primary dialects-Low (L).

Below is a more detailed explanation of the differences between the two:

1) **function**—the functions of H are formal and guarded; those calling for L are informal, homey and relaxed;

2) **prestige**—H is believed to be superior, more elegant and logical; L is treated as inferior to the point that its existence is denied;

3) **literary heritage**—H serves as a language of literature which is much admired as either inherited from the past or continuing the heritage in the present;

4) **acquisition**—L is used to speak to children and by children among themselves, and, as a result, it is learned in an unconscious way; H is acquired by formal teaching at school much in the fashion of foreign language acquisition in terms of the amount of conscious effort and memorization;

5) **standardization**—H is standardized and all the grammars and dictionaries are written for it, rather than for L;

6) **stability**—H is more stable than L and is often perceived as more archaic than L; tension between a more dynamically developing L and
the conservative H is resolved by the emergence of an intermediate form of language, which has features of both;

7) **grammar** – based on an intuitive notion of ‘simplicity’ in grammar, the grammar of L is simpler than the grammar of H; the difference can be manifested in the number of grammatical categories, in the complexity of syntax and etc;

8) **lexicon** – H lexicon contains more technical terms and other learned words, while L lexicon is full of words for homey objects; often for some of the words in L lexicon there exists a correspondence in the H lexicon;

9) **phonology** – L phonology is a basic system; H phonology is either a subsystem or a parasystem. (Ferguson, 1972, 246-8)

Diglossia can remain stable for a long time. Under certain conditions, though, it can become unstable. This instability can be increased by the spread of literacy and broader communication throughout the country. These two factors may lead to a blurring of the linguistic distinctions between H and L. A third factor is the development of nationalism based on a national language as its symbol (Ferguson, 1972, 250).

Ferguson’s original definition of diglossia was later revised and expanded by Fishman. Fishman modified the classical definition in two ways. First, he expanded the phenomena covered to situations with more than two linguistic varieties (Fishman, 1967, 35). Second, he claimed that “diglossia exists not only in multilingual societies which officially recognize several 'languages', or societies that utilize vernacular and classical varieties, but also in societies which employ
separate dialects, registers, or functionally differentiated language varieties of whatever kind" (1972, 91-100). In addition, he investigated the relationship between individual bilingualism and diglossia with the result being represented as a typology of bilingualism/diglossia combinations:

1) *both diglossia and bilingualism*—a situation when almost everyone in the community knows both H and L, and the two varieties are distributed in a manner typical of diglossia;

2) *diglossia without bilingualism*—a situation when there exist two disjunct groups within a single political, religious, and/or economic entity; one is a ruling group who speaks only the H language, the other, normally a larger group, has no power in the society and speaks exclusively the L language;

3) *bilingualism without diglossia*—refers to communities with a large number of bilingual individuals, but where there is no functional distinction between language varieties;

4) *neither bilingualism nor diglossia*—a hypothetical situation when a small linguistically isolated community does not have any sort of functional differentiation or societal bilingualism.

Out of the four combinations, the only stable one is diglossia with bilingualism (Fishman, 1967, 29-38).

Fasold expanded Fishman’s ideas even further. First, he argued that there could exist several diglossic communities sharing the same H (see Figure 1), thus
explaining the relationship between diglossia and standard vs. dialect variation (Fasold, 44).

He also resolved the problem of binarity in Fishman’s and Ferguson’s definitions by explaining multi-language differentiation with the existence of essentially binary *double overlapping* and *double-nested* diglossias. The first type of diglossia refers to the intersection of diglossic situations (*see Figure 2*).
Figure 1  *Speech communities sharing the same H but distinguished by different Ls. Squares represent separate diglossic communities. (Fasold, 44)*

Figure 2  *Double overlapping diglossia in Tanzania (English is colonial lingua franca, Swahili is the national language). (Fasold, 45)*
Double-nested diglossia refers to a situation of existence of “little diglossias” within the “big diglossia” (see Figure 3).

The suggested types of diglossia do not require anything more than a refinement of the concept of binarity. In one case, there are two sets of two, the L of one set being the same as the H of the other. In the other case, there is a large diglossic pair, within each member of which there is a more refined diglossic distribution. In both cases, the combinations are binary sets. However, Fasold also identified one non-binary situation of linear polyglossia in which several language varieties are involved with the L form of any of the languages being ‘higher’ than the H form of the next language in the series (see Figure 4) (Fasold, 46-8).
Double-nested diglossia in Khalapur, India (Hindi is the formal national language, Khalapur is a local dialect. There are low—conversational Hindi and Motī bolī Khalapur, and high—Oratorical Hindi and Saf bolī Khalapur, varieties within both languages; so that the high/low within each of the languages is nested within high/low between Hindi and Khalapur). (Fasold, p. 48)
Figure 4  
Linear polyglossia for English-educated Malaysian Chinese. The vertical arrows between the two Highs are intended to indicate that Bahasa Malaysia is gaining ground at the expense of English as the ‘higher’ High. Mandarin is a high variant of Chinese. Bahasa is a high variant of Malay. Bazaar Malay is a low variant. (Fasold, 50)
One other problem that Fasold tried to resolve was the question of the degree of relatedness between the language forms participating in diglossia. As a result of analysis of a number of multilingual linguistic communities, he came to the conclusion that

…people have a universal tendency to reflect their perception of the intimacy or formality of a situation in their speech. This may be done by means of subtle stylistic shifts within the same language, by switching between two moderately distinct ‘dialects’, or by selecting entirely different languages. The social phenomenon is the same, regardless of the nature of the linguistic means used to accomplish it. (Fasold, 52)

His conclusion led to the necessity of expanding the notion of diglossia to include not only separate languages, but style-shifting and other functional variations as well. In addition, his conclusion made it clear that since style-shifting involves the whole set of varying linguistic alternatives from colloquial to formal, it cannot be represented in a binary form and, consequently, binarity cannot be an absolute attribute of diglossia (Fasold, 50-2).

Finally, Fasold also contributed to the understanding of diglossic stability by identifying the role of functional specialization and formal distinctiveness between H and L. Agreeing with Ferguson about relative stability of functional specialization, Fasold indicated that while some overlap between functions is possible, a high degree of overlap is usually a sign of the incipient breakdown of
the diglossic relationship (Fasold, 52). In general, Fasold identifies two characteristics of changing diglossia: 1) *leakage* in function; 2) *mixing* in form. (Fasold, 55)

On the basis of his additions and corrections, Fasold suggests a definition of *broad diglossia* that will be used in further analysis:

Broad diglossia is the reservation of highly valued segments of a community’s linguistic repertoire (which are not the first to be learned, but are learned later and more consciously, usually through formal education), for situations perceived as more formal and guarded; and the reservation of less highly valued segments (which are learned first with little or no conscious effort), of any degree of linguistic relatedness to the higher valued segments, from stylistic differences to separate languages, for situations perceived as more informal and intimate. (Fasold, 53)

Fasold then determines the place of the classic definition of diglossia in his conceptual framework by identifying three types of broad diglossia:

1) *classic diglossia*, which exists whenever divergent dialects can be found;

2) *superposed bilingualism*, which refers to functional differentiation of separate languages;

3) *style shifting*, which takes place in the case of stylistic differences between varieties. (Fasold, p.54)
Language Maintenance and Shift

One of the ways to characterize the stability of diglossia is with the help of the concepts of *language maintenance* and *language shift*. Language maintenance refers to the stable preference of the speakers of a language community for the use of a particular language as the main means of communication. Language shift refers to a change in language as the main means of communication. The concept of language shift serves to identify a change in language attitudes at the societal level, when the members of a community have collectively chosen a new language as a means of communication. One special case of language shift is called *language death*. It takes place when a community consisting of the last surviving native speakers of a language shifts to a new language totally so that the old language is no longer used (Fasold, 213).

There are a number of important conditions associated with language shift that will be useful in our subsequent discussion of the language situation in Kazakhstan. A necessary condition is presence of societal bilingualism. Bilingualism, however, is not a sufficient condition. The second condition is existence of bilingualism during several generations: in almost all cases, societal language shift comes about through intergenerational switching (Lieberson, 11-29). Language shift is also typically attributed to such causes as migration, industrialization, urbanization, educational and other government pressures, decline in speaker population, and changes in language prestige (Fasold, 217).
Language Planning and Standardization

Since the focus of our discussion is language policy, it might be beneficial to define some basic concepts connected with policy making in the domain of language.

One such basic concept is language planning, which means an explicit choice among alternative languages, design of a program that would allow a shift to occur in the direction of the chosen alternative and subsequent evaluation of the program in relation to the previously existing situation.

Bjorn Jernudd mentioned two aspects of language planning: language determination and language development (16-7). Language determination refers to 'large-chunk' choices of languages that need to be used for specific purposes (official language, language of instruction, etc). Language development refers to the promotion of variants within a language.

The most important language determination issue around the world is the choice of national languages. The choice is determined by a set of functions that a national language is expected to fulfill. The most important of the functions mentioned in the available literature include:

1) symbolic (separatist+unifying), which, in fact, defines a nation as a social entity, prevents a nation from falling apart by maintaining the common identity of all the citizens of the nation (unifying function) which is distinct from identities of other nations of the world (separatist function);
2) *communicative*, which provides for effective interaction between citizens of a nation, a condition essential for success of the nation as a whole;

3) *participatory*, which allows a nation to remain an integral part of the world community. (Haugen, 1966, 50-71; cf. Jernudd and Das Gupta; Garvin and Mathiot, 1973)

An ideal national language should be able to fulfill all the three functions, although not every language is capable of doing this. In order to be capable of serving as an effective means of communication, a national language should have a sufficient set of varieties to reflect any aspect of the nation’s life. To serve in the participatory function, it should have a certain number of speakers around the world and have the status of a language of international communication. As a symbol, the language should have a recognized status based upon its historical and present functionality as a means of intra-national and international communication.

Of the three functions, the symbolic one is the most important. The other two can be fulfilled by other languages of a special status. Such functional differentiation is usually temporary. Because the symbolic function is directly related to the status of a language and the other functions -- to the ability of the language to fulfill the communicative and the participatory functions, there is a general tendency for nations to fortify their identity by facilitating the development of their national language in order to increase its functionality and, consequently, its status.
Ferguson identified 3 forms of language development:

1) *graphization*, i.e. adoption of a writing system and the establishment of spelling and other orthographic conventions, such as capitalization and punctuation;

2) *standardization*, i.e. ‘the process of one variety of a language becoming widely accepted throughout the speech community as a supra-dialectal norm – the "best" form of the language – rated above regional and social dialects;’

3) *modernization*, i.e. ‘the process of...becoming the equal of other developed languages as a medium of communication’. (Ferguson, 1968, 27-36)

By modernization, Ferguson meant first of all expansion of vocabulary and "development of new styles and forms of discourse" (Ferguson, 1968, 32).

Analyzing Ferguson’s interpretation of vocabulary expansion, Fasold makes a comment that will be useful for our further discussion of the situation in Kazakhstan:

…as far as vocabulary expansion goes, it does not matter much to the linguist whether the new vocabulary comes from some other language (by borrowing) or whether it is made up of elements already in the language. However, borrowing versus coinage often becomes an emotional issue in actual practice. Not infrequently, a planning agency will attempt to ‘purify’ the language by replacing borrowing with newly coined words. As long as
coinage does not conflict with what members of the society are prepared to do, it works out well… When loanwords are already in regular use by speakers and writers, however, an attempt to purge them will probably fail. (Fasold, 249)

Ferguson’s examples of “new forms of discourse” included “paragraphing, ordered sequences, transitions, summaries, cross-references, etc.” Fasold correctly explains that what Ferguson meant by “the development of new styles of discourse” was not grammatical intellectualization, i.e. “development of word formation techniques and syntactic devices allowing for the construction of elaborate, yet tightly knit, compound sentences” (Garvin and Mathiot, 1973, 24-73) but rather “acquisition of skill in the use of linguistic resources that a language probably already has” (Fasold, 249).

Although the most recognized and powerful (not necessarily successful) planning agency is government, most sociolinguists (Haugen; Ray; Rubin, 1973) agree that planning can be conducted by almost anybody. Fasold gives several examples of non-government planning:

1) The decision by the Roman Catholic Church in the 1960s to, which allowed the use of vernacular languages in place of Latin, and the revision in liturgical language in the Church of England in 1980s;

2) Decision-making on proper use of a language performed by language academies in some countries;

3) Dictionary compiling efforts of Samuel Johnson and Noah Webster which resulted in standardization of the meanings and spellings of
words in the English speaking countries;

4) Language-use decisions made by translators and publishers during the early days of printing – these decisions set precedents of what was considered appropriate for some time thereafter;

5) Orthography-related decisions of missionaries when they attempt to translate the Bible into unwritten languages;

6) National non-government agencies, such as the Singapore Chamber of Commerce, which constructed and issued language examinations and a style manual for business correspondence in Malay;

7) Individual businesses, such as the Shell Company, which provided its own Malay oil terminology and influences language development in its personnel and training policies;

8) Contemporary editors who help to implement government’s standardization decisions in practical ways by disseminating newly adopted rules in proofread texts;

9) Individual authors, writers and even after-dinner speakers, who disseminate the rules by means of their influence;

10) Individual managers, who impose a certain procedure for correspondence in their office, thus affecting language-planning on a smaller scale. (Fasold, 246-66)

These examples support the conclusion made by Ray:

…any formal organized action by an acknowledged authority, such as a State or a Church or a learned society or an author, can be successful in
its intention to encourage or discourage linguistic habits only if it correlates maximally to informal unorganized action on the part of numerous locally more accessible authorities. (Ray, 764)

Rubin outlined the four steps of the planning process:

1) *Fact-finding*: a substantial amount of background information should be available before any planning decisions are made;

2) *Planning*: here the actual decisions are made; “The planner will establish goals, select the means (strategies), and predict the outcome”;

3) *Implementation*: the planning decisions are carried out;

4) *Feedback*: at this step, the planner finds out how well the plan has worked. (Rubin, 1971, 218-220)

Fasold also mentions the main tools that a government can use in language planning decisions. These include

1) *Educational system*, where the ways range from teaching the language in accordance with the newly introduced orthographic innovations to offering the language as a school subject, using it as a medium of instruction or even imposing on children the requirement to use the language in school;

2) *Government agencies*, where knowledge of the national language can be a requirement for employment (introduction of such a requirement can have a positive impact on language development in two cases:

a) when civil service employment is extremely prestigious and the status
connected with it is a significant motivating factor for learning the language, and b) when the language is used in legislation and government-related documentation);

3) Military, which can be extremely important if the country has universal conscription;

4) Print and media, which can be either forced (if the regime is authoritarian) or subsidized/exempted from taxation to publish or broadcast in the national language. (Fasold, 253)

Non-government agencies that may participate in language-planning and their typical methods are:

1) Professional societies that can issue official terminology lists as guides to their members;

2) Businesses that have an effect on language planning by their personnel and training practices;

3) Political and cultural organizations and societies that offer public courses and cultural events aimed at preservation and popularization of the national language. (Fasold, 253)

Finally, Fasold also mentions the role of an individual speaker of the national language. Specifically, he claims that an active role can be assumed by writers or filmmakers, who choose to create in the national language, thus encouraging their viewers or readers to learn the language. Even an ordinary citizen can potentially participate in language planning by refusing to communicate with other citizens in a language other than the national one. Fasold gives an interesting example of a
Welsh speaker, who “would speak slowly, but require the other person to reply on whatever competence in Welsh he had” (Fasold, 254).

Haugen has proposed three criteria for language planning. These are:

1) *efficiency*, or ease of learning and use;

2) *adequacy*, the ability of a form to convey information with the desired degree of precision;

3) *acceptability*, the degree of acceptance by the members of the society where the planning is taking place. (Haugen, 61-3)

Of the three, the last one is usually disregarded despite the fact that it is extremely important if the language is to fulfill its symbolic function. No matter how “easy to learn and use” a language might be, it will never become widely used if the speakers experience aversion to it. At the same time, absence of aversion is not sufficient for speakers to willingly switch from one language to another. The transition should be adequate for the purposes they have in mind (Fasold, 257).
CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL PRELIMINARIES

The questions addressed in the analysis of the historical preliminaries of the linguistic situation in contemporary Kazakhstan are as follows:

a) When did recognized Russian/Kazakh diglossia and societal bilingualism emerge?

b) How did their character change over time?

c) How did they affect and how were they affected by the dynamics of interethnic communication?

d) When did language shift occur and in which directions?

e) How did language shift result from and in turn cause a change in ethnic and national identities?

f) How did nationality and language policies became transformed in the context of mainstream political ideology?

Colonial Period: Emergence of Diglossia

Overview of the Colonial Period

The question about the first appearance of diglossia is very difficult to answer. The extent of diglossia remained rather limited even at the eve of the Socialist Revolution, however, by the end of the colonial period there had emerged at least one domain reserved exclusively for Russian—the domain of the official colonial
legislation and government communication--to claim the existence of diglossia. Therefore, it would not be a mistake to refer to the colonial period as *the period of emerging diglossia*.

Early diglossia was not accompanied by societal bilingualism because serving primarily as the language of written communication in the proceedings of the colonial apparatus, Russian assumed the functions which had never been fulfilled by Kazakh and which were barely necessary in everyday communication of the culturally unassimilated Kazakh masses. Therefore, the knowledge of Russian was necessary only for those few who worked for the colonial bureaucracy.

Because nationalism evolved only towards the end of the colonial period, the czarist administration never implemented a direct and conscious nationality or language policy, i.e. policy based upon an understanding of the importance of an interethnic dynamics and distribution of language statuses for societal stability and directed towards modification of dynamics and distribution of status. Political acts related to language development and resolution of interethnic conflicts were often no more than an aspect of general economic and social legislation as well as of related administrative reforms. Education and human-resource policy in the bureaucratic system were the main spheres for implementation of language-related initiatives.

Most of the recognized researchers in nationality and language policy issues in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union consider the pre-revolutionary period as non-discrete. In the specific case of Kazakhstan, however, when focusing on the language planning aspect of nationality policy, it might be reasonable to
distinguish between two stages, each characterized by a specific type of socio-economic structure, a form of power distribution, interethnic dynamics, functional assignment between the two languages under consideration and corresponding language policy approaches. Following is a discussion of the two stages in detail. Keep in mind that this division is artificial and the actual transition from one type of language policy to another, as well as the modification of functional assignment between the languages, occurred as a continuous process. The suggested division into periods might not be perfectly accurate, but its accuracy is hoped to be sufficient for identification of the language planning approaches that would reappear later during the times of emergence of Soviet multilingualism.

**Early Colonial Period**

The first period started in 1731, the year when Abulkhair Khan, the head of one of the three Kazakh tribal unions (zhuzes), accepted the terms of joining Russia. It lasted till the end of the third quarter of the 19th century, when the 150-year-long process of annexation was completed and most of the colonial administrative apparatus was put into place. In its turn, the period was divided into two more stages, which I will further refer to as the onset and the end (see Olcott, 1995, 28-57).

At the onset of the process, the new colony was viewed mainly as a fortification line to protect the southern borders of the Empire. Although Russians realized the potential role of the steppe as the gate to Central Asia, since they were still at the stage of feudalism, they had neither significant economic interests
in the newly annexed lands nor political power to directly influence Kazakhs’
internal affairs (see Olcott, 1995, 28-57).

In their turn, the Kazakh khans who were the first to accept the Russian
protectorate viewed their agreement with the czar as a way to increase their
political authority over the tribes under their rule, as well as to protect their people
from Dzhungars, the war with whom had turned unsuccessful for the declining
Kazakh Zhuzes. So the alliance took the shape of semi-dependency, with the
Russian administration promising military and political support in return for the
right to establish fortifications along the border, for the provisions of the
traditional caravan escort for Russian merchants by Kazakh militia, for the benefit
of natural exchange of agricultural for nomadic products, as well as for the
advantage to have a word in external policy decisions (see Olcott, 1995, 28-57).

By the beginning of annexation, neither of the peoples had developed into a
nationality. Russians, although already centralized and perceiving themselves as
distinct from other culturally and linguistically related Slavic tribes, were only
entering the epoch of imperialist capitalism, which would lead to the decline of the
traditional family and natural economy that kept their ethnos from becoming a less
localist nationality (Kan, 35-8).

Kazakhs had also developed an ethnic identity that allowed them to
distinguish themselves from other Turkic peoples, except for, perhaps, closely
related nomadic Kyrgyz. Although Kazakhs Zhuzes were disintegrated at the point
of annexation, Kazakhs had experienced unification under a single ruler before.
This experience created a precedent for the rise of nationalism under a colonial regime later in the 19th century. Unfortunately, the criterion of localism as a determinant of nationality status is barely applicable in case of nomadic Kazakhs. However, the sustaining importance of tribal affiliation required by the nature of nomadic economy might serve as a proof that by 1731 Kazakhs had not yet developed a sufficient level of individualism to rise above the level of kinship affiliation and had not yet acquired a strong collective supra-tribal identity (if strength is determined by awareness not only in the times of external threat, but during the times of political stability and economic prosperity, too) to qualify as a nationality (see Tynyshpayev, 78-123).

None of the states had evolved into a nation. Russia could not be a nation dominated by Russian nationality because the latter was virtually nonexistent. It could hardly be claimed to have evolve into a nation unified on grounds other than ethnic affiliation because, under conditions of territorial isolation characteristic of feudalism, such unification was simply unnecessary. Even if such unification had been in any least needed, it would have had poor chances of success, with the indigenous peoples of the colonies being still powerful enough to resist any sort of cultural assimilation.

A much more important necessity was to keep the newly colonized people loyal to the Russian czar and willing to remain a part of the empire. As long as such loyalty was in place, Russians did not care whether the peoples prayed to the same god or spoke the same language. To fulfill their task, the imperial administration used different approaches with each of the colonized peoples,
trying to be sensitive to unique cultural characteristics and individual interests, since it was engaged in increasing its influence and the colonies’ dependence. The sum of these differentiating culture-sensitive approaches, aimed at maintaining loyalty to the state rather than to the Russian culture, targeting the establishment of political influence rather than at the formation of group identity can be treated as a precedent of the 20th century nationality policy approach of Sovietization (Tynyshpayev, 78-123).

In the case of Kazakhstan, the approach consisted in keeping nomadic tribes motivated to stay under Russian rule, to attract new members from the steppe and to increase czarist influence and presence in the life of nomads. This was done by playing on their intertribal conflicts, by bribing the khans, and, simultaneously, by encouraging migration from the Russian territories to the imperial periphery, as well as by building military forts for presumably common security purposes. The Kazakh identity remained largely intact. No attempts to ingrain an idea of unity with either Russians or other ethnicities of the empire were undertaken (see Tynyshpayev, 78-123).

The semi-dependent Kazakhs had not yet formed a nation, either. Because of nomadism and strong tribal affiliation, the Kazakh khanate was only relatively stable at the beginning of annexation with a higher degree of inter-tribal mobilization taking place during the times of external threats and availability of strong leadership. Therefore, although it was ethnically homogeneous, a national idea had never become a basis for political unification because of the lack of necessity in such an idea for the confederation of the relatively autonomous
nomadic tribes (see Tynyshpayev, 98-115).

Hence at the beginning of annexation, Kazakh tribes lost autonomy only in the sphere of external policy, and economic and cultural assimilation had not yet achieved a pace destructive to Kazakh ethnic identity; no tensions on ethnic grounds took place (see Tynyshpayev, 98-115).

Under these circumstances, a special form of diglossia had evolved. The functional roles of Russian and Kazakh had not changed within their usual domains, i.e. Kazakh was used in all spheres of communication among Kazakhs, while Russian was used as a language of communication among Russians, and increasingly, as the official language of the emerging Russian Empire.

Designation of Russian as the language of official communication was not accidental. On the one hand, it had a long written literary tradition history. Kazakh had such a tradition, too, but writing was used mainly in religious discourse with most of the regulations concerning internal affairs being preserved in the format of orally described traditions and practices. In general, introduction of regulations in the steppe was often a consequence of sufficient occurrences of a certain problem, so Kazakhs were not concerned about the pro-active Russian ordinances themselves, or about the language in which they were compiled, until the ordinances started to have a direct effect upon their lives. On the other hand, the dominance of Russian in discourse related to affairs external to the life of Kazakh tribes can be explained by the nature of the Kazakh-Russian partnership in general. Kazakhs agreed upon the use of Russian as the language of official communication when they signed the contracts delegating their right for decision
making in foreign policy to the czarist administration (Asfendiyarov, 157-9).

Bilingualism was still at the individual level with most of communication in trade and political discourse taking place by means of non-native interpreters. The only change that happened was activation of official communication between Russian and Kazakh speakers with Russian being assigned the formal role of the language of documentation.

There was one conscious effort that could be viewed as a manifestation of ethnic sensitivity: the preference given by the czarist administration to Tatar interpreters. These interpreters were close to Kazakhs in language and culture, a circumstance perceived as conductive to the formation of the desired loyalty to the czar (see Asfendiyarov, 168-177).

Thus, at the onset of the first period, diglossia was a formal rather than an actual state of affairs with czarist legislative documents passed by the central colonial administration and compiled in Russian and translated into Kazakh later by non-native interpreters. Bilingualism was primarily at the individual level and was rare among the indigenous population. Interethnic communication was rather stable, mostly because the two peoples were relatively isolated from each other. At the same time, the Russian administration had not yet developed sufficient interest and presence in the steppe to be able to conduct a policy completely insensitive to the interests of the Kazakh population. Therefore, some cultural and linguistic sensitivities were an integral part of the efforts in the direction of military and economic expansion.
This relative stability lasted for only about 25 years, during which Russians were building a line of military forts and cities all along the border of the steppe. Towards the end of the first period, the increase of military presence changed the balance of power between Russians and Kazakhs. This change allowed the czarist administration to continue expansion, acting against the interests of the indigenous population by imposing official restrictions on the use of lands by Kazakhs and persecuting any attempts of Kazakhs not to comply. The loss of lands caused the first wave of dissatisfaction among Kazakhs, which motivated them to join peasant wars initiated by the Russian poor and to organize their own anticolonial upheavals in the last quarter of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries (see Asfendiyarov, 228-56).

