A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF FOUR METAREPRESENTATION MARKERS OF INDUS KOHISTANI

by

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This thesis, submitted by Beate Lubberger in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts from the University of North Dakota, has been read by the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done and is hereby approved.

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Dr. Adam Baker

This thesis meets the standards for appearance, conforms to the style and format requirements of the School of Graduate Studies of the University of North Dakota, and is hereby approved.

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Dean of the School of Graduate Studies

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Beate Lubberger

____________________________  July 23, 2014
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### ABBREVIATIONS

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<td>metarepresentation marker</td>
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<td>negation, negative</td>
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<td>subordinator</td>
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ABSTRACT

This thesis describes and analyzes four markers of Indus Kohistani, a language spoken in Northern Pakistan that has received little attention so far. The markers discussed are *lee*, a “hearsay” evidential that does however not mark every reported speech, *karee*, a grammaticalized quotative and complementizer that is also found in purpose and reason clauses, in naming and in similarity constructions, *če*, a complementizer borrowed from Pashto, and *loo*, a marker that indicates utterances a speaker wishes her audience to convey to a third party.

Relevance Theory, an inferential theory of communication, distinguishes between utterances that are descriptions or representations of a state of affairs and utterances that are the representations of another representation like speech or thought, i.e. metarepresentations. This distinction allows for an analysis within this framework that shows one underlying meaning common to all four markers: all are used as indicators of metarepresentation. What distinguishes them is the kind of metarepresentation they point out. The evidential *lee* indicates metarepresentation of attributed utterances; *karee* marks attributed and self-attributed thoughts and utterances; the complementizer *če* indicates the same metarepresentations while gradually replacing *karee*; and the marker *loo* is used to indicate metarepresentations of desirable utterances, a non-attributive type of metarepresentation. Furthermore, I suggest that the evidential *lee* also activates the cognitive assessment mechanism of an addressee, providing input for the evaluation of the communicated information, namely its source. A speaker will use *lee* when what she communicates is the report of rather unusual events, to show herself as trustworthy and to hand over some of the responsibility of assessment to the addressee.

This study uses data from collected narrative and non-narrative recorded texts as well as from recorded conversations; it includes a short sketch of Indus Kohistani typological features.
Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Purpose

One purpose of this thesis is to describe four discourse markers of Indus Kohistani\(^1\), a language that so far has not received much attention. Each of these particles marks utterances that are not descriptions of states of affairs but representations of someone’s speech or thoughts: The evidential particle \textit{lee} indicates reported speech but is not used as a default ‘reported’ marker. The marker \textit{karee}, the converb of \textit{kar}- ‘do’ is similar to SAY complementizers in its functions as a quotative, as a complementizer and as a marker of purpose and reason clauses. The complementizer \textit{če}, a more recent acquisition into the Indus Kohistani lexicon, seems to be replacing the marker \textit{karee} in all the uses mentioned above but is even more multifunctional. Finally, the marker \textit{loo} indicates utterances that a speaker wants her hearer to say to a third person.

The second purpose of this study is to propose an analysis that offers an underlying unifying meaning but can also account for the differences between the four markers. Using the theoretical framework of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), an inferential theory of communication, I will show that \textit{lee}, \textit{karee}, \textit{če}, and \textit{loo} are procedural indicators of metarepresentation, the feature that is common to all four. What distinguishes them is the kind of metarepresentation they mark: \textit{lee} indicates attributed metarepresentations of speech, \textit{karee} and \textit{če} mark (self-) attributed metarepresentations of speech and thought, and \textit{loo} indicates metarepresentations of non-attributive desirable utterances. Furthermore, the fact that \textit{lee} does not mark every instance of reported speech can be explained within relevance theory by analyzing \textit{lee} as an indicator that triggers the hearer’s argumentative module, a

\footnote{\textit{ISO 639-3 code [mvy]}.}
cognitive epistemic vigilance mechanism aimed at protecting a hearer from being misinformed (Sperber et al. 2010). It follows that a speaker will use *lee* when she wants to present herself as a reliable and trustworthy informant by laying open the sources of her information, so that the addressee believes her.

In the remaining part of this chapter I introduce the speakers of Indus Kohistani and the language itself in sections 1.2 and 1.3. An overview of previous research of Indus Kohistani is presented in section 1.4. Section 1.5 contains a brief description of the data used in this study and their transcription. In section 1.6 I list the main typological features of Indus Kohistani (a more detailed description is provided in the Appendix); and this chapter concludes in section 1.7 with an overview of the thesis.

1.2 Indus Kohistani: the people

*Kohistan*, a Persian word meaning “land of mountains”, is the name of an area and district in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (formerly North-West Frontier Province) in Northern Pakistan. And indeed, this mountainous region in the Western Himalayas has been one of the most remote and difficult to access. Only since the construction of the Karakoram Highway, which connects Pakistan with China and was completed in 1979, can it be reached more easily.

The Indus river divides the district Kohistan into an Eastern and a Western part; at the same time it also functions as a natural border between two language areas: on the Eastern side, Shina Kohistani is spoken, on the West bank and its side valleys Indus Kohistani. On both sides of the river the inhabitants refer to themselves as Kohistani. In the 1981 census (as cited in Hallberg 1992:89) the number of people living in the district Kohistan was given as approximately 470,000, about half of these living on the Western side of the Indus. In 1998 the reported population number was 472,579 (District Profile Kohistan 2007:23); assuming that about half of them still live on the Western bank the estimated number of Indus Kohistani speakers at that time was approximately 235,000. There has been no more recent census.

Traditionally, most of the Indus Kohistani speakers were herders and farmers who used to move up and down the mountains in a yearly cycle (transhumance; for a detailed description see Zarin and Schmidt 1984). The winter months were spent near the river; in Spring people with their families and
cattle moved up the side valleys. On their way up they would plant maize on different altitude levels and spend the hottest months on alpine pastures high up the mountains. At the end of the summer season they would gradually move back towards the river, harvesting the fields on each level on their way down. At that time, the only way to get to more settled areas of Pakistan was on precarious footpaths (Jettmar 1975:22; Zoller 2005:6).

The construction of the Karakoram Highway has opened up the area and thereby triggered many changes. Nowadays, many have abandoned this way of life for economic reasons and have left the district in search for a living elsewhere. In all major cities of Pakistan, from Peshawar to Karachi, there are Kohistani settlements. Some of these are in the Mansehra - Abbottabad area in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province where an increasing number of Indus Kohistani speakers is living, among them the extended family of my main language consultant.

1.3 **Indus Kohistani: the language**

Indus Kohistani is classified as belonging to the Central (Kohistani) group of Dardic languages within the Northwestern zone of Indo-Aryan. On a higher level, it is part of the Indo-Iranian, and Indo-European language family (Hallberg 1999:1; Zoller 2005:1; Mock 1997:6).

The term “Dardic languages” is somewhat of a misnomer; it refers back to the Dards or “Darada”, a people who, according to Sanskrit, Greek and Roman sources, were assumed to live in the area of the upper Indus which includes today’s Northern Pakistan (Jettmar 1975:19). The term was again used in the 19th century to describe “an independent mountain tribe, three or four marches north from Dras, who speak the Pashtu as well as the Daradi language” (Izzet Ullah 1843:286 as cited in in Mock 1997:4). As Mock remarks, the area mentioned here most likely refers to the Astor valley where until today Shina is spoken. Subsequently other authors continued to use “Dardic” and “Dards”, among them Leitner (1893:1) who coined the geographical term Dardistan ‘land of the Dards’ which included the Shina-speaking area as well as Hunza and Nagar in the North, and the area to the West up to Chitral and parts of Eastern Afghanistan. It has to be noted that none of the inhabitants of what Leitner called Dardistan ever referred to themselves as Dards.
Following Leitner, Grierson (1919:1) then adopted the term “Dardic” to refer to the languages spoken in this area and to classify them as an independent branch of Indo-Iranian (Masica 1991:461), assuming that a genetic relationship distinguishes this group of languages from others. This assumption (and likewise the use of the term) has since been a point of dispute; most authors (the author of this study included) use the expression as a convenient term for a group of languages in the mountainous area of Northern Pakistan but note that it is a geographical rather than a linguistic term; that is, the term “Dardic” does not indicate that the languages in question are a separate branch of Indo-Aryan (Morgenstierne 1965:138-9; Fussman 1972:11; Mock 1997; Strand 1997/2013; Liljegren 2008:29-32). As long as there is no evidence of shared innovations that would distinguish the languages classified as Dardic from other languages, the term “Dardic” will remain controversial; a reason for some researchers to reject the use of the term (Strand 1997/2013) and to replace it with a less contentious one (Liljegren 2008:31).

When asked by an outsider, Indus Kohistani speakers refer to their language as koostāĩ ‘Kohistani’. As this term is also used for other languages of Northern Pakistan, Hallberg (1992:91) introduced the term Indus Kohistani to avoid confusion. Other names mentioned in the literature about Indus Kohistani include Shuthun (Leitner (1893 Appendix IV:1), Mayon and Maiyā (Biddulph 1880:12), but there is no evidence that these names are known or used currently.

There are two main dialects of Indus Kohistani: one spoken in the settlements near the Indus River, such as Jijal, Pattan and Seo, and a second variety spoken in the Kandia and the Dube valley (Hallberg 1992:92-102). The sociolinguistic survey by Hallberg shows that the two dialects share around 90% lexical similarity; he notes that mother-tongue speakers from both areas perceive both varieties as one and the same language. There are some phonological differences as well as differences in verb inflection which is a topic of current research (Hallberg, p.c.). However, as Zoller (2005:4) remarks, although

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2 Leitner (1893, appendix IV: 10) mentions two dialects “Shēnā” and “Shūthun” which however turned out to be two different languages, namely Shina Kohistani and Indus Kohistani. Jetmar (1983), Fussman (1989), and Cooper and Fitch (1985) remark on the existence of two distinct dialects on the Western side of the Indus, but the first comprehensive dialect survey was done by Hallberg (1992).
dialectal variations within the two varieties are few, mother-tongue speakers can easily identify another speaker’s home village by his speech.

The Indus Kohistani language area is surrounded by several other languages, among them Shina Kohistani on the Eastern bank of the Indus; another dialect of Shina is spoken in the North-East, and to the South and South-West of District Kohistan, Pashto is the main language. In the next valley to the West, in Swat, we find Torwali and Gawri (Kalam Kohistani), two other languages belonging to the Dardic group. Three smaller languages, Bateri, Chilisso and Gowro, are found within the Shina-Kohistani language area on the East bank of the Indus (Hallberg 1992; Zoller 2005). Furthermore, small language enclaves of Indus Kohistani as well as of other languages can be found outside their own language areas; for a more detailed picture I refer the reader to Zoller (2005:8-10).

The languages of wider communication are Pashto, and increasingly Urdu, which is the language of instruction in schools and the official language of Pakistan. As the literacy rate in district Kohistan, especially for females, is low (District Profile Kohistan 2007:17) it is mainly younger men who are proficient in Urdu, although most men speak some Urdu or Pashto. The majority of the women are more or less monolingual, or speak some Shina Kohistani or Pashto when women from those language areas come into the family through marriage.

In the growing language community outside the district Kohistan the picture is different: often both boys and girls are sent to school; also the women of such families learn the local languages of their neighbors (Hindko, Pashto, Punjabi etc.) as well as some Urdu due to the Urdu television programs. And as can be observed elsewhere in Pakistan, English vocabulary makes its steady entry into the Indus Kohistani lexicon.

To conclude this section, Hallberg (1992:112) characterizes Indus Kohistani as a very vital language that is widely used in homes as well as in most other domains.

1.4 Previous research

When looking at the entries for the language Indus Kohistani in Baart and Baart’s “Bibliography of languages of Northern Pakistan” (2001:66), there exists relatively little literature compared with other
languages of the region. In this section I look at publications about the language Indus Kohistani, leaving aside literature that is concerned with Indus Kohistan from an ethnological viewpoint.

The book “Dardistan” by Leitner, published in 1893, contains the first written evidence of the language in the form of word lists, dialogs, proverbs, riddles and a ballad, presumably all from an informant of the Kandia valley. Leitner himself had never been in Kohistan. Biddulph (1880:158) mentions the “Maiyon tribe of Kandia, Doobeyr and Seo” but the only language data of the area of today’s Kohistan described by him are of Chilisso. In 1958 Barth and Morgenstierne published some wordlists of Indus Kohistani; this was followed by a study of the language of Kanyawali by Buddruss (1959). In 1985 Fitch and Cooper published their “Report on a Language and Dialect survey in Kohistan District”; the first extensive survey of languages in Kohistan was carried out by Hallberg and published in 1992 (Rensch, Decker and Hallberg 1992:83-115). This was followed by the monograph “Indus Kohistani: A Preliminary Phonological and Morphological Analysis” by Hallberg and Hallberg in 1999; their data are from the Seo and Jijal villages. A dictionary of Indus Kohistan, based on the Jijal variety, was published by Zoller in 2005, including notes on phonology and Indus Kohistani tone, and a diachronic sketch of the Dardic languages.

A primer of the Indus Kohistani variety of Kandia together with some notes on the grammar has been published in 2007 by M. Sh. Rashid, himself an Indus Kohistani mother tongue speaker.

1.5 Data and transcription

My first contacts with Indus Kohistani speakers were within a hospital context, where I worked as a midwife and nurse. Caring for patients whose only language was Indus Kohistani made it necessary to learn their mother tongue. Subsequently, the language learning developed into language documentation and research. The data used in this thesis consist of a large corpus of oral texts that include folk stories,

3 Kanyawali is a village within a Shina-speaking area whose inhabitants are Indus Kohistani speakers, see also Zoller 2005: 5.