From 1820 to the 1860s, the czarist administration conducted a number of administrative reforms that targeted political independence for Kazakh rulers. The reforms started with elimination of the institute of the khanate and ended with the installation of a colonial bureaucratic apparatus where all the key roles were occupied by ethnic Russians or by specially trained Kazakh nobility enculturated into Russian values and committed to czarism. These reforms were conducted gradually, in several steps, but each of them was nevertheless immediately followed by an increase in anti-Russian and separatist moods among Kazakhs, which again demonstrated that the actions of the Russian administration were now in conflict with the interests of the indigenous population.

During the second half of the first period, incipient diglossia moved from the potential into a consciously actualized state. This situation happened primarily
because of the increase in interference of czarism into internal affairs of Kazakhs, resulting in Russian assuming some functions previously fulfilled by Kazakh in the sphere of administrative communication. In addition, the colonial authorities became more suspicious of Tatar translators, who pursued their own purposes in the steppe, proselytizing for Islam, which was now perceived as alienating Kazakhs from Russia. The concerned czarist administration started to make some efforts in nurturing a class of native nobility, devoted to the colonial system and enculturated into Russian values. As a consequence, Russian was being increasingly used not only for documentation, but also for oral political debate, since both Russian and designated Kazakh participants could speak the language. Bilingualism still remained at the individual level, although now there were more bilingual indigenous interpreters (see Tynyshpayev, 113-124).

Towards the end of the first period, diglossia, although restricted, became more widely spread with Russian being increasingly used in the sphere of official communication. Although bilingualism still occurred at the individual level, it was now more widespread among the native population. Interethnic communication became charged with some sense of intolerance of the ethnicities towards each other. This intolerance, however, was intertwined with dissatisfaction with the colonial policy and would often resolve into manifestations of protest against czarism together with the Russian peasantry and the exploited masses of other peoples in the empire. Nationality and language policy per se were still non-existent. Moreover, with the change in power distribution, the czarist administration became less sensitive to the interests of the southern colony. Even
in the attempt to train native rather than Tatar bureaucracy, it acted out of its own interests rather than out of the interests of the local population (see Tynyshpayev, 113-124).

In general, the first period was characterized by diglossia restricted to the domain of official communication with Russian and Kazakh used interchangeably in economic spheres (trade). Bilingualism was still at the individual level within a small circle of native individuals serving colonial administration. Language policy at this stage was an integral part of administrative system reform rather than a rubric of a nationality policy consisting of a conscious effort to modify functional assignment between languages with the intent to affect group cohesiveness.

**Late Colonial Period**

The second period started in the last quarter of the 19th century, when the end to the continuous process of annexation was accomplished by the conquest of the Senior Zhuz and the rest of Central Asia and by the establishment of a functional colonial apparatus which distanced Kazakhs from decision making in both external and internal affairs. It lasted till the fall of the Czarist Empire in 1917, when the nations and languages suddenly lost the statuses and roles that they had acquired under the imperial system and a new system of roles and statuses came into existence (see Olcott, 1995, 35-57).

By the middle of the 18th century, the interests and powers of both interacting sides--Russia and Kazakhstan--had changed. Russia was rapidly joining the international race for industrialization, its plants and factories, as well as
commercialized agriculture, demanding new material, land and human resources. Czarist administration was no longer satisfied with indirect influence on internal affairs of Kazakhs. Having increased military presence and finalizing administrative reforms, it now had enough power to dictate its will and to handle any sort of resistance (see Olcott, 1995, 57-83).

Kazakhs, on the other hand, had been weakened as a result of the systematic “divide and conquer” policy of czarism and the decline of traditional economy as a consequence of land loss and restrictions on relocation imposed by the colonial administration. The relationship of limited autonomy (protectorate) was replaced by total colonial dependence with Kazakhs being completely incorporated into the larger Empire, treated similarly to the Russian masses in implementation of economic and social reforms and even participating in anticolonial upheavals together with the population of other colonies, as well as in peasant and worker riots in Russian villages and towns (see Asfendiyarov, 225-9).

Towards the end of the 19th century, both peoples had also started to develop a feeling of national identity. In the case of the Russians, the weakening of the parochial family and the rise of both international and country-level markets triggered the formation of identity, by the development of infrastructure and new means of communication that allowed group identity to rise above the local level (see Tynyshpayev, 150-67).

In the case of the Kazakhs, nationalist aspirations were primarily a direct outcome of a century-long experience of anticolonial movement, which, as Russian influence and Kazakh powerlessness increased over time, was becoming
more and more organized and separatist in nature, thus contributing to the formation of a strong non-localist supra-tribal identity. Another factor that contributed to the formation of national identity was the weakening of tribal ties, partially as a result of the relocation restrictions imposed by the colonial administration. Some of the restrictions were introduced directly by issuing ordinances prohibiting Kazakhs to use lands designated for military fortresses and the use of Russian peasants (see Olcott, 1995, 57-83).

In the second half of the 19th century, such restrictions were imposed indirectly by the division into administrative territories without regard to traditional distribution of pastures between the tribes. In any case, the lack of lands made Kazakhs change the patterns of land use and became involved in more frequent intertribal interactions (see Olcott, 1995, 57-83).

Another contributor to the weakening of tribal affiliation was the development of a capitalist economy. With the example of Russian landowners the profitability of trade was evident for the increasingly impoverished as a result of land-deprivation Kazakhs. Therefore, while the less powerful majority of them were turning into an easily available and cheap agricultural workforce, the financially able ones became motivated to adopt capitalist principles of organization for stock-breeding and, in some places, of irrigated agriculture. These principles included production not only for the purposes of satisfaction of their own needs, but mostly for subsequent sale, as well as the use of out-of-tribe employees in increasing numbers (see Tynyshpayev, 156-9).
These moves led to changes in the social structure of Kazakh society, which in its turn influenced the internal organization of the people. In addition, they resulted in the formation of nomadic and agricultural units on the basis of social status rather than kinship. This process of the loosening of the kinship unit was accompanied with some growth in the percentage of the urban population of Kazakhs, as well as with the appearance of the new social class of industrial workers among the previously nomadic population. The sum of all the processes produced a formation of group identity on grounds other than kinship affiliation, and that is why it would be correct to claim the rise of nationalism developed among Kazakhs during this period. The nationalist character of the anticolonial war under the leadership of Kenesary Kasymov and, even more so, the national-liberating war of 1916, which unified Kazakhs from all parts of the steppe and which were motivated by the desire of re-creating an independent Kazakh state, are the best evidence of the fact that by the end of the colonial period Kazakhs had developed a strong national identity (see Olcott, 1995, 100-129).

Despite the formation of the Russian nationality and the amount of power that it exercised in comparison with the peoples populating its numerous colonies, the process of nation-formation had not yet been completed. Any attempt to implement anything undermining the interests of existing ethnic and emerging national minorities and potentially leading to the formation of a nation under the political control of Russians was destined to face a fierce protest. The possibility of unification on grounds other than ethnicity had not been discussed in Russian educated circles preoccupied with disputes either about the ways to preserve the
traditional way of life or about the fastest ways of adopting the progressive European innovations (see Tynyshpayev, 1995, 117-123).

Although no direct nationality policy had yet emerged, the character of the human resource strategy of the colonial apparatus, which had been previously charged with some ethnic sensitivity, was undergoing more changes. At a first glance, the strategy was still the same: the colonial administration was putting much effort into educating a Russian-speaking native bureaucracy. The motives behind the strategy, however, had transformed. If before the Russian-language endorsement had been conducted with the purpose of maintaining the sensitivity of the administration to the interests of the indigenous population, now the main reason was connected with a desire to use this influential part of the native population for dissemination of Russian values (see Asfendiyarov, 265-89). What showed the change in orientation of the emerging nationality policy was the growing intolerance of the Russian administration towards the alternative Tatar schools, where Kazakh students received Russian language instruction, but where the latter was accompanied with indoctrination into Islamic and anti-Russian values. Further evidence was the hasty attempt to transform the Arabic-based Kazakh alphabet into its Cyrillic counterpart with the underlying desire to get rid of the influence from the East. This strategy was a precursor of what researchers in Soviet nationalism call the policy of Russification (see Tynyshpayev, 167-89).

As for the dynamics of interethnic communication, it would be reasonable to claim that intensification of conflicts on nationalist grounds caused by the growth
in national self-awareness of both the Kazakh and the Russian peoples, as well as the low level of cultural sensitivity of colonial policy-making, were the main reasons for the Kazakh popular masses to join the Bolsheviks’ movement against Czarism in 1917 (see Olcott, 1995, 100-129).

The development of capitalism accompanied by the growth in intercultural communication both increased the extent and changed the character of the functional assignment of domains between Russian and Kazakh. Russian was now dominant not only in the sphere of official communication, it was increasingly becoming the language of scientific research. If in the areas of business and commerce both languages were still being used interchangeably because both Russian and Kazakh sides expressed interest in development of the domains, the growing scientific intercourse encouraged primarily by the czarist administration was gradually switching from Oriental languages to Russian. It is not that czarism was willing to invest money into the development of Kazakh science, but the growth in popularity of secular education made more Kazakh nobility send their offspring to secular Russian rather than to traditional Moslem schools. The young intelligentsia, being brought up on the values of the European civilization, and striving to obtain recognition among the Russian scientific circles, would choose Russian as the language for their scientific works, even when their works were connected with the exploration of Kazakh land, culture and natural resources (see Asfendiyarov, 245-67).

As in the case of diglossia in the first period, diglossia in the second period of colonization was rather restricted. The scientific domain had never been
dominated by the Kazakhs, and with scientific discourse being foreign to the needs of the poor and mostly illiterate Kazakh masses, bilingualism continued to remain at the level of individual communication, although one could note increasing numbers of bilinguals among the Kazakh intelligentsia and nobility.

The penetration of Russian into the scientific domain was, of course, not accidental. Although not a result of conscious and direct language legislation, it was an outcome of the colonial administration’s efforts to develop the system of education for the purpose of training a class of Russian-speaking, loyal natives that could serve the needs of colonial bureaucracy and fulfill the function of role-models in the early attempts of cultural assimilation. The fact that the administration was taking education as a serious asset in Russification can be demonstrated by their willingness to collaborate with a distinctive figure among the Kazakh intelligentsia of the time--the famous Kazakh pedagogue Ibrai Altynsarin. While nominally only a school inspector for the Turgai region, Altynsarin was in fact the architect behind the network of secular schools introduced in the steppe at the end of the 19th century; the network, which, according to Martha Olcott

...was not intended to achieve mass literacy, but to educate a small sector of society, a new elite, who it was hoped would become bilingual and accept the ‘inherent superiority’ of the Russian culture (and maybe even the Russian faith). (Olcott, 1985, 181)

The establishment of a network of Russian schools in the steppe was closely related to another indirect language-policy effort--the attempt to transfer the
Kazakh alphabet from Arabic into Cyrillic script. As it has been mentioned, this was done for the purpose of eliminating the influence of the anti-Russian Islamic Orient. Being not only a distinguished educator, but also a recognized linguist, Altynsarin was the author of the first version of the Cyrillic-based Kazakh alphabet. According to Olcott,

Altynsarin spent his life striving against what he feared was the imminent destruction of a unique Kazakh people, who unable to adapt their nomadic economy, would slip in status and merge with the undistinguished rabble of the empire. He maintained that the successful economic transformation of the Kazakh economy would occur only if a minimal level of technical education was introduced. Altynsarin often found himself in conflict with his Russian superiors as he attempted to achieve "enlightenment" without Russification. He had to be "convinced" that the Cyrillic script was better than the Arabic one, yet he shared the Russians' belief that Kazakh needs would best be served by a network of secular rather than confessional schools. (Olcott, 1985, 187)

The connection of language reform with the establishment of the educational system was due to the fact that, according to Altynsarin’s proposal, the schools were supposed to teach native language literacy in Cyrillic. The educator, in fact, put considerable effort into the development of an instructional methodology and Kazakh primers. It was very unfortunate that his efforts were fruitless; in the last decade of the 19th century, the newly created Cyrillic alphabet fell into disuse
mostly because of the unwillingness of the czarist administration to publish new instructional materials (see Olcott, 1985, 187).

Altynsarın was not the only representative of the Kazakh intelligentsia who was concerned about the status of the native tongue. One of the unexpected outcomes of the human resource policy of czarism was the formation of a class of educated native individuals who were brought up in the best traditions of European education, but nevertheless remained committed to their own culture, striving to bringing to the steppe the best advantages of Western civilization and, simultaneously, to do everything possible to prevent cultural assimilation and to maintain cultural sovereignty. The contribution of these individuals to the development of the Kazakh language was both direct and indirect. Some of them influenced the emergence of the modern Kazakh language by their literary, political and philosophical works. Others, like Baitursynov and Bukeikhanov, were initiating discussions about the purity of the Kazakh language, and about the development of a script which would better reflect the Kazakh phonological system. The last two also made a huge contribution into understanding the grammatical structure of Kazakh (see Olcott, 1985, 189).

Worth mentioning is that both types language development activities were an integral part of the process of emergence of the Kazakh national identity. Both were most visible on the pages of newspapers published by groups of the national intelligentsia (see Olcott, 1985, 189).

Thus, the second period of the colonial era was characterized by an increase in functional domains assumed by Russian with the language being used not only
in official discourse, but also in scientific communication. Although still at the individual level, bilingualism was becoming more widespread among certain circles of Kazakh society, specifically among the class of Kazakh nobility and the emerging class of Kazakh intelligentsia. The end of the colonial period was also marked by the rise of nationalism and marked tensions in interethnic communication. Language-related initiatives remained only a part of economic and social policy; increasingly, however, language development was being initiated by the representatives of the indigenous population.

Soviet Period: Emergence of Bilingualism

*Emerging Bilingualism*

The time when Kazakhstan became largely bilingual is more difficult to identify. On the one hand, it can never be clear when exactly bilingualism takes place with respect to the degree of mastery of the participating languages by the speakers:

1) when most of the citizens of a particular country are able to communicate in two languages, although they may prefer to use only one of these languages when not constrained by the necessity to use both or;

2) when the citizens are not only proficient in both languages, but also have no preference for either of them in actual communication. (Crystal, 362-3)
On the other hand, the problem of identifying the exact moment of the emergence of bilingualism is complicated by the vagueness of the distinction between individual and societal bilingualism, which are essentially forms of group bilingualism. The question here is how big a group should be to qualify at the societal level. In addition, in case of the Soviet Union, even with census results at hand it is virtually impossible to access either the degree of language proficiency and use or the actual number of speakers of a particular language because of the subjectivity of self-assessment used in the censuses and because of the distorted character of the published official reports of survey results. The only fact that is more or less unquestionable is that by the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was bilingual (Olcott, 1985, 192-203). Since it is impossible to pinpoint an actual date of emergence of societal bilingualism in Soviet Kazakhstan, let us treat the whole epoch as the epoch of emerging bilingualism.

Traditionally, researchers distinguish three periods in the development of Soviet nationality and language policy. Because of some decline in interest towards this issue after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the relatively short but extremely important period of Gorbachev’s reformation was never carefully considered by researchers. This circumstance provides us with an opportunity to contribute to the field by also considering this fourth period.

What follows is a detailed description of each of the proposed periods:
Period of Leninist Sovietization (1917-1924)

The first period of the Soviet development started in 1917 with the Bolsheviks’ victory in the October Revolution and ended with the death of its leader, V.I. Lenin, in 1924. It was the time when the idealistic program of socio-economic reform that allowed the Bolsheviks to overthrow bourgeois government was transformed by the complexity of reality into controversial practices which created the basis for the subsequent gradual transformation of the ideals themselves.

Having overthrown the dysfunctional and therefore short-lived Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks had not thrown away the main challenge it inherited from czarism. The challenge consisted in keeping together culturally diverse and linguistically dissimilar populations of formally one of the biggest world’s empires. Moreover, for the Bolsheviks, the task was now complicated by the fact that most of the numerous peoples of what was soon to become the U.S.S.R. had developed some sort of national identity by 1917. It was the invisibility of this identity to the colonial czarist administration that had been one of the most important triggers and determinants of success of the October Revolution (Read, 267-89). To make matters worse, in the case of some of the non-Russian peoples, Central Asians in particular, the feeling of national identity strengthened to the point of potential separatism as a result of experiencing relative autonomy during the bourgeois democracy brought about by the February Revolution and by the anarchy of the Civil War following the October revolt (see Olcott, 1995, 129-57).
In the specific case of Kazakhstan the complication originated in the ex-colony’s experience of recognized self-governance after the February Revolution and during the Civil War, which made Kazakhs aware of the possibility for restoration of independence as a part of the autonomous Republic of Turkestan, envisioned as a confederation of historically and culturally related Turkic-speaking nationalities (see Olcott, 1995, 129-57). Inspired by the pre-revolutionary experience of successful anti-colonial wars, and moved by the ideas of sovereignty of the politically influential and popularly recognized national democratic intelligentsia, Kazakhs would no longer tolerate invisibility. They would prefer the confederation of Turks to the union of the Soviet republics, only if the union administration guaranteed them the right for national and linguistic self-determination, as well as equal treatment in socio-economic affairs of the new nation. The union administration had to satisfy this demand for Kazakh national determination conflicting neither similar expectation from other ex-colonies nor the purpose of building the unified Communist state (see Olcott, 1995, 129-57).

The Revolutions’ and Civil War’s impact on Russian nationalism was much less positive. The panic of the post-October immigration and the wartime extermination stripped the Russian people of an impressive number of its intellectuals, who carried the essence of group identity. Some of the old intelligentsia were still present in the country, either because of assumed political neutrality or because of being attracted by the promises of Bolshevism; however, they comprised too weak a force to be able to lobby for the interests of Russian
nationality, thus eliminating one variable in the nationalities problem for the Bolsheviks (see Olcott, 1995, 129-57).

The weakening of Russian nationalist aspirations was a favorable circumstance for the founders of the new state. On the one hand, there was less danger for conflicts on nationalist grounds. On the other, there was a greater chance of less resistance to the formation of the new supra-national identity by the most numerous, powerful and self-aware nationality of the former Empire.

Whether the rise of Kazakh nationalism would contribute to centripetal or centrifugal tendencies depended on what the Bolsheviks would make out of it. The separatist potential of the national minorities had been well understood by Lenin before the Revolution, and he used it to excellent advantage in facilitating the breakup of the Empire (Rakowska, 72). After the revolution, however, the separatist potential became the main impediment to the Bolshevik reform. Following is a discussion of how the challenge was addressed by Lenin administration’s actual political practice.

In its short-term objective, the nationality policy of the early Soviet state had some semblance to the early nationality policy conducted by the administrators of imperial Russia. In both cases, the administration was confronted with the same temporary problem--winning the trust of the indigenous steppe population in order to keep it in the new political formation (empire in one case, and U.S.S.R. in the other) (Besancon, 1-14).

The difference between the approaches was in the fact that, in order to prevent separatism in the long run, the Bolsheviks, unlike czarist authorities, had
to cultivate a supra-national identity. Their policy’s sensitivity to cultural diversity was a means to prepare soil for nurturing a nation. Adherence to the socio-economic theory of Communism was to serve as a foundation for the supra-national identity of a Soviet people. The approach to nation-building based upon the supra-national identity of the Soviet citizen is conventionally referred to as the policy of Sovietization (Szporluk, 1-24).

Of course, given the new political reality for the Kazakhs (emergence of nationalism, negative colonial experience, absence of external threat) the approach to “trust-winning” had to be modified. Under the new conditions, Kazakhs, as well as other nationalities of the former colonies, had to be provided with some official evidence of cultural sensitivity in nationality and language-policy-making. Even before the revolution, Bolsheviks stated the evidence in the form of two program principles: the principle of full equality and self-determination of nations (including the right to secede) and the principle of full freedom and equality of languages (including abolition of the required state language), both were further included into the “Declaration and Treaty on the Formation of the U.S.S.R.” (December 30, 1922) and the subsequent U.S.S.R. Constitutions (1924, 1936, and 1977)(Bruchis, 23-7).

As with many idealistic statements, the two equality statements turned out to be difficult to implement practically when the Bolsheviks came into power, especially during the first years, now under consideration. The difficulty in applying the first principle to the nationalities of the former empire lay in the fact that their popular masses (whose interests the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union was supposed to serve) were either politically inert or largely under the influence of frequently both anti-Russian and anti-communist indigenous intelligentsia, and if given the right, would most probably choose independence. The Communists did not perceive such an outcome as beneficial for the national peasantry and the working class (see Bruchis, 27).

Realization of the complexity of this reality, where implementation of social reforms could be impeded by compliance with the proclaimed principles of the nationality policy, led to legislative modifications: the principle of national self-determination was paraphrased to be restricted to foreign policy relations (see Bruchis, 26). In addition, the danger of secession of former colonies was eliminated by centralizing control over the regional committees of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. During the Eighth Congress of the C.P.S.U, on the organizational question it was indicated that

All decisions of the Russian Communist Party and its ruling institutions are unconditionally obligatory for all parts of the party, regardless of their national composition. (Bruchis, 26)

The Congress also delineated relations between the Party and the Soviets, establishing the Communist Party’s “full rule in contemporary state organizations like soviets” (Bruchis, 27).

According to Michael Bruchis

With such an absolute subordination of national Party organizations of the non-Russian Soviet republics to the Russian Communist Party and its ruling institutions, on the one hand, and of Soviet organs to the Party ones,
on the other hand, any possibility of secession by any non-Russian republic was excluded. (27)

If the right of secession was eliminated from the very beginning, the right for equal treatment was carefully observed by Lenin’s administration. In activities ranging from establishing regional organs of self-governance (soviets) to raising money to fight hunger in the most distant regions of the country, the founders of the Soviet state were committed to the principle of equality of opportunity regardless of national affiliation (Thompson, 226-78).

Unlike the main principle of nationality policy, the Bolsheviks’ principle of language equality remained rather consistent with its pre-revolutionary version: however, just as in case of the nationality policy, it was not observed absolutely.

In a continuation of the imperial tradition, early Soviet language policy was conducted in two major domains—bureaucratic and educational (including cultural establishments with their educational function). During the Tenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. conducted in March 1921, there was indicated the need to

1) develop and fortify, in the native languages, courts, administration, organs of economy and authority, composed of local people who know the local ways and psychology of the local population;

2) develop the press, school, theater, clubs and general cultural-enlightenment institutions in the native language. (Bruchis, 30)

The first of these sub-points turned out to be aborted at the very beginning. Even if desired, operation of national state organs in tongues other than Russian was impossible for the simple reason that the organs were under party control and
the party membership was predominantly Russian, both in the Soviet Union as a whole, and in each of the republics taken separately. This is not to say that the Soviet authorities of the first period were cautious about collaboration with national intelligentsia (one evidence of an interest is their extensive reference to national intellectuals in alphabet reforms and disseminating literacy). Rather, the reason for uninvolved was connected with voluntary Party membership and the low level of the Kazakh masses’ pre-revolutionary and even early post-revolutionary participation in political activities in general. Because of the circumstantial character of Russian-domination in government structure, the policy, although contradicting the principle of linguistic equality, was unintentional Russification.

One evidence of the absence of intent regarding Russification was the adoption of a decree about Russian-Kazakh bilingualism in state institutions at the end of the first period (February 1921). In addition, in 1923, a Central Commission for the “indigenization” of the state apparatus of Kazakhstan and for the introduction of the Kazakh language for the conduct of business, was set up (cf. Olcott, “The Politics of Language Reform,” p.192). At the same time, it was authorized that the administrative languages should be Kazakh in districts and regions with predominately Kazakh populations, and Russian together with Kazakh in mixed population areas (Lewis, 70).

In the second point of its statement, the C.P.S.U. Congress recognized the role of education, press and cultural institutions, both in meeting the interests of the Soviet nationalities and in the future development of the system. The
underlying assumption was that if the citizens of the country were able to read in their native tongue, they could easily be convinced of the advantages of and indoctrinated into the new ideology. This could be done via the press, which was becoming accessible to popular masses and could help to make them less susceptible to external anti-soviet propaganda and to provocations of the informal nationalist leaders dissatisfied with the new regime. In addition, a certain level of literacy, even in a mother tongue, was a pre-requisite for workforce development and for the leap to industrialism that was planned by the central administration. Cultural institutions were also perceived as carrying an important role in the formation of the Soviet nation, as well as possessing a potential danger of nurturing nationalism (see Thompson, 278-86).

With this realization of the importance of literacy, Lenin's administration made an enormous effort to open elementary schools for children and evening classes for adults, to create alphabets for previously unwritten languages and to modify existing alphabets (as in case of Kazakh) to better reflect the phonological structure, to publish books and newspapers in more than one hundred national tongues, to build libraries and community centers fulfilling the purpose of enlightenment and indoctrination, and to support theaters and moving entertainers, bringing knowledge to the most distant villages of the young Soviet state (see Thompson, 278-86).

And in this noble effort, the Bolshevik government was not afraid to resort to the assistance of the intellectual vanguard of its numerous nationalities. In the case of Kazakhstan, the national intelligentsia was involved regardless of their
pre-revolutionary political affiliation. In fact, the former activists of the Alash Party, which had argued for the formation of an independent Kazakh state organized according to the principles of capitalist democracy before the revolution, now comprised the largest part of the national representation in the soviets. Concerned about the interests of their people, they chose to assume political neutrality and to collaborate with the Bolsheviks after the revolution primarily in such areas as education and press. Due to their high popularity among the masses, they thus contributed to cultivation of national tolerance and loyalty towards the new administration (see Asfendiyarov, 278-89).

Because of the pluralist character of the language policy, the first period evidenced some change in functional distribution between Russian and Kazakh. Although Russian remained a dominant language in administrative transactions and barely lost its position in education, Kazakh expanded its area of application with official documents translated into and literacy immersion conducted in the language, and with the increasing number of books and newspapers published by Kazakh-speaking writers and journalists (see Asfendiyarov, 278-89).

Having received a status equal with the Russian language, Kazakh was rapidly developing its lexicon as well as new literary forms, which were self-standardized as a result of the growing press and literacy.

Bilingualism was still at the individual level with the number of both Russian and Kazakh bilinguals growing as a result of corenization (preferential treatment of the representatives of the indigenous nationality in human resource decision
making) and literacy campaigns, the latter producing mostly Kazakh-speaking Russian teachers. This increase in the number of bureaucrats and educators, as well as formation of the positive attitude towards the Russian culture and language prepared conditions for the emergence of societal bilingualism during the following years of the Sovietization experiment.