4 Data collected under IRB proposal # IRB 200908-041 with the author as principal investigator. Permission to include data collected between 2001 and 2009 has been given by protocol change approved on July 8, 2011.
narratives of personal experiences, expository and procedural texts; these have been recorded between 2001 and 2009 and have been transcribed and translated by me. A second corpus of recorded conversations has been collected within the extended family of my main language consultant in the years 2011 to 2014. The passages relevant for this study have again been transcribed and translated by me. The data represent the Pattan variety of Indus Kohistani as spoken by the people settled in Pattan, the dialect found in settlements near the Indus river. Due to cultural constraints the speakers are, with very few exceptions, female; and my medical background is to be blamed for the relative dominance of health-related topics in the collected data. Names of speakers and persons mentioned in the data have been replaced by capital letters so as not to reveal their identity.

The transcription of Kohistani language data in this study is mostly based on what Masica calls the “Standard Orientalist” transcription (Masica 1991:xv), with the addition of symbols borrowed from the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA). Retroflex consonants are represented by letters with subscript dots: ĭ, ī, ī, īn. Aspirated consonants are represented with a regular h following the consonant as in th, dh, ph, etc. The characters s, z, and c represent the voiceless and the voiced retroflex grooved fricative, and the voiceless retroflex affricate. Alveopalatal fricatives and affricates are written as follows: s represents the voiceless grooved fricative, and ĺ its voiced counterpart; ĝ denotes the voiceless affricate, and ts the voiceless dental affricate. The voiceless velar fricative is represented by x, its voiced counterpart as y. The character y represents the palatal semivowel, as y in English yard. I do not follow Masica in his annotation of vowel length. In this study a long vowel is represented as for example aa, a short vowel as a (Masica uses ā for a long vowel). Likewise, nasalization is indicated by the tilde over the vowel symbol as in āā, representing a long nasalized vowel (In Masica’s transcription the tilde follows the vowel).

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5 The corpus includes one hundred and five texts of varying length: the shortest ones consist of twenty sentences, the longest ones of five hundred and thirty sentences. Average length is between one and two hundred sentences.

6 My own estimate of my proficiency in Indus Kohistani would be level three on a 1 to 5 scale or, in the terms of the ACTFL proficiency guidelines, ‘advanced’ level.
Indus Kohistani has pitch accent which is perceived as either rising or falling. In this study I follow Zoller (2005) in that a rising tone is represented with an acute accent as in ʼā and ʼāā, and a falling tone with a grave accent as in ā and āā.

1.6 Main typological features of Indus Kohistani grammar

In this section I briefly mention the main typological features of Indus Kohistani. A more detailed overview with examples will be presented in the Appendix (for a phonological and morphological analysis see Hallberg 1999; Zoller 2005; Buddruss 1959).

The basic constituent order of pragmatically unmarked Indus Kohistani clauses is S-O-V. Speech and other sentential complements may follow the clause-final verb of the matrix clause. The word order may be different because of pragmatic factors.

In an Indus Kohistani noun phrase, the head noun is usually the right-most element; adjectives, demonstratives, numerals, possessors, and the indefinite marker ʼek ‘one’ precede the noun. Relative clauses may be prenominal or postnominal.

In Indus Kohistani verb phrases with complex verb constructions, the first verb usually carries the meaning and has a non-finite form (root or participle) whereas the second verb is marked for tense/aspect and agreement but is more or less semantically empty.

Grammatical relations within noun and postpositional phrases are marked on the dependent element. That is, adjectives of the variable kind show agreement with the head noun for gender (and for number as well in some cases); possessors are marked with genitive case and show gender/number agreement with the head of the phrase, the possessee; and in postpositional phrases the noun as the dependent element is case-marked.

At the clausal level, Indus Kohistani shows case marking, again a marking of grammatical relations on the dependent constituent, and agreement of the verb with its subject, this being a case of head marking.

Indus Kohistani displays ergative alignment in clauses with transitive verbs that are marked for perfective aspect. For a more detailed description and examples see the Appendix, section 3.
The Indus Kohistani verb shows one of two agreement patterns: Finite verbs are marked for aspect, tense and gender/number agreement, verb forms expressing mood are marked for person and number only. Again, more details and verb paradigm examples are found in the Appendix section 4.

1.7 Overview of the thesis

In Chapter 2 I introduce Relevance Theory, the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the four Indus Kohistani markers that are the topic of this study.

Chapter 3 discusses the Indus Kohistani “reported” marker lee. After introducing this marker and giving a brief overview of similar evidential markers in the wider geographical context I describe the different uses of lee and then analyze it as a marker that indicates metarepresentation of attributed utterances. Moreover, I show that lee also plays a role in activating a hearer’s cognitive assessment mechanism, the argumentative module; this analysis can account for the fact that lee is not the default “reported” marker in Indus Kohistani.

In Chapter 4 I introduce the marker karee, the grammaticalized converb of the verb kar- ‘do’ that has a wide range of functions from marking reported speech to indicating reported thought, and purpose and reason clauses. This chapter gives an overview of sentential complementation in Indus Kohistani and then describes the different uses of the marker. As karee shows many similarities to so-called SAY complementizers (complementizers that have developed from a verb of speech) found on the Indian subcontinent, Turkic and Tibetan languages as well as in other parts of the world, section 4.4 presents an overview of relevant literature concerning grammaticalization of such complementizers. In section 4.5 I analyze karee as a metarepresentation marker that indicates (self-) attributed utterances and thoughts.

Chapter 5 discusses the Indus Kohistani complementizer če, a borrowed marker that is on the way to partly replace the older marker karee. After describing this multifunctional marker and its uses I analyse če as a metarepresentation marker similar to karee in many aspects but also different in that its uses extend those of karee. The chapter concludes with a brief synchronic and diachronic analysis of these two markers.
In Chapter 6 I present the Indus Kohistani marker *loo*, a discourse particle that marks utterances that a speaker wants her addressee to say to a third person. The marker *loo* is also used as an indicator of third-person imperative. In section 6.3 I describe and illustrate its two main uses; in section 6.4. I analyze *loo* as a metarepresentation marker of desirable utterances and show that this analysis accounts for both uses stated above.

Chapter 7 contains a summary of this thesis and discusses topics for further research.
Chapter 2
Relevance Theory

In this chapter, I introduce Relevance Theory, the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the four Indus Kohistani markers treated in this study. This brief introduction to Relevance Theory is based on Sperber and Wilson (1995), Blass (1990), and Unger (2006).

2.1 Communication is inferential: the basics of Relevance Theory

Relevance Theory has been described as an “inferential theory of communication which aims to explain how the audience infers the communicator’s intended meaning” (Unger 2006:10). This theory stands in contrast to the “code model” approach (as outlined in Blass 1990:34) where communication is basically seen as a matter of encoding and decoding messages. Grice (1989) went beyond the code model by pointing out the huge role that inference plays in the process of interpreting a speaker’s meaning. Grice noted that a communicator provides evidence (not necessarily linguistically encoded) for her intentions; the hearer on his part has to infer the intentions from the evidence offered. Grice formulated four basic maxims of conversation, namely the maxims of quality, of quantity, of relevance, and of manner which together underlie the co-operative principle of communication (Grice 1989).

Building on Grice’s insight into the inferential nature of communication, Sperber and Wilson (1995) postulate that inference in communication is not just filling the gap between “what is said” and “what is meant” but is fundamental in all aspects of utterance interpretation. Furthermore they claim that in fact relevance is the single factor guiding an audience in recovering an intended meaning, making Grice’s maxims and co-operative principle of communication redundant.

7 Throughout this study, unnamed speakers or communicators will be referred to with a female pronoun and addressees with a male pronoun.
Sperber and Wilson formulated two principles, the cognitive principle of relevance and the communicative principle of relevance:

Cognitive principle of relevance: Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance.

and

Communicative principle of relevance: Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995:260).

In other words, human cognition in general attends only to those phenomena (utterances and otherwise) that promise to be relevant in some way. In the case of communication, the single factor guiding the hearer’s comprehension process is the search for relevance; the speaker, on the other hand, by the mere act of communicating verbally signals that the content of her utterance will be relevant to the hearer.

The comprehension process then goes as follows: (i) recovery of the linguistic utterance content by decoding; its result is an incomplete logical form, (ii) reference assignment, disambiguation, recovery of elided material, resolution of semantic indeterminacies such as big, here, or now, all by way of inference, the result of which is a fully developed propositional form or explication, (iii) search for implicit contents, or implicatures, within a specific context, again a purely inferential process, until the search for relevance has been satisfied and thereby the speaker’s intended meaning has been recovered (1995:185-202). It has to be noted that although this brief description might be seen as a serial order of steps (i) to (iii), this is not the case: massive parallel processing takes place in the search for relevance.

Information that is relevant increases or improves an individual’s overall knowledge of the world. We say in this case that the hearer achieves cognitive effects. These occur in three different ways: (i) the new information, processed together with already existing assumptions, leads to new conclusions or contextual implications, thus increasing the knowledge about the world, (ii) the new information confirms and strengthens already existing assumptions, and (iii) the new information contradicts already existing assumptions and, being stronger than these, will eliminate them and so improve the existing
assumptions about the world. Information which does not lead to one of these three effects is not relevant to a hearer.

Search for relevance, or cognitive effects, involves costs such as processing effort and time. The human mind is geared to process only such information which promises cognitive effects with the least expenditure of time and effort. High processing costs will decrease the relevance of any input. It follows that relevance is defined in terms of cognitive effects as well as processing costs. A hearer will therefore, when interpreting an utterance, always follow a path of least effort, access the context most accessible, and stop the interpretation process when his expectations of relevance is satisfied (Wilson 2012:238).

2.2 Representation and metarepresentation

One basic concept in Relevance Theory, and indeed in cognition and Theory of Mind in general, is that of representation and metarepresentation. A representation is used to represent something else. The photo of a house represents a real house; likewise, the word *house* represents a real house and the concept “house”. Our knowledge about the world is stored in the mind in the form of representations of the world. The utterance “Yesterday was my sister’s birthday” represents a state of affairs in the world if it is true that the speaker’s sister had birthday one day prior to the utterance. Such an instance Sperber and Wilson call the descriptive use of a representation (Sperber and Wilson 1995:228). To clarify, on the most basic level every utterance is the representation of a thought of the speaker and resembles this thought. In what follows I am not concerned with this basic level, the descriptive use of representation and resemblance. What concerns us here are instances where the speaker’s utterance does not represent a state of affairs in the sense described above but represents another utterance or thought. Such an utterance is the metarepresentation of another utterance or thought: a lower-order representation embedded within a higher-order representation. Example (1) is such an instance.

(1) A: “What did Mary say to you?”
    B: “She said, ‘I have to go to a meeting to Islamabad tomorrow’”
A direct quotation such as the example above is a typical instance of such a metarepresentation. Speaker B’s utterance does not only contain a descriptively used representation (“she said”) but also the representation of another representation, namely Mary’s utterance. B is quoting Mary verbatim, that is, Mary’s original utterance, the lower-order representation, and B’s quote of her, the higher-order representation, are identical. But does such a metarepresentation have to be identical with the lower-order representation, or in other words, are only direct quotes instances of metarepresentation? Sperber and Wilson show that this is not the case. It is not identity but rather resemblance of some kind that characterizes the relation between representation and metarepresentation. To use example (1), if speaker B had answered A’s question by saying “Tomorrow she has to go to a meeting to Islamabad”, B’s utterance would still be a metarepresentation of Mary’s, albeit not a verbatim one. What is important here is that the two representations resemble each other; in our example it is resemblance of content or, as Wilson says, in sharing of logical and contextual implications. Imagine that B’s answer is something like “She won’t be here tomorrow”. Although there is even less similarity between original utterance and quote, there is still resemblance in the shared implication that Mary will not be here tomorrow. To quote Wilson,

According to Relevance Theory, in interpreting a quotation, or more generally a linguistic metarepresentation, the hearer is not entitled to assume a strict identity between representation and original. Rather, following the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, he should start deriving implications that might plausibly be shared with the original, and stop when he has enough to satisfy his expectation of relevance. Thus, resemblance rather than identity, is the normal or typical case (Wilson 2012:244).
Such a resemblance in content is also called interpretive resemblance; a metarepresentation that resembles the lower-order representation is used interpretively. It follows that not only direct but also indirect and free indirect quotations are instances of metarepresentation.

However, this is not the whole range of linguistic metarepresentations. Sperber and Wilson distinguish between attributed and non-attributed metarepresentations, and in the case of attributed ones, between interpretive and metalinguistic metarepresentations. As to the latter contrasting pair, B’s utterance “She won’t be here tomorrow” above is an instance of an interpretive metarepresentation that shares implications with the original but not verbatim identity. If on the other hand speaker B is quoting Mary verbatim, may be even imitating her accent, then this is an instance of a metalinguistic metarepresentation where the resemblance that the speaker points out is linguistic and stylistic rather than in content.

Attributive metarepresentations also include self-attributed metarepresentations: quotes of a speaker’s previous utterances or thoughts, such as utterances introduced by “As I said, …” or “I think that …”.

A special case of attributive metarepresentation is one that echoes an attributed utterance or thought and at the same time expresses the speaker’s attitude towards it. Consider example (2), taken from Wilson (21 and 22 in 2012:249). Suppose Peter and Mary have been to see a film. As they come out, one of the following exchanges occurs:

(2) PETER: That was a fantastic film.

   b. [puzzled] Fantastic?
   c. [scornfully] Fantastic!