Thus, the Kazakh nation entered the new political reality with hopes for self-determination and treatment equal with sister-nationalities. Since all of the former colonies shared similar expectations, the new administration set the goal of counteracting nationalist aspirations for separatism by cultivating the supra-national identity of the Soviet people and by ensuring equal treatment of all the peoples of the newly formed confederation. Although the proclaimed principles of national and linguistic equality were not always easy to implement in practice, in most of cases early Soviet nationality and language policy was more sensitive to the nationalist aspirations of the Kazakh people than the corresponding policy of the czarist colonial administration (see Szporluik, 1-24). With Sovietization understood as cultivation of a common identity without destruction of ethnic identifications and linguistic pluralism as a necessary condition for survival of ethnicities, the Kazakh people had emerging chances for developing its language and culture in the context of the new political reality. This expectation was demonstrated in the development of the literary language and its written literature, in the growth of printed material, in the penetration of Kazakh into new communicative domains and the growing consciousness of literary heritage and linguistic identity by the Kazakh popular masses. Redistribution of functional
domains had not resulted in a loss of communicative functions by Russian. Instead, by allowing Kazakh into domains which were previously restricted to the state language of the empire and which were perceived as prestigious by the population of the new state, the change in the diglossic situation contributed to the formation of a positive attitude towards Russian by Kazakhs and towards Kazakh by Russians. This change in attitudes prepared a good ground for the emergence of societal bilingualism (see Tynyshpayev, 156-9).

**Period of Stalinist Russification (1924-1953)**

The second period lasted from 1924 till 1953, from the last day of Lenin, whose attempts for socio-economic reformation of the Soviet Union unexpectedly led to the emergence of a relatively unregulated free market economy, to the last day of his follower, I.V. Stalin, whose attempts to establish control over the economy resulted in the formation of one of the most notorious totalitarian regimes and centrally-planned economies in the world.

Stalin came to power when most of the peoples of the multicultural Soviet Union had started to gradually internalize the idea that together they comprised what could be referred to as an emerging Soviet nation. Of course, their new identity was not yet as strong as it would become towards the end of the Soviet epoch; however, it was significant enough to hamper separatism among the non-Russian population of the former empire. Because of a high degree of ethnic sensitivity in Lenin’s model of socio-economic reformation, the appropriate balance between ethnic identifications and supra-ethnic identity evolved. Absence
of interethnic conflict could have been expected to simplify the task of further reformation under the leadership of Stalin; however, the advantage of interethnic stabilization was used by Stalin, the former Minister of Nationalities, to implement a completely different type of experiment (see Thompson, 289-97).

Stalin was afraid of the spirit of uncontrolled competition brought about by Lenin’s New Economic Policy. For him, Lenin’s approach resembled too closely the free market concept of the ideological enemy. He also felt that capitalism could not implement a transition of the country from feudalism to communism in the shortest possible timeframe (see Thompson, 203-8). With most of the Soviet people having internalized the destiny of becoming the citizens of a new state and developing some level of trust in the Bolshevik authorities, Stalin launched an ambitious experiment during which the original purpose of socio-economic reformation was lost in the midst of personal insecurities, and centralization of control with the purpose of facilitating change was transformed into centralization with the purpose of persecuting any sort of opposition to the existing order.

The experiment started in 1925 with Union-wide planned extermination of all the representatives of national intelligentsias who held views different from and, therefore, were perceived as dangerous for the existing system. This first wave of repression affected the most progressive Kazakh intellectuals, who had once obtained positions in the capitalist democracy and carried aspirations for national independence as autonomous members of the confederation of Turkic states (see Olcott, 1995,129-76).
Simultaneously, a wave of repressions accompanying collectivization took away the more entrepreneurial part of the nations--the owners of flourishing farms and business and those representatives of the middle class who were unwilling to voluntarily abandon their property in the interest of collectivism by the state. In the case of Kazakhstan, collectivization was conducted at the same time as forced settlement of nomadic tribes. Frequently implemented without regard to peculiarities of the nomadic way of life, the attempts to form settled collective farms out of transient tribes of herders resulted in otherwise preventable loss of stock in addition to the loss of invaluable lives of human beings (cf. Asfendiyarov, pp. 289-9). The famine of the 1930s resulted in 3,000,000 deaths among the Kazakh population (according to contemporary Kazakh statistics). Together with de-privatization, it also forced many Kazakh families to leave the country for nearby Mongolia, China, and the Middle East (see Olcott, 1995, 129-76).

Collectivization created favorable conditions for the beginning of industrialization, which in the case of Kazakhstan meant accelerated exploration of mineral and energy resources, and construction of power stations, factories and mines. Accompanying this were the processes of the urbanization of Kazakhs and the in-migration of other ethnicities, whose representatives came to the republic in search of employment or, by the Party’s directive, to assist those republics lacking in technical professionals and a skilled work force in developing their industrial potential (see Tynyshpayev, 187-9).

Despite the overall decrease in the tempo of industrialization in the Soviet
Union during the Second World War, the rate of in-migration to Kazakhstan did not decline because the under populated republic became home to thousands of refugees, a place of exile to thousands of the politically persecuted, and a place of work to thousands of specialists, sent there to build planes, tanks, submarines, bombs, and weapons to satisfy the needs of the Soviet Army in its fight against fascist Germany (see Tynyshpayev, 189-90). If one were to look for the roots of the contemporary ethnic composition of the republic, it is this period during the Second World War that should be investigated, since during this period the children of occupied Russia and the Ukraine were being adopted by Kazakh parents; families of Korean, Chechen, Tatar, Greek, German, and other “politically unreliable” ethnicities were transplanted to the steppe communities, and the opponents of the regime from all parts of the country were being sent to labor camps to be used as a free working force, serving the needs of the militarized economy (see Olcott, 1995, 157-224).

As this account of the large-scale experimentation demonstrates, a major change in Kazakhstan’s demographics took place during the Stalinist period. This had made an important impact on the dynamics of nationalism, diglossia, and multilingualism (Lewis, 90-123).

Very few Kazakh intellectuals--and by this is meant individuals who asserted a distinct Kazakh cultural identity--survived the decade, and the few who did faded from the public eye (Olcott, 1985, 15). As a result of fatalities from famine, out-migration, political extermination and purges, combined with an increase in representation by other nationalities and ethnicities, the number of Kazakhs
significantly declined in comparison with all other peoples of the Kazakh S.S.R. The demographic loss during the famine not only turned Kazakhs into a numeric minority, but also, together with the development of the apparatus of political persecution, made Kazakhs a political minority deprived of the ability to influence decisions affecting their culture, lacking the courage to demand realization of the Constitutionally guaranteed right for equality and self-determination (see Asfendiyarov, 200-17). In addition, the impoverishment brought about by collectivization, as well as the insufficiency of the work force caused by industrialization, forced some Kazakhs to move to the city, thus setting off the gradual process of urbanization (see Lewis, 90-123). Finally, the necessity to co-exist with all the diverse newcomers to the steppe increased the threshold of ethnic tolerance that would make Kazakhs more accepting of Russification in the future. Thus, the combination of the demographic changes prepared conditions that would have a detrimental effect on Kazakh national identity in the subsequent years of planned Russification (see Lewis, 90-123).

Surprisingly, Russians experienced decline in their national identity, too. Some of the causes of the decline were similar to those contributing to the loss of identity among Kazakhs. These causes included numeric loss during famine, the loss of power to oppose cultural genocide as a consequence of using the accusation in “Great-Russian chauvinism” (belief in the cultural superiority of Russians over other peoples of the former Russian Empire) as the most frequent
ground for political persecution during purges, urbanization \(^1\) accompanying industrialization and failed collectivization, and out-migration both within and outside the U.S.S.R. during the Second World War. Finally, similarly to the Kazakhs, Russians lost the most significant, in terms of national identity, representatives of scientific, technical, and literary intelligentsia during purges. Unlike Kazakhs, Russians also lost a huge number of their soldiers in the battlefields and civilians on the territories occupied by Axis forces (see Thompson, 289-93).

Towards the end of the Stalinist era, non-Russian immigrants to Kazakhstan had accumulated into rather numerous groups to become role-players in the interethnic interaction of the republic. They were not uniform in their susceptibility to assimilation with either of the dominating cultures, and in this respect could be divided into three main groups.

The first group included refugees and work-immigrants from the Soviet West, especially from Ukraine. These usually came in individual families in connection with industrialization and, being isolated from the representatives of their culture, were prone to adopt the assimilating culture (see Tynyshpayev, 189-90).

The second group was comprised of individuals from other parts of Central Asia, as well as immigrants from the Caucasus and other area of Russia, who were either Turkic-speaking or historically Moslem. These people would often come with their extended families and settle down in rural areas in the south,

\(^1\) The reason why urbanization played a role in the decline of the Russian national identity becomes clearer if it is recalled that, historically, Russianism was perceived as associated with the traditional pastoral way of life.
where they tended to form mono-ethnic communities, often maintaining their
culture (see Tynyshpayev, 190-1).

The third group consisted of those ethnicities who had been deported to
Kazakhstan due to accusations of political unreliability. Representatives of these
ethnicities were always placed into special areas of restricted access; in fact, they
had to request special permission when they planned to leave these areas for any
reason. Such placement of the deported was made for a number of different
reasons, the most important of which were the necessity to keep them under
control (since they were viewed as potentially dangerous for the Soviet regime)
and the intent to use them as an inexpensive working force in economically
problematic areas. The best example of this group would be Koreans, who were
very good at growing vegetables and rice. The expectation of the Soviet planners
was that they would assist in introducing the practice to the steppe. Because of
their relative isolation, the communities of the deported preserved their culture in
the least modified way (see Tynyshpayev, 191-3).

Of the these groups, the representatives of the third were likely to retain (if
such was in existence) or develop a strong national identity, mostly because that
identity was oppressed by the regime. In this group, only Tatars could have been
considered a nationality at the time of deportation: however, the strength of their
identity declined in Kazakhstan because of cultural proximity to and acceptability
by the native population (see Tynyshpayev, 194).

Germans seem to have developed such an identity while in the republic.
Partially, this can be explained by the fact that they could not assimilate with any
of the nationalities during the war since they were treated with hostility because of their ethnic affiliation with the Axis. Immediately after the war, assimilation was prevented by strong religious and cultural distinctiveness (see Tynyshpayev, 194-5) (Assimilation could hardly be expected from them in Kazakhstan after their failure to assimilate to the less culturally distant Russians before the war).

The change in ethnic composition of the republic did not result in notable interethnic tensions, although they might have been expected in the conditions of war crisis and poverty. One explanation could be the effectiveness of the ideological propaganda machine, which helped not to only mobilize the resources of the country to win the war, but also inspired people for international friendship and collaboration (see Tynyshpayev, 197).

The rise of patriotism during the Second World War also contributed into the formation of a common Soviet identity in most of the ethnicities of the Kazakh S.S.R. and other parts of the Soviet Union. At this point, care should be taken not to confuse this with the results of Stalin’s nationality policy, since its actual results were manifested only during the subsequent period of the Cold War. The explanation for that was that the implementation of the new policy was not yet consistent enough to produce any visible changes, and insufficient time had passed for change to become considerable. In the same way, the earlier results of Lenin’s Sovietization became more noticeable after Lenin’s death. Combined with the rise in patriotism, which was not a direct effect of the nationality policy, but rather an outcome of war-related indoctrination, these later results led to the formation of a rather strong supra-nationality feeling of Soviet identity among the
citizens of the U.S.S.R. This feeling might have been one of the main pre-
conditions that allowed Stalin’s cult to develop, with the cult psychology
subsequently enhancing the feeling of common identity in return, and both cult
psychology and the feeling of common identity contributing to positive attitudes
towards Russification during the Stalinist era and even more so after 1953.

Before proceeding further with the discussion of the impact of demographic
changes of this situation of multilingualism and functional role assignment, some
attention should be spent on the analysis of the language policy whose effects
were expected to change the situation in straightforward ways.

In the late 1930’s, Moscow introduced a new approach to nationality and
language policy, a policy of linguistic and cultural Russification. This approach
was a mutation of the earlier policy of Sovietization, which had targeted the
formation of supra-national identity on the basis of ideological affiliation in the
conditions of cultural and linguistic pluralism. De jure, reformation was still
conducted in accordance with the principles of national and language equality; de
facto, however, the purpose of creating the nation of the Soviet people with
preservation of linguistic pluralism underwent some transformation. Unlike
Sovietization, Russification implied the formation of the supra-national identity on
the basis of Russian values and the Russian language; it envisioned the process
of the identity formation as assimilation of the non-Russian cultures of the Soviet
Union to the Russian culture and as gradual disappearance of linguistic
differences as a result of cultivation of the Russian-dominated bilingualism
combined with expansion of the communicative domains of the lingua franca
The switch to Russification was caused not by the whim of Stalin, but rather as a consequence of his interpretation of and his method of implementation of socio-economic reforms, especially, as a result of his belief in and actual realization of centralized coordination and planning. Such centralization was perceived as necessary for accelerated collectivization and industrialization, for the quickest possible resolution of the economic breakdown caused by collectivization, as well as for the urgent military mobilization during the Second World War. It was also believed to be dependent upon the clarity of communication channels, the condition that could be met by the development of a more homogeneous culture and by the introduction of a union-wide lingua franca (see Lewis, 49-89).

The choice of Russian as the lingua franca was inevitable. Bernard Comrie mentions the following reasons:

1) Russian was the language of the majority of the Soviet citizens;

2) Russian had already assimilated modern Western technology and culture, and so did not have the problem, faced by other languages of the U.S.S.R., of first coming to terms with these phenomena;

3) Russian had already, partly by force and partly by choice, become the lingua franca of most parts of the Russian Empire, and no other language came near to satisfying this criterion. (Comrie, 31)

Once Russian had been assigned the status and the functions of the medium of interethnic communication, bilingualism became a target of linguistic reformation. The traditional domains of official transactions and education were
chosen as the main institutes of immersion into the Russian language.

Human resource Russification was conducted by introduction of the unspoken requirement for the knowledge of Russian for all the national party and soviet representatives on the one hand, and by increasing the representation of bilingual European bureaucrats on the other. An interesting fact about the latter is that the increase in the bilingual non-native representation was a result of the combination of the policy of corenization and the political purges of the late 1920s (see Olcott, 1985,192-6). While the purges created a deficit of sufficiently educated indigenous bureaucrats, the condition under which non-native representatives were allowed in the national party committees and soviets if bilingual in Kazakh provided a channel for the growing penetration of non-natives into these structures.

Educational Russification was conducted in several ways. The most straightforward one was connected with introduction of a required course in the Russian language as a part of all school curricula. This course was aided by general “enrichment” of the curriculum with values characteristic of Russian culture (Kreindler, 345-61). There were also more subtle means of educational Russification, such as through the reform of the writing system into Cyrillic, piloted with the stated purpose of simplification and acceleration of the literacy campaign. A discussion of the alphabet reform provides more detail.

At the very beginning of the literacy campaign (conducted under Lenin’s administration), writing systems developed before the revolution and based upon Arabic were used for Kazakh and for other Turkic languages of Islamic Central
Asia. The systems were rather complicated with each letter having several variants, depending on the position of the word in the clause. In addition, they did not accurately reflect the complex vowel and consonant distinctions of the harmony systems of Turkic languages. In order to improve this situation, Lenin’s administration undertook some attempts for simplification of the systems; however, with Stalin’s goal of accelerated development of societal bilingualism, a more radical reform of the script was required (Comrie, 23).

The reform was conducted in two steps. In 1927, the Latin alphabet replaced the Arabic one for writing in Kazakh, in other Turkic languages, and, in fact, in all languages of the Soviet Union except the Slavic languages, Georgian, Armenian, and Yiddish. The choice of the Latin alphabet was not accidental. One reason was “the necessity to avoid the impression, especially among traditionally Islamic peoples, that the replacement of their traditional script, with its religious connotations, was part of a policy of linguistic, cultural and religious Russification” (Comrie, 23). As Comrie indicated, “the Latin alphabet was a compromise neutral between the Arabic and Cyrillic scripts” (Comrie, 23).

The second reason was connected with the long-term goal of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—the formation of a worldwide proletarian state. The goal made the Latin alphabet, which was used by many of the languages of wider communication in the world as a basis of their scripts the best candidate for the universal system of writing in the Soviet Union. One other reason for the use of Latin script originated from the attempt to make peoples of Central Asia less susceptible to the external influence of the Islamic world. The use of the alphabet
as a universal system of writing was also expected to simplify the task of printing and publishing, and, consequently the task of providing schools with primers and textbooks. Finally, by devising a writing system allowing for a reflection of the phonological characteristics of Russian, the language reformers created conditions for intensive penetration of the Russian words into lexicons of ethnic tongues (Comrie, 23).

Analyzing the results of Latinization in terms of acceleration of the literacy campaign, Martha Olcott mentions:

Although in the long run the introduction of the new alphabet helped to serve the socialization aims of the regime, in the short run it worked against the rapid promotion of universal literacy, as all the primers had to be discarded and new ones written, printed and distributed. All this at the very time that the collectivization drive was being unsuccessfully pursued. (Olcott, 1985, 195)

The danger of complete economic breakdown that could result from the unsuccessful attempt of collectivization mentioned by Olcott caused a higher degree of centralization, which manifested itself in greater determination to establish Russian-Kazakh bilingualism by means of direct Russification and by exclusion of Kazakhs from the debate over the language reforms. As Olcott observes, “Kazakh linguists were accorded a purely functional note in executing the structural changes mandated in Moscow” (Olcott, 1985, 196).

Under these new conditions, in 1940, the second step of the reform was taken with introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet for all languages of the Soviet
Union except Georgian, Armenian, Yiddish and the languages of the Baltic region (Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian). Comrie (32) identified two main reasons for the new alphabet reform. One reason was educational: with introduction of the requirement for Russian language instruction, acquiring literacy, which was a difficult task in itself, was “made only worse by the need to acquire two different alphabets, especially given that many letters of the two alphabets are similar in form, but have different phonetic values (e.g.: the Cyrillic letter ц is pronounced [s], р is pronounced [r], в is pronounced [v])” (Comrie, 32).

With respect to the second reason, Comrie writes:

In addition to this educational reason, there was probably also a more political reason: at this time, the U.S.S.R. was becoming increasingly inward-looking, with the realization that the world revolution was not imminent and that the U.S.S.R. would for a long time be virtually the single Soviet-style state, surrounded by hostile political systems. This led to a consolidation of internal unity, and demarcation from outside forces, both of which functions was served by the Cyrillic alphabet. (Comrie, 33)

Among other reasons enumerated by the reformers themselves was the claim that “the Cyrillic alphabet has more letters than the Latin alphabet and is therefore better suited to representing languages with a large number of phonemes” (Comrie, 33). Comrie objects to this claim with the following counter-argument:

…the special Cyrillic letters used to represent either a sequence of ж plus vowel or a vowel after a palatalized consonant are rarely needed (though often used) in other languages of the U.S.S.R., and some distinctions that
can be made with the Latin alphabet are not possible with the Cyrillic alphabet except using diacritics (e.g.: \(k/q, x/h, v/w\)). (Comrie, 33)

Although most of the new alphabets still did not reflect all the phonological peculiarities of the reformed languages, they were put into use right before the war: the proximity of a military conflict with the capitalist world required a strong army able to follow commands and to communicate the results of completed orders (see Tynyshpayev, 198).

Not only did the new alphabet fail to convey some important phonological distinctions of Kazakh, it was also designed in such a way that it rendered the language distinct from all other languages of Soviet Central Asia (Olcott, 1985, 196), thus eliminating mutual enrichment of languages and undermining the unimpeded exchange of ideas and forms in literatures. In addition, a lot of unnecessary distinctions, peculiar to the Russian language, were introduced, opening the gate for extensive borrowing of the Russian words into the lexicon of Kazakh (see Bruchis, 23-41).

Although the re-orientation of language and nationality policy towards Russification took place during the Stalinist period, the effects of its linguistic component were not yet as radical as they would become during the following period. With the several alphabet modifications confusing both the teachers and the already literate part of the population, as well as adding headaches to the authors and publishers of textbooks and primers, the educational system remained as unsuccessful in the literacy campaign as it was in the effort of Russian-language immersion (see Bruchis, 23-41). In most cases, bilingualism
resulted from the mere necessity for communication between representatives of different nationalities, which for whatever reason happened to find themselves in Kazakhstan, with Russian being the only language that was more or less understood by everyone, and this is when the aforementioned demographic changes would come into play.

The demographic changes had, in fact, a greater influence on the functional role assignment between Russian and Kazakh than any direct act of language reformers. By creating the necessity for interethnic communication, they assisted Russian in expanding its influence to previously unoccupied and currently important domains, such as interaction in the workplace and everyday communication.

The demographic changes were also a strong reason for the emergence of societal bilingualism. Increase in ethnic diversity was particularly important in this respect with the non-Russian immigrants playing the most important role in the transition of bilingualism from the individual to the societal level. The three groups of immigrants had not only to assimilate with one of the dominating cultures, but also to become bilingual in one of the dominant languages. Linguistic assimilation followed different tracks for each of the groups. Immigrants from the European parts of the U.S.S.R. almost always became bilingual in Russian and gradually gave up their native tongue. Those from the Caucasus and Central Asia would adopt structurally similar Kazakh, retaining their language, especially if settled in rural areas. The deported peoples retained their native tongue regardless of their new place of residence and would, in addition, learn one of the dominant
languages, with preference in most cases given to Russian because of its wider use and higher status.

Numerically no longer dominant, Kazakhs, especially with the growth of urbanization, were pushed to become bilingual in Russian, which was rapidly becoming known by other ethnic groups of the U.S.S.R.

Although no longer restricted to select individuals, bilingualism was not yet characteristic of the absolute majority of the population (see Bruchis, 23-41). In addition, the knowledge of Russian was still insufficient for the speakers to have no preference between using their native language or the second language wherever a choice was allowed. In other words, language shift, which could be interpreted as a qualitative change, was still to be expected.

Thus, the Stalinist period of Soviet language and nationality policy was characterized by a change in ethnic composition and the decline of national identities. In the case of Kazakhs, this weakening was caused, first of all, by extermination of the carriers of the identity during political purges. It was also associated with Kazakhs becoming a numeric minority, due to the decrease in the number of Kazakhs during the famine and from the simultaneous increase in the number of representatives of other ethnicities who immigrated to Kazakhstan during industrialization, were evacuated during the war, or were deported during the times of attack on “unreliable” nationalities. The deflation of the sense of national identity was accompanied by the development of susceptibility to political manipulation, which resulted from the fear of political persecution, of tolerance of ethnic diversity and gradual expansion of the Russian language and culture.
The decline of Russian national identity was caused by immigration and political purges among intelligentsia, as well as by population loss in the collectivization famine and casualties during the Second World War. The status of the Russian nationality was also undermined by the use of Russian language and culture for the all-Union purposes of supra-national identity cultivation. The practice made it dangerous for Russians to counter their culture against another culture because of the risk of being charged with Great-Russian chauvinism.

The numerous representatives of other ethnicities tended to intermingle with the ethnic majorities of Russians and Kazakhs. Their ability to sustain their language and culture depended on the proximity of the culture to the cultures of the majorities, on the similarity of their language structure to the structure of Russian or Kazakh, and on their place of residence in the republic. In most of the cases the minorities became bilingual.

The decline of ethnic and national identities was accompanied by the growth of identification with the Soviet nation, which was a longitudinal consequence of Lenin's nationality policy and an outcome of the rise of patriotism during the Second World War. The task of accelerating socio-economic reformation as well as the necessity of rapid military mobilization during the Second World War required greater centralization and more efficient communication, which could provide for higher control over the processes. Efficient communication necessitated the introduction of Russian as lingua franca and resulted in modifications to the approach towards nation-building and linguistic reformation. Instead of attempting cultivation of the ethnically diverse and multilingual Soviet
citizens, an attempt was made to enculturate the ethnic citizens to the Russian language and Russian-Soviet values.

The change in the character of language and nationality policy had not yet resulted either in a significant transformation in the functional role assignment of the Russian and Kazakh languages or in the character of emerging societal bilingualism. Combined with the consequences of the demographic change, this change did, however, prepare the conditions for extensive Russification, for emergence of absolute bilingualism, and for language shift during the next period of the Soviet epoch.

Period of post Stalinist Complexity (1953-1985)

The third period in the development of the Soviet nationality and language policy started in 1953, after the death of Stalin, and lasted till 1985, when Gorbachev’s reform was launched. Although the period could be divided into several sub-periods in terms of socio-economic processes in terms of nationality and language policy it could be treated as indiscrete.

If for the previous sections of the analysis it was possible to discuss nationality and language policy more or less separately from each other and from the socio-economic life of the country, such an approach is impossible for consideration of the post-Stalinist period, because during this period, the Soviet authorities started to use language as the main mechanism for the formation of a common identity for the Soviet people, thus removing any distinction between the issues of nationalism and language-related legislation and policy implementation.
Hence, for the purposes of this part of the analysis, nationality and language policy must be discussed simultaneously. In addition, with nationality policy being connected with socio-economic policy, we would have to consider the language policy of the period not merely in the context of socio-economic changes, but in the realm of socio-economic legislation and political practices.

It is no longer possible at this stage to characterize language policy as consistently Russifying (Stalinist) or Sovietizing (Leninist), since in the late Soviet state, both types of policies and the resulting processes of Russification and Sovietization occurred simultaneously and with the process of the development of national identities. Russification, the formation of the identity of the Soviet citizen and nationalistic revivals were at times cultivated by direct political action, but in most cases they were a result of a combination of a multiplicity of factors, not always straightforwardly related to any sort of Party intent, but often produced as a result of the combination of political action, societal response and the mere chance of their mutual impact upon each other.