Mary’s answers in (2a), (2b), and (2c) metarepresent Peter’s remark but they do not achieve relevance merely by resembling Peter’s utterance in content: it is Mary’s attitude to this content that she wants to convey with this kind of metarepresentation. In the case of (2c), her attitude is one of strong disagreement with Peter’s view of the film. Irony is an instance of echoic metarepresentation where a
speaker quotes or echoes an attributed utterance or thought and at the same time dissociates herself from this quote.

Other cases of echoic utterances include denials such as the following example (3).

(3)  

A:  “Oh, next week you are on holiday”

B:  “I won’t be on holiday; I will be working on my thesis”

Speaker B echoes speaker A’s utterance, at the same time negating it. The effect is that of rejecting A’s assumption that B will be on holiday next week. In a similar way, echo questions are analyzed: The speaker echoes an attributed utterance or thought and at the same time questions either its content or form.

All instances of metarepresentation treated so far metarepresent an attributed representation. Following are instances of metarepresentations where the lower-order representation is non-attributive. Cases of mention of sentence types, utterance types or proposition types, that is, abstract representations, belong into this category. Furthermore, within Relevance Theory regular (that is, non-attributive) questions and exlamatives are analyzed as metarepresenting desirable thoughts, and regular (non-attributive) negations and disjunctions as metarepresenting possible thoughts (2012:254). Likewise there are representations of desirable utterances and possible utterances. In Chapter 6 I will discuss the Indus Kohistani marker loo that marks desirable utterances: utterances that a speaker wants her addressee to say to a third person. And, as Wilson notes, drafts, essay plans and rehearsals of future conversations might be examples of representations of non-attributive possible utterances (2012:257).

How does a hearer recognize that the speaker’s utterance is not describing a state of affairs but is representing another representation? A quotation may be introduced by “he said” or “I have heard” and thereby be identified as a metarepresentation (conceptual encoding). Hearsay markers, question and negation markers are grammatical indicators of metarepresentations (procedural encoding). But other metarepresentations may not be explicitly marked as such, for example instances of free indirect quotation. In such cases of tacit quotation it is the task of the hearer to infer the speaker’s meaning by following the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure. As Wilson says, “… [T]he recognition and
interpretation of linguistic metarepresentations involves a substantial amount of pragmatic inference” (2012:244). Also languages differ in what kind of metarepresentations they encode and what is left to the hearer to infer, as well as how an explicit metarepresentation is coded: conceptually or procedural. In the next section we will look at conceptual and procedural meaning within relevance theory.

2.3 The conceptual - procedural distinction

Words encode meanings, but not every word encodes the same kind of meaning. Many, such as child, house, tree, and go, buy, say, encode concepts - someone who is familiar with these concepts has no problem in describing what they represent. There are, however, other words whose meaning is more difficult to pin down, for instance words such as but, so, and also. Within Relevance Theory, words that encode concepts or are “content” words, are said to have conceptual meaning whereas the second type of words encode procedural meaning - meaning that is computational rather than conceptional, and therefore difficult to describe.

It was Blakemore who introduced this particular distinction into Relevance Theory and who analyzed discourse connectives such as and, so, and but as containing not concepts but procedural information whose function is to constrain the inferential comprehension procedure, thereby reducing processing costs (Blakemore 1987). This analysis has since been successfully applied to discourse connectors and other grammatical words of a wide range of languages and has allowed for one unifying meaning of markers with a seemingly wide range of uses, see for example the interpretive use marker ré and the marker ma in Sissala (Blass 1990).

Early on in the study of such procedural markers, it seemed that all words encoding procedural information are also non-truth-conditional, whereas all words encoding concepts also contribute to the truth conditions of a proposition. Later it became obvious that these two distinctions cross-cut each other: content words encode concepts and are truth-conditional, discourse connectives encode procedural instructions and are non-truth-conditional, personal pronouns on the other hand encode procedural meaning and contribute to the truth conditions of a proposition, whereas illocutionary adverbials encode concepts but are not truth-conditional (Sperber and Wilson 1993; Blakemore 2002).
Words encoding procedural meaning, or procedural indicators, as they are termed now, may function as constraints on explicatures (for instance personal pronouns), on implicatures (discourse connectors such as *so, but, after all*), and on the construction of higher-level explicatures (for example illocutionary force indicators such as mood), that is, procedural indicators act on all levels of utterance interpretation. In fact, “many or possibly all types of grammatical marking” can be seen as encoding procedural instructions for the interpreter of an utterance (LaPolla 1997:13). For instance, tense marking constrains and simplifies the search for relevance by indicating the time frame for a particular event, something that otherwise would have to be either expressed as a concept or inferred from the context, both of which would increase processing costs (1997:10).

More recently, the understanding of how lexical items encoding procedural instructions work has been expanded. Previously, as noted above, procedural markers were seen as constraints on relevance, in other words, they activate procedures that guide a hearer towards the intended interpretation of an utterance, thereby saving effort and time. In the light of research about what Sperber calls “epistemic vigilance” (Sperber, Clément, Heintz, Mascaro, Mercier and Origgi 2010) it seems that procedural indicators have more functions. These I will relate in the following section.

### 2.4 Argumentation and persuasion

Relevance Theory assumes that the mind is modular, and that apart from general mind-reading capacities there is an array of other modules that are closely interacting, for instance emotion reading, social cognition, and, as one of them, a comprehension module specialized for comprehension of overt communication. More recently, Sperber et al. (2010) and Wilson (2011, 2012c) have argued that other cognitive procedures located in distinct modules are involved in comprehension and in the search for relevance, specifically the hearer’s ability to assess the trustworthiness of the source as well as of the content of communicated information. This specialized cognitive mechanism, “epistemic vigilance”, is assumed to be located in a distinct, the argumentative or argumentation module.

But what is epistemic vigilance, and why do we need an argumentative module? Wilson (2011:20) notes that a speaker, when communicating, has two goals: (i) that her addressee understand, and (ii) that
he believe what the speaker is communicating. The hearer, on the other hand, has two tasks when something is communicated to him, namely (i) to infer the speaker’s meaning, to understand, and (ii) to decide whether to believe it, in other words, to protect himself from being misinformed, either accidentally or intentionally. This latter task is called epistemic vigilance. According to Sperber et al. (2010), two categories of assessment procedures subsumed under epistemic vigilance can be distinguished: mechanisms that evaluate the reliability of the content of communicated information, and such ones that assess the reliability of the information source, namely the speaker. These two categories of cognitive assessment procedures constitute the argumentative module. It is activated if for instance communicated information is inconsistent in itself or contradicts already existing knowledge.

A speaker will therefore, in order to achieve her goals of being understood and believed, word her utterances in such a way that they pass the hearer’s epistemic vigilance mechanisms. This involves using procedural indicators aimed at showing logical relations within the communicated as well as with background information to convince the hearer to accept the content; and evidential markers in order to persuade the hearer to trust the source of information, namely the speaker.

Wilson (2011:22-5) remarks that indeed the main function of procedural indicators such as the discourse connectives so, but, and therefore may not be that of constraining the hearer’s comprehension procedure in order to arrive at the right inferences without undue effort, but rather to activate the argumentative module in order to get past the hearer’s epistemic vigilance. Likewise, evidential markers not only indicate attributive use and source of information as such, thereby constraining the comprehension process, but may also activate the described assessment procedures. In this case, by marking grammatically second- and thirdhand information and thus disclosing the source of information, the speaker aims at persuading the hearer of her reliability and trustworthiness. Aikhenvald’s observations about languages that have evidential systems confirm this claim: “Ignoring evidentiality in a language with evidentials gets you marked as unreliable or a liar” (Aikhenvald 2004:344), and “Accuracy in getting one’s information source right is crucial for successful communication and for the speaker’s reputation” (2004:335). In more general terms, procedural indicators in a language “put the user of the language into a state in which some of these domain-
specific cognitive procedures [e.g. assessment of trustworthiness and reliability, the author] are highly activated” (Wilson 2011:11).

Unger notes that the respective inputs to the comprehension module on the one hand and to the argumentative module on the other hand are distinct. Whereas the comprehension module works with decoded utterances (or writing) as input,

the input to the argumentative module are claims, that is, assumptions (mental representations) that the audience is not prepared to accept at face value, and information relevant to its evaluation (Unger 2012:49).

The triggers activating this module can be logical connectors such as so, therefore, and but, or evidential markers such as the Indus Kohistani lee, as I will argue in section 3.6.4. The output of the argumentative module will then be reasons to accept or reject the claims made by the speaker (Unger 2012). Here again, the activation of different cognitive modules does not happen as a serial process but rather simultaneous.

What insights can we gain from Relevance Theory in respect to the four Indus Kohistani markers that are the topic of this study? All four of these are markers of reported speech, or speech and thought in the widest sense, but distinct from each other. In traditional grammar, it would be difficult to find one unifying meaning and at the same time account for the differences between the four markers. Within the relevance-theoretic framework, on the other hand, all utterances marked by any of the four markers have to be seen as metarepresentations; consequently all four expressions can be analyzed as metarepresentation markers. The variety of metarepresentations then accounts for the differences: The marker lee indicates representations of attributed utterances, the markers karee and ě indicate representations of attributed and self-attributed utterances and thoughts, loo is a marker of non-attributive representations of desirable utterances, and the concepts of epistemic vigilance and argumentative cognitive module can explain why the use of lee is not obligatory for all reported speech.

As Wilson writes, “Linguistic metarepresentations range from the fully explicit and conceptually encoded […] to the fully tacit” (2012:247). The four markers to be discussed in this study are evidence that Indus Kohistani is a language that makes the presence of metarepresentations explicit by the use of
procedural indicators, thereby reducing decoding as well as inferential processing effort, namely the effort of decoding a fully explicit metarepresentation, and the effort of inferring a fully tacit one.
Chapter 3

The Indus Kohistani “reported” marker *lee*

The Indus Kohistani marker *lee*, the topic of this chapter, indicates second- and thirdhand report, that is, it is an evidential marker. Within Relevance Theory, evidentials proper such as *lee* are seen as procedural markers or indicators (Blass 1990); my analysis of *lee* goes along this line. In the following sections I first introduce *lee* and give a brief overview of evidential markers in the wider geographic area. In 3.3 I describe the semantic and syntactic properties of *lee* and define it as a “reported” marker. I describe and illustrate its uses in section 3.4, and then compare the use of *lee* in narratives of personal experiences with those of folk stories. In section 3.6 I analyze *lee* as a procedural indicator, more specifically, as a metarepresentation marker of attributed utterances. Furthermore I argue that *lee*, besides indicating interpretive use, triggers the activation of the audience’s epistemic vigilance mechanisms, the so-called argumentative module. Such an argumentative function of *lee* would also explain why not every reported utterance in Indus Kohistani has to be marked by *lee*.

3.1 Definition of the marker *lee*

The particle *lee* is used when a speaker is quoting someone else or when she wants to indicate that the information she is sharing is not firsthand knowledge. In other words, *lee* is an evidential marker.

Aikhenvald defines evidentiality as “a linguistic category whose primary meaning is source of information” (2004:3). She points out that it is not part of the primary meaning how reliable such information is, just how this information was obtained. Only such languages have evidential systems proper where source of information is expressed grammatically. That rules out expressions such as “I heard that …” or adverbs such as *reportedly* or *apparently* as being counted as evidentials in this sense. Furthermore, Aikhenvald stresses the fact that evidentiality is a grammatical category distinct from modality.
In this study I follow Aikhenvald’s classification of evidentials (Aikhenvald 2004:393) and define the Indus Kohistani marker lee as a “reported” or “hearsay” marker. Both these terms are interchangeable and are used to mark information “that has been learned from someone else’s report” (2004:394). Other terms in use are “secondhand” or “quotative”; however, “quotative” should only be used for such “reported” evidentials that are employed when the exact source of the quoted information is known. A “reported” evidential does not have this condition; the original provider of the quoted information may or may not be mentioned or even known. As this is the case with the marker lee I use the term “reported” throughout this study.

3.2 “Reported” markers in the wider geographical context

Indus Kohistani is not part of a linguistic area where evidential systems with several distinctions abound. Nevertheless, evidentiality is grammatically marked in neighboring languages of the Dardic group, in Tibeto-Burman languages to the East, in Indo-Iranian languages to the West, and in Turkic languages to the North of the Dardic languages area (Bashir 1996, 2006). Here, I want to mention just a few languages that employ “reported” markers. Other evidentials that are used to mark information obtained by inference, or the notion of mirativity, I ignore here as this would be beyond the scope of this study.

Bashir (2006) gives an overview of evidentiality in South Asian languages. Whereas her main focus is on inferentiality and mirativity, she also mentions “reported” evidentials. Starting in the East, Nepali, an Indo-Aryan language, has, among other evidential strategies, a hearsay particle re (2006:6).

Balti, the only Tibeto-Burman language in Pakistan, has a morpheme –lo, a “reportative” marker (Jones 2009:58). This marker follows the sentence-final verb, and is used to mark reported information whose source is not indicated.

To the West, some of the Nuristani languages, a subgroup of the Indo-Iranian family, have a “reported” evidential. Buddruss (1987:33,37) describes a “Reportativpartikel” -le for the language Waigali (see also Degener 1998:173-182; Bashir 2010:10). The marker, an enclitic, always follows the clause-final verb. Buddruss compares this marker with the Nepali reported evidential re and notes that it
is used to mark information that one knows by hearsay. In the text his analysis is based on, -le is present in every sentence that states hearsay information; the exact source of the reported information is not mentioned. There seems to be a remarkable similarity to the Indus Kohistani marker le.