We should attempt to determine where the complexity of the post-Stalin era came, how nationality and language policy during the era could simultaneously be Russifying and Sovietizing. The source of this complexity is traceable back to the previously noted concept of centralization advocated by Stalin. Totalitarianism was viewed by Stalin as the fastest way of implementing socio-economic reforms. In order to be efficient, centralization required clear communication channels, and, in the context of the multilingual U.S.S.R., introduction of some sort of lingua franca that could fulfill the communicative function. Because Stalin was looking for
a fast solution of socio-economic problems, his choice was Russian, the best widely-available language in terms of communicative function. However, his choice was also the worst in terms of nationality policy, because, due to its symbolic function of the maintenance of Russian national identity, Russian carried the historical load of being the state language of the Czarist empire and, therefore, easily could and actually did revive imperialist identity in Russians and colonialist identities in the non-Russian peoples (Spechler, 281-305). As attempts towards Russian-dominated bilingualism were being undertaken, these old identities inevitably started to affect nationality-related attitudes, ideas, actions, and re-actions of both policy-makers and policy subjects. The imperial “flashbacks” of predominantly Russian Stalinist policy-makers prevented them from seeing that even with Russian fulfilling the communicative function of lingua franca, now referred to as the internationalist language of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet identity did not have to be based upon the Russian culture. So, trying to balance between socio-economic and nationality policy goals, administrative attitudes towards language selection collapsed to the simplistic choice of Russification. Although after Stalin’s death the old interpretation of Lenin’s principles was restored and the distinction between the communicative and symbolic functions of the Russian language was formally re-established, this understanding did not protect the policy makers and the now still ideologically suppressed but no longer terrorized general public from the influence of the symbolic function of Russian (see Olcott, 1985, 192-9). So the administration was constantly switching from Leninist to Stalinist mindsets and methods, while the public would periodically
become anti-Russian and anti-lingua-franca because of their perception of the “big brother” as the former oppressor and the state language as the medium of Russification.

To conclude, the complex pattern of simultaneous Russification, Sovietization and national identity formation evolved because the need for socio-economic reformation in the multiethnic state required centralization, which could be implemented only with the introduction of a lingua franca, because the language chosen as a lingua franca was charged with a contradiction between the communicative and symbolic functions, because the historical and the newly assigned symbolisms of Russian were incompatible, because this incompatibility produced conflicting identities in the policy makers and those for whom the policy was designed, and finally, because the reactions of the policy-subjects to the actions of the policy-makers induced a new response of the latter and changed both their attitudes and the new actions based upon them.

In some aspects of the Soviet policy (socio-economic, nationalist, language), complexity became widely manifested creating consequences for bilingualism, diglossia and the dynamics of interethnic communication.

One such aspect was power distribution between the all-union and republic-level party authorities and the party cadre policy. Under Brezhnev, the pattern of power distribution was somewhere half-way between Leninist self-governance (realized through local soviets) and Stalinist centralization (realized through central party organs), a marriage of the two with national elites being given more opportunities in union-wide decision-making and in defining what is to be done in
their republics, and central authorities maintaining control over all the processes in the country (see Thompson, 278-85). Decision-making was in the form of a feedback loop, i.e. it included both bottom-up and top-down elements rather than the mere form of directive as it used to be under Stalin. The center determined major directions for the country’s development for the upcoming five-year period and ensured control over the decisions’ implementation. The republican administrations were responsible for practical execution of the identified course, devising ways of implementation most efficient for the settings of their republics. In addition, they had some input into the center’s decisions in the areas connected with the needs and interests of their republic, wherever their proposal was reasonable from the point of view of all-union interests (Thompson, 278-85).

Similar types of relations existed between the republican and the local administrations. Thus, the center and the periphery exercised their authority simultaneously with the degree of participation of one in the affairs of the other varying depending on the importance of an issue and the consequences for the U.S.S.R. as a whole. Since neither center nor periphery dominated consistently, the resulting policy was neither Russification nor Sovietization, rather a co-existence of both, each manifested at different times in different degrees.

The impact of the policy on its subjects was also two-fold. On the one hand, it promoted the Soviet identity in Lenin’s interpretation by lowering dissatisfaction with the Russian interference, but, on the other, it produced an increase in national awareness. As was noted by R. Szporluk, the awareness was especially high among the political elites. For one reason, they always had to balance
between the interests of the center and the interests of their republic. In addition, the rise of nationalism among the elites was connected with the accumulation of unmet career expectations (With the increase in the quality and accessibility of education, more non-Russian individuals became capable of and willing to pursue professional careers, including careers in politics, however, the access to such careers for them was still restricted, especially in administrative positions at higher levels) (see Szporluk, 1-24).

In addition to the overall tendency towards de-centralization, during the years of Brezhnev's administration the Kazakh political elite was given more autonomy than the elites of other republics, reinforced by the special connection that the all-Union Party Secretary had to the republic--before being appointed the leader of the Soviet Union; Brezhnev was the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. The next secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party, D. Kunayev, was Brezhnev's protégé and, in the course of time, he became an extremely influential figure in the politics arena of the Soviet Union, able to surround himself with a circle of Kazakh supporters and to "nativize" to a certain extent both local party administrations and the managerial bodies of major industrial enterprises. Nativization contributed to the rise of the feeling of national identity in the Kazakh elite to such an extent that in 1986, when Moscow attempted to undermine Kazakh nationalism by appointing a non-native Secretary of Kazakh Communist Party, an upheaval that shook the whole country broke out in Alma-Ata (then the S.S.R. capital) (see Olcott, 1995, 224-49).
The all-Union tendency towards decentralization and Brezhnev’s favoritism were not the only reasons for the Kazakh Communist Party’s nativization. To a certain extent, nativization was caused by the flourishing corruption and nepotism in the specifically Kazakh forms of tribalism and zhuzovshina, the forms, which implied bias favoring the member of the same tribe and zhuz (administrative-territorial union introduced by Chenghizkhan, which in the course of time became intertwined with the tribal system). The fact that tribalism and zhuzovshina penetrated the system was also a symptom of the strengthening of Kazakh nationalism (see Olcott, 1995, 249-99).

Education was another sphere where conflicting language functions produced contradictory practices. Theoretically, Khrushchev’s education laws of 1958-59 restored juridical equality to all languages by offering parents “freedom of choice” in determining the language of instruction for their children. If taken out of the context of the time, the statement is consistent with the goal of ensuring linguistic pluralism as a pre-requisite for inter-ethnic stability and successful Sovietization. However, with parents increasingly perceiving knowledge of Russian as a requirement for social mobility, with higher educational opportunities in all areas (except for the ones pertaining to the Kazakh language, literature, music, art and history), existing almost exclusively in Russian, and with the quality of Kazakh-language education being undermined by the notorious lack of teachers, facilities, equipment, instructional materials and methodology, the freedom would very seldom be exercised (see Bruchis, 23-41). Moreover, since the responsibility for the provision of national-language-based instruction was assigned to the
republican administration and the funds allocated for the purpose were always insufficient, while the pressure for implementation of the centrally-controlled Russian-language-development program was high, the policy conducted in accordance with the statement resulted in the decline of the use and resulting knowledge of national languages. This carried the potential to transform the process of the acquisition of Russian into cultural assimilation (see Bruchis, 23-41).

Stalin's moves in the direction of a Russian-based-literate bilingualism aimed at creating a linguistic situation which would facilitate centralized control over the process of socio-economic reformation were changed by the new administration into a very effective scientifically-justified and research-supported program of Russian language instruction throughout the system of education (see Tynyshpayev, 203-9).

The program was launched in 1975, when, during an all-Union congress on Russian language education, advice was given to pay more attention to closing the gap between theory and practice. The all-Union congress was followed by a sequence of local conferences that discussed the way of implementing the instruction in the conditions of their republic or locale. In 1978, a conference was sponsored by the section on Russian language of the Kazakh Academy of Science. As a result, a list of lengthy and highly specific directives on how to improve instruction of Russian and in Russian was compiled. These directives were followed by all researchers, educators, and other practitioners (see Olcott, 1985, 196-9).
In accordance with one such directive, the school curriculum was modified to include a course in Russian literature to be taught in the Russian language (see Bruchis, 23-41). In addition, teachers of Russian were encouraged to use the methods of ethno-pedagogy, i.e. not only to teach the structure and vocabulary of the language, but also to cultivate in their students appreciation of the Russian values, aesthetics and even humor (Kreindler, 344-61). From the point of view of the Soviet theory of second language acquisition, such changes were necessary to approximate Russian language instruction to the natural process of language learning as enculturation.

Another directive led to the rapid increase in the number of pre-school institutions where Russian was taught not only to six-year olds in special preparatory classes, but also to much younger children in kindergartens and nursery schools (Bruchis, 23-41). Based upon psychological findings about the ontogenesis of linguistic ability, which identified early childhood as the age of maximal instructional sensitivity, the practice was a much more efficient guarantee of Russian-based bilingualism development and a much more dangerous threat for the national languages than the 1975 decree requiring dissertations to be written in Russian (Lewis, 333).

In addition to the conventional schools with Russian language instruction, two additional experimental types of schools were introduced. In the schools of the first type, children instructed in Russian were to be educated in the same building as children instructed in Kazakh. In the second type, children were to be instructed in both languages with half of the courses offered in Russian and half of
the courses offered in Kazakh. Both models were built upon research findings, one emphasizing the importance of play and out-of-class peer communication for language learning in childhood, and the other recognizing the mechanism of language learning as knowledge acquisition (Kreindler, 189-98).

In accordance with another directive, the quality of the Russian-language instruction in national schools was to be improved. The efforts for this directive were limited to increasing the length of the school day in Kazakh language schools to provide for more hours of Russian and to establishing the special Scientific Research Institute for Teaching Russian in Non-Russian Schools to ensure research support of the endeavor. The fact that the research activity of the institute was mostly involved in justification and popularization of the idea that the use of Russian is not inconsistent with a sense of Kazakh self-identity, while the additional instructional and learning load worsened the quality of teaching and learning in national schools, explains why the number of Russian and bilingual schools was rapidly increasing while the national schools were disappearing because of the absence of demand (see Kreindler, 144-61).

From this account of the language-related educational processes, educational Russification was not caused by a direct intent of Moscow, but rather by a combination of different factors. On the one hand, the needs of socio-economic reformation dictated the necessity for promoting the lingua franca. This task was fulfilled by teaching the language through the most effective medium, i.e. the educational system, in the most effective way, i.e. using the methods of ethno-pedagogy, and to the most sensitive category of population, i.e. children.
Simultaneously, national-language-based instruction, although juridically allowed, was not financially ensured or encouraged to be sustained at the same level of Russian-language-based instruction. Combined with the parents’ positive attitudes towards Russian and the quality of Russian-language-based instruction, as well as with the absence or poor quality of Kazakh language instruction in Russian and bilingual schools, the innovations in the lingua-franca-based education and the disregard of the Kazakh-language-targeting and national-language-based alternative resulted in a situation in which Russian was pushing Kazakh out of communicative domains instead of assuming intended co-existence. This increased the process of bilingualism emergence, characteristics of linguistic assimilation and created conditions for subsequent language shift, resulting in Russian monolingualism among educated Kazakhs (see Kreindler, 344-61).

Another field exemplifying this complexity was Kazakh language development. The necessity for national language development was enforced by the principle of linguistic equality. Maintenance of the Kazakh language as a symbol of national identity dictated taking certain steps to improve its existing resources to keep it functional in communication, able to reflect all the phenomena of contemporary times. In order to use Kazakh as a medium of instruction, modernization of the Kazakh lexicon (corpus building) was required, as well as exploration of the language’s grammatical (word formation and syntax) resources to make it functional in the changing conditions of the modern world.

One other reason for modernization of Kazakh was linked to the task of establishing societal Russian-based bilingualism. Here the idea was to facilitate
language contact in such a way that some sort of universal word stock based upon Russian lexical items and shared by all the languages of the Soviet Union was constructed and introduced into use. This task was extremely challenging, since the planners ran the risk of switching from internationalization to assimilation while creating and introducing into languages such a common stock. It was, nevertheless, possible to implement, since as along as no interference into the structure of the national languages took place, the integrity of languages would not be affected.

How were the ideas implemented practically? In terms of lexicon development for the purpose of language maintenance, native linguists displayed a renewed interest in finding ancient Kazakh terms to replace vocabulary from Arabic, Persian and other Turkic dialects. Such vocabulary purification served as a permitted outlet for realization of Kazakh national identity, and, therefore, had consequences for the rise of nationalism. There was also a trend to re-substitute Kazakh terms for Russian ones, especially in such areas as politics and economy. This tendency could be explained by the fact that the Kazakh political elite was given some autonomy at the time, as well as by the development of the Kazakh-language television and press as the major instruments of indoctrination and the necessity to convey the message through the media in the way most understandable to the masses (Olcott, 1985, 196).

Two other goals of language development, modernization and universalization, were to be met by a special commission of the Institute of Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences, which was supposed to implement the
so-called internationalization of the national language. In 1959, the commission produced a list of “all union” terms to be adopted by all the Turkish-speaking peoples of the U.S.S.R. Most of these terms belonged to the scientific area, politics and economy. The majority of them were Greek and Latin-based terms used in the rest of the world with phonologically different modifications (Olcott, 1985, 198). The act would not have been a contradiction to the stated principles and identified goals if the terms had not been introduced into the lexicons of the Turkic languages together with the morphology and pronunciation characteristic of Russian, which served as the source for borrowing. However, as Comrie indicates:

The policy was basically that such words should be taken into the local language in their Russian orthographic forms (even, in general, where this conflicts with the orthographic norms of the local language), and should be pronounced in the Russian way, or at least as close as is possible for speakers of the language in question. In this way many phonetic features of Russian found their way into other languages, such as palatal consonants, and free stress, though for the most part they remain restricted to those loan words. (Comrie, 33-4)

Understanding that language is subject to evolution in the same way as the society it serves, Brezhnev, unlike his predecessors, maintained that linguistic reform should be an on-going process. In accord with this belief, a standing commission on language reform was organized in Kazakhstan in 1972. This commission was composed primarily of Kazakh linguists, and also included
representatives from both party and state (note that the composition of the commission reflected the pattern of power distribution). Because of Brezhnev’s loyalty to Kazakhstan, the work of this commission more closely reflected the Kazakhs’ concerns than its predecessor had done; however, the efforts of the Kazakh members of the committee were often fruitless. Although the new phonemes and orthography were restricted to loan words, the penetrating structures of morphological word formation became productive in the same way as syntactic structures, which invaded Kazakh as a result of translation from Russian. The syntactic structures included the use of conjunctions and subordinate clauses where normally special verb forms, verbal adverbs (gerunds), verbal adjectives (participles) or case forms of verbal nouns (nominalizations) were used (Comrie, 34).

In the same way as in the previously discussed domains, the domain of language development contained elements which could at different times, under different rulers, in different aspects of lexicon, grammar, and function provide evidence for the effort of Russification, the result of a rise in national identity rise or even a manifestation of the emergence of Soviet identity.

National literature, television, radio, music, choreography, and art were other areas demonstrating the complexity of interplay between the processes of cultural assimilation, national identity maintenance and Soviet identity formation. Out of the three, music was very important as a mechanism of culture preservation. One explanation for that would be the fact that music was perceived as the least dangerous of all the cultural forms for conveying ideas threatening the existence
of the Communist system. However, another reason why the power of the musical form was so strong in Kazakhstan was because of its nomadic-related characteristics. Nomadic Kazakh tribes did not have literature and music existing as two separate entities; instead, the two always co-existed in different combinations, song, epic, aitys of akyns, etc. In such combinations, music served not only as an expressive but also as a mnemonic function allowing the singer to easily recall the associated literary form through lyric or recitation. In its turn, the literary form was not stable; rather, it was a living idea transferred from author to author and from generation to generation in the form of a plot re-told to every new group of audience in new poetic representations. The unusual characteristics of traditional Kazakh music allowed it to not only be preserved in an intact form, but actually to develop further in relative isolation from Russian folk, popular and classical music. Because literature was part of the musical form and because Kazakh poetry was improvised, the form was not easy to censor, and as a result, it left room for the nurturing of national identity and the development of the Kazakh language (see Tynyshpayev, 178-89).

Kazakh music also benefited from the Soviet rule in terms of development of new genres, especially classic and popular. By creating new interpretations of traditional themes, as well as by incorporating some structural characteristics of folk music, these new genres contributed to the sense of national pride. At the same time, by their mere existence throughout all the republics of the Soviet Union, they built up the sense of shared cultural values and, therefore, the sense of common Soviet identity.
Choreography was another art which benefited during the Soviet period. Its emergence was one of the positive outcomes of the activity of the Party ideologists, since it was created for previously nomadic Kazakhs for universalization of cultural forms, as it was in all the republics of the U.S.S.R. Out of all the genres, Kazakh ballet was especially important for it was an object of national pride due to the high quality of training provided at the Kazakh Ballet School for several generations by world famous dance teachers (see Tynyshpayev, 190).

Television and written literature were two forms whose gains and losses were more difficult to estimate and to compare. The greater importance of these forms for the purposes of indoctrination ensured greater interference of Party ideologists into the natural process of literature’s development shaped by the tastes of readers and the aspirations of the writers. The leaders seeking ideological control attempted to tame these aspirations and to shape tastes to conform to the Party’s program (see Tynyshpayev, 167-8).

One way to establish control was to popularize those writers and poets who conveyed the ideas supporting or, at least, not contradicting the Communist agenda. Thus, the 19th century author, Abai Kunanbaev, was idolized for his loyalty to the Russian culture (a quality necessary in connection with Russian-bilingualism promotion) and his protests against czarism, colonial rule and the degrading influence of Islam and patriarchal society (an activity perceived favorably due to the example that it could provide in promoting the socio-economic program of the Party); while 20th century author, Dzhambul Dzhabayev,
was raised almost to the rank of a saint for the inspiration that he offered to the people of occupied Leningrad during the Second World War (his contribution was thought essential because it provided inspiration to the victims of Leningrad and promoted the ideas of unity, relatedness and friendship between the Soviet people during and after the Second World War).

In a similar fashion, Kazakh writers and poets of the second half of the 20th century were noticed whenever the themes of their works happened to correspond with the current focus of the party’s attention, either in dissemination of new ideas and values or in extermination of the old ones.

No matter how random the choice of such writers and poets was, it was beneficial for the maintenance of the Kazakh national identity and, in some respects, even contributed to its revival by raising the pride of the Kazakh people for their literary contribution into the common Soviet culture. The negative consequences of the practice were not limited to the randomness of the choices, but also consisted in the fact that all the richness of the Kazakh literary tradition was reduced to a couple of repeatedly mentioned names and, combined with the constant emphasis on the fact that Kazakhs had not had a written tradition prior to the 19th century (which was not accurate), led to inevitable stigmatization of Kazakh literary culture as immature and underdeveloped in comparison with Great Russian literature, as well as promoted chauvinism towards Kazakhs, undermining their national self-esteem, and caused disintegration of the nation of the Soviets (Olcott, 1990, 43-72).
Another way to establish control was censorship implemented through two institutions—the writers’ unions and the publishing houses. In both cases, Moscow might use either economic levers or direct intervention. Writer’s unions served as professional organizations, membership in which was essential for being able to get published, and, therefore, to make a living. Being a part of the union was to comply with the literary standards imposed by Moscow, often at the expense of the quality of work and one’s own beliefs and values. Publishing houses served as economic regulators of the development of the national literature because they were run, not by the principles of economic profitability, but rather by the ideologically motivated directives from the party authorities, who determined how many books would be published each year, how many of them would be in national languages, how many of the latter would be translations and on certain topics or by certain authors (Olcott, 1985, 142-5).

The popularization efforts, as well as the two institutions of ideological control favored the development of Soviet identity and Russification, with the first being promoted by literary planners by means of encouraging writing on topics connected with internationalism, friendship among Soviet peoples, etc., while the second being facilitated by providing more financial support to publication in the language of interethnic communication. Under these conditions, Kazakh nationalism could be expected to decline. Contrary to this expectation, however, Kazakh authors continued to write and to publish, as well as to remain popular among their readers by exploring topics dealing with the issues of preservation of the Kazakh culture and national identity. These were interesting for the native
population, and, although they were not encouraged, they were not banned from discussion either. Most of the authors of the time attempted to restore the historical past or tried to explore and to develop traditional Kazakh forms and genres; some wrote in Kazakh, while others did not, but treatment of national themes did not appear to be correlated with the language of the text. Moreover, all the works were translated into both Kazakh and Russian and so all were accessible to the entire Kazakh community (Multilingualism, 201-2). Some of the authors, such as M. Auezov and O. Suleimenov achieved U.S.S.R.-wide recognition.

The situation with television was similar. On the one hand, the programs of Kaz TV and the movies and the documentaries of the KazakhFilm Cinema Studio were subject to a scrutinizing censorship in the same way as literary works, and the amount of production was also set from above, with the general tendency of promoting Russian-language programs at the expense of the quality and amount of Kazakh-language productions. On the other hand, Kaz TV served as one of the most important tools for maintaining traditional culture with the majority of entertainment programs presenting a movie or a musical competition of some kind. With most of the movies produced by the Kazakh Film cinema studio being based upon folklore and traditional topics, cinematography had an important role in maintaining national traditions, history, account of role models, etc. Musical programs were even more important in that respect, since most of them were in the form of the traditional aitys of akyns, a competition of improvising singers, competing in witiness, poetic skill and singing, often discussing contemporary
social issues in the traditional musical way. As it has been mentioned, aityses were important for the development and preservation of the Kazakh language. Both indirectly, through language, and directly, through the content of the programs, TV facilitated the growth of national identity.

TV also became important in terms of the development of new musical and other art forms. Thus, TV provided wide access for Kazakhs from different parts of the country to the developing national classic and instrumental music, to the growing art of national dance and ballet, to the new form of humor in the extremely popular program *Tamasha (Good Mood)*, which in the most entertaining form criticized issues in the Kazakh and Soviet societies that otherwise could not be discussed.

A control similar to that over literature existed not only for all major art forms (theater, cinema, visual art, the circus, etc.), but was also established over major museums and exhibition facilities. In case of the latter, not only the content of expositions would be monitored, but also the re-distribution of material funds would be implemented by Moscow. In fact, it is due to such a redistribution favoring central Russian museums and exhibition halls that Kazakhstan lost many valuable artifacts from its archeological sites, private collections, museums and other sources (see Tynyshpayev, 175-89).

Another context where the complexity of the situation was manifested was in the military. In 1938, the Soviet government introduced universal military conscription. In accordance with the innovation, all male citizens were subject to military obligation based on individual recruitment and the service in ethnically
mixed units away from their places of residence. The language of the forces was exclusively Russian, and ethnic Russians predominated in the professional cadre. Such an organization of the army was initially expected to serve the mission of "internationalization," or to use the terminology of this study, of the formation of the supranational Soviet identity; later there was added the purpose of second language promotion. However, in the course of time, with the U.S.S.R.-wide spread of the stereotype of Moslem ethnicities as lagging behind in their development, with the numeric increase of Moslem populations in the army as a result of demographic changes in Central Asia, with the discriminatory practice of assigning draftees to their divisions according to the prestige of the division and the status of the ethnicity of the draftee, and with the notorious under-funding of the army and the flourishing of violence as a sign of dissipation, the army became an instrument of fostering ethnic discrimination and chauvinism as a form of xenophobic national identity, rather than a way of facilitating internationalization. In realization of this problem, with the rise of nationalism, the army launched a campaign to recruit Moslem youth for officers schools, one aspect of which was building military ethos using the example of Moslem participation in the Second World War (Lewis, 80). The declining economic and disciplinary conditions in the army, however, made the prospective of military service unattractive for Moslems, thus undermining the efforts made by the administration. During the war in Afghanistan nationalism increased even more, since at the time Moslems came to be viewed as politically unreliable. The experience of forced devaluation of the Central Asian soldier during the service, especially strong if the soldier were
assigned to serve in *stroibats* (construction brigades) would develop into strong feeling of dislike of everything Russian or, in some cases, of everything non-Moslem (Rakowska, 91).

Economic policy during this period was closely connected with and contributed into the complexity of the nationality and linguistic situations and policymaking. As Schroeder mentions

…not only the nationality factor constrained decisions about how best to organize the administration of the economy, but it also politicized and sharpened the inevitable conflicts over budget allocations for social services and investments. (Schroeder, 43-72)

Until the early 1960’s, the central leadership remained committed to “massive transfer payments from the more developed regions to the less developed ones” (Burg, 33) to level out differences in the socio-economic development of the republics. At the very beginning, this approach benefited Kazakhstan, which was considered an underdeveloped area. It was subject to special treatment in budget allocations and received influxes of a much needed working force in the form of seasonal student brigades and the re-location of professional employees for longer periods. (One of the biggest of such influxes occurred during the Virgin Lands Raising Campaign in late 1950s) (see Asfendiyarov, 278-95). This special treatment contributed to the formation of positive attitudes towards Sovietization.

However, the commitment (for securing economic integration of the less developed periphery) declined as the most outrageous inequalities were reduced and a concern for the economy as a whole increased in the second half of the
period. Moreover, the inefficiency of the regional economy and the catastrophic ecological problems of the time revealed the colonial character of the socio-economic policy of the first half of the period and the failure to comply with the principle of national equality claimed as a basis of the socio-economic policy's development and implementation. The efforts to raise the economy of Central Asia resulted in making the region dependent on external allocations. In spite of all the allocations, the region had “by far the least manufacturing per capita, with the relative level actually declining in every republic...” and “its resources…shipped overwhelmingly to the European U.S.S.R. and for export in virtually unprocessed form” (Hetcher model of internal colonialism). During the Cold War, Kazakhstan was also turned into a huge testing facility, exploding nuclear bombs and launching spaceships at the expense of its populations health, ecological balance and without substantial increase in the professional work force with most of the key staff for the secret military objects being imported from the European part of the U.S.S.R. (see Tynyshpayev, 190).

The desperate state of the economy was primarily reflected most in the republic's living standards (per capita expenses), which were lower in Central Asia than anywhere else, and in the state of the national work force with titular nationalities being poorly educated and therefore more likely to be employed in low-wage sectors such as agriculture and food-processing industries, and the trade and service areas (Schroeder, 46).

The dissatisfaction with the combination of all the negative consequences of internal colonialism taking place in Kazakhstan would manifest itself in the form of
national front movements during the next stage of the development of the Soviet
Union, once Gorbachev’s glasnost would disclose information and remove the
ban on open discussions of the drawbacks of the existing system (Marshall, 7-41).

Long before 1985, the negative outcomes of extensive economic development
would force Moscow to increase centralization of control, which would lessen
relative autonomy of the republic in economic, social and other sorts of decision
making, the result of which would lead to the rise of nationalist aspirations and
anti-Sovietism.

Another major area of controversy was the policy of the C.P.S.U. with respect
to religion. During the post-Stalinist era, as a result of the decline in political
persecution on the basis of religious affiliation, all religious denominations in the
Soviet Union experienced some sort of revival with a number of believers growing,
and educational institutions for religious servants increased in numbers. In
Kazakhstan, Islam and the Russian Orthodox Church in particular were
expanding (Bociurkiw, 148-75).