Strand (2012) mentions two other Nuristani languages that employ reported markers: “Kati”, or “Bashgali”, has a reportative particle mem; “Kamdeshi” has a similar particle mma. Both “indicate that what the speaker is relating is hearsay” (2012:6; see also Bashir 2010:8).

Nearer home, Torwali, another language of the Dardic language group spoken in the Swat Valley, is reported to have a sentence-final particle a, that is “employed in all tenses for sentences representing information acquired indirectly” (Bashir 2006:12). This marker is also mentioned by Lunsford (2001:142) without any further discussion.

Bashir also notes a sentence-final particle –yer in Kalam Kohistani of the same language group, which, according to her, indicates hearsay, mirative meanings and indirect knowledge. Baart (1999:147-9) describes the two Kalam Kohistani morphemes äro and är as “reported-speech” markers. These evidentials are used to mark reported information; the source of the reported speech may or may not be expressed. äro occurs reported-speech clause-initial, är clause-final. If a speaker wants to quote her own previous utterance then the morpheme märo is used, again speech clause-initial. I suspect that Bashir’s yer and the morpheme är mentioned by Baart represent one and the same marker.

I have no knowledge of “reported” evidentials in Kohistani Shina and Gilgit Shina, the two Shina dialects immediately to the East and North-East of the Indus Kohistani area. They do have a “quotative” for marking quotations of speech and thought, similar to the Indus Kohistani marker karee (Radloff 1998, Schmidt and Kohistani 2008). However, this will be the topic of Chapter 4.

In this section I have shown that “reported” evidentials are not uncommon in the surrounding language area. It is a well-known fact that evidential features easily spread from one language to another (Aikhenvald 2004:271, 288-299). The source or “epicenter” of diffusion of evidentiality (2004:289) that led to the emergence of evidential markers in Indus Kohistani remains a topic for further research. Several sources are possible: Turkic languages which, according to Aikhenvald, are
considered such an epicenter in Central Asia, Iranian languages, and third, the Tibeto-Burman language area.

Furthermore, Degener (1998:181) in her description of the Waigali “Reportativ” particle –*le* considers the Sanskrit particle *kila* as a possible source, referring to van Daalen’s description of *kila* as a particle being used in reported speech to mark hearsay information (van Daalen 1988). For the time being I have to leave open if such a relationship might be possible between Indus Kohistani *lee* and Sanskrit *kila*.

### 3.3 Syntactic and phonological properties of the marker *lee*

The marker *lee* is a particle that may attach itself to the following syntactic categories: a sentence- or clause-final verb, the speech verb of a matrix clause, a vocative, and a personal pronoun that fills in the subject (speaker’s) slot of a main clause that is followed by a speech complement\(^8\). The marker has a distinct meaning “reported” but syntactically it cannot stand as an independent word; it always needs a host. Phonologically, too, it is dependent – it does not have an accent of its own as an independent word would have. On the other hand, it is not a suffix, as it may attach to a variety of syntactic categories as mentioned above. Consequently, it should be classified as a clitic; and as it always follows its host, as an enclitic (Haspelmath 2002:150-4).

If the preceding word, the host of *lee*, ends in a short vowel then this vowel may be lengthened. For instance, the third-person singular distant personal pronoun is *sό*. If it is followed by the marker *lee*, the short vowel -*ό* may become a long one as in *sόό* = *lee* ‘he said’. The accent on *sό* does not shift to the right when the vowel is lengthened so that phonetically the accent is now perceived as falling. This is a morphophonemic change that can also be observed when the marker *loo* (Chapter 6) follows a host ending with a short vowel, and when the pronouns *bé* ‘we (EXCL)’ and *tú* ‘you (SG)’ or *tús* ‘you (PL)’ build the inclusive pronoun *bέttu(s)* ‘we and you, the addressee (INCL)’.

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\(^8\) These are the syntactic categories followed by *lee* that occur in my data. There might be other constituents that may precede *lee* of which I have no knowledge.
3.4 Uses of the evidential marker *lee*

In this section I describe the different uses of *lee*: the marking of reported information that the speaker herself has heard, marking of reported information that came to the knowledge of the speaker via a third person, instances where the marker *lee* replaces the speech verb of a complement-taking predicate, and the marking of reported information where the exact source is not known.

In Indus Kohistani all reported speech is direct speech. The speech complements always take the perspective of the quoted speaker; this is reflected in deixis, pronominal and time reference.

The data that illustrate the uses of *lee* are mostly taken from natural discourse and narratives. When listening to Indus Kohistani discourse it becomes soon obvious that the use of *lee* is not obligatory; this becomes even more evident when looking at narratives. I further refer to this fact in sections 3.5 and 3.6.4.

3.4.1 Marking of secondhand information

Indus Kohistani distinguishes between secondhand and thirdhand information when the marker *lee* is used: if a speaker quotes something she has heard herself from the original source then *lee* follows the quoted speech complement. If on the other hand the speaker quotes thirdhand information then *lee* follows the speech verb of the matrix clause (see section 3.4.2). In this section I illustrate the use of *lee* as a “secondhand report” marker. The following examples (4a) to (4d) are taken from a narrative about the earthquake in 2005. The speaker was quoting one of her sons speaking to her when he came home after the earthquake.

\[(4a)\] khē entreprise 3SG.PROX.ERG māayn say.PFV1 āā yes VOC ūku = lee older.sister = REP

‘Then he said, “Yes, oh Older Sister’

\[(4b)\] mā flee-PRS.PFV.M.SG = lee

‘I have fled’
(4c) iskul-ār kūr-muṛ bazíthe = lee
school-GEN.F wall.F.PL-things.like.that.ECHO go.PRS.PVF.M.PL. = REP

‘The walls of the school went (down)’

(4d) hāā maasmá būṭ bāč hu-ūthe = lee
and child.PL all saved become-PRS.PVF.M.PL = REP

‘But the children all escaped’” (The earthquake #188, 190-1)

The first occurrence of the evidential marker is in (4a) following the vocative ‘oh Older Sister’. I assume that a name plus vocative here count as a constituent, therefore lee follows the vocative. In utterances (4b) to (4d) the marker follows the utterance-final verb, marking the utterance content as secondhand report, something that the speaker had heard from the original source with her own ears and now quoted to me.

In example (5), the speaker told me how high her blood pressure had been when she had gone to the doctor.

(5) khē màayn če biśš kām dūu šöl šū tsiz
DEVM say.PFV1 COMP twenty less two hundred 3SG.DEM thing

thū = lee baḍplešár
be.PRS.M.SG = REP blood pressure

‘(The doctor) said that it is one hundred and eighty, this thing, the blood pressure’ (conversation 19.7.2013)

Again, lee is following the quotation to indicate that this is second-hand information. The word “blood pressure” is a kind of afterthought, added to help me understand the meaning of “this thing”.

3.4.2 Marking of thirdhand information

In the previous section we have seen that lee follows the speech complement when it contains secondhand information. In this section I illustrate the use of lee as marker of thirdhand report. Thirdhand information is “based on verbal report from someone else who in their turn acquired the information through another verbal report” (Aikhenvald 2004:395). If a speaker quotes someone she has heard about through a third person then the evidential marker lee follows the speech verb of the matrix clause. The following example is taken from a conversation about dreams. The speaker narrates a dream
that her son had told her. In (6), she is quoting from an encounter with a strange man that her son had had in his dream.

(6) \[ \text{màaṣ = } \text{uk} \quad \text{ti-galeé} \quad \text{miigéé} \quad \text{man-ààs = } \text{lee} \quad \text{če} \quad \text{má} \]
\[ \text{man = INDEF} \quad \text{come-put.CVB} \quad \text{I SG.DAT} \quad \text{say-PST.IP.FV.M = REP} \quad \text{COMP} \quad \text{I SG} \]

\[ \text{tii} \quad \text{qábur-a man de-ént} \]
\[ \text{2SG.DO grave-OBL in give-PRS.M.SG} \]

‘A man came and said to me, “I’ll put you into a grave”’ (Graves, graveyards #87)

The man’s utterance in the dream is marked with \text{lee} as this is reported information; the marker follows the speech verb and not the complement clause because this is a thirdhand report.

In addition to marking the speech verb, \text{lee} may also follow the quotation as shown in example (7).

It is the beginning of an incident related to the earthquake that my language consultant told me.

(7) \[ \text{AB mùuṭ dis qasá kar-ààs ěs ñú baazaár.o} \]
\[ \text{name.M former day story do-PST.IP.FV.M COMP 3SG.DEM market.OBL} \]

\[ \text{man man-ààs-e = } \text{lee ěs taalíb = } \text{uk ààs = } \text{lee} \]
\[ \text{in say-PST.IP.FV.M-PL.M = REP COMP student = INDEF be.PST.M = REP} \]

‘The other day AB was saying that in the market people were saying that there was a student’ (The earthquake #327)

The first \text{lee} follows the speech verb of the matrix clause “(people) in the bazaar said”. This marks the following utterance as a quotation of a quotation, in other words, as thirdhand information.

Subsequently, when AB (who is being quoted by the speaker) goes on telling the story of the student, \text{lee} occurs at the end of nearly every sentence. I assume that this was AB’s way of indicating to his mother that what he was telling her was secondhand information. So in this quotation we have both: AB’s use of \text{lee} (following the speech complement) as a marker of secondhand report, and my language consultant’s use of \text{lee} (following the speech verb) as a marker of thirdhand information.

3.4.3 The marker \text{lee} in utterances that are not speech complements

The examples presented so far are all utterances said by specific persons and quoted as complements of speech predicates. Quite often, however, the quotation is not obvious as such; i.e. there may be neither a matrix clause with speech verb nor a speech complement. The reported information is
quoted as a statement; only the presence of *lee* indicates that the actual utterance is a quotation of someone else. The speaker of the original utterance may be inferred from the context/the preceding discourse. But there is also reported information where the exact source is not known or mentioned or which consists of what “people say”; here, too, *lee* is the sole indicator that the utterance in question is a quotation. With the following examples I want to illustrate this use of *lee*.

The context of example (8) is as follows: My language consultant’s family had found a wife for one of their sons, and father and son went to the bride’s family to finalize the arrangements and to perform nikah, the actual marriage contract. As my language consultant was not present at the occasion her husband told her later about it, and subsequently she reported it to me. The actual utterance was remarkable and therefore reported because it is unusual that a young man would raise his voice in the presence of his elders.

(8)  
\[
\text{ghōō} \quad \text{awāaz} \quad \text{kar-āās} = \text{lee} \\
\text{big.M.SG} \quad \text{voice.M} \quad \text{do-PST.IPV.M} = \text{REP}
\]

‘He made (gave his consent with) a loud voice’ (conversation 4.5.2012)

Although the speaker does not mention the source of the quotation, it is obvious from the context that she is quoting her husband.

In (9), the speaker is talking about a house that she herself had not yet seen but her husband and her sons had told her about.

(9)  
\[
\text{càa} \quad \text{kamrió} \quad \text{ghēē} \quad \text{ghēē} \quad \text{baá-ó} \quad \text{thé} = \text{lee} \\
\text{three} \quad \text{room.PL} \quad \text{big.M.PL} \quad \text{big.M.PL} \quad \text{house/room-PL} \quad \text{be.PRS.M.PL} = \text{REP}
\]

‘There are three rooms, big, big rooms’ (conversation 10.9.2012)

The marker *lee* at the end of the utterance indicates that this is a quotation, not a statement. The original speaker of this quotation can be inferred from the preceding discourse where I was told that the speaker’s husband and sons had gone to look at the house.

In example (10), the speaker talks about what she had heard concerning a young man who had committed suicide. The following utterance from this conversation is marked by *lee*.

(10)  
\[
\text{yàa} \quad \text{aspatàal-ó} \quad \text{man} \quad \text{āīs} = \text{lee} \quad \text{nií} = \text{aa} \quad \text{sáx} \quad \text{bimàar} \quad \text{āīs} \\
\text{mother} \quad \text{hospital-OBL} \quad \text{in} \quad \text{be.PST.F} = \text{REP} \quad \text{neg = Q} \quad \text{very} \quad \text{ill} \quad \text{be.PST.F}
\]

‘(His) mother was in the hospital, they say, wasn’t she, she was very ill’ (conversation 8.6.2012)
Here, the speaker did not specify the source of her information. It may be that she herself did no longer remember who exactly had told her about this incident. *lee* in this example indicates what “people” said.

This is even more obvious in example (11) where what the speaker is quoting may be knowledge acquired from a number of different people over a longer period of time. The topic of her talk is how eating habits and availability of food items have changed since her childhood⁹.

(11) hǐ̀ hár xoraak-á tsèe thé, daaldá kha-ánt = lee
  now every food.M-PL much.M-PL bePRS.M-PL vegetable.ghee eat-PRS.M = REP

ghee kha-ánt = lee masùu ho-ógaa = lee mhees-āā masùu
  eat-PRS.M = REP meat become-PFV2.M.SG = REP buffalo-GEN.M meat.M

ho-ógaa = lee guur-ōō masùu ho-ógaa = lee

bakar-čel masùu ho-ógaa = lee
  goat-ADS.M meat.M become-PFV2.M.SG = REP

‘Now, every kind of food is available in abundance: people eat vegetable ghee, they eat ghee, I have heard, they eat ghee, I have heard …’ (Family planning #32)

Each of the six statements is followed by *lee*. It indicates that what is marked by it is information that the speaker has heard and gathered from other people, in other words, is hearsay. So another way to translate this utterance would be “… people eat vegetable ghee, I have heard, they eat ghee, I have heard, there is meat, I have heard …” and so on.