This revival was only indirectly a result of a political action. More importantly,
the development of previously oppressed religious aspirations was facilitated by
the atmosphere of ideological thaw as well as by unintended results of political
actions in other spheres. For example, the rise of Orthodox Christianity was
connected with the promotion of the Russian culture as a part of the bilingualism
campaign, the governmental approval of the celebration of the millennium of
Christianity in Russia being particularly notable in this respect, while the growth of
Islam was a side effect of the prolonged war with Afghanistan.
In addition, Islam was not a national religion; rather, it was transnational and, therefore, it was perceived as more dangerous by the Soviet authorities due to its potential in unifying all Turks of Central Asia amongst themselves and also with the rest of the Islamic world. An aggressive policy against Islam was viewed as carrying a potential for causing separatism, and, as a consequence, Moslems had more freedom to build their mosques and to train clergy than any other religion of the Soviet Union. Although nomadic Kazakhs had never practiced Islam as obediently as their neighbors, mingling Islamic practices with their own cosmological shamanism, in the conditions of the Soviet ethnic de-individualization Islamic revival played an important part in the growth of national awareness, especially closer to the end of the post-Stalinist period during the years of the Afghan war. In combination with national identity promoting the role of Christianity, Islamic revivalism contributed to polarization of the two major nationalities of Kazakhstan by the end of the post-Stalinist era (Lewis, 161-2).

Despite all the complexity of the nationalist and linguistic situations during the post-Stalinist period discussed above, it is still possible to identify in the most general way the end-result of the direct and indirect language-related legislation and political practices.

By the end of the period, as a result of an intentional effort for developing societal bilingualism in Russian, the language of international communication significantly expanded in terms of the number of functional domains. Apart from dominating the fields of bureaucratic discourse and science, it came to dominate
the system of education, and, in addition, penetrated the field of everyday communication at work, in mass media and, at times, even in family communication. Kazakh continued to be used simultaneously with Russian in all the domains (see Olcott, 1985, 183). With both languages used in all the possible functions of domestic communication (this excludes the functions of the language of inter-republican communication and the language of negotiations with other countries fulfilled exclusively by Russian), the existence of diglossia might be questioned if it were not for the difference in the frequency of use of Kazakh and Russian in a specific function. If calculated in terms of the numeric majority of speakers, Russian was used more frequently in all the domains except communication with family members (extended family included). This absolute domination of Russian is evidence of the establishment of Russian-based bilingualism in the republic. However, it cannot serve as evidence for the decline in the use of Kazakh. The frequency of the native language’s use in particular domains depended on the geographic location of the speaker, and on the ethnic composition of the region, as well as on a number of other factors. A set of functional domains for Kazakh characteristic of a particular speaker ranged from a very small one including restricted symbolic use with family members for extremely Russified Kazakhs of the industrial north to a large set of all existing functional domains with Russian used only out of necessity for communication with Russian-speakers not conversant in the national tongue in the scarcely populated rural south.
One other matter of interest should be noted: Russian had an influence on the development of increasing diglossia within the Kazakh language itself. Because under Russian pressure Soviet linguists often tended to create a literary standard based on urban dialects, which often bore only limited similarity in some important respects to rural dialects, there appeared increasing divergence between the literary and spoken Kazakh language (Lewis, 51).

By the end of the third period of the Soviet era, there had evolved different patterns of language use:

1) monolingualism – among the youngest generation, whose members are brought up in the native language at home (in early childhood);

2) national-Russian bilingualism – among school children and among workers in urban areas;

3) other variants of bilingualism – for instance Kazakh-Uzbek bilingualism among the elder generation;

4) multilingualism – for instance Kazakh-Uzbek-Russian multilingualism among Uzbek workers in rural areas and in ethnically mixed families.

(Haarman, 314-19)

In the case of national-Russian, specifically Kazakh-Russian bilingualism, the situation was similar to the situation with diglossia. It could be claimed that societal bilingualism had been eventually achieved, although language shift had not yet happened. This conclusion can be confirmed with the available statistical data provided by Lewis:

According to the 1979 census, 52.3% of the Kazakh population “freely
speaks” Russian (proof of societal bilingualism). Nonetheless 97.5% of the Kazakh population still considers Kazakh to be their native language (proof of absence of shift). (Lewis, 200)

However, just as in the case of diglossia, this generic statement would not necessarily be true if one started to analyze the nature of the bilingualism in a specific linguistic community. The structure of this type of bilingualism differentiated with respect to the demographic milieu.

The language behavior (including varying preference of language choice, language maintenance and integration processes) of the urban population differed considerably from that of the population in rural areas. Normally the urban population used Russian more widely as a second language component of the national-Russian bilingualism than did the rural population (Lewis, 156-80). The level of language maintenance (maintenance of the native language in its status as a primary language or mother tongue) frequently showed a special correlation to the second language component, so in urban bilingual groups, which were characterized by a higher rate of (Russian) second language use, the rate of Kazakh language maintenance was lower and language shift to Russian was more likely to occur.

The female population preserved the national language better than males (see Lewis, 156-80). One may find an explanation for this general tendency by taking into consideration the unequal level of education among males and females in the Soviet Union; there were more members of the male population who obtained qualifications as special workers and of the university level than females.
Both education and the experience in Russian-dominated work-place communication made males more likely to adopt Russian as a second language.

Assimilation was strongest in the age group 12-25, the years of secondary and higher education, where Russian was either the only language of instruction (higher education) or was intensively taught as a second language (secondary education) (see Lewis, 156-80). In general, Russian as a second language component was widespread among all age groups with the exception of the youngest and oldest members of the speech community. The youngest members, predominantly infants and toddlers were monolingual in the language used by their mothers, while the older generation might have failed to acquire the second language during their youth and early adulthood because of the different linguistic situation at the time (see Lewis, 156-80).

Thus, the extent of bilingualism and language maintenance varied according to the geographic location of the specific language community. There were more bilingual and Russified Kazakhs in the urban areas of the Russian-dominated north than in the predominantly Kazakh south (see Lewis, 156-80).

If we were to identify types of Kazakh-Russian bilingualism depending on the degree of assimilation, then the following would be the result:

1) co-existence of languages caused by geo-proximity, no distinction, indifference to what language is used (on the border with Russia);
2) dynamic bilingualism--assimilation (role differentiation) (in the north of the republic among the younger generation);
3) overlapping (assume overlapping functions, one in group, the other in
the civic cultures) (in the south of the republic among working adults);

4) almost complete assimilation (the native language performs only symbolic role) (in multiethnic families, outside the republic, in communities dominated by Russian among younger generation).

(Lewis, 276)

Regarding this state of bilingualism in the Kazakh republic, it should be noted that the situation with language maintenance and assimilation was complex and unstable, showing a high degree of variation, depending on the demographic factors and geographical location of the linguistic communities. By the beginning of Gorbachev’s reform, Kazakh and Russian had equal chances of dominating the structure of bilingualism, and subsequent development of their role distribution depended on the implementing of further policy related to issues of language and nationalism. On the one hand, the majority of Kazakh bilinguals in Russian were still maintaining their language, on the other, “the pressure of Russian exerted on the local languages tended to weaken their position as a primary language and thus functioned as a factor in dissolving the structures of national-Russian bilingualism” (Lewis, 326) to make language shift possible in the nearest future among the younger generation of speakers.

There is a need to characterize the state of national and supra-national identities and the dynamics of interethnic communication.

By 1985, most of the peoples in the Soviet Union had developed rather a strong sense of common historical and cultural identity, the identity of the Soviet People. The extent of identification with the group varied, depending on the age of
a person, his/her ethnic affiliation, level of education, type of occupation, and social status. As a result of the consistent attempt to cultivate societal Russian language bilingualism, and the increasing role of the Russian language as a means of interethnic communication, an important part of the identity was associated with the Russian culture. Due to the systematic practice of emphasizing the role of Russia in the progressive development of the former colonies of the Russian Empire, as a consequence of the applications of the methods of ethno-pedagogy in teaching Russian as a second language, and as an outcome of extensive media support of Russian literature and art, most of the citizens of the Soviet Union internalized a belief in the cultural superiority of the ethnically Russian big brother. This belief, however, should not be confused with cultural assimilation. Despite the cultural exchange between the peoples of the Soviet Union, leading to the inevitable unification of life-styles, rituals, values and tastes during the process of the formation of their Soviet common identity, most of the larger ethnicities and nationalities outside of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, especially those comprising the majority in the republics, continued to maintain their cultural identity. This identity, of course, was preserved to different degrees. Below is the discussion of the state of different ethnic and national identities in Kazakhstan.

At no other point of Soviet history up to the period of Gorbachev’s reform, had such an impressive amount of the Kazakh population experienced awareness about the importance of their language and culture. While the number of the consciously aware had grown as a result of the increase in the level of education
and general public's political participation, the extent of awareness was different for various groups of the Kazakh population. Thus, the national intelligentsia remained the main carriers of the distinct Kazakh national identity characterized by the memory of the heroic past and concern for the troubled future. It was reduced to a mere indication of ethnic affiliation in the Soviet passport for some of the assimilated individuals in the Russian-dominated regions of the republic. In the majority of the population, however, this feeling of national identity was balanced with affiliation with the larger group of Soviet citizens.

Whenever the two affiliations were not in conflict most of the Kazakhs would willfully admit their membership in both groups; in situations of conflict, however, the consciousness of national identity would always be stronger. Thus, most Kazakhs were likely to experience nationalist aspirations when their rights were endangered in favor of other ethnicities of the Soviet Union or whenever other nationalities, out of their nationalist aspirations, perceived and acted towards Kazakhs on the basis of belief in Kazakh inferiority (see Tynyshpayev, 167). With this explanation in mind, it will not be difficult to understand why nationalism often appeared in the armed forces and among the lower class, especially the rural population. In the first case, the representatives of the Kazakh nationality often became aware for the first time of the wide spread prejudice of the European population of the Soviet Union towards Central Asians and Kazakhs in particular, while in the second case, the underprivileged status of the predominantly uneducated, minimally bilingual and culturally assimilated rural Kazakhs made them extremely conscious about their national identity when they compared
themselves with their perceptually Russified urban counterparts (see Rakowska, 72-95). This is not to say that urban Kazakhs were not aware of their national identity. The point is that awareness was conscious only when it was not taken into consideration by the Soviet nationality policy planners.

As early as the 1960s, Russian nationalism became the main threat to the common identity of the Soviet people and the main factor contributing to the gradual dissipation of the Soviet system as a whole (see Spechler, 281-305). There were three major sources that contributed to the rise of nationalism. One was the internal decline in the economics of R.S.F.S.R., especially the problem in agricultural development and the death of the Russian village, perceived by Russians as the center of the Russian soul. This awareness of the agricultural catastrophe was accompanied by the feeling of reverse discrimination, perceived as resulting from the affirmative action program providing special support to the underdeveloped economies of the former colonies. There was also a general devaluation of the Russian culture, resulting from its exploitation in the attempt to achieve societal bilingualism and promote a sense of common identity in the Soviet people. This attempt was narrowed down to ideological “promotion” of the Russian language and culture by means of imposition of politically correct truths and ready-to-use speech samples. Such promotion led to trivialization of the most important achievements of the Russian people. There was also another reason for devaluation. As mentioned earlier, because of its symbolic function, the Russian language had the potential for being destructive of the feeling of supra-ethnic unity in the Soviet people. This potential was a result of the Imperial past and the
negative attitudes of the non-Russian population towards czarism. In order to prevent the negative influence of past associations, the Soviet nationality and language policy planners tried to prevent the manifestation of any feeling that even distantly resembled Great Russian chauvinism. Under the conditions of the blind rule of ideological doctrine, these attempts often resulted in attacks on any display of respect towards Russian culture by anyone ethnically Russian (Szporluk, 12-4).

Other ethnicities of Soviet Kazakhstan underwent a higher degree of assimilation than the indigenous population, because of the lower status that they were assigned in the nationality policy game. The tendency for assimilation with one of the majority groups characteristic of the previous period continued further. This assimilation was strongest in linguistic respects with most of the groups retaining some sort of ethnic traditions at least at the level of family communication. Out of the national groups that evolved during the period in the Soviet Union, a group of Russian Germans was particularly strong in Kazakhstan. Germans consistently claimed the right for autonomy in the territory of the republic and maintained very strong nationality-based group networks (see Tynyshpayev, 178-95).

As for the dynamics of interethnic interaction during the post-Stalinist period, although there were no open nationality based conflicts in Kazakhstan during this time, ethnic intolerance did exist at the level of individual encounters and teatime conversations between family members and friends (see Tynyshpayev, 178).
The post-Stalinist period in the development of the nationality and language policy in Kazakhstan saw greater complexity in the overall situation and in the controversial character of the resulting strategies and practices. Although centralization of control over the process of socio-economic reformation was less totalitarian than during the time of the personality cult, it was retained and required further effort to promote societal bilingualism. The importance of the development of bilingualism in the lingua franca made language policy central in the nationality concerns of the Communist Party. The attempts to promote bilingualism became more systematic and were justified and supported with scientific research, monetary input and media support. At the same time, the danger of disregarding non-Russian nationalism was well understood and the attempt to at least allow for the exercise of the right of linguistic and national equality was undertaken. Not accompanied with financial or media support and supplemented with the increase in the status of the Russian language, the right to Kazakh language use was not frequently utilized by Kazakh people, who often chose Russian-language instruction and, subsequently, the Russian way of life for the promise of high status guaranteed to bilinguals and those brought up in the values of the Russian culture. The complexity of the situation was manifested in all aspects of the society, starting from the traditional domains of institutes of political control and education to such domains as the military, media, economic policy and religion. Language related acts varied from direct ones, connected with language development and promotion, to indirect ones, implemented through untraditional domains. The resulting functional distribution between Russian and Kazakh
prepared the conditions for the formation of societal bilingualism by producing an overlap of communicative domains and variation in terms of use between speakers of different demographic characteristics and geographic origins. Although societal bilingualism had finally emerged, the language shift had not and the extent of bilingualism varied with regards to demographic and geographic characteristics in the same way as in the case of diglossia.

Both Kazakhs and Russians had also developed a strong supra-national identity of the Soviet people, although both also became more extensively and intensively aware of their national affiliation. Sovietization was also based upon a high degree of enculturation into the Russian values and traditions, although this enculturation took the form of cultural exchange rather than assimilation.

Minority groups in Kazakhstan were also experiencing the sense of common Soviet identity and managed to preserve their cultural identities to a different degree. Interethnic conflicts were manifested only at the level of interpersonal communication and their intensity depended on the presence of conflict between the Soviet and national identity of the involved sides. Overall, further development of the interethnic dynamics as well as the character of societal bilingualism and functional role assignment depended on the directions of further nationality and language policy: actual legislation and practices in implementation.

Period of Gorbachev’s Bilingualism Reversal

The last period of the Soviet era lasted for only six years; however, because of the role the six years played in the evolution of Kazakh-Russian bilingualism, it
should be given separate consideration. The period began in 1985, the year of the beginning of Gorbachev’s reform, and finished in 1991, when the reform resulted in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the formation of the independent Republic of Kazakhstan. The importance of the period was as a turning point, radically changing the distribution of language roles and statuses, as well as the nature of Kazakh-Russian bilingualism. This period reversed the flow of ethnic and linguistic assimilation of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, set the process of formation of culturally distinct nations and put an end to an almost century long endeavor of generating a unity of historically, culturally and linguistically diverse ethnic groups.

Gorbachev’s reform was a natural end to the prolonged period of economic stagnation that had been keeping the Soviet Union far behind its ideological foes. Stalin’s idea of centralized control as a necessary condition of a successful socio-economic reformation with the goal of catching up with the development of the capitalist world turned maintenance of control into an end in itself. With the rest of the world developing at accelerated rates because of scientific progress and freedom of creativity under the conditions of unregulated competition, the U.S.S.R., encapsulated into ideological isolation, was suspended in economic stagnation while the living conditions of its population, rapidly expanding and growing in expectations, were approaching the threshold of potential by mutual intolerance.

Under these conditions, the new Secretary General, M.Gorbachev, had to take steps towards economic reformation. The solution to economic stagnation
was comprised of two components. One was economic restructuring, *perestroika*, aimed at replacing central planning and control over the regionally implemented unified economy with central coordination of locally planned, controlled and implemented independent economies. The second component was ideological liberalization, *glasnost*, aimed at creating a level of pluralism that would enliven economic creativity. This combination of decentralization and liberalization from the very beginning had the potential for destroying the two most important foundations of the Soviet Union--economic interdependence and ideological unity ensured by the leading role of the Communist party (see Thompson, 300). By removing the two foundations, it released the centripetal forces originating from the aspirations of the various nationalities for maximal self-determination. Deprived of the common ground, the nationalities saw no reason for membership in the supra-national entity of the Soviet Union (Marshall, 7-41). A more detailed explanation of the mechanism that released the centripetal forces in Kazakhstan is worth examining.

The solution of economic problems was seen in increasing the efficiency of republican economies by separate management of regional resources and local funds. Inter-republican economic relationships were to be based upon mutual interest and profitability for the participating sides rather than on centralized redistribution. Decentralization put an end to the practice of preferential treatment of Central Asian republics. The practice was declared to have produced the positive results of bringing the republics to the level where they could successfully participate in unaided union-wide economic development (see Schroeder, 43-72).
The decision regarding economic decentralization had both favorable and unfavorable consequences for Kazakhstan. On the one hand, the republic lost a considerable amount of financial inflow into its struggling economy and was facing the challenging task of successfully competing with the more efficient economies of European republics while facing growing social problems of unemployment and declining living standards, amplified by population growth among the indigenous nationality. This had the side effect of breaking the ethnic balance and the stability in interethnic communication dependent upon socio-economic situation. On the other hand, the republic received an opportunity to control its financial and material resources, and to use them for the benefit of its population, including their use for the solution of social problems. The success of the reform depended on whether the conditions for self-governance were created. Gorbachev’s administration failed to create such conditions, because of the internal contradiction of their concept of economic reformation (see Schroeder, 43-72).

In order to maintain the coordinating role of the center, Gorbachev conducted a cadre policy that favored ethnic Russians or local officials with experience in Moscow. This policy was destined to fail because it did not take into consideration the ethnic aspect of policy-making. On the one hand, the new appointees were perceived negatively by the general public, who expected immediate improvement of living conditions and could not see the promise of such improvements from the leaders who had not had experience in the republic. On the other hand, this policy was disfavored by the local political elite, whose expectations of greater control over the republic had not been met. The combination of these two factors resulted
in a demonstration of protest in December 1986, which caused Gorbachev’s administration to commit another major error--to use military and subsequently political persecution against the demonstrators, acts that led to mobilization of national fronts in Kazakhstan and, in fact, all around the Soviet Union (see Olcott, 1995, 249-71).

In its turn, glasnost’ “had been more effective in arousing nationalist sentiments than it had been in mobilizing a constituency for economic reform” (Bessinger, 301-23). Freedom of speech brought about two important forums related to nationalism. One was connected with the legalization of the political ideas from the past, which included the ideas of national autonomy and of the discriminatory practices of the previous union administrations. The other was connected with open discussion of nationality specific problems then current. The combination of the two produced a marked rise in nationalism. According to Bessinger:

Though ostensibly created to aid the party’s goal of restructuring, these fronts in a number of cases succeeded in becoming the leading political force of their republics, commanding the allegiance of the overwhelming majority of their population, toppling local party secretaries, and in some cases capturing local party organizations and turning them into vehicles for the expression of nationalist demands to the center. (Bessinger, 314)

This increase in the political influence of the national fronts undermined the leading role of the Communist party, and with the further decline of its role as a consequence of the worsening of the economic situation, allowed the national
fronts to take full control of republican administrations and, in 1991, claim their republics' sovereignties.

The short period of Gorbachev's reformation had a detrimental effect on the feeling of common Soviet identity, carefully cultivated by all previous administrations. Dissipation of the interconnecting economy and the crisis of the unifying Communist ideology cut the ties connecting the republics, while the redistribution of regional control, as well as an increasing struggle for limited resources, produced ethnic tensions within each of them. This is not to say that the cultural and linguistic unity disappeared within a moment; rather the conflict between the ethnic and Soviet identities resolved in favor of ethnic affiliation (Marshall, 7-41).

Each of the peoples of the multinational Kazakhstan experienced a rise in nationalism. For all the nationalities and ethnicities the rise was caused, first of all, by the spiritual revival brought about by the unconstrained and self-feeding discussion about history that people had the previously been prohibited from recalling and the problematic and controversial present of the group unleashed by ideological liberalization. Each of the peoples was restoring names, events, traditions and ideas which had been banned during the years of Soviet rule. In the case of Russians and Kazakhs of Kazakhstan the rise of nationalism was reinforced even more by the redistribution of control over the resources of the republic. Kazakhs were empowered by the promise of political autonomy and dissatisfied with the continuing practice of preference for Russian or loyalty towards Russian cadres in the republican administrative organs. Russians were
empowered by legalized Russian nationalism and the experience of autonomy in the Russian Federation and frustrated at the increase in political influence of the national political elite. These two major ethnic groups of the republic had different views with regard to the future of nationalities and language legislation. However, at the moment of dissolution, they both wanted to remain in a political unit with Russia.

Initially, neither nationality nor language policy were on Gorbachev’s agenda. In fact, the discontinuation of the principle of affirmative action in economic regulation and of the principle of corenization in the party cadre policy was a manifestation of a total disregard to nationality issues. Only in 1987, after two years of being in office and having had an opportunity to observe the negative consequences of the politics of nationality-blindness he came to the conclusion that “not a single major issue can be resolved …without taking into consideration the fact that we live in a multinational country” (Bessinger, 306). In Kazakhstan the change in Gorbachev’s nationality policy took place after the events of December 1986, when Gorbachev’s Russian-speaking appointee Kolbin undertook efforts to learn the national language and to familiarize himself with the national culture. However, even after the change in the party’s attitudes towards the nationality policy, its involvement in the resolution of the nationality issues was restricted to proclamations and passive observation of what was happening as a result of the loosening of ideological control. Most of the actual policy making was implemented by another political power of the time - the participants of the national fronts. These founded cultural centers, organized celebrations of
traditional holidays, sponsored the publication of new books and filled the role previously reserved for the Communist Party—shaping the political opinion of the popular masses.

One of the most important direct language policy decisions of the time was introduction of the required training in Kazakh as a second language in schools with Russian language instruction, as well as enrichment of the school curriculum with separate courses in revised Kazakh literature and history including the names, dates and events blacked out during the years of ideological suppression.

The ten years of reformation were insufficient for any sort of visible change to occur in the structure of bilingualism or diglossia. Russian and Kazakh continued to have overlapping communicative functions and maintain the existing character of bilingualism. What changed was the character of linguistic attitudes that would affect the future of language reform in independent Kazakhstan.

The importance of Gorbachev’s reformation consisted in several facts: it led to a polarization of the ethnic structure of Kazakhs society by generating an intense awareness of national identity; it changed the statuses of ethnicities in terms of political influence (changed majorities and minorities); it undermined the feeling of unity among the culturally and linguistically diverse peoples of what was to become an independent Republic of Kazakhstan; it reversed the process of ethnic and linguistic assimilation and changed attitudes towards the two major languages participating in societal bilingualism. Whatever course the new leaders of independent Kazakhstan were to assume, they had to take into consideration
the complexity of the ethno-linguistic situation and the historical origins of this situation from the very point of conception of the Kazakh-Russian diglossia in 1731.
CHAPTER IV

PRESENT STATE

This section is devoted to the contemporary stage in the development of bilingualism, diglossia, and language policy in Kazakhstan. What we refer to as the contemporary stage in the development is the period starting from December 25, 1991, when Kazakhstan became an independent state, lasting up to the present moment, more than 10 years, time enough for considering it in a historical perspective. However, we will treat the early days of independence as a part of the present because the current state of bilingualism, diglossia and language policy in the country is in most respects a result of the strategy assumed and the acts undertaken by the government at the early stages of independence.

The Republic of Kazakhstan was formed as an outcome of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This did not happen by the will of the Kazakhstani people (represented by their government), who until the last moment had attempted to retain membership in the Soviet Union re-organized on the basis of a new type of interaction between the comprising republics. The formation of the independent state of Kazakhstan was a historical necessity, which made it more beneficial for the republic to leave the union rather than to become a part of independent Russia after the non-Central Asian republics had expressed their intent for autonomous development.
Although few years have passed since Kazakhstan acquired independence, many changes that affected the state of diglossia and bilingualism in the country have been implemented. There is need for a detailed evaluation of the results achieved and for subjection of the chosen course to scrupulous re-consideration. This chapter attempts to provide an analysis of this sort, taking into consideration the existing theory, historical preliminaries and some relevant extra-linguistic contexts.

Let us start with the description of the initial conditions, under which the goals of the language policy were to be stated and the strategies identified.

At the moment of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the total population of Kazakhstan was 16,464,464. Of the total, 6,535,000 (39.7%) were Kazakhs, who were only slightly greater in number than the 6,228,000 (37.8%) Russians. Other major ethnicities represented were Ukrainians, 896,000 (5.4%); Uzbeks--332,000 (2.0%); Germans--958,000 (5.8%); Tatars--328,000 (2.0%); Uigurs--185,000 (1.1%); Byelorussians--183,000 (1.1%); Koreans--103,000 (0.6%); Azerbaijanis--90,000 (0.5%), and Turks--75,900 (0.5%) (1989 census, Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Statistics). As a result of Soviet nationality and language policies, these people entered their new citizenship either monolingual or bilingual in Russian in such a way that almost 100% of the population were using Russian, the language of interethnic communication in a wide range of functional domains, while the language of ethnic majority, Kazakh, restricted both in use and the number of speakers, was known primarily, but not universally, by Kazakhs
themselves and was used equally with Russian only in communication with family members among most of the native speakers (see Bruchis, 23-41).

The complexity of the ethnolingusitic situation for further nationality and language policy-making rested on the fact that all of the peoples of newly independent Kazakhstan had developed a rather strong ethnic/national identity during the years of Soviet rule, especially during the era of restructuring and glasnost. At least three groups—the titular nationality, Russians and Germans -- had developed a strong feeling of nationalism, particularly relevant for a potential break-down in interethnic dynamics.