3.4.4 The marker *lee* in questions

In interrogative clauses, evidentials may be indicators of either the speaker’s or the addressee’s information source or even of that of a third party (Aikhenvald 2004:244, 248). From the Indus

⁹ One might wonder why this particular information is not firsthand knowledge. Due to strict observance of *purdah* ‘female seclusion’, Kohistani women rarely leave their homes. Firsthand knowledge may be acquired from relatives and immediate neighbors; knowledge about the wider Kohistani community is usually passed on by a household’s menfolk and visitors, i.e. is secondhand knowledge.
Kohistani data available to me it seems that when *lee* is used in a question it reflects the addressee’s source of information; the speaker expects the addressee to provide information that has not been acquired firsthand but was itself reported to the addressee. Such questions are of the kind “did you hear that/if …?” as illustrated in (12) below. The background to this example is such that the speaker had heard about a relative’s car accident; this relative had been hit by another car whose driver had been in the wrong. The speaker now asked another family member who had knowledge about the accident if the other driver had paid compensation, knowing that her addressee had previously called the relative’s family.

(12) \[ \text{sèč} \quad \text{màaś-e} \quad \text{rupāy} \quad \text{dīt = lee = aa} \]
\[ 3\text{SG.DIST.ERG} \quad \text{man-ERG} \quad \text{rupees} \quad \text{give.PFV1 = REP = Q} \]

‘Did you hear if that man gave money (paid compensation)?’ (conversation 7.10.11)

The speaker knew that her addressee had no firsthand knowledge about whether compensation had been given or not but assumed that the addressee had been told on the phone by a third person, so she used *lee* in her question. This use is further illustrated in (13), taken from a conversation about a device for children with cleft palate. I had been asked to find out if such a device is available in Pakistan. After some enquiry I went back to tell them that “this thing is not available in Pakistan; I have asked the doctors”. My language consultant then replied with a rising/questioning pitch:

(13) \[ \text{nií} \quad \text{thú = lee} \]
\[ \text{NEG} \quad \text{be.PRS.M.SG = REP} \]

‘It is not, they say?’

Later another member of the family asked my language consultant about the same device, again with a rising pitch towards the end of the utterance (14).

(14) \[ \text{gi-ì} \quad \text{nií} \quad \text{thú = lee} \]
\[ \text{what-also} \quad \text{NEG} \quad \text{be.PRS.M.SG = REP} \]

‘There is nothing at all available, they say?’

Whereupon my language consultant confirmed (15):

(15) \[ \text{nií} \quad \text{thú = lee} \]
\[ \text{NEG} \quad \text{be.PRS.M.SG = REP} \]

‘It is not, they say’ (conversation 7.5.2012)
Both, question and answer, are marked by *lee* and reflect that the information asked for and given is reported.

In examples (13) and (14), the speakers indicated that their utterance is a question by raising their voice at the end of the utterance. In the next example (16) below (as well as above in example (12)) we see that the question particle, itself a clitic, follows *lee*. The context of this utterance is as follows: Some men of the extended family were supposed to go up to Pattan. They had left my language consultant’s house earlier on but were still in town, meeting with other relatives. After some time my language consultant asked one of her daughters-in-law if she had heard about the men.

(16)  
\[
\text{bazíthe} = \text{lee} = \text{aa} \\
\text{go.PRS.PFV.M,PL} = \text{REP} = \text{Q}
\]

‘Did you hear that the men have left (for Pattan)?’ (conversation 10.5.2013)

The marker *lee* in this question indicates that the speaker does not expect her addressee to have first-hand knowledge about whether the men have left. The meaning of *lee* in such a case is “did you hear” or “did they say”. Note that the question marker *aa* follows the “reported” marker, having both the statement and the marker *lee* in its scope.

This use differs from the quoting of a question as shown in example (17). It is taken from a conversation about my language consultant’s oldest daughter who, after several pregnancies, was not well. My language consultant told me that she had advised her to stop getting pregnant. She then quoted her daughter’s answer.

(17)  
\[
\text{khẽ} \quad \text{màayn} \quad \text{éqaa} \quad \text{má} \quad \text{gí} \quad \text{zar-í} \quad \text{hu-úthi} = \text{aa} = \text{lee} \\
\text{DEVM} \quad \text{say.PFV1} \quad \text{oh!} \quad \text{1SG} \quad \text{what} \quad \text{old-INCH} \quad \text{become-PRS.PFV.F} = \text{Q} = \text{REP}
\]

‘Then she said, “Oh! Have I become that old?”’ (conversation 7.5.2012)

In this example, the quoted utterance is indicated by the speech verb “(she) said”, and the “reported” marker follows the question marker, that is, the question as such is in the scope of *lee*. It is an instance of a simple quotation where the quoted utterance happens to be a rhetorical question. In examples (12) to (14) and (16) on the other hand, it is not a question that is being quoted but a statement that the speaker expects the addressee to confirm or deny, depending on the addressee’s knowledge acquired through a third person.
3.4.5 The marker lee and person

The marker *lee* being a “reported” evidential, it seems obvious that it is used for quoting persons other than the speaker herself. The examples seen so far are all quotations of persons other than the speaker and her addressee. However, hearsay evidentials may also mark utterances with a first-person speaker subject. Aikhenvald (2004:225-7) describes that the use of a “reported” evidential with first person, that is, the speaker, may produce special effects such as expressing lack of control, surprise (= notions of mirativity), disagreement, denial, or irony. My data of Indus Kohistani do not include instances of the use of *lee* with a speaker subject. The following example (18) is elicited; but although there is a first-person subject it is still the report of what “people say”.

(18) má ɡàadii mül di-int = lee
1SG car price give-PRS.F = REP

‘People say that I am selling my car’ (elicited 19.8.2013)

This could be uttered in a context where the speaker is astonished to hear what other people are saying about her as she has no intention at all of selling her car. As for using *lee* to mark self-quotation: according to my language consultant, it is ungrammatical for a speaker to use *lee* to mark quotes of her own previous utterances. In such a case, the Indus Kohistani marker *karee* would be employed (see Chapter 4).

In my Indus Kohistani corpus there are few instances of *lee* marking quotes of an addressee’s previous utterances. In these examples, *lee* often replaces the speech verb, as illustrated by example (19). This utterance is taken from a conversation with my language consultant, in the course of which we had been talking about one of her daughters-in-law, D, who had a health issue. Having been asked for advice I had recommended to do nothing for the time being. Then we had talked about something else. Later on, my language consultant resumed the former topic by saying the following utterance.

(19) tèe D-ã̀ã̀ intezàar kar-iž = aa = lee
then name.F.GEN.M waiting.M do-sbjv.1PL = Q = REP

‘So did you say that we should wait with D?’ (conversation 27.4.2012)

Although there is no mention of the original speaker of this quoted utterance, it is obvious from the context that the speaker is quoting (in question form) what I, her addressee, had suggested earlier in the
conversation, in other words, she is echoing what I had said earlier. This is an instance of an echo question.

Example (20) is elicited; it is the quotation of an addressee’s previous utterance. Here the marker *lee* follows the quoted speech.

(20) m̀uṭ ẁar t̀è̀e man-̀āте ě ě zòó kira
previous time/turn 2SG.ERG say-PRS.PFV COMP 1PL.OBL for

ṣas baá-an be-ā thù = lee
3SG.DEM.DOM house-ABL go-INF be.PRS.M.SG = REP

‘Last time you said, “We will have to leave this house”’ (elicited 11.3.2013)

Example (21), another second-person quote, was uttered when my language consultant explained to me that her sister-in-law had called to ask if I would come that day, because she wanted to meet me. My language consultant told her that she was not sure about my coming, but …

(21) t̀èe telfún kiir khē t̀ú = lee má uka-̀ínt
then telefone do.PFV1 SUB 2SG = REP 1SG come.up-PRS.F

‘Then you called and said, “I will come”’ (conversation 10.5.2013)

Here again, the speech verb of the quotation is replaced by *lee*. In section 3.4.7 I will present and discuss more such examples.

3.4.6 The marker *lee* and tense

The notion “reported” implies that what is being reported has been uttered at some time previous to the quotation, that is, in the past. So we can expect that speech verbs introducing a quotation containing *lee* are marked for past tense. That this is indeed the case can be seen in all those examples shown so far that have a speech verb preceding the reported utterance. The following example (22) deviates from all the others in that the speech verb of the quotation has a present tense suffix. Previous to this utterance, my language consultant’s daughter, having a health problem, had been persuaded by doctors and family to have an operation in our hospital. As the date for it was approaching I asked my language consultant if her daughter was prepared to be admitted. She responded that she herself had not heard anything from her daughter; however, this is what she had heard from other people:
Present tense marking in this example does not contradict the assumption that what is being quoted has been uttered at some time in the past. In this case, present tense indicates that the quoted speaker’s saying started at some time in the past and is still going on at the time of the quotation. So we can assume that *lee* is used to mark only such quotations that were uttered in the past.

But what about possible/hypothetical utterances that someone might utter in the future and that are quoted? An example of such a hypothetical quotation is the following example (23) taken from a story about a king’s minister who has been sent to find six stupid people. On his search the minister meets a man lying on the road and stretching both his hands upwards. When the minister asks him what he is doing there and why he does not take down his hands he answers, “My wife has sent me to the market to buy a cooking pot this size (indicated by his hands). If I take down my hands to get up I no longer know the size of the pot and will buy the wrong one”. Then follows (23).

In this example of a possible/hypothetical quotation it is not the “reported” marker *lee* that is used but the allomorph *karagal* of the marker *karee* which will be discussed in Chapter 4. For now let me state that *lee* cannot be employed to indicate hypothetical quotations that might have been uttered or might be uttered in the future.

### 3.4.7 The marker *lee* replacing the speech verb of a matrix clause

In every-day conversation and also in folk stories, the speech verb introducing quotations may be replaced by the marker *lee*. Although the use of *lee* in the latter kind of narratives differs from that discussed so far, the following example (24) is a fairly typical instance of *lee* replacing the speech verb
(the use of *lee* in folk stories will be addressed in section 3.5.2). In this story, several crows are talking about a girl and wondering who she is.

(24a)  
\[\text{qàa-}\text{Ø} \quad \text{i-Øthe} \quad \text{šår-šar} \quad \text{huú} \quad \text{man-Øthe}\]
\[\text{crow-PL} \quad \text{come-PRS.PFV.M.PL} \quad \text{gathering-REDUP.L} \quad \text{become.CVB} \quad \text{say-PRS.PFV}\]

‘The crows came, gathered and (one) said,’

(24b)  
\[\text{ú} \quad \text{mĩ} \quad \text{bheentuú} \quad \text{thi}\]
\[\text{3SG.PROX} \quad \text{1SG.POSS} \quad \text{sister.DIM} \quad \text{be.PRS.F}\]

“‘She is my sister’”

(24c)  
\[\text{mút = lee} \quad \text{mĩ} \quad \text{ghariú} \quad \text{thi}\]
\[\text{other = REP} \quad \text{1SG.POSS} \quad \text{wife} \quad \text{be.PRS.F}\]

‘Another said, “She is my wife”’

(24d)  
\[\text{mút = lee} \quad \text{mĩ} \quad \text{bheentuú} \quad \text{thi}\]
\[\text{other = REP} \quad \text{1SG.POSS} \quad \text{sister.DIM} \quad \text{be.PRS.F}\]

‘Another said, “She is my sister”’

(24e)  
\[\text{mút = lee} \quad \text{mĩ} \quad \text{ghariú} \quad \text{thi}\]
\[\text{other = REP} \quad \text{1SG.POSS} \quad \text{wife} \quad \text{be.PRS.F}\]

‘Another said, “She is my wife”’ (Princess and crows #77-80)

Note that the speech verb in the first sentence is in Present Perfective Tense which would have induced ergative case marking on the subject had it not been omitted. In the following clauses the subject noun phrase *mút* ‘another’, however, has no case marking, that is, it is in nominative case. This is typical for this use of *lee* where it replaces the speech verb: the speaker-subject noun phrase preceding *lee* is never marked for ergative case. In other words, one cannot say *ɛ̀ɛ̃ = lee* (3SG.PROX.ERG = REP) ‘he said’; this is ungrammatical.

The next example is from The Earthquake text, a narrative about a personal experience. The speaker recounts what happened before the earthquake. In the morning, she and one of her daughters-in-law were about to go up the mountain to cut grass. B, another daughter-in-law had been told to stay at home. The speaker then quotes B as saying to her (25):
Although there is neither speech verb nor tense marking it is clear that the saying was done in the past. It could never be understood as “she is saying”. So, le, where it replaces a speech verb, always indicates past tense. This is also illustrated by the next example (26), taken from a conversation between my language consultant and me. I had told her about a new bio gas project that one of my colleagues was interested in starting. Later on, while I was still sitting with her, another woman joined us and my language consultant quoted me as having said:

(26) \[ \tilde{u} = le, \quad \text{H-\~{a}\~{a}}, \quad \text{xaw\~{a}and}, \quad \text{koo\~{s}ii\~{s}}, \quad \text{man}, \quad \text{th\~{u}}, \quad \text{wale\~{c}} \]

\[
\begin{array}{llllllll}
\text{a\~{a}zdis} & \text{ha\~{a}r} & \text{\~{a}s} & \text{nee\~r-\~{a}the} \\
\text{nowadays} & \text{until} & \text{3SG.PROX.DOM} & \text{not.do-PRS.PFV} \\
\end{array}
\]

‘She has said, “H’s husband is trying (to start such a project) but so far he has not done (started) it’” (conversation 30.4.2012)

As in the previous example, le indicates that the quotation has happened in the (albeit immediate) past, and consequently the translation has to be “she has said”.