As a result of the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., the national identities of the peoples increased even more. Kazakhs became more aware of their identity having eventually become not only the numeric, but also the political majority in the country. The main source of nationalism of Kazakhstani Russians was twofold. On the one hand, it was connected to the fact that Russians had lost their positions as the political majority that they had assumed in the non-Russian Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan. On the other, it was amplified by the acquisition of independence by their historical motherland across the border. Kazakhstani Germans' aspirations for preservation and further development of their language and culture, as well as for re-unification with their co-nationals in Germany, originated from the repatriation and diaspora-support policy conducted by the German government towards all the representatives of their nationality from the former Soviet Union. Finally, as a consequence of the liberalization processes that had been taking place on the eve of dissolution, all other ethnic minorities had
high expectations from the government with respect to protection of their right for the preservation of their national identity and language.

In addition, the new language policy had to be put into practice together with reformation of the economic, social and political systems, simultaneously with new supra-national identity building, in the conditions of under-funding, attitudes of resistance to change, in general, under the circumstances of the complex interplay between contradictory forces and goals, and in the context of interdependence with other former Soviet republics and the increasing pace of globalization and accelerated differentiation between the developed and the developing worlds.

At the same time, some of the initial conditions were favorable; one such condition was the culture of relative interethnic tolerance, which had been cultivated, due to or in spite of the efforts of the Soviet government for Sovietization. This tolerance was, of course, very fragile and easy to break with ethnically insensitive experimentation of political, economic, social or other kinds. Another facilitative factor was a well-developed societal bilingualism, which reflected the ethnic representation of the country. If it were not for this bilingualism, the wounds of ethnic minorities caused by language reformation in Kazakhstan would have been much more.

Another factor was the relative secularism of the society, which prevented interethnic conflicts on religious grounds with ethnicities and nationalities belonging historically to different confessions. Still another contributing factor was absence of reasonable grounds for separatist claims, which saved the new state
from destructive wars and upheavals. Finally, there was also the geopolitical location of the country, which made it too important a buffer between Europe and Asia for a single powerful country, such as Russia, the United States or China, to interfere with the internal affairs of the republic too much. Indirectly, Kazakhstan’s language and nationality policy-makers benefited from the combination of factors that made the country attractive for a multitude of serious international partners--its vast territory, the potential promise of its natural resources, the appropriate level of development of its science and educational system, relatively developed infrastructure and, initially, even the mere fact of presence on its territory of the considerable amount of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear reserve and one of the world’s largest in the world launching facility for spacecraft. The combination of these factors created a relative advantage in the implementation of economic, political and social reforms compared with some of the partners from the Commonwealth of Independent States, and, consequently, less potential for interethic conflicts and better conditions for linguistic reformation and nation-building.

The success of language policy-making seems to depend on the nation’s leaders’ ability to make the most of the advantages and to come up with a well-thought through way of dealing with disadvantages. It also seems to depend on the ability to take into consideration gains and losses from the nation’s past and the experience of language reform in other countries at present. A successful language policy needs to be consistent, i.e. built upon a set of consciously and intentionally defined goals, based on regular progress evaluation, and an absence
of contradicting reforms in the nationality policy, economics, social and political spheres. It has to encourage extended forums of discussion involving all the relevant groups of the society. Now let us see whether the contemporary language policy in Kazakhstan has met these criteria (see Fasold, 246-66).

One of the first problems facing the early Kazakhstani policy-makers was determination of the official language of the new state. The difficulty in choosing the language came from contradictions in the goals posed by nationality, language and socio-economic policies. The goal of the nationality policy was to build a new sense of nationhood that would keep the multiethnic society together. The achievement of the goal was not easy because of the co-existence in the country of several groups with nationalist aspirations which counteracted the cultivation of Kazakhstanis’ new identity. But even more importantly, the complication was posed by the fact that the intentional process of nation-building was accompanied by the continuing natural process of the rejuvenation of the national identities of the comprising nationalities, the process which had started during Gorbachev’s reformation and which in many ways counteracted the goal of the nationality policy. Kazakhs and Russians were particularly relevant in this respect, because the former were gaining power at the expense of the latter, who perceived the loss even more acutely with the strengthening of Russianism in their historical motherland across the border.

The linguistic situation added to this complexity. With language being an important element of national identity, the goal of the language policy was to choose, develop and promote a language which would provide for the fastest
formation of interethnic unity in the republic, necessary for its successful socio-economic development.

Due to the efforts of the Soviet language policy-makers, societal Russian bilingualism had become a reality in Kazakhstani society, with all the population speaking Russian. Because of the numeric prevalence of these speakers, Russian was a potential candidate for the new nation’s language. The problem with Russian, however, was connected with the fact that it carried with it the stigma of having served as the state language of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and, in the future, the Russian Federation— all serving as impediments to the formation of the new identity, especially with non-Russian peoples having some negative associations with the Russian rule in the case of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, and with the possibility for the contemporary Russians of the mainland to consider restoration of the Empire or to exercise political, cultural or economic influence over the former colonies and, subsequently, union republics.

With the majority of the population being Kazakh, and with the uniqueness of the language itself, Kazakh was a possible alternative to Russian. However, after the years of Russification, often based on cultivation of a belief in the inferiority of non-Russian languages, most of the non-Kazakhs, who, in addition, were not conversant in the language, were likely to resist its promotion. Besides, since the process of the formation of the Soviet identity had never been completed, Kazakhs were still perceived by the representatives of the minority ethnicities and nationalities as historically indigenous people, who, under the new conditions,
were likely to push the process of restoration of the national identity further towards the prevalence of the Kazakh rather than Kazakhstani nationalism. Thus, the choice of the Kazakh language would be inevitably interpreted as an attempt to build the nation of exclusively Kazakhs rather than multiethnic Kazakhstanis. This, of course, would be a political mistake with Kazaks not being particularly numerous and with the country’s professional workforce being predominantly ethnically Russian, especially taking into consideration the danger of expansion posed by overpopulated China behind the back door.

Whether Russian or Kazakh were chosen, the choice would have been poor, since if either of the two identity-defining languages had been given the special status of the state language, this selection would have immediately destroyed the relative balance of power between the two major nationalities and, therefore, would have counteracted the major goal of the nationality policy.

Not only did Kazakh not have as many speakers as Russian, but also, because of the Soviet diglossia, it was not developed enough to successfully fulfill all the communicative functions of a state language, especially in such domains as business, official communication and science, which were undergoing radical transformation during the process of democratization after the acquisition of sovereignty (see Olcott, 1995, 271-99). Thus the choice of Kazakh on nationalist grounds would work against the goals of socio-economic reform, while the choice of Russian in order to comply with the necessities of the economic reform would offset the attempts of building a new supra-ethnic identity.
Because of this complexity, a monolingual model, assumed in most other republics of the Soviet Union, would never work for Kazakhstan either in its Russian- or its Kazakh-based versions. The selection of the Kazakh language would be interpreted as linguistic discrimination by the majority of monolingual Russian-speakers. The assignment of the official status to the widely used Russian language would contradict the goal of nation-building, with Russian being the main cause of the weakening of Kazakhstanis’ formally colonial, more recently union and perspective new autonomous identity. In addition, absence of a legislative confirmation of a special status for Kazakh posed the danger of reviving the process of the inevitable linguistic assimilation of Kazakh to Russian, reversed during the years of glasnost and restructuring. Hence, at the beginning of nation-building and linguistic policy-making, both languages needed to be somehow reflected in the Constitution, in such a way, however, that de jure Kazakh had a higher status than Russian to compensate for the lack of actual distributional prevalence over the realm of functional domains among the majority of speakers.

The first attempt to put this into practice was conducted in the first Constitution adopted in 1993. This Constitution proclaimed Kazakh the state language and Russian as the language of interethnic communication following the Law about Languages in its 1989th edition (Kim). Such a solution, which had worked perfectly fine for the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, was not the best possible for the newly independent Republic of Kazakhstan. In the Soviet Union, Russian was assigned the status of the official language at the union level and the fact that it had a lower status in the Constitution of a comprising republic had not
affected its actual position in comparison with Kazakh. Since, during that period Russians were more influential in Kazakhstan, their attitudes were not as negative towards the assignment of the status of the official language to Kazakh: this designation was perceived as an affirmative action, directed towards preservation of the language of the numeric majority. Under the new conditions, such a distribution of statuses could not be successful, since Russian had lost the status of the official language at the state level and Russians became both a numeric and political minority.

Unlike the leaders of the other formerly Soviet republics, the Kazakhstani administration mentioned Russian in the Constitution, but no clarification was provided about the implications of the language’s special status for its destiny in the political reality of language use (Constitution of 1993). The status of Russian was purposefully formulated in a vague way. This was not done because the administration of independent Kazakhstan did not understand the danger of disregarding Russian, but out of the optimism about the tempo of reformation characteristic for the first years of independence and an underestimation of the complexity of the interethnic dynamics.

In addition to the fact that the first legislative document of the country was unclear about the status of Russian, its practical implementation was extremely complicated in the absence of a clearly formulated strategy, in a state of disarray at the very beginning of economic and administrative reforms, and in the process of renovation of the educational system, in the re-organization of mass media and re-alignment of all other societal institutions directly or indirectly related to
language policy. In fact, the first attempts to impose Kazakh as a state language in governmental structures complicated their adaptation to the new conditions even more.

Political scientist Berik Abdygaliyev, whose opinion reflects the official point of view, lists some of the successes and failures of the first attempts of the new administration in the domain of language policy (31-8). To demonstrate positive outcomes, he mentions the statistical data provided by the State Statistical Agency for 1993. During that year, 262,511 children in the republic attended Kazakh-speaking kindergartens, while 478,490 children attended Russian-speaking ones. In 52 pre-school institutions, in 130 groups there were 7,000 children being taught in Korean, German, Tajik, Tatar, Uzbek and Uigur. 806,100 children attended Kazakh-speaking secondary schools, while the number of students in schools with Russian as the medium of instruction was 1,033,900. Mixed instruction in Kazakh and Russian was offered in 2092 schools. In addition, there were 73 schools with instruction in Uzbek, 17 in Uigur, and 3 in Tajik. Twelve languages (Azeri, Greek, Dungan, Korean, Kurdish, German, Polish, Tatar, Turkish, Ukrainian, Uigur and Chechen) were also offered as native in regular schools. It was claimed that 189,416 students in the republic were enrolled in groups with Russian-language instruction at the post-secondary level. The corresponding figure for Kazakh-language instruction was 77,243. Abdygaliyev also mentions the fact that in a number of universities in the country, a specialization in minority languages education was offered, including methodology of teaching of or in German, Korean, Polish and others (31-8). There might be
some doubt as to whether this data actually illustrate the success of the new language policy, since the increase in the number of Kazakh-based educational institutions and in the number of students receiving education in their native tongues or studying the language of their ethnicity or nationality could be a delayed outcome of Gorbachev’s later policy, which had become more sensitive to nationality issues towards its end. The increase in numbers could be also a result of the initial enthusiasm (in the case of Kazakhs) or concern (in the case of non-Kazakhs) caused by the change in the de facto (as opposed to de jure) statuses of the Kazakh and Russian languages. What the numbers do indicate is the starting conditions for the next stage of language policymaking, i.e. the situation when approximately only 1/3 of secondary and 1/4 of post-secondary education is conducted in the state language, with instruction in minority languages also remaining rather limited in the number of schools, hours and students.

Abdygaliyev provides some data on mass media, since the “Law about Languages” contained a special article about language–related regulations in this sphere. He mentions that in accordance with the law, 1,044 periodicals were published in Kazakhstan, 2672 of which were in Kazakh, 396 in Russian, 357 in both, and 29-in other languages. Of 238 radio and television stations, 2 were broadcasting in Kazakh, 9 in Russian, 171 in both, and 56-in other languages (31-8). Unlike the questionable significance of the statistics for education, the data for mass media does look impressive, because even if we disregard all the 19 regional companies, and the state Kazakhstani and Russian ones, the number of
broadcasting and publishing firms will still be quite large. With the new private publishing and broadcasting firms opening in the conditions of freedom of speech, Kazakh-speaking readers and viewers benefited, since in the environment of the initial accumulation of capital, they were treated as important customers who could pay regardless of the language they spoke (Abdygaliyev, 31-8).

In the list of positive outcomes, Abdygaliyev also mentions the opening of 165 national-cultural centers, which contributed to the development and restoration of national languages, culture, customs and traditions. These, of course, were created with the government’s encouragement, but with little state financial support.

The two facts mentioned above undoubtedly evidence, as Abdygaliyev concludes, that “the overall character of language policy conducted in the republic is that of linguistic pluralism and that the laws of the republic assure rights, guarantees and respect towards all the languages in the country” (33). This conclusion is correct if the word “guarantee” is understood as provision of legislative support. The data does not prove that the practical actions of the government were at all successful. The number of schools and students, as well as the amount of print and broadcasting do not tell anything about the actual quality of the educational and information dissemination services in the state language.

Abdygaliyev mentions a number of negative outcomes of the first steps in the nation’s language policy. His major concern is the fact that the conditions had not been created for successful functioning of the state language. To support the
idea, he provides the statistics of the State Languages Committee for the year 1994, according to which of 55,008 state agencies only 16.6% conducted paperwork in both Kazakh in Russian, while 70.3% continued to use exclusively Russian. Of the 223 republican administrative districts (oblasts), 131 ran the official correspondence in Russian only. Abdygaliyev also points to the fact that “in many districts in elimination of the ‘Law about Languages’ the principle of bilingualism is not observed in the sphere of commercial transactions and services” (33). Only 6 republican departments and ministries out of the assessed 37 conduct official transactions in two languages. The remaining 31 use only Russian (Abdygaliyev, 33).

From the same source comes data which serves as evidence of the restricted use of the state language in higher education. According to the State Committee on Nationalities, 78% of university students received instruction in Russian in 1994.

On the basis of the analysis of the statistical data, Abdygaliev makes an important conclusion that “the language proclaimed as the state one de facto does not fulfill the assigned role. For a number of objective reasons, the Kazakh language is not developed enough to implement all the complex of state language’s functions” (34). This conclusion nicely demonstrates the administration’s realization of the complexity of the linguistic situation in Kazakhstan and the reason for its eventual decision to change the course of actions.
What Abdygaliyev’s assessment does not uncover, however, is the figures for the increased outward migration of the non-Kazakh population during the first years of independence, the figures that were partially dependent on the effect produced by the first language-related legislative act and the actual political practice on the resulting language attitudes and expectations about the future of nationality policy.

In January of 1994, according to sociologist M. Kaizer, Kazakhs comprised 44.3% of the population (compared with 39.7 in 1989); Russians, 35.8% (37.8), Germans, 3.6% (5.8), Ukrainians, 5.1% (5.4), Uzbeks, 2.2% (2.0), Tatars, 2.0% (2.0); Byelorussians, 1.1%. The negative balance of migration calculated for 1,000 individuals, according to the same source, comprised 24.52 individuals leaving the country for all nationalities, 42.66 for Russians, 160.20 for Germans. 38.54 for Ukrainians (Kaizer, 1-13).

A number of formal and informal attitude studies identified different factors for outward migration (Abenov; Tatimov; Sergiyenko). P. Svoik wrote that

...opinions about the causes of out-migration vary considerably: the official sources claim that it has a purely economic nature, that as sociological surveys indicate, tensions in interethnic communication are not the primary reason (they occupy 10th-20th place according to their importance). Independent experts insist that the main reason for out-migration is political, connected with the nationality policy of the state 'pushing' the Russian-speaking population out of the country. (Svoik)
In actuality, however, the decision to leave the country was caused by a complex of factors, one of which was economic with the majority of the individuals who were leaving the country expecting to find better conditions of life in the new country of citizenship. This fact is well supported by the difference in the numbers of emigrants for certain nationalities. The numbers are highest for Russians, Germans, and Ukrainians, who were leaving for countries which had a perceived higher economic promise and opportunity. Germans were particularly prone to leave with Germany being one of the most developed countries in the world. On the other hand, the out-migration was low for minorities from Central Asia, which were perceived as less economically promising. In fact, the numbers were surpassed by the numbers for in-migration from the neighboring republics, especially for the republics’ ethnic Russians, who were driven to Kazakhstan for the same reasons that Kazakhstani Russians were driven to Russia.

Among other important reasons were the desire to return to the historical motherland and family re-union (Kvyatkovskiy). This motif was more important for those who had arrived with the last wave of in-migration to Soviet Kazakhstan during the Virgin Land campaign, as well as for the former Soviet military personnel and engineering professionals, who had been sent to the republic on an individual basis to resolve the problem of the lack of a professional workforce in Kazakhstan. These recent immigrants had not developed a strong attachment to the new place of residence by the time of the dissolution and, therefore, were more likely to leave.
Finally, although the reason of language-discrimination was one of the least frequently officially quoted ones, it can be inferred that for most of the emigrants, dissatisfaction with the new political status of their ethnicity and the constitutionally finalized change in the status of languages contributed to finalizing their decision to leave the country.

In general, the more realistic explanation is probably the one provided by Sergiyenko, who indicated that the main attitude underlying emigration was “deficit of predictability (of the future)” (Sergiyenko). If this reason is correct, then the lack of clarity in the definition of the status of the Russian language was one of the contributing factors.

Another such factor was a change in the attitudes of Kazakhs themselves. Returning to Abdygaliyev’s evaluation of the results of the first steps in language policy in Kazakhstan, the political scientist noted the “tendency for extreme purism” implying the rush of onomastic changes, and the extremities of the first attempts of vocabulary construction (35).

The deficit of predictability amplified by the overall economic and political crisis led to relative instability in interethnic communication, with the culmination of the Russian-speaking population’s dissatisfaction reached in December of 1992 in Ust-Kamenogorsk, where a demonstration was organized by Russians who demanded reconsideration of the status of the Russian language. Similar demonstrations were then conducted in the similarly predominantly Russian city, Petropavlovsk (Kaizer, 5).
The failure of the first attempts to change the linguistic situation to meet the needs of nationality policy and socio-economic reformation pushed the Kazakhstani administration to assume a more serious approach to the problem posed by Russian bilingualism and Russian-Kazakh diglossia. This new approach was initiated by the change of status assignment to the Kazakh, Russian and minority languages in the new Constitution adopted on August 30th, 1995. In article 7 of the new Constitutions, it is stated that:

1) The state language of the Republic of Kazakhstan is Kazakh;

2) In all governmental organizations and in the organs of local administration, the Russian language is officially used on equal terms with Kazakh;

3) The state assumes the responsibility for the provision of conditions necessary for teaching and development of languages of the peoples of Kazakhstan. (Constitution of 1995)

In addition, in rubric 2, article 19 of the new Constitution, it is mentioned that “everyone has the right for the exercise of their mother tongue and culture, for the free choice of the language of communication, education and creative expression” (Constitution, 1995).

As is clear from the new formulation of the section devoted to the status of languages quoted above, the new Constitution assigned a special status to the Russian language. A good interpretation of the difference between status was provided by G. Kim, Professor of History of the Kazakh State University, in his speech about languages in Kazakhstan:
In the international practice, the terms “official language” and “state language” are used synonymously. The *official language* is defined as the main language of the state, used in legal and governmental discourse. The difference of the *state language* from the official one is in the fact that while the latter does not need any formal, constitutionally ensured proclamation, the status of the state language requires such normative confirmation. (Kim, 1)

Thus, the new Constitution achieved the goal of the first one in a more successful way: it managed to assign equal status to both languages, but, at the same time, to provide special protection for Kazakh, ensuring its use as the language defining supra-national identity and Kazakhstani patriotism, despite its lower prestige among the citizens in Russian-dominated bilingualism.

In November of 1996, an important document formulating the new strategy in language policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan was adopted in continuation of the general principles stated in the Constitution. This document is the *Conception of the Language Policy in the Republic of Kazakhstan* (Concepciya…), whose content and the results of practical implementation will be discussed in more detail.

This conception was extremely important for planning--a guarantee of success in any large-scale change--because it provided a general theoretical framework and guidelines for language policy-making, i.e. an overview of pre-conditions, of the most general goals and objectives based on the interpretation of the pre-conditions, a course of action to be taken in order to achieve the goals, a
model of the target linguistic situation, the primary directions of political legislation and practices, and a convincing plan to counteract the public’s resistance to change.

In this conception, the authors recognized that “the main pre-requisite for the optimal development of social processes in the contemporary world is stability of interethnic communication” and that “language policy should facilitate the preservation of stability in interethnic communication” (Concepciya…,1). In other words, the connection between nationality and language policy was well understood.

The conception was based on a realization that “new socio-economic conditions of Sovereign Kazakhstan demand a language policy that would be able to meet the needs of the country’s multiethnic population and to take into consideration the peculiarities of the linguistic, demographic and political situation” (Concepciya…,1).

One of the important characteristics of the new approach assumed by the language policy-makers, as is clear from the strategic document, was understanding that the goals and objectives as well as deadlines for language reformation should be derived from the analysis of the actual linguistic situation, i.e., the context of the actual use of the language; and that the context itself “is determined by a multiplicity of factors both linguistic and extra-linguistic (historical, psychological, social, economic, political, geographic and etc)” (Concepciya…,1).

Providing a general estimation of the linguistic situation in Kazakhstan, the authors of the strategy used the results of a sociolinguistic investigation
conducted in April of 1996 by the Parliamentary Center of Information Analysis in collaboration with the State Committee on Nationality Policy, whose role was to assess the place of the state language and other languages in the communicative system of Kazakhstani society, the level of mastery of each of the languages by the population, preferences in language use in different spheres of life, and the state of language instruction in educational institutions and in the workplace (see Kim, 2). On the basis of the results of these investigations, the following overview of pre-conditions was given:

Presently there exists a variety of languages: over 100 of them fulfill some sort of communicative function. The languages are not equal in the volume of the fulfilled communicative functions…The status of the Kazakh language remains of a merely declarative character and is not supported sufficiently with a mechanism that would provide for its extended use and acquisition. Official correspondence and work-related communication are still conducted in Kazakh as a secondary language.

The problems of Kazakh are not limited to the necessity of development of the actual rather than a declared status as a state language. In the center of attention, especially, the attention of teachers and researchers, there should be the actual state of the Kazakh language itself, the problems of its development and maintenance. What is meant here is improvement of the language’s ability to reflect the new sociocultural reality by means of mutual enrichment in close contact with other languages of the world and by utilization of the internal potential of the language…
The needs of the ethnic groups in pre-school and secondary education are not fully satisfied. There exists a lack of instructional materials, facilities and qualified personnel…

There exists a need in improvement of contacts with foreign countries, where most of the representatives of the Kazakhstani ethnicities reside…

There is also a necessity to create a more consistent and detailed body of laws and other legislative documents, as well as to provide for better coordination in the work of governmental and non-governmental structures.

(Concepciya…,1)

As is clear from the abstract, the conception of language policy was built on a more objective rather than politicized assessment of the initial context of language policy. This assessment resulted in identification of both the general state of diglossia and bilingualism (stated here in non-technical terms) and the specific areas of concern as perceived from the point of view of the results of previous attempts of language development and maintenance.

The next section of the strategy was devoted to the proposition of the model of the “functional development of languages” (Concepciya…,2). What was referred to as functional development of languages was the attempt to determine and to achieve the most optimal functional distribution between languages of different ethnicities of Kazakhstan. Thus, primary attention was given to the status of the state language:

State language fulfills the most important functions in the state and public life. It is first of all the language which is used for the formulation of all
legislative acts of the state. It is an obligatory language of official meetings and correspondence. It is to be used in responding to citizens’ letters and petitions. The state language should be also used in all governmental institutions, organizations and in the military. All the statistical, financial and technical documentation should be filed in this tongue. It is to be used in jurisprudence as well as in compiling written agreements between physical and juridical persons. The language should be used in diplomatic consulates and embassies, in conducting international negotiations and official receptions. The use of the state language should be obligatory in means of mass communication, with the use of other languages being less than the use of the state one. The state language should be also used in issuing passports, identification documents, birth certificates, documents proving completion of education and other official paperwork; in organizational letterheads and stamps, in labels, blanks, announcements, and visual information of other sorts. The status of the state language implies the creation of conditions for universal acquisition of the required level of skills in the language by all citizens of the state. Employment in government structures should require possession of the skills at an identified obligatory minimal level. Upon creation of the appropriate legal basis, the protection of the state language is to be ensured by means of constitutional persecution of the individuals who do not comply with the state’s regulations concerning the language. (Concepciya…,3)
Following the Constitution, the new strategy also guaranteed the Russian language “preservation of all the communicative functions fulfilled by the language at present” (Concepciya…,3) by allowing official utilization of the language on equal terms with the state language in all the spheres of government communication. In perspective, Russian will “remain the main source of information in many fields of science and technology, a means of communication with the countries of CIS and the rest of the world” (Concepciya…,3).

According to the conception, the use of minority languages would have to be restricted to the domains of everyday and family communication. Understanding the importance of the native tongue for the preservation of ethnic identity made the authors of the strategy assign to the government responsibility to facilitate the creation of conditions for the use and acquisition of minority languages (Concepciya…,3).

At this point, it should be clear that in the new strategy, the administration managed to propose a more promising model of multilingualism and diglossia. In this model, the issue of supra-national identity building was resolved by assignment of the status of the state language to Kazakh with the status to be legally protected and the conditions for its actualization created by introduction of the obligatory bilingualism in Kazakh and imposition of the legal responsibility for compliance with this civil responsibility. The issues of Russian nationalism and negative attitudes of other non-Kazakh Russian-speaking population were resolved by assignment of a special status to the Russian language. By proclaiming Russian the official language of the republic, the state ensured
preservation of the currently existing communicative functions of Russian. The problem of potential separatism and impediments to the process of formation of the Kazakhstani identity by the centripetal influence of Russian nationalism was addressed by making the status of the Russian language lower than the status of the Kazakh language. (The alternative approach would be to merely proclaim two state languages.) Finally, the rights of languages of ethnic minorities were not only recognized, but also protected by the government.

So, overall, the proposed model was reasonable enough to be able to resolve the issue of the multilingual and multiethnic complexity in the country. Further analysis will have to determine whether the model became workable in the process of implementation.

The last section of the conception was devoted to the statement of the specific objectives for language construction.