In (24), the speaker quoted thirdhand reported information (a conversation in a folk story); in both (25) and (26) she quoted secondhand information. In sections 3.4.1. and 3.4.2. we had seen that in the case of secondhand information le follows the quote whereas in an instance of reporting thirdhand information le follows the matrix clause speech verb. When the marker le replaces the speech verb then the distinction in the marking of secondhand and thirdhand information is not maintained. The addressee will have to infer from the context if the information conveyed is second- or thirdhand.

Example (27) is another instance of quoting an addressee’s earlier utterance. It is taken from a conversation about a sick baby I had been asked to see. I had advised the parents to show the baby to a pediatrician, saying, “I am not a proper doctor” although in Pakistan, everyone who is working within the health services calls him- or herself a doctor and is addressed as such by patients. The speaker then commented, half-jokingly:
‘You too said, “I am this, I am a doctor”’

When I did not immediately grasp what she had said, she repeated her utterance, this time without using *lee* (28).

(28)  
\[
\text{tēć } \\text{māayn } \text{ma-ī } \text{daaktār } \text{thī } \text{pakistāa-ō } \text{man}
\]
\[
2\text{SG.ERG} \text{say.PFV1 } 1\text{SG}-\text{also} \text{doctor be.PRS.F} \text{Pakistan-OBL in}
\]

‘You said, “I too am a doctor, in Pakistan”’ (conversation 22.6.2012)

This example as well as (19) to (21) in section 3.4.5 clearly show that *lee*, when replacing the speech verb, is not restricted to marking second- and thirdhand reports but can, just like *lee* in other placements, be used to quote an addressee’s previous utterances. Likewise, *lee* cannot replace the speech verb when a speaker is quoting herself, another point that I have noted in section 3.4.5.

There is another restriction in this use of *lee* as a speech verb replacer. The person that is being quoted has to be already introduced and activated in the mind of the hearer if *lee* is to stand in place of the speech verb. In examples (24) to (27) the quoted-speaker’s subject slot is filled by a pronoun because the quoted speaker has already been activated in the discourse. In my data, I have not found any instance where *lee* replaces the speech verb and the quoted speaker is referred to by something other than a pronoun, i.e. is not already introduced and activated in the minds of the audience.

3.5 The marker *lee* in narratives

Above I have already given a few examples of *lee* in narratives; but most of the examples were taken from every-day conversation. In this section, I want to take a closer look at how the marker is employed in narratives as opposed to its use in conversations. I show that, as observed in conversations, in narratives of someone’s experiences, too, *lee* does not mark every reported utterance. Further on, I will describe the role of *lee* in folk stories.

3.5.1 The marker *lee* in narratives about someone’s experiences

In my corpus of Indus Kohistani texts there are many instances where a narrator tells about a previous personal experience or about what happened to someone else, using the “reported” marker *lee*. 
One such instance is given in (29), taken from the recount of the happenings after the earthquake in 2005. The madrassah student in this example had been dug out from under a collapsed building several days after the earthquake. Example (29a) has already been presented as (7) in section 3.4.2.

(29a)  AB  múut  dis  qasá  kar-āās  če  stú  baazaar-á
name.M  former  day  story  do-PST.IPV.M  COMP  3SG.DEM  market-OBL

man  man-āās-e  =  leč  če  taalib  =  uk  āās  =  leč
in  say-PST.IPV.M-PL.M  =  REP  COMP  student  =  INDEF  be.PST.M  =  REP

‘The other day, AB was telling us that in the bazaar people were saying that there was a certain madrassah student’

(29b)  só  taalib  amā́i  zānd  nika-ñaas  =  leč
3SG.DIST  student  REFLEX  alive.M  come.out-PST.PFV.M  =  REP

‘That madrassah student had survived (the earthquake)’

(29c)  zānd  nika-́í  sayōó  man-áthe  =  leč  če  tú  gí
alive.M  come.out-CVB  3PL.DIST.ERG  say-PRS.PFV  =  REP  COMP  2SG  what

khāās  če  tú  zānd  thú
eat.PST.IPV.M  COMP  2SG  alive.M  be.PRS.M.SG

‘Having emerged alive they (=people) asked him, “What did you eat that you are still alive?”’

(29d)  sēč  màayn  máá  sá  ziib-ò  hin  màats
3SG.DIST.ERG  say.PFV1  1SG  3SG.DEM.OBL  tongue.OBL  with  mud

tsāt-āās
lick-PST.IPV.M

‘He said, “With my tongue I licked mud’

(29e)  mút  mēč  gi-́í  nií  kha-áthe
other 1SG.ERG  what-also  NEG  eat-PRS.PFV

‘Other than that I have not eaten anything’

(29f)  mút  miigeé  gí  pát  nií  i-íthí  tamāñ  āās
other 1SG.DAT  what  knowledge.F  not  come-PRES.PFV.F  darkness.F  be.PST.F

‘Other than that I did not know anything; it was dark’
The “reported” marker is found in both the quotation of the people and those of the madrassah student. However, not every sentence of the student’s answer is marked with *lee*. This may be so because once the source of the utterance, namely the student, has been established it is no longer necessary to mark every single clause of it with *lee*.

However, if we look at The Earthquake narrative as a whole there are many instances of reported utterances that are not marked by *lee*. In Table 1 I want to give a brief overview of the recorded text’s content and the sections where *lee* is marking reported information.
Table 1. Occurrences of *lee* in The Earthquake narrative

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>happenings before the earthquake, conversations with husband and daughter-in-law; <em>lee</em> used once as speech verb replacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>the earthquake, conversation with daughter-in-law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>immediately after the earthquake: conversations with daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, husband, visitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>arrival of and quotation of first son: <em>lee</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>arrival of and quotation of second son: <em>lee</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>arrival of and quotation of third son: <em>lee</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>the first day and night after the earthquake, conversations with family members, relatives, other people about household goods, cattle, where to sleep etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>talk about what caused the earthquake, what people think</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>recount of a visit to the town B. which had been destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>report of the story of the madrassah student: <em>lee</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is obvious that by no means is the “reported” evidential *lee* used to mark every quotation of second- or thirdhand information. The same pattern emerges in other narrative texts that I recorded. Here a question arises: why did the speaker not use *lee* to mark every instance of a reported speech? Is it because its use is not obligatory or because the speaker had pity with me, the addressee of these texts and non-native speaker, and left the “reported” marker out to make things easier for me? At some point, I noticed that my language consultant used *lee* less frequently when talking to me than when talking to other mother tongue speakers (because *I* was struggling with the concept of using evidentials when talking). So the recorded narratives, especially the early ones that she told me, might not reflect a mother-tongue speaker’s use of *lee* when talking to other mother-tongue speakers.

Subsequently I paid special attention to the use of *lee* in other people’s (family members, visitors) conversations among themselves. Their pattern of use of the “reported” marker coincides with and
confirms that of my language consultant in that many quotations of third persons are not marked by *lee*, in conversations as well as in longer narratives.

For now let me state that not every report of second- or third-hand information is marked by *lee*, and that its use is conditioned by pragmatic factors. These I will set out and discuss in section 3.6.4.

### 3.5.2 The marker *lee* in folk tales and other narratives that are not someone’s personal experiences

Folk stories are reported narratives per se, and one might expect that every single sentence is marked by *lee* or, in other words, that “reported” evidentials function as narrative genre markers. This is true for many languages that have evidentials, where the “reported” evidential marker is used in traditional and folk stories (Aikhenvald 2004:310). However, as Aikhenvald remarks, such a use is not obligatory (Aikhenvald 2004:314-5). “Reported” markers may or may not be used in traditional or folk stories. Every language seems to have its own conventions in this respect. Evidentials can be used in such narratives to create specific stylistic effects. In what follows I briefly describe the occurrences of *lee* in these kinds of Indus Kohistani narratives although I do not yet have a precise understanding of this particular use.

There seems to be a basic distinction in Indus Kohistani between narratives about someone’s experiences that really happened, and folk stories. The latter have a fixed “frame” or formula for beginning and ending the narrative which automatically informs the addressee that what will be told is a folk story, not something that happened in the real world. Examples (30) and (31) show the typical opening and closing sentence of such a narrative; the formulaic part of the clause is in bold script.

(30)  
\[ \text{qasá gay gay gay ek baača = uk āās} \]  
\[ \begin{array}{llllll}
\text{story.F} & \text{go.PFV2.F} & \text{go.PFV2.F} & \text{go.PFV2.F} & \text{one} & \text{king = INDEF be.PST.M} \\
\end{array} \]

‘Once upon a time there was a certain king’ [lit.: ‘The story went and went and went, there was a certain king’] (King’s son and fairy #1)

(31)  
\[ \text{qasá aalu má unduú} \]  
\[ \begin{array}{llllll}
\text{story} & \text{thither} & \text{1SG} & \text{hither} \\
\end{array} \]

‘This is the end of the story’ [lit.: ‘The story (went) thither and I hither’] (Prince and fairy #225)
As Aikhenvald (2004:314) notes, “such ‘fixed frames’ may make the ‘reported’ evidential redundant”. And this seems to be true for Indus Kohistani folk tales. Furthermore, inside this frame, in the body of the narrative, the use of *lee* is distinct from that mentioned so far. In all the folk tales in my corpus of data, *lee* is mostly used to replace the speech verb when conversations are narrated. Once the identity of speaker and addressee has been established the matrix clause of a speech complement simply consists of a personal pronoun (indexing the speaker) and the marker *lee*. Examples of this use I have shown in section 3.4.7.

In addition, *lee* occurs in sentences that comment on the inner state of a character, or that describe circumstances such as time of day or of aspects of the local area, or that convey information that is of secondary importance. By definition such comments and observations count as background information. Following are all instances where *lee* is used in two folk stories, shown in (32) and (33).

(32)   
#89   After that, the king’s son became very distressed =*lee*

#96   Dawn broke =*lee* and they set off

#97   When they arrived =*lee* at his father-in-law’s house he put one foot to the inside of the door’s threshold

#120  Over there, there was a mountain =*lee*

#164  When she (the fairy) arrived =*lee*, she (the king’s daughter) again saw her taking her husband and bringing him to the mountain

(Prince and fairy)

(33)   
#12   One day they went to get rid of the daughters =*lee*

#67   They asked, “Why?” and she said, “That’s it; now I go” =*lee*

#78   another =*lee*, “She is my wife”

#79   another =*lee*, “She is my sister”

#80   another =*lee*, “She is my wife”

#151  Then the king became very glad =*lee* because the crows had done such a great job for him.

(Princess and crows)
The sparing use of *lee* in such narratives is conspicuous. Other stories of this genre in my data collection contain even less occurrences of *lee*.

Aikhenvald remarks that in narratives, evidentials may be used to mark either a climax or background material. She points out that “the non-firsthand evidential often has a distancing effect … in its ‘distancing’ function the non-firsthand evidential may serve to differentiate backgrounded and foregrounded information” (Aikhenvald 2004:313-6). Degener suggests such an interpretation for the “reported” marker –*le* in Waigali (Degener 1998:173-84; see also section 3.2). This analysis might also work for Indus Kohistani *lee*. However, I do not have enough data to prove such a claim. Further research will be needed to determine the function of *lee* in such narratives.

There is one particular text in my collection of narratives, a story told about Adam and Eve. Although such a text might not be considered as a narrative of someone’s personal experience, the difference between a folk tale and this story is conspicuous in that *lee* is being used like in narratives of someone’s personal experiences, as seen in (34).
In the beginning of our world, in the beginning, our God created two people, a man and a wife.

God gave them permission (saying), “There are many fruit trees; you are allowed to eat all the fruit”.

He showed them two trees (saying), “Do not eat the fruit of these two trees”.

In this way they ate fruit and for a long time lived as husband and wife.

One day a man came.

That man said: “What do you eat?”

They replied: “We eat fruit.

But God has not given permission to eat the fruit of these two trees.

He said, ‘Do not eat the fruit of these two trees.’ They are very bad.’”

Then the man said: “Leave God! He will not say anything.

Eat the fruit of those two trees!”

They tore off that fruit and hid it ...

Like in stories about someone’s personal experiences, and in day-to-day discourse, quotations in this narrative are marked by *lee*. Interestingly, it is only the reported speeches of human beings that are marked, not the quotations of what God was saying. My impression is that this narrative has to be grouped with other narratives of people’s experiences, not with myths or folk stories.

This section discussed the use of *lee* in narratives of different kinds. In narratives of someone’s personal experiences, *lee* marks some but by no means all reported utterances or reported information. In the story about Adam and Eve, belonging to the category “creation of the world, origin of humankind”, *lee* is used similarly (although God’s utterances are not marked). Folk tales are distinct from these narratives in that they have a fixed frame or formula for beginning and ending the story; this frame might be the reason that *lee* is used mainly to mark parts of the narrative that are background information. More data will be needed to confirm or disprove this first impression.
3.6 The “reported” marker *lee*: an interpretive use marker

In this section, I show that within the framework of relevance theory, the reported evidential *lee* is best analyzed as a procedural marker indicating metarepresentations of attributed utterances. Furthermore, I look at an additional function of *lee*, namely that of activating the addressee’s argumentative module. This function might explain why *lee* is not obligatory when reporting second- and thirdhand information.

3.6.1 Evidentials in the literature

Palmer (2001) classifies both evidential and epistemic systems as part of modality. The difference between the two he describes as follows.

> The essential difference between these two types is [...] that with epistemic modality speakers express their judgment about the factual status of the proposition, whereas with evidential modality they indicate the evidence they have for its factual status (2001:8)

Within evidential systems, Palmer distinguishes the categories “sensory” and “reported”. Others such as “inference” or “assumed”, he notes, are not purely evidential categories; they may belong to either evidential or epistemic modality; it follows that these two may overlap.