The role of the state was understood as “correction of the current hierarchy of languages in the direction of the primary development of the state language” (Concepciya...,4). On the basis of this understanding, the conclusion was made that the responsibilities of the state will vary for different languages in the hierarchy. Below is the translation of the section of the conception devoted to the objectives of the new language policy, which is included unabridged because of the importance of understanding the objectives for the subsequent analysis of the results of their implementation.

The state assumes responsibility for the creation of conditions for the practical realization of the status of the state language. For this purpose it
should mobilize all the necessary financial, material, and organizational resources. In the case of the state language, the efforts of the government should, in fact, supercede the efforts of individuals and public organizations, as only the state is able to resolve the problems associated with the development, maintenance and use of Kazakh.

One of the most important directions of language policy-making should be the provision of conditions for universal acquisition of the state language at a certain identified minimal obligatory level by all the citizens of the republic. In order to fulfill this task, special centers should be opened offering free courses in the Kazakh language differentiated for various ethnic, demographic and professional characteristics of the learners. State means of mass communication should also offer Kazakh language lessons in the form of TV and radio programs and newspaper rubrics. In all institutions of pre-school, secondary, and post-secondary education, a level of instruction in the Kazakh language should be ensured that would allow for successful communication in the spheres of interpersonal, business and official communication. The process of acquisition of the state language should be supported with mass publication of accessible and effective methodologies of language teaching and learning, textbooks, and dictionaries oriented to different categories of users. The successful experience of language centers in implementation of instruction according to original methodologies should be disseminated across the country.

Special minimal language requirements should be determined and
introduced as a pre-requisite for employment in the government, as well as in the spheres of health services, science, culture, education and community life organization. A system of material reinforcement of those who successfully acquired the minimum should be designed.

The use of the state language should become a norm in the practice of communication at the international level. All events involving participation of official foreign representatives should be conducted in the state language, with synchronous translation into other languages provided whenever necessary. All legislative acts, reports by officials and other state documentation should be prepared in state language. In order to provide interethnic communication in state organs, special state translation services should be introduced. The staff of all governmental institutions should include positions of interpreters from and into the state language. The amount of training of such interpreters in institutions of higher education should be increased. The Eurasian University and the Kazakh State University should become centers for the preparation of such interpreters as well as centers for the training of specialists in languages and cultures of the peoples of Kazakhstan.

The prestige of the state language should be raised to such a level that its acquisition becomes a vital necessity for every citizen of the country, a defining element of Kazakhstani patriotism. The state language needs support not only from the officials, but also from the rest of the society. It makes sense to create a special fund for the support of the state
Language, maintained collaboratively by the governmental and non-governmental organizations and institutions, by financial, and business structures.

State support of the official language consists in providing conditions for its utilization equally with the state language in the organs of state government. Its status is ensured by translating into Russian all legislative acts and other documents, by interpreting into it official correspondence and by using the language in a secondary role in financial and statistical documentation. Preservation of the Russian language’s communicative spheres is ensured by the intention of Kazakhstan to participate in the processes of integration, and to preserve cultural and educational collaboration with other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Provision of the conditions for the development of the languages of other peoples of Kazakhstan implies the creation of opportunities for learning native languages by all willing to do this. This is implemented by providing secondary education in the mother tongue or offering instruction in the language as a required subject, by training native-language instructors, by ensuring assistance in publication of instructional materials, fiction and periodicals. Such activities can be successful with active participation of the ethno-cultural centers able to express the interests of their nationality or ethnicity. There is a need to establish partnerships with the countries of origin of the Kazakhstani ethnic minorities, as well as with the European
Bureau of Minor Ethnicities and similar international organizations.

Foreign language instruction also requires state support. Financial reinforcement should be provided for government employees conversant in a foreign language. The practice of intensive foreign language instruction in specialized language schools should be continued.

Language construction would be impossible without scientific analysis of the state of ethnic languages in the republic as well as of the overall linguistic situation. Sociological and sociolinguistic monitoring should provide for on-going correction of the language policy able to reflect the dynamics of the language processes and its regional differentiation according to demographic, social and ethnic criteria.

In the case of research on Kazakh, an important task is to develop a system of orthographic and orthoepic rules, ensuring the language’s unification and standardization. It is also essential to create a corpus of Kazakh terminology. For the purpose of standardization of the spoken language, publication of orthographic, orthoepic and semantic dictionaries should be implemented. It is also necessary to provide for the production of video and audio-lingual materials for Kazakh language learners.

The realization of the conception would be successful only if it is supported by legislative acts and organizational activities. The conception is submitted with a proposal for the law “On Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan”. Subsequently amendments should be introduced into the Civil Code, Administrative Code, Labor Law and other laws. The
mechanisms of the development of the state language should be reflected in governmental programs of development of Kazakh and other languages. (Concepciya..., 5)

The new law “On languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan,” mentioned in the Concept was passed on July 11, 1997 (Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Yazike). This document created a legal basis for the implementation of the strategy providing definition of the status of the languages of Kazakhstan in juridical terms, defining rights and responsibilities of the state and of the individuals with regards to language development, maintenance, knowledge and use, determining the exact spheres where the state language should be used, and describing the mechanism that would ensure implementation of the law itself. As was planned in the conception, the law served and continues to serve as a foundation for formulation of language-related articles in other legislative acts and executive orders of the government and organs of local administration to provide for consistent implementation of the defined strategy. Thus, since the adoption of the new law on languages, language-related articles were introduced into such important laws as:

1) “On Labor” (1999) (Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Trude)--prohibition of discrimination on the basis of language knowledge and use;

2) “On Mass Media” (1999) (Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Sredstvah Massovoy Informaciyi)--determination of the volume of broadcasting in the state language: the time of broadcasting in other languages should not exceed the time devoted to programs in the state language;

--requirement for ensuring the knowledge of the state, the official and a foreign languages, as well as for the provision of instruction of or in the mother tongue in the areas with a high concentration of the population of minority nationalities or ethnicities.

An article about languages (requiring the use of the state and official languages together with a language of the advertiser's preference) is expected to be included into the law "On Advertisement" (proposed in 2002) (Proyekt Zakona Respubliki Kazakhstano o Reklame). Changes determining responsibility for elimination of the laws have also been introduced into the Civil and Administrative Codes.

Parallel to the modification of the legislative basis for the language reform, there is taking place the process of re-structuring the central and local administrative organs responsible for implementation of the new strategy is taking place. Thus, in 1999 the Languages Development Department was created in the Ministry of Culture, Information and Social Harmony. The Department is supposed to fulfill the major planning and coordinating role in implementation of the adopted programs of languages development. In addition, two other special language-policy related coordinating bodies were introduced in the central government structure. One is the State Terminological Commission, opened in 1998 by a special order of the Government of the republic of Kazakhstan. The other is the Republican Center Accelerated State Language Instruction, formed in 1999. The functions of the commission include provision of counsel and advice to the
Government in the sphere of terminological construction as pertained to various branches of economy, science, technology, and culture (Postanovleniye Pravitel'stva Respubliki Kazakhstana ot 21 Aprelja 1998 goda). The center is supposed to "create all the necessary organizational, material and technological resources, as well to guarantee the required scientific and methodological support for organization of the accelerated instruction in the state language for all government employees" (Postanovleniye Pravitel'stva Respubliki Kazakhstana ot 9 Oktyabrya 1998 goda). An important role in the implementation of the language policy also belongs to the Ministry of Science and Education, as well as to the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan created by the President's ordinance in 1995 and entitled to serve as a consultative organ for the President of the republic expressing the interests of different ethnic and national groups of Kazakhstan, to coordinate the activity of the ethno-cultural centers in the maintenance of ethnic cultures and languages, to initiate and to facilitate partnership of such centers with the countries of historical origin of the minority ethnicities of the country, as well as to promote general atmosphere of internationalism, ethnic tolerance and Kazakhstani nationalism. Each of the described government agencies has local branches and subdivisions to allow for reflection of the local specifics in implementation of government programs.

The provision of the basic legislative foundations and the system of coordinating organs prepared favorable conditions for planned language reform. In accordance with the principle launched by the issuance of the major ideological document of the republic--"The State Program of Development of the Republic of
Kazakhstan until the year of 2030” (Nazarbayev), planning in the area of language development and maintenance should be implemented in the form of programming for certain periods of time (long-term for 10 years and short-term plans of action--biennially), as well as for specific ranges (state vs. regional and general vs. specialized for a particular area) based on the objective analysis of the linguistic situation and the results of implementation of the language policy during the previous years conducted on a regular basis in the form of a standardized sociolinguistic survey by the Parliamentary Center for Information Analysis (Arenov and Kalmykov).

The most recent 10-year-long program of this type was adopted by the Government in 2001 (Gosudarstvennaya Programma…). The program states the following objectives of the language policy:

1) provision of functioning of the state language as the language of state governance, i.e.

- development of the legislative foundations;
- taking actions that would ensure acquisition of the required level of skills in the state language by the government employees;
- ensuring of the use of the state language as the main means of communication in the government;
- ensuring state-language-use in the court and in legislation;
• taking actions for the use of the state language in the military of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in all types of military formations and units;
• provision of functioning of the state language in communication in all organs of local administration;
• ensuring utilization of the state language in international relations;

2) creation of the conditions for learning the state-language in the republic:
• organization of a unified system of free instruction in state language skills funded from the local budgets;
• provision of material, technical and legislative conditions for the acquisition of the state language acquisition by employees in such spheres as science, culture, education, public health, and service;
• provision of the maximally high level of the knowledge of the state language among the students of the pre-school, secondary and postsecondary educational institution regardless of their form of property;

3) provision of the unification of the norms of the contemporary Kazakh literary language by means of intensification of the scientific research and practical implementation of its results:
• systematization on the scientific grounds of the rules of word
formation in the Kazakh literary language, including the rules for
terminological construction;

• implementation of a functional Kazakh language terminological
  apparatus;

• formalization of the norms of the Kazakh literary language;

• taking steps to ensure the improvements of the Kazakh alphabet
  and orthography in such a way that it would better reflect the
  phonological structure of the language;

• scientific support of onomastic changes;

4) provision of functioning of the state language in the spheres of
culture and mass media:

• development and implementation of a system of actions directed
  at production or renting of movies and video materials in the
  state language, including animation and programs in translation;

• provision of issuance of periodicals and other printed materials in
  different branches of culture, science, fiction and art;

• ideological support (agitation and propaganda) of the activities
  directed at the promotion of the state language;

• ensuring the use of the state language in the means of mass
  communication;

• resolution of the problem of computerization of the state
  language;
For the purpose of the implementation of preservation of the functions of the Russian language to provide for

- functioning of the Russian language as a language officially used in the governmental organizations and organs of local administration; provision of functioning of the Russian language in the spheres of science and education; provision of functioning of the official language in the spheres of culture and mass media;

- research support of the functioning of the official language.

For the purpose of the implementation of preservation of the functions of minority languages to provide for

- state support in teaching representatives of ethnic minorities their native tongues;

- creation of conditions for minority languages in the cultural sphere

- facilitation of the use of the languages of ethnic minorities in mass media. (Gosudarstvennaya Programma..., 1-5)

The program also determines the mechanism for its implementation (the principle of short-term vs. long-term, state vs. regional, general vs. specialized programming mentioned above), as well as the source of funding (3087.7 million tenge from local and republican budgets for the current 10-year long period).

Now, before analyzing the actual practice and the results of implementation of the language policy, it is necessary to evaluate the efforts of the government
directed toward the provision of the legislative foundations for the political practice aimed at a change in the linguistic situation and towards the establishment of the system of coordinating and executive bodies.

All the ideas, models, systems and programs concerning the legislative foundations and organization of control, planning and coordination seem to be reasonable. They are justified from the point of view of civil rights, attainable with respect to the official analysis of the linguistic situation, well balanced in terms of relationships between their different parts and with the elements of societal reformation in related spheres (education, economy, political structure and etc.), consistent with the Constitution, general national ideology and the course of development identified by the President until 2030; they are based upon historical experience of language construction in the Soviet Union and in other countries; and they are flexible enough to allow for on-going modification for the purpose of achieving better and faster results under changing conditions of language use, developing language attitudes and the goals of nationalist and language policy. In the absence of external interferences and on condition of consistent implementation, the models, programs and systems could be expected to lead to the achievement of the stated goals. Following is the account of the actual results of the recent political practice in the sphere of language construction.

According to the official view, the best results have been achieved in implementing the task of introducing Kazakh in communication within government structures. A more critical analysis, however, would manifest a number of facts that would make one question whether the proclaimed
increase in the use of the state language in the government structures was a result of the efficiently implemented language policy.

On the one hand, the officially claimed increase was observed mostly in the regions of the republic where the Kazakh-speaking population traditionally supercedes Russians in numbers, and it was often accompanied by the increase in representation of ethnic Kazakhs throughout the hierarchy of organs of state and local administration. The latter situation can be accounted for by the presence of discrimination on the basis of competence in the state language, which would be an evidence of the failure of the language policy, which prohibits such discrimination. However, a more plausible explanation for the situation is a process that has nothing to do with the language policy per se--it is increase in tribalism, zhuzovshina (preferential treatment in the basis of zhuz affiliation) and nepotism, which has been accompanying the rise of Kazakh nationalism since the times of Gorbachev’s glasnost and re-structuring.

In addition, despite introduction of the requirements for language use and the presence of a system of administrative responsibility, Kazakh continues to be the secondary language with all paperwork completed in the official language and subsequently translated into Kazakh. Moreover, with the lack of the sufficient quantity of Kazakh-Russian interpreters and inadequate knowledge of the Kazakh language by government employees, the imposition of the requirement for the use of the Kazakh language in official correspondence creates and impediment to communication and the process
of reformation in the administrative system itself. One of the interesting directions in the search for a resolution of the problem of state language use in governmental organizations is research in machine translation, which has already resulted in development of a special computer program that allows for automatic translation of documentation from Russian into Kazakh and backwards. Although presented as an achievement of language policy, the software can be also interpreted as a potential danger in case it becomes powerful enough to eliminate the need for the knowledge of the state language by an individual.

No consistent requirements for state language use have been developed yet and no system of assessment has been designed for free state language courses to be effectively organized for government employees. Such courses were opened in many organizations throughout the country at the beginning of the new stage of the language policy; however, given the lack of instructional methodology for effectively teaching adult learners, the lack of instructional materials and instructors, and no mechanism of reinforcement developed to ensure motivation in participation on a voluntary basis, the courses are no longer either financed by organizations or find their learners (see Abdygaliyev, 31-6).

Another frequently mentioned area of success is state language instruction. In accordance with the new model of the state language development, all the learners of the Kazakh language were divided into two
groups. These groups face different expectations in terms of the level of knowledge of the state language that they have to achieve.

The first group includes all people who were born before 1995. These learners are expected to master the language at some minimal level and they include Kazakhstanis of older generations, for whom language learning presents a challenge because of their age and other responsibilities connected with adulthood. The main rationale behind the minimum language proficiency for this category of the population (mostly active workforce) is to ensure the environment of state language use that would be conductive for acquisition of the Kazakh language as a second language by the younger generation.

These persons are expected to learn the language by means of voluntary instruction at the workplace, in mass media and different educational community centers, such as public libraries and ethno-cultural centers. As already mentioned, the workplace courses were rather unsuccessful. Free courses of Kazakh are offered in community centers; however, they are not promoted enough and, in general, face the same problem of the lack of methodology, instructional materials and instructors as in the case of workplace instruction. Newspaper courses seem to be popular among Kazakhs who already know some Kazakh and try to work on the development of their literary language. Such courses often provide lists of new terminology and explanations of the grammatical phenomena, which are of interest for the category of language learners. TV courses, especially “Tilashar” broadcasted
by the most popular state channel “Khabar,” are designed for viewers at the beginning levels of acquisition of the state language. They are implemented in the form of entertaining dialogues and cover primarily topics connected with everyday communication, basics of grammar and pronunciation. With the characters in the short video streams being of different ethnic backgrounds and demographic characteristics and the units organized around topics related to the contemporary Kazakhstani rather than traditional Kazakh life with only some elements of ethnopedagogy included (an exclusive methodology in this respect), the TV courses are extremely successful not only in teaching basic Kazakh, but also in promoting positive language attitudes and the notion of the Kazakh language as the attribute of Kazakhstani nationalism. Finally, the internet is becoming an important tool of Kazakh language instruction for independent learners, although at this moment only a small amount of the republic’s citizens can afford the use of the internet for the purposes of language learning. Most of the Kazakh language-learning websites are visited by learners of the Kazakh language residing abroad.

In general, as statistical data indicates, at the beginning of the new stage in language policy there was an increase in the interest towards the Kazakh language both among Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs. However, in the course of time, the interest of both groups declined, although the total number of Kazakhs who consider themselves articulate in the state language slightly increased mostly due to the individual efforts directed towards language
learning undertaken by those who could speak their native tongue but were unable to read and write in it (see Arenov and Kalmykov, 21-33).

The second group of learners of the state language learners includes the younger generation, essentially everyone who was born after the year 1995. These learners are expected to master the language at a level that would make them functionally bilingual in Kazakh, in perspective, to the extent of knowing the state language at the level of their mother tongue. In current practice, most attention is paid to the Kazakh language instruction at the secondary level (see Arenov and Kalmykov, 21-33).

Up until recently, kindergartens did not play any significant role despite the fact that psychologically the age of children attending these educational institutions is the most sensitive for language instruction. This lack of attention to pre-schoolers can be explained by two reasons. On the one hand, education at the kindergarten level is not universally provided for all children in the republic, and during the period of economic crisis, most of the parents could not afford sending their children to the educational institutions. In addition, during the first stages of the reformation of the educational system insufficient attention and funding was provided for the reformation of the methodology of pre-school instruction because it was more important to modify the system of secondary and higher education. At the present moment, when the process of reformation of the two upper systems have been successfully initiated, more attention is being paid to kindergarten instruction.
and the methodology of teaching Kazakh as a second language to pre-
schoolers (see Arenov and Kalmykov, 21-33).

In higher education, instruction in Kazakh as a second language
continues; although its quality usually declines because of the low level of
development of androgogy in the country and the lack of methodology of
teaching Kazakh as a second language at the advanced levels. In addition,
the problem of lack of instructional materials and professional instructors is
even worse than at the secondary level. Although the number of groups with
Kazakh-language based instruction have increased, it continues to be very
small in comparison with the Russian language groups, so that post-
secondary education is still dominated by the official language. This situation
might be one of the main reasons for the decline in interest in Kazakh-
language-based secondary education (see Arenov and Kalmykov,
21-33).

School children are differentiated in terms of their first language of
instruction into those who learn Kazakh as a native tongue and those who are
offered courses in Kazakh as a second language. Discussion of the state of
Kazakh as a second language instruction at the secondary level of education
will be limited to the second category (see Arenov and Kalmykov, 21-33).

Following the Soviet practice, Kazakh as a second language instruction is
provided in two types of schools--those where Kazakh is offered only as a
separate course, and those where it is used together with Russian as a
medium of instruction. The former type is more widespread and is now
increasingly being incorporated into the system of bilingual schools, i.e. schools where children instructed in Kazakhs are placed in the same building with children instructed in Russian. This is done out of the belief that Kazakh as a second language acquisition will be facilitated for the Russian-speaking learners if they learn it in the environment where the second language is used. There might be some doubt whether the mechanisms is working, because of the continuous domination of Russian in the distribution of communicative domains; Kazakh-speaking children are more likely to use Russian than Kazakh in the bilingual school environments.

According to the official figures, the number of parents who choose to send their children to schools with Kazakh as a language of primary instruction tends to decline compared with the initial stages of implementation of the new language policy. This fact can serve both as evidence of a higher quality of instruction in the Russian language schools and as a manifestation of the actual attitudes of the citizens of the republic towards the importance of the state language: compared with the first years of independence, more people feel that the knowledge of Kazakh is not essential for successful functioning in the Republic of Kazakhstan (see Bekturganov, 1-16).

In terms of quality of second language instruction in Kazakh, some improvements have been made as a result of the accumulation of efficient teaching experiences and an effort put into publication of the instructional materials. However, intermediate and advanced level instruction continue to be lower in quality, compared with the beginning levels. Methodologically,
Kazakh is taught within the framework of the communicative method of teaching foreign languages, which is very popular in the post-Soviet countries, with the application of some of the methods of ethnopedagogy. It is accompanied with instruction in the Kazakh history and literature implemented in Russian. Judging from the fact that the training of instructors in Kazakh as a second language is still conducted by the Departments of Kazakh Philology, the conclusion can be drawn that the difference between second, first and foreign language acquisition is not completely understood. Further evidence is that very few teachers use the actual environment in their instruction and bring native speakers to the classroom. Among some of the achievements of the recent years, it is important to mention the creation of an electronic fund of best teaching practices, as well as attempts at incorporating modern technology and the internet into Kazakh language instruction. One of the significant innovations was the introduction of standardized Kazakh language and history tests used for assessment at the secondary level and in application for post-secondary studies (see Bekturganov, 1-16).

Another domain where implementation of the new language policy is claimed to be successful by the officials is mass media. Here reference is usually made to the increased use of broadcasting in Kazakh on radio and TV. With the introduction of the requirement for the amount of broadcasting in the state language, the number of hours did increase, however, motivated by profits, owners of TV and radio stations, who are aware of the fact that broadcasting in Russian is attractive to a wider range of viewers and listeners
and consequently advertisers, resolve the controversy between the necessity of surviving in the market and the necessity of complying with the state requirement by broadcasting in Kazakh during the unpopular hours, e.g. at night or early in the morning. In addition, the quality and the variety of programming is significantly lower than in case of Russian (see Arenov and Kalmykov, 21-30).

The requirement for the use of the state language in advertising, if adopted as a part of the law "On Advertisement" might become a tool for state language learning with the ad strings repeated over and over several times a day. The situation with the use of the state language in newspapers might be further evidence of the fact that the official claims about the increase of the use of the state language in mass media are not consistent with reality. Because there is no requirement for the use of a minimum amount of the material in the state language for the newspapers, the volume of news published in Kazakh is much lower than that in Russian (see Arenov and Kalmykov, 21-30).

The number of Kazakh-language newspapers is significantly lower. The fact that the government has not introduced any minimum requirement on the use of languages in periodicals might be accounted for by two facts. On the one hand, the printed word (reading) is much more difficult to learn than a spoken one, so by default, newspapers are less efficient in promoting the national language than TV and radio (see Arenov and Kalmykov, 21-30).
The internet continues to be dominated by Russian; although, due to the effort of the Kazakh scientists and computer engineers, Kazakh scripts have been developed, although the state language is used primarily on the websites of the government. In perspective, these will be less numerous in number than the sites of businesses, commercial and financial institutions, which are even now coded predominantly in Russian. In general, the Internet seems to produce more danger for the status of the Kazakh language than all other means of mass communication taken together. This crisis is not going to happen in the near future with most of the Kazakhstani population having only a restricted access to the internet; however, the problem of the near future is asking for a solution at this point of time.

The military still remains only a potential mechanism of Kazakh language endorsement. On the one hand, it is still undergoing organizational reform. On the other, its popularity among the young people remains very low with the effect that only the poorest members of the society, mainly the young men from Kazakh-speaking rural areas willingly join the army in search of better opportunity than their auls (small rural settlements) can or rather cannot offer.

The use of the state language has not been brought to the appropriate level in the sphere of service and commerce, either. Although most of the labels and instructions accompanying goods are now provided in both Kazakh and Russian, the use of the Kazakh language remains insufficient in the service area, specifically in organizing window displays in small shops, in
providing price tags and as indicators of directions. The use of the Kazakh language did increase in billboards and street displayed signs and ads (see Arenov and Kalmykov, 21-30).

Corpus building and the sphere of onomastics are probably the most successful domains of language policy implementation. As a result of the collaborative efforts of a number of different research institutions, the rules of the Kazakh orthography, punctuation and orthoepics have been revised. The grammar of the Kazakh language has been carefully investigated; the prescriptive rules have been modified to be included into the newly published grammar references, orthoepic and orthographic dictionaries (Kim, 4-5).

Unlike the case of automatic translation software, the special computer programs designed to implement grammatical and spelling correction might play a positive role in the process of the standardization of the Kazakh language as well as in the promotion of positive attitudes and respect towards the state language.

The State Terminological Committee is conducting the hard work of introducing new terms into the state language so that it can successfully implement the assigned functions. The lexicon developers have overcome the state of extreme purism and presently implement their task by utilizing a set of specifically defined rules of word coining, transliteration and calquing, using the stock of the primary Kazakh morphemes, the stock of internationally-used-for-terminology-creation Latin and Greek roots and affixes, the stock of Arabic and related Turkic languages, and, finally, the resources of the Kazakh
dialects. The results of the research groups’ collaborative effort are reflected in the Kazakh encyclopedic dictionary and are systematically published in the official newspapers in the lists of new terminology (Bekturganov, 1-16).

One of the issues in linguistic research associated with the use of the state language which keeps coming back as a topic of scientific forums, is the reform of the Kazakh alphabet. The existing Cyrillic based alphabet does not accurately reflect the phonological structure of the language, and in addition presents problems in computer coding. The research on the topic follows two routes. One goes in the direction of Latinization of the alphabet; this option is presently seriously considered by the Kazakh Academy of Sciences upon the request of the government. The other leads towards modification of the current Cyrillic script to include letters representing phonemes which were not included before, to simplify writing by the application of diacritics in accordance with the rules of harmony, and some other minor modifications. One radical but in fact very innovative and easy solution for computer coding was suggested by one Russian-speaking programmer who suggested a way of writing the specific sounds of the Kazakh language with the help of palatalization and disjunction signs. The New Kazakh Cyrillic script, as the author called it, could be written with the existing 33 letters of the Russian alphabet, thus eliminating the problem of codification already resolved for the official language. The idea of the New Kazakh Cyrillic script, although convincingly presented during one of the conferences devoted to the problems of the state language development and promotion, was not implemented in
practice for the simple fact that it is perceived as carrying a potential danger for the Kazakh language and nationalism. The question here is whether the idea is more dangerous than is the fact that Russian is already far ahead of Kazakh in expansion throughout the World Wide Web (Sergeyev).

Some of the actions of the government are directed at improvement of speakers' attitudes towards the state language; these include celebration of the Day of Languages, and conducting Student Olympiads in the knowledge of the languages of the peoples of Kazakhstan. Television in particular plays an important role in the promotion of the Kazakh language and nationalism (Nazarbayev).

In accordance with the plan presented in the State Program of the Development of Languages, efforts are being taken to provide for the preservation of the Russian language. Maintenance and development of Russian is ensured by keeping Russian language instruction at the appropriate level, by conducting conferences and workshops for the teachers of Russian, by conducting competitions among students aimed at determining their Russian language skills, by celebrating significant dates and names of the Russian history, and by collaborating with the administration of the Russian Federation, which is interested in support of their Kazakhstani co-nationals (Nazarbayev).

The political practice with respect to minority languages seems to be consistent with the initial goals. Opportunities have been created for the representatives of the less numerous ethnicities of the republic to receiving
education in their mother tongues as well as for classroom (at specialized
schools) and individual (through ethno-cultural centers) learning of the native
languages. The task of the promotion of national cultures and languages is
implemented by the subdivisions of the Assembly of the Peoples of
Kazakhstan, seeking partnership with co-nationals abroad and raising funds
from the public, individuals and private foundations.

In the same way as during the years of Soviet rule, the contemporary
linguistic situation is not only directly affected by language policy conducted by
the central planning authorities. It is also indirectly influenced by the nationality
policy and by the socio-economic processes.

The relationship between the overall nationality and language policy is
twofold. On the one hand, the ideas of interethnic tolerance (peaceful co-
existence of various ethnic groups on the territory of Kazakhstan),
Eurasianizm (Kazakhstan as a transition point between European and Asian
worlds), and cultural and economic integration with other countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (some of which are homelands for the
ethnicities of Kazakhstan), which are emphasized by the nationalism doctrine,
are all conductive to the formation of positive language attitudes which
facilitate the changes in the states of diglossia and bilingualism targeted by
the language planners. On the other hand, promotion of bilingualism and,
especially, the use of the methods of ethnopedagogy in teaching both the
state and the official languages provide for better interethnic understanding
and, consequently, societal stability. At the same time, because the process of
re-juvenation of the Kazakh national identity connected with gaining of independence from the Soviet Union is still in progress, and because the development of the Kazakh language as a symbol of national identity of Kazakhs is happening simultaneously with its promotion as the symbol of supra-national identity of Kazakhstanis, language policy favoring Kazakh is often perceived as favoring the ethnicity for whom the language is native, or, in other words, as discriminating on grounds of nationality and language. In this respect, the existing language policy contradicts the goals of the nationality policy, targeting the formation of the identity of Kazakhstanis.

Socio-economic processes are also closely associated with both nationality and language policy. The links are multiple. Economic processes affect language policy directly by determining the amount of money that is expended on language development and maintenance purposes, by defining which of the language planning initiatives are feasible and which are not, by creating demand for knowledge of a particular language, thus producing negative or positive language attitudes, conducive to or impeding the process of language acquisition. They also affect language policy indirectly by increasing the level of nationalism in case of economic decline, by causing migration and by initiating the process of urbanization.

In the case of Kazakhstan economics, destabilization during early 1990s lowered the level of nations’ sensitivity to experimentation with their languages. It was very difficult to promote the Kazakh language in the conditions of disarray, when citizens’ existence was complicated by many
other problems, such as unemployment, inflation, crime and impoverishment. In the second half of the last decade, as a result of radical reforms implemented in economic, administrative and social spheres, Kazakhstan achieved a certain level of stability when the words of the President about the interethnic stability suddenly started to be perceived as making sense rather than airing political hypocrisy. Once the foundations for economic development were created, there emerged conditions necessary for the successful promotion of supra-national identity and, consequently, for the promotion of the state language. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, corruption in the government structures--an outcome of political destabilization--could not help but produce discrimination on the basis of language competence. Redistribution of the workforce caused by the natural economic demand, as well as by central planning (for example, in the case of the nation’s capital re-location) and associated migration trends affected the map of language use and, therefore, indirectly the results of language planning (Zhdanov).

Migration was, in fact, one of the most significant factors that counteracted the efforts of the language planners. Thus the efforts of Kazakh language promotion were undermined by the general trend for urbanization and consequent Russification of the population. While the language planners were putting effort into increasing knowledge of the Kazakh language, new urban Kazakhs were learning and increasingly switching to the use of Russian in every day communication.
While the government was trying to re-distribute the Kazakh-speaking and the Russian-speaking population, as well as the population of three different Kazakh zhuzes, in such a way that they are more or less evenly dispersed across the country as one of the purposes of the nation’s capital re-location, natural economic trends (increase in the importance of Almaty as the center of Central Asia and turning of the Caspian region into one of the world’s biggest oil fields) emerged that drove the Kazakh populations in the opposite directions from the planned ones--westwards and southwards--so that the existing situation with concentrations of Kazakh speaking population in the south and in the west and the Russian speaking population in the north and in the east have only increased (Gafarly).

Overall, if we look at the course of implementation of the language policy in the Republic of Kazakhstan, it seems to be successful at this point of time. If the success of language planning depends on the degree of accord of language legislation and practice with the tempo and goals of economic reformation and the efforts of nation building, as well as on the absence or presence of negative or positive influences of socio-economic factors and the dynamics of interethnic communication, then at this particular point of history of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the language policy can be treated as well balanced in all respects. Its goals are consistent with the goals and the nationality policy and are reasonable from the point of view of economic conditions. Its implementation is well planned and is flexible enough to allow for the introduction of necessary modifications as linguistic situations change.
Despite of the complexity introduced into the state of diglossia, bilingualism and interplay of ethnic, national and supra-national identities by the years of the Russian and subsequently Soviet Rule, as well as by the necessity of continuing collaboration with the former union republics, the new language policy seems to be successful, finding a golden mean between all the positive from the Soviet past, the experience of the Soviet politicians’ mistakes and the useful findings of other countries resolving similar problems.

Thus the contemporary idea of Kazakhstani nationalism is an attempt to built a new version of American internationalism on the basis of the existing identity of the Soviet people cultivated by Lenin’s vision of internationalism – the idea of Sovietization. Stalin’s idea of the necessity of centralization and planning for successful coordination of the process of reformation is interacting in the present Kazakhstani society with the American idea of local autonomy, unregulated competition and freedom of speech as the mechanisms of the socio-economic evolution. Lenin’s concept of the native tongue as a symbol of ethnic identity and Stalin’s idea of the language as a unifying and mobilizing force of the nation are given equal consideration in the new language policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in the attempt to build common supra-national identity without undermining national identities and especially their symbolic representations – native tongues. These efforts are often counteracted by natural socioeconomic trends, by the tendencies in the development of languages and by the change in the attitudes of their speakers, but there is no doubt that overall the new language policy of the
republic of Kazakhstan is extremely successful, especially if compared with all
the previous attempts to resolve an even lower level of complexity in the
Soviet Union and in the peer-republics in the Commonwealth of Independent
States. Whether the success is going to be sustained is, in fact, highly
unpredictable. However, some of the possible scenarios should be
considered.
CHAPTER V

FUTURE PROJECTIONS

The model developed by the contemporary policy makers involves four languages. Most of the communicative functions including the functions of interethnic communication within the country are to be fulfilled by two major languages--Kazakh and Russian. The only difference between the languages is that the state language is expected to carry the additional function of the symbol of the supra-national identity of Kazakhstanis, while the official language would be expected to fulfill the function of the language of interaction in the Commonwealth of Independent States, essentially the symbol of Eurasianism. It is also expected that two more languages will be involved. One is English, which is to fulfill only the function of communication with the external world outside the C.I.S. The other is the language of one's ethnicity, which is to serve as a symbol of ethnic group identity and which, in case of Russians and Kazakhs, would correspond to one of the languages of wider communication.

At the present moment, two of the languages are still not in the places reserved for them. These are Kazakh and English. Whether the chosen model is to be achieved depends not only on the actions of the language policy makers, but also on the dynamics of interethnic communication, on the development of the
socioeconomic situation in the country, on the character of internal administration and the state of the external political climate.

No radical changes in either the political or economic situation of the republic can be expected in the nearest future: Kazakhstan will continue to be a buffer on the crossroad between Russia, China and US-controlled Asia. Until the northern or the eastern neighbors become powerful enough to independently challenge the United States, Kazakhstan will be looked upon as an important partner by each of the three parties, thus being ensured relative political independence, playing on the differences between the interests of these parties. Since the internal political power has to comply with the interests of the national economic magnates as well as with the interests of the external pressure groups investing money into the economy and politics, change of the existing leadership, if it happens soon, is unlikely to affect the direction of the political course and socio-economic reformation. With the existing distribution of the political power unchanged, the pace and the direction of the political reforms is also going to be the same. Under these conditions, the selected general model of linguistic reconstruction will remain the most reasonable one, although, not necessarily as successful as at the current moment.

The pace and the success of implementation of the model depends largely on the distribution of status between the Kazakh and Russian nationalities, on the continuity of economic growth of Kazakhstan in comparison with Russia, and on the policy of the Russian government conducted with respect to Russian co-nationals abroad, as well as on the future of integration in the post-Soviet world.
Changes in any of these areas have the potential of upsetting the balance in interethnic communication—the basis of the nationality policy and the main condition of successful implementation of the language policy. It would be helpful to consider the likelihood of changes in the identified areas and the effect they may have on the distribution of language status and the extent of actual use.

The first factor, as earlier mentioned, is the dynamics of Kazakh and Russian nationalism. Presently, these processes are becoming increasingly integrated with the process of the formation of supra-national identity, especially among Russians. The number of Russians who consider Kazakhstan their motherland grows and they are connecting their lives with their present country of residence rather than with their historic country of origin. This tendency, as indicated by the results of some studies on language attitudes, is observed even among the youngest generation. This optimism is, on the one hand, an indicator of the success in nation-building, and, on the other, the evidence of the existence of positive expectations about the opportunities in Kazakhstan, the feeling, resulting from the successful attempt of shock therapy at the beginning of socio-economic reform in the republic, which is allowing to catch up with and at times even exceed the pace set by the Russian Federation, where such a therapy would not have been successful because of greater disunity among the larger and more ethnically diverse population and the higher complexity of the economic and social structures. The feeling of optimism is extremely important in maintaining interethnic stability and developing pride in the Kazakhstan identity. This feeling of identity is also important for the formation of positive attitudes towards learning
the state language. Therefore, as long as the reforms are conducted at the current
tempo, language policy is going to remain relatively successful.

Once Russia achieves a certain level of economic development, it may start
to express imperial aspirations and attempt to use ethnic Russians in the former
Soviet republics as pressure groups. Such attempts would be extremely
destructive for Kazakhstani nationalism and, consequently, for the state language
promotion attempts. Such attempts, however, are unlikely to happen in the near
future, especially with the skillful tactics of the current government of the Republic
of Kazakhstan playing on the conflicting interests of its powerful neighbors.
However, the Russian Federal government is likely to put some effort into
maintaining a strong Russian presence in Kazakhstan by favoring the integration
initiatives of the Kazakhstani president and by playing an active role in the
development of Kazakhstani science and education, which play the most
important roles in maintaining Russian nationalism in the republic. Extremely
successful is the policy of brain draining conducted by the Russian government in
the Central Asian republic. By providing educational opportunities for Kazakhstani
youth, Russia “kills two birds with one stone”—weakens the country by
appropriating its most intelligent individuals and by providing a constant influx of
intelligentsia who is enculturated into Russian values. These people are likely to
be politically active and to favor pro-Russian rather than pro-American orientation
in Kazakhstani foreign policy. By affecting the degree of Russian nationalism, the
policy of the Russian federal government towards Kazakhstani Russians has an
indirect impact on the dynamics of reversal of bilingualism.
The final factor which is likely to influence the status of the major languages is the extent of integration of the post-Soviet block. Intensification of integrative processes and further increase in cooperation between the republics is likely to raise the value of the Russian language, thus counteracting the attempts of bringing Kazakh to the level of equal functional and communicative importance as Russian. Thanks to the successful attempts of promoting new Kazakhstani ideology, to the successes in the reformation of the socio-economic system and to cultivation of loyalty towards the country, integration is unlikely to develop into cultural assimilation of the strengthening new Kazakhstani culture. A more likely outcome is cultural exchange and co-existence. In case the efforts of the Kazakhstani language planners continue to be relatively successful with more attention paid not only to the improvement of language instruction, but also to cultivation of positive language attitudes, the processes of integration, especially with the idea of Eurasianism built into the nation’s ideology, are not going to counteract the formation of Kazakhstani identity and the attempts to reverse diglossic functional distribution and bilingualism.
CHAPTER VI

SUGGESTIONS

This chapter will attempt to answer one question in only a relatively exhaustive way. The question is: What could be done by the language planners to improve the efficiency of policy implementation? Below are some suggestions that they might find useful in their work.

Currently, the implementation of language policy consists primarily in attempting to extend the use of the state language in all functional domains. Such an approach is evidently not effective, since in the conditions of a lack of financial and material resources combined with the attitudes of resistance to change, it produces only exasperation and loss of interest in the Kazakh language and in respect for the Kazakh culture. An alternative approach could be intensification of the efforts of language promotion in particular communicative domains where expansion can happen relatively painlessly and quickly, thus contributing to the change of the overall linguistic situation. This would prepare conditions for further change in other; more problematic domains, such as education, mass media and communication in the workplace.

Another way to change the linguistic situation in such a way that it will become more conductive to the spread of Kazakh bilingualism among Russian speakers is to put more effort into improving the knowledge and promoting the
use of the Kazakh language by Russian speaking Kazakhs. Learning the
language by ethnic Kazakhs presents less of a psychological challenge for them
than for Russian speakers, who might not be intrinsically motivated to learn the
tongue. Unlike Russians, Kazakhs have the advantage of greater proximity to the
natural environment of language use. They are more likely to successfully learn
and subsequently use the language, thus potentially contributing to societal
bilingualism and to preparing conditions for the development of bilingualism
among other ethnicities. In addition, the increase in the number of Kazakh-
speaking Kazakhs will have an affect on the language attitudes of Russians. For
many of them, one of the excuses not to learn the state tongue is that fact that it is
not used by the representatives of the titular ethnicity. The risk of a rise of Russian
nationalism should be also taken into consideration, since polarization of
nationalist aspirations could be expected with Russian losing its dominance and
Kazakh acquiring stronger positions.

More attention should be also paid to strengthening the knowledge of the
Kazakh language among the younger generations. Because environment in which
language is isedof language use is conductive to the second language acquisition
process, the use of the language among the older generations should be
promoted, too, but this promotion should have a secondary importance. Rather
then becoming a goal in itself, it should be a means for increasing the efficiency of
cultivating Kazakh bilingualism among younger people. What is most important for
older generations is a change in attitudes, especially in terms of their ideas about
the importance of the knowledge of the language for the successful functioning of
their children in the Kazakhstani society of the future. Since parents have an important influence on the language attitudes of their children, they should be the first targets of efforts to promote language prestige. The success of these efforts depends on the degree of understanding of the purposes of language policy rather than on manipulation with quotations from the President’s speeches. After the years of Soviet brainwashing, many of the representatives of the older generation are desensitized to such manipulations.

Some of the specific improvements could be done in promotion of the state language use in official and business communication. First, the obligatory use of the state language by government employees should be more consistently utilized. For that purpose, the exact list of the required language skills and the expected level of mastery, the timeframe for acquisition and the consequences for noncompliance with the language requirement by a stated deadline should be identified and stated in detail and disseminated among all the parties involved in implementing the requirement, so that the parties have the same understanding of the final goal.

A means of assessment of the initial skills in the language should be determined and whenever possible, the instruction should be individualized. One way of doing this is by grouping learners according to their level of knowledge of the language.

Training could be conducted by an independent agency, which would have better chances of finding the best way of organizing the courses in accordance with the needs of the adult learners, and with the requirements of the profession
and of the particular employee, by collaborating closely with the organizations requesting service and with educational institutions, especially institutions where research on androgogy is conducted and effective methodologies of instruction are developed.

Such training can be conducted as a part of workforce development and does not have to be financed from state or local budgets. It can be implemented by a for-profit organization provided with tax relief or other economic advantages on a competitive basis. Such an agency will also be able to provide specialized training for Kazakh language instructors specializing in adult learners.

In order to provide for a relatively balanced and even dissemination of the knowledge of the Kazakh language across the country, a standardized system of assessment of proficiency in the Kazakh language should be designed. It makes sense if such an assessment system is created by the agency which provides preparation for the assessment, because then the agency would be able to formulate the goals and the procedures for instruction in the most efficient way.

In addition to improving the mechanism of language instruction, organizations should create conditions for the use of the state language in the workplace. For many adult learners, especially the Kazakh-speakers who can understand but have never used their native tongue, the main problem is not a lack of motivation for learning or the lack of language learning ability, but the psychological barrier of language use. Such a barrier can be gradually broken by introduction everywhere throughout the country of a tradition of using conversational Kazakh in the workplace during a designated day every month. During this day, various activities
could be conducted, aimed at promotion of Kazakhstani patriotism and awareness of the Kazakh culture. If such a tradition is turned into a pleasurable experience associated with food and entertainment, if at the end of the day groups or individual competitions are conducted to determine the level of proficiency in Kazakh or familiarity with the Kazakh culture and history, and if such days involve members of the employees’ families or partners from other organizations, then they would contribute to the improvement of organizational culture, to the overall satisfaction with employment, and to the formation of positive attitudes towards the Kazakh language and culture. They would also facilitate the formation of Kazakhstani patriotism, would promote actual language use and, therefore, would contribute to the overall implementation of the goals of the nationality and language policy and socio-economic reform. To ensure the equality of languages and cultures, similar activities could be conducted for Russian and the other languages and cultures of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The important objective here is not to deteriorate into indoctrination and not to turn the activities into a routine. In order to maintain a stable level of interest and motivation, employees should participate in planning the events.

Considerable improvement could be made in language instruction at schools. One possible improvement is to increase the number of schools where Kazakh language classes are located in the same building as Russian-language classes. Bringing together children for whom the primary language of communication is Russian, with children for whom the primary language of communication is Kazakh, might lead to the creation of a language environment beneficial for the
development of bilingualism in both groups. It is important, however, for the pattern of language use outside the classroom not to become the same as the pattern characteristic for the society as a whole with all children eventually using the official language. Special efforts should be taken to somehow motivate children to use their second languages in communication outside the classroom with the peers for whom the language is the primary means of communication. One way of doing this is by organizing the instructional process in the form of peer-tutoring, bringing children from different language groups together for a discussion in one of the languages, organizing out of class activities in such a way that children from different language groups have to work together and are expected to use only one of the tongues. If the theories that children learn mostly from each other and that the best way to master a language is by communicating with native speakers are correct, then mixed schools could become the best way of promoting bilingualism.

A number of improvements could be implemented in the organization of the instructional process. First of all, grouping children according to the level of language proficiency should become universal. The groups should be also fewer students. This task is difficult to implement with the lack of instructional personnel. Such groupings could be attempted, however, with the use of additional assignments for the children who come to class with a better level of the language, as well as by grouping children in the classroom according to the levels of proficiency and by using a language assistant to help the instructor to implement the task of individualization.
One way to resolve the problem of the lack of instructional materials is to change the approach to its publication and use. At the present moment, universalization of instruction is implemented by the use of standardized instructional materials. The textbooks are created by specially appointed commissions and are published by designated publishing houses.

There exists an alternative way of approaching the problem of universalization. In this approach, the government would establish certain standards similar to expectations for state employees about the level of language skills and the topics that are expected to be covered by a student at the secondary level. School districts should be given more autonomy to determine what books to buy and what methodology to use in order to comply with the established standards. In order to control the quality of instructional materials, a special committee could be created at the Ministry of Education that would evaluate the new textbooks and assess the efficiency of newly designed methodologies, as well as grant copyrights to the authors of the textbooks and methodologies. The authors, in their turn, could sell their ideas to independent publishing houses that would compete in the market to sell the instructional materials. Thus, the publishing houses would be motivated to improve the quality of print, paper and illustrations. Such a mechanism would be based on free competition and should contribute to the improvement of the quality of instruction as well as to development of small business in the country, thus facilitating economic reforms, whose course indirectly affects the results of the language policy.
The system of teacher training and professional development should be modified, too. First, instructors in Kazakh as a second language should be trained separately from instructors in Kazakh language and literature. Second language instruction is based upon a special methodology different from native language instruction. In fact, this methodology is closer to foreign language instruction and, therefore, training of teachers of Kazakh as a second language should be conducted in special groups at the Departments of Foreign Languages.

The departments training Kazakh language instructors should be supported (by research grants) in conducting research on instruction in Kazakh as a Second Language, in the efforts targeted at the development of language learning methodologies, and in the accumulation and dissemination of the best practices through direct rather than indirect interaction with school districts.²

Professional development of teachers should also be modified to provide for a faster resolution of the problem of the deficit of instructors of Kazakh as a Second Language. The suggested way of re-organization of professional development for teachers also requires de-centralization of school districts. Professional development should become not only a means of quality control, but also a way of re-training teachers in other subjects for instruction of or in the Kazakh language. The new system should also allow for the constant improvement of the quality of Kazakh language instruction by insuring an efficient means of disseminating the new research findings and best practices. In order to provide for such professional development, a closer connection between

² by a third party agency (such as the Institute for Teacher Professional Development)
universities and schools should be established, so that universities could use the experience of school teachers in implementing research, and teachers could have easy access to newly designed methodologies and instructional techniques. Universities could become responsible not only for traditional instruction, but also increasingly for the provision of continuing education and extension services. With the establishment of a direct link between the university and school district, a number of different problems could be resolved. On the one hand, new sources of funding would be created for the institutions of higher education. On the other, research would become more attended to practical needs and practice better equipped with research findings. A greater and consequently a better variety of services would be provided for the users of workforce development services. The universities will have to compete for school districts in order to ensure an additional source of profit and, as a result, will be more motivated to meet the needs of the instructors. More teachers will become motivated to take continuous education courses if a standardized system of continuing education requirements is introduced with motivation for professional development, ensured by salary schedules and sets of benefits. Because the system of professional development will be connected with universities, which implement basic training of instructors, special programs could be created allowing short-term re-certification for teaching of or in the Kazakh or other ethnic languages.

One way to improve instruction is to better utilize modern technology, especially audiovisual equipment and the Internet. The newly designed instructional materials should not necessarily be in print. With the possibilities
promised by contemporary technology, and with the faster printing and re-
reproducing capacity of the contemporary information technology, each school is
able to produce instructional material necessary for the support of quality
instruction on the condition it is provided with the opportunities for autonomous
decision-making and financial management.

Use of the Internet, especially with its communicative capabilities, could be
very helpful in increasing the efficiency of the Kazakhs in a second language
instruction. The price for the Internet could be decreased by unification of the
educational system of the country into a common network. Such unification would
also make the use of the Internet more affordable, improve the speed of
connection and enable the sharing of instructional and organizational know-how.
Such a network would facilitate the development of distance education, which
could become an important mode of professional development, bringing together
instructors from different parts of the country, allowing for teleconferencing and
therefore easy exchange of research information and best practices.

Instructional methodology in a second language should be differentiated not
only on the basis of the level of language competence, but also on the basis of the
cognitive style, age and individual needs of the learner. This communicative
method should be balanced with the methods of ethnopedagogy; however,
familiarization of the learner with the cultural context should not supercede the
primary purpose of instruction: achieving competence in the language at a level
appropriate for successful functioning in contemporary society. Cultural and
historic information should be included into the instructional materials for language
courses only to the extent of its relevance to an understanding of a linguistic
phenomenon. All other information related to culture should be taught in Kazakh
literature and history courses. The progression of instruction across the levels of
proficiency should be from everyday/cultural awareness use of the language to
the more specialized language of scientific and official communication. Younger
learners should be taught the basics of grammar, pronunciation, everyday lexis
and the cultural background of the language, while advanced learners should be
assisted in the use of actual language by greater incorporation of natural
language materials, such as TV programs, movies, newspapers, and lectures.
The Kazakh language and literature or a specialized course in culture study aimed
at promotion of Kazakhstani supra-nationalism could be taught to the advanced
level learners.

Language promotion in the mass media could be also improved. On the one
hand, the requirement for the use of certain levels of the Kazakh language could
be extended to include periodicals. On the other hand, new, market-based
mechanisms of motivating broadcasters and publishers could be designed that
would encourage them to use the Kazakh language programming more frequently
and during more popular hours, as well as to improve the quality of the
programming in the state language. One way of doing this is to provide tax-cuts or
other benefits to TV and radio companies that are willing to extend the hours and
to improve the quality of programming. Instead of poorly managed programs in
the state language on the Kazakh-language based central channel, the
administration could conduct a tender on the free use of the broadcasting hours
and slots for advertisement by any company that could provide programming on a certain topic. Of particular interest should be programs devoted to language instruction, cultural topics, and analytical programs devoted to the current issues of Kazakhstani society that would be of interest for adult populations, animation and feature movies for children dubbed into Kazakh, bilingual news, etc. A special channel, financed from the educational section of the budget, could be devoted to programs used in language instruction at different levels, so that any citizen of the country could watch the programs at a convenient time and find a program for any level of proficiency. Similar radio channels could be also created. Such channels could be financed by advertising and by the use of public donations. The channels could provide programs not only in Kazakh, but also in other languages of the republic and other countries of the world. The programs could be linked to the distance education network to allow for live broadcasting of important language-related conferences and innovative courses.

In general, within the coordinating role of the government, the role of individuals in implementation of the language policy should increase. This should happen not by imposition, but by providing better opportunities into the actual process of language planning, by allowing for the release of the creative energy of the rising Kazakhstani supra-nationalism.
CHAPTER VII
IMPLICATIONS

There are a number of practical and theoretical implications of the suggested analysis of bilingualism, diglossia, the dynamics of interethnic communication and language policy in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

This analysis should contribute to an understanding of the linguistic situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan, to a determination of the historical and contemporary linguistic and extra-linguistic factors affecting the contemporary linguistic situation and the results of language planning, development and promotion, to explanation of the place of the language policy with respect to the more general nationality policy and socio-economic reform, and to the resolution of the problem of finding the relationship between the role of an individual and the society in the successful implementation of a language reform.

The results of the analysis should serve as a confirmation of the validity of the existing theory of nationalism and language planning. The insights about the course of development of societal bilingualism in Kazakhstan might be useful for the purposes of further research in this area.

The analysis and the list of suggestions for policy improvement could assist Kazakhstani language planners and practitioners in successful achievement of the
goal of cultivation of Kazakhstani patriotism, and in their effort to develop and to promote the state language of the newly independent state of Kazakhstan.
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