Aikhenvald (2004) sees evidentiality as a grammatical system distinct from modality, its core meaning being “source of information”. She distinguishes the following categories of information marked by evidentials: (i) information acquired directly through seeing, (ii) information acquired through hearing or other senses such as smelling and tasting (auditory/sensory), (iii) inferred information based on visible or tangible evidence, or result, (iv) information acquired through logical reasoning, assumption or general knowledge, (v) hearsay, that is, reported information with no reference to the one it was reported by, and (vi) reported information with an overt reference to the quoted source (quotative) (2004:63-4). Epistemic overtones, that is, indications about the reliability of information such marked, are secondary and not part of the core meaning. Nevertheless, evidentials, especially hearsay markers, may acquire additional readings such as epistemic and mirative extensions (2004); and
Aikhenvald notes that such evidentials may function as tokens of narrative genre (2004:310), may be used to mark ironic or sarcastic utterances (2004:166, 183-4), or to mark complement clauses of verbs such as wonder or think (2004:51). However, she does not offer an explanation for these secondary meanings such as indicating irony, that seem to have nothing to do with reported information.

One other analysis that I want to mention here is that of markers of evidentiality and mirativity in Turkic languages by Johanson (2000). The notion of mirativity covers “speaker’s ‘unprepared mind’, unexpected new information (for the speaker) and concomitant surprise” (Aikhenvald 2004:195). It is related to evidentiality but is seen as a separate semantic and grammatical category (2004; DeLancey 2001).

For Turkic languages, where both “reported” or “inferred” (evidentiality) and “unexpected new information” (mirativity) may be marked, Johanson does not see the need to set up a distinct category “mirativity” to account for instances of the latter kind of information, nor does he assume that evidentiality covers both notions. Instead he subsumes both kinds of markings under the notion of indirectivity. This indicates that “a narrated event E is not stated directly, but in an indirect way by reference to its reception by a conscious subject P” (Johanson 2000:62). So, for him, neither “source of information” nor notions of unpreparedness of mind, surprise or unexpected new information define this category of grammatical marking, but the fact, that such a marked utterance, in addition to the information about some state of affairs it contains, has a second layer referring to the speaker’s reception of the obtained information. In Johanson’s words, this second layer “expresses the speaker’s attitude towards the proposition expressed in the sentence” (2000:70). The notion of indirectivity covers all three uses mentioned by him: reportive, inferential and perceptive.

Some Turkic languages such as Turkmen and Chuvash (2000:77) have more than one indirective marker, thus distinguishing between reception realized by hearsay, through inference, and by perception. Modern Turkish, on the other hand, has one marker müs that covers all three notions subsumed under indirectivity.

This analysis of Turkic indirective markers is of interest because it would well fit in with an analysis of evidential markers as markers of interpretive use. I will come back to it in the next section.
3.6.2 Evidentials and Relevance Theory

As already outlined in Chapter 2, within Relevance Theory it is assumed that every utterance represents a thought of its speaker. This thought itself may be a representation of a description of a state of affairs in the actual world, as in “today the sun is shining”; or the thought may be the representation or in other words, the interpretation of, another thought or utterance, as in “he thought that she had already left” or “Renate has said that she will come tonight”. The former use is called descriptive use, the latter interpretive use (Sperber and Wilson 1995; Wilson 2012). Such interpretively used representations are really metarepresentations because they metarepresent another public (speech) or mental (thought) representation.

In this section I am concerned with the interpretive use of representations. Reported speech is one but by no means the only instance of this use. There is a further distinction between attributive and non-attributive interpretive use (Wilson 2012). Attributive interpretive use, besides representations of attributed utterances and thoughts, also includes cases of irony, where the speaker metarepresents an attributed utterance or thought and at the same time expresses a dissociative attitude to it. Echoic utterances, echoic questions and echoic denials are other such instances where the speaker metarepresents an attributed utterance or thought with an attitude (see section 2.2).

Blass (1990) was the first to point out that for markers used to indicate hearsay, an analysis as evidential marker may be less than satisfactory. In her analysis of the Sissala particle rɛ́ she states that its interpretation as a “hearsay” or evidential marker does not account for all its uses, for example when marking ironic utterances, when occurring in echoic questions or in constructions involving verbs of propositional attitude. She shows that an analysis within the framework of Relevance Theory is much more satisfying, where rɛ́ is seen as a marker of interpretive use, that is, as an indicator of metarepresentations of attributed utterances or thoughts. Within this analysis, not only the “hearsay” use but also the other above mentioned uses can be accommodated. For instance, constructions involving verbs of propositional attitude are analyzed as representations that the hearer has to embed under a higher-level metarepresentation or higher-level explicature representing the speaker’s attitude to the lower-level representation. In the same way, echo questions and echo denials are metarepresentations of
attributed utterances which may have an additional layer of metarepresentation expressing the speaker’s attitude towards the attributed utterance. With irony, this additional layer is obligatory (see section 3.6.2.5).

Let me summarize: an analysis of evidential markers such as Sissala *rɛ́* within the framework of Relevance Theory does not just explain its use of marking verbal reports. It can also account for other uses such as marking reported thoughts, echo questions and denials, ironic utterances, and utterances that express a propositional attitude towards its content in that all these cases are seen as metarepresentations of attributed utterances or thoughts. So the scope of an evidential marker may be way beyond marking reported speech.

The categories of metarepresentations, attributed and non-attributed, are understood to be universal, but languages differ in the way they choose to mark them grammatically or otherwise. In Sissala, interpretive use of metarepresentations of utterances as well as of thoughts is grammatically indicated by *rɛ́*. For Japanese, Itani (1994) re-analyzed the utterance-final “hearsay” particle *tte* within Relevance Theory as a marker of attributed utterances but not thoughts.

Here I want to come back to Johanson’s analysis of Turkic markers of hearsay, inference and mirativity mentioned in section 3.6.1. Striking similarities can be observed in so far as Johanson states that propositions marked by the “indirectivity” marker have a second layer referring to the speaker’s reception of the obtained information. Translated into relevance-theoretical terms, this means that a speaker’s utterance that is marked by an indirectivity marker contains two levels of representation: a lower-level representation of a state of affairs embedded under a higher-level metarepresentation expressing – in Johanson’s words - the speaker’s reception of this state of affairs. This higher-level metarepresentation may be of the kind “someone said that …”, in other words, hearsay (evidential), or such as “I inferred from fact X that …” (inference), or it may express the speaker’s surprise etc. (attitude) about the said state of affairs. In each case, a metarepresentation is involved. If this analysis is correct then, like Sissala *rɛ́*, the scope of Modern Turkic *miş* as a marker of metarepresentations includes several other kinds of metarepresentations besides those of attributed utterances. Mirativity, within this approach, seems then to include just another bundle of speaker’s attitudes such as surprise,
unprepared mind etc. that involve metarepresentation and results in the construction of a higher-level explicature. Some languages do not mark it grammatically at all, others have a marker used exclusively to mark this notion (lo in Hare, DeLancey 2001), whereas languages such as Modern Turkic group it together with other kinds of metarepresentations expressing the notions of “reported” and “inferred”. This is just a first impression; it would be interesting to take a closer look at mirativity as seen within Relevance Theory.

In the next section, I will argue that a similar analysis works well for Indus Kohistani lee.

3.6.2.1 Indus Kohistani lee: a marker of attributed utterances

In Indus Kohistani, the “reported” marker lee is best analyzed as a marker of interpretive use, restricted to indicating attributed utterances, or in other words, marking attributed public metarepresentations. When comparing the Sissala and the Indus Kohistani marker it is obvious that Sissala ré covers a much wider range of metarepresentations, for instance it includes metarepresentations of attributed thoughts. Indus Kohistani lee, on the other hand, marks only a subset of metarepresentations, namely that of metarepresentations of attributed utterances that were actually uttered by someone. We will see in the following chapters that Indus Kohistani has several other markers for indicating different kinds of metarepresentations, for instance example (35) illustrates the use of two different markers for indicating attributive speech and thought respectively. This utterance is part of a conversation about a woman who thought she was pregnant and about whom my language consultant had heard via other people. The “think” clause at the beginning of the utterance and the complement clause are in square brackets.

(35) 

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{oolàat} & \text{thi} & \text{karee} = \text{lee} & \text{tilaà–tilaa} \\
\text{offspring} & \text{be.PRS.F} & \text{MRM = REP} & \text{cause.to.move.CVB–REDUPL} \\
\text{paátyô} & \text{màayn = lee} \\
\text{later} & \text{say.PFV1 = REP}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{če} & \text{rasuulii} & \text{thi} \\
\text{COMP} & \text{tumor} & \text{be.PRS.F}
\end{array}
\]

‘Assuming that (she) is pregnant (they) went with her (to different places), later (they) said that it is a tumor’ (conversation 14.1.2013)

The first clause of this utterance “it is offspring” is marked by karee, another metarepresentation marker indicating that this is not the description of a state of affairs in the real world nor an actually uttered
speech but an assumption, a thought. This assumption was then reported by someone else to my language consultant who in turn reported it to me; therefore it is marked with *lee* as a reported or attributed speech. The last clause, the speech complement clause “it is a tumor”, is again marked by *lee* because it is an attributed utterance which, this time, does not contain an assumption/thought but a description of a state of affairs (verified by ultrasound).

In section 3.4 I described different uses of *lee*: marking explicit reported utterances that are complements of a speech verb; marking propositions that would otherwise not be identifiable as reported utterances; and replacing the speech verb in reported utterances. In all these instances, *lee* marks the propositions as attributed utterances, that is, utterances that were originally uttered by someone other than the speaker. In the following sections I will apply my analysis to the data described above and also show how the analysis of *lee* fits in with that of the other two attributive use markers.

### 3.6.2.2 *lee* marking clauses other than speech complements

Recall that *lee* is not only found in complements of speech predicates but also in other clauses that are otherwise not explicitly marked as reported speech. Consider again example (8), repeated here. The speaker was telling me about the nikah (marriage contract) of one of her sons at which she herself had not been present but had been told about by her husband. The utterance consists of a simple proposition; nothing apart from the marker *lee* indicates that this is a reported utterance. Such instances demonstrate the most typical use of a “reported” marker.

(8)  
ghôô awâaz kar-ââs = *lee*
big,M.SG voice,M do-PST,IPFV,M = REP

‘He made (gave his consent with) a loud voice’ (conversation 4.5.2012)

The first explicature of this utterance is something like “the speaker said, ‘He (my son) gave his consent to the marriage with a loud voice’”. However, the presence of *lee* indicates that the proposition uttered by the speaker is an attributed one, originally uttered by someone else. In relevance-theoretical terms, *lee* constrains the addressee of this utterance to construct another, a higher-level explicature, of the kind “the speaker said, ‘Someone said/it has been reported to me that he (my son) gave his consent to the marriage with a loud voice’”. For me, the addressee of this utterance, it was easy to recover the original
source of this utterance from the context, so the final higher-level explicature was “the speaker said, ‘My husband told me that my son gave his consent to the marriage with a loud voice’”. (There is still another higher-level explicature as I realized later on because the speaker told this utterance with a mocking attitude. Young men are supposed to be quiet and not raise their voice in the presence of their elders. So the speaker’s mocking attitude (although not expressed linguistically) causes the hearer to construct another higher-level explicature such as “The speaker said with a mocking attitude, ‘My husband told me that my son gave his consent to the marriage with a loud voice, indeed!’”).

In utterances such as the one above *lee* functions as a procedural indicator that guides the addressee towards the construction of a higher-level explicature such as “someone has told that … (proposition of utterance)”. The original speaker of the reported utterance may or may not be mentioned or even known. In example (8) above, the context helped in recovering the source.

In example (36), the final clause is marked by *lee*. The speaker had related that she had had a sugar test because she suspected having diabetes.

\[(36) \text{tést} \text{ kar-i-aafl} \text{ khê} \text{ niî} \text{ thiî = lee} \]

\[
\text{test} \quad \text{do-CAUS-PFV1} \quad \text{SUB} \quad \text{NEG} \quad \text{be.PRS.M.SG = REP}
\]

‘When (I) had the (blood sugar) test done (the doctor) said that it is not (diabetes)’ (conversation 24.12.2012)

Leaving aside *lee*, the explicature would be “the speaker said, ‘When I had the test done it was not (diabetes)’”. Here again, the addressee is constrained by the presence of the marker *lee* to construct a higher-level explicature such as “the speaker said, ‘When I had the test done, X said that it is not diabetes’”. Considerations of relevance guide the search for X, the original speaker of the quoted utterance: the one who had ordered or done the test must be the one who commented on it.

In other instances, considering the context, the addressee arrives at the conclusion that what has been marked by *lee* is what people in general say, as illustrated in example (11), repeated here.

\[(11) \text{hîî} \text{ hár} \text{ xoraak-á} \text{ tsêe} \text{ thê,} \text{ ḍaaldá} \text{ kha-ánt = lee} \]

\[
\text{now} \quad \text{every} \quad \text{food.M-PL} \quad \text{much.M.PL} \quad \text{be.PRS.M.PL} \quad \text{vegetable.ghee} \quad \text{eat-PRS.M = REP}
\]

\[
\text{ghiîl} \text{ kha-ánt = lee} \text{ masùu} \text{ ho-ôgaa = lee} \text{ mheés-ââ} \text{ masùu} \text{ mesùu} \text{ mheés-ââ} \text{ masùu} \text{ meat.LM}
\]

\[
\text{ghiîl} \text{ eat-PRS.M = REP} \text{ meat} \text{ become-PFV2.M.SG = REP} \text{ buffalo-GEN.M} \text{ meat.LM}
\]
In summary, the marker *lee*, when following a proposition, indicates that relevance is to be found by constructing a higher-level explicature such as, “the speaker has been told/the speaker has heard that … (proposition)”.

### 3.6.2.3 *lee* replacing complement-taking speech predicates

In section 3.4.7 I showed how *lee* can be used to replace complement-taking speech predicates. Example (37) illustrates this use.

(37) \[ \text{paátyö} \quad \text{mẽ̀ẽ} \quad \text{P-an} \quad \text{tapús} \quad \text{kar-áthe} \quad \text{só} = \text{lee} \quad \text{só} \]

\[
\text{later} \quad \text{1SG.ERG} \quad \text{name.M-ABL} \quad \text{question} \quad \text{do-PRS.PFV} \quad \text{3SG.DIST} = \text{REP} \quad \text{3SG.DIST}
\]

\[ \text{pií} \quad \text{nií} \quad \text{thú} \quad \text{over.there} \quad \text{NEG} \quad \text{be.PRS.M.SG} \]

‘Later, I asked P; he (said that) he is not there’ (conversation 5.10.12)

Looking at all the instances of this use I noticed that the complementizer *če* ‘that’, although not obligatory with speech complements, is never used in such constructions. The syntactic pattern of such utterances is as follows (38):

(38) \[ \text{PRONOUN - lee - PROPOSITION ( = speech complement)} \]

Furthermore, the pronoun is never marked for ergative case although if preceding a speech verb marked for perfective aspect, the speaker subject has ergative case marking. The only difference between propositions such as (8) and (36) and this one is the explicit mention of the original speaker (its slot usually filled by a pronoun), and the marker *lee* preceding the proposition instead of following it. It might well be that in such cases, *lee* has the same function as mentioned above, namely constraining the addressee towards constructing a higher-level explicature of the kind described in the previous section. To take example (37), the explicature of the second part of the utterance would be “he = *lee* he is not
there”. The presence of *lee* indicates that relevance will be achieved by the further construction of the higher-level explicature “he said that he is not here”. Within the conventional analysis of reported speech in terms of complement clause and matrix clause it is difficult to place this verb-less construction. A pronoun plus a “reported” marker do not make a matrix clause. Here Güldemann’s analysis of matrix clauses as quotative indexes and “tags” on the speech clause (see section 4.2) works better. He shows for African languages that a minority of them has verb-less quotative indexes (QI); in some cases such a QI consists of just a pronoun (Güldemann 2008), or a pronoun and what he calls quote orienter\(^\text{10}\). It seems that in Indus Kohistani, this particular verb-less construction is such an instance of a “non-predicative quotative index” (2008:54).

3.6.2.4 *lee* marking speech complements and complement-taking speech predicates

In my data, in the majority of instances of *lee* being used, the marker either follows a speech complement or a complement-taking speech verb, in which case it is then followed by the speech complement. Of these speech complements, most of them are introduced by the complementizer *če* ‘that’, another interpretive use indicator (see Chapter 5). Examples (39) and (40) illustrate this use.

(39)  
\[
\begin{array}{llllllll}
3\text{SG.DIST.ERG} & \text{māaṣ-e} & \text{māa}yn = \text{lee} & \text{če} & \text{tūs} & \text{gi} & \text{kha-ánt-ø} \\
\text{say.PVF1 = REP} & \text{COMP} & \text{2PL} & \text{what} & \text{eat-PRS.M-PL.M}
\end{array}
\]

‘The man said, “What are you eating?”’ (More about sin #6)  

Here, too, the basic function of *lee* is to indicate attributive use, that is: marking an utterance as originally uttered by someone other than the speaker. But at the same time, the fact that this is a reported utterance is already part of the explicature, namely “the speaker said, ‘The man said, “…’”. Is this a case of double or redundant marking? In the example above, taken from the narrative about Adam and Eve, where we find a speech verb followed by *lee* and the complementizer *če*, one could argue that the presence of *lee* is necessary to indicate that what is attributed is thirdhand information (see section 3.4.2). However, this explanation does not hold for example (40) where the speaker is quoting her son whom she had herself heard saying “I do not eat curry”.

\(^{10}\) Such quote orienters may be (speech) verb copies, proforms (for instance “thus”), and quotatives (Güldemann 2008:134)
From the conversation immediately preceding it was clear that the speaker herself had witnessed her son making this utterance. She introduces the quotation with, “he said”. So the marking of this utterance as a reported speech heard by the speaker (= lee following the speech complement) would seem not to be necessary. Here the question arises why there is double (example (40)) or even triple (example (39)) marking, namely an explicit speech verb plus complementizer če plus the marker lee.

Another question would be why not every attributed utterance is marked by lee (see section 3.5.1, Table 1 where I give a list of occurrences of lee in a personal-experience narrative). Two answers seem possible: (i) seen from a diachronic point of view, lee may be in the process of being replaced by other interpretive use markers i.e. by the complementizer če; therefore its use is no longer obligatory and it will eventually fall out of use at some time in the future; (ii) whereas the complementizer če is the default interpretive use marker (see Chapter 5), lee marks something else in addition to interpretive use (= is the marked one of the two interpretive use markers). In what follows I will consider both possibilities.

Concerning the first-mentioned possibility I am not able to confirm or refute such a claim. As there are no earlier language records available with which to compare my data, one can only speculate about a possible reduction and final loss of lee. Aikhenvald notes that evidentials easily spread, but also can be lost due to language contact (2004:294-6). If lee is in the process of being replaced by če, this would explain why the use of this marker is no longer obligatory, but would offer no explanation as to why utterances may have both markers. As to the second answer, namely that lee is the marked member of the two markers of attributed use če and lee, I want to make a suggestion which I will outline in section 3.6.3.

3.6.2.5 Does lee mark echoic utterances?

In section 3.6.2 I noted that the analysis of the Sissala marker rɛ́ as an interpretive use marker explains why it is also used in echoic utterances including ironic ones. Both are metarepresentations of
attributed utterances or thoughts. And both achieve relevance not so much by reporting or repeating an attributed utterance or thought as by conveying the speaker’s attitude towards it.

In the case of echoic use, the speaker is metarepresenting interpretively the speaker’s previous utterance, as shown in (2), taken from Wilson and repeated here. Suppose Peter and Mary have been to see a film. As they come out, one of the following exchanges occurs:

(2)   PETER:  *That was a fantastic film.*

             b.  [puzzled]  *Fantastic?*
             c.  [scornfully]  *Fantastic!*

As Wilson notes, the speaker who echoes the hearer’s previous utterance (or parts of it) may convey all kinds of attitudes of which (2) shows three instances. In (2a) the attitude conveyed is that of agreement, in (2b) it is questioning, and (2c) conveys disagreement and scorn.

Ironic utterances are a special case of echoic use. The speaker is echoing an utterance or a thought of someone else and at the same time conveying a dissociative attitude, (2c) being an instance of this use. Mary is repeating part of Peter’s utterance but with such an attitude that the hearer (Peter) is being constrained to construct a higher-level explicature such as “The speaker (Mary) does not think at all that the film was fantastic”. In other words, by echoing part of Peter’s utterance with this attitude she is signaling that she rejects his judgment of the film.

Both, simple echoic and echoic utterances spoken with a dissociative attitude, may be marked by a “reported” evidential, not because an evidential may have secondary meanings or overtones but because echoic utterances are, like reported speech, instances of attributed utterances or thoughts.

Coming back to the Indus Kohistani marker *lee*, the question arises if it is also used to mark such echoic - including ironic - utterances. I will now present and discuss instances of what might be considered echoic utterances. Let us first turn to questions marked by *lee*. The next two examples are instances of questions being echoed. In (41) the speaker repeats as a question what the hearer has said in the previous utterance.
The second instance of what seems to be an echoic question is presented in examples (13) to (15), repeated here and taken from a conversation about a device for children with cleft palate. I had been asked to find out if such a device is available in Pakistan. After some enquiry I went back to tell my language consultant that “this thing is not available in Pakistan; I have asked the doctors”. She then replied with a rising/questioning pitch:

(13)  
\[ \text{nií thú} = \text{lee} \]  
\[ \text{NEG be.PRS.M.SG = REP} \]  
‘Is it not, they say?’

Later another member of the family asked my language consultant about the same device, again with a rising pitch towards the end of the utterance (14).

(14)  
\[ \text{gi-́i nií thú} = \text{lee} \]  
\[ \text{what-also NEG be.PRS.M.SG = REP} \]  
‘There is nothing at all available, they say?’

Whereupon my language consultant confirmed (15):

(15)  
\[ \text{nií thú} = \text{lee} \]  
\[ \text{NEG be.PRS.M.SG = REP} \]  
‘It is not, they say’ (conversation 7.5.2012)

Both, examples (41) and (13) to (15) contain clear instances of questions echoing the content (or part of it) of the hearer’s previous utterance. However, in both cases the hearer’s previous utterance that is being echoed is already an attributed utterance. In (41) speaker B echoes an utterance attributed to speaker A who in turn attributed it to the doctor. In other words, the utterance that speaker B is echoing is itself an attributed “reported” utterance.

The same is true for (13) to (15) and, in fact, for all other instances of echoing questions in my data: the utterance that is being echoed is itself reported. So, as long as I have no data that show a
marked echoic question referring to an utterance that itself is not reported, I cannot claim that \textit{lee} marks echoic questions.

In my data there are only a couple of utterances marked by \textit{lee} that have ironic connotations; one of them is example (17) from section 3.4.4, repeated here. It is taken from a conversation about my language consultant’s oldest daughter who, after several pregnancies, was not well. My language consultant told me that she had advised her to stop getting pregnant. She then quoted her daughter’s answer.

(17) \textit{khê màyn \textit{égaa má gí zar-i hu-úthi}=aa=lee}

\begin{tabular}{llllll}
then & say.\textit{PFV1} & oh! & 1SG & what & old-F & become-PRS.\textit{PFV.F}=Q=REP \\
\end{tabular}

‘Then she said, “Oh! Have I become that old?”’ (conversation 7.5.2012)

Here the original speaker of the reported utterance echoes what Kohistani women in general believe: A woman is considered old once she is beyond the childbearing age. At the same time this is also an instance of echoing an implicature of my language consultant’s previous utterance “stop getting pregnant”, namely “if someone stops getting pregnant then she is considered old. It follows that if I stop getting pregnant I will be considered old”. The speaker’s (i.e. my language consultant’s daughter’s) attitude is dissociative, this being conveyed by the exclamation particle \textit{égaa}.

But here, too, the ironic utterance is not just the echoing of an utterance attributed to the hearer and Kohistani women in general; it then was reported to my language consultant who in turn passed it on to me. In other words, it contains multiple levels of attribution, and we have the same problem as with echoic questions above.

All the instances of echoic use that I have found so far involve multiple levels of attribution: (i) speaker echoing the hearer’s previous utterance (second-level attribution) that itself is attributed (first-level attribution), or (ii) the hearer’s previous utterance is being echoed by the speaker (first-level attribution), then this echoic utterance in turn is reported to another addressee (second-level attribution). It follows that from the data available we cannot conclude that \textit{lee} is being used to mark echoic utterances per se, without a second-level attribution involved. Further research of more diverse data may
approve or disprove this impression. To summarize: from the data available at this point it seems that Indus Kohistani lee is not used to mark echoic questions and ironic utterances per se.

3.6.3 Procedural indicators: triggers of the argumentative module

In section 2.4 I introduced the relevance-theoretic concepts of argumentation and persuasion as goals of a speaker, and that of epistemic vigilance on the part of an addressee when communicating. I also mentioned the argumentative module that is assumed to be separate from the comprehension module and whose activation may be triggered by procedural indicators. Recall that an addressee’s epistemic vigilance is directed toward the contents of an utterance as well as the trustworthiness of the communicator. A speaker may therefore use procedural indicators such as so, but, and therefore to activate the audience’s epistemic vigilance mechanism towards the content of her utterance, whereas evidentials are employed as an attempt to convince the addressee of the speaker’s trustworthiness. It follows that an evidential marker may have two functions: (i) indicating source of report/attributed representations and (ii) activating the addressee’s argumentative module in order to prove herself as a trustworthy and reliable communicator.

In the next section, I outline Unger’s analysis of the Estonian quotative as an example of such a twofold function of a procedural indicator.

3.6.3.1 The Estonian quotative

Unger (2012:45-73) suggests that the Estonian quotative, a verb form with the ending –vat, is one such evidential marker that has a twofold function: indicating interpretive use and activating the argumentative module. Comparing –vat with the Sissala marker rɛ́ he notes that both are used to mark quotations including indirect speech, hearsay and information acquired through inference; in other words, both are markers of interpretive use. But whereas Sissala rɛ́ does not have any connotations of diminished speaker’s commitment to the truth of her proposition, the Estonian quotative is used only in such contexts where the speaker is not fully committed to the truth of her proposition expressed.

Unger argues that this difference between the two markers exists because the Estonian verb suffix -vat activates the argumentative module whereas Sissala rɛ́ does not. That is, the Estonian quotative has
two functions, (i) indicating interpretive use (like Sissala rɛ́) and (ii) activating the epistemic vigilance mechanism located in the argumentation module, thereby making sure that the source of information description is used as input (2012:68).

Such an analysis predicts that Estonian –vat will only be used when the speaker wants her audience to evaluate for themselves whether to accept or reject the claims contained in the reported information. This means that the Estonian quotative will be used to mark only a subset of attributed propositions, for instance reports of rather unusual events, or quotations where the speaker cannot guarantee for the precise contents of the original utterance (2012:69).

In section 3.6.4 I will suggest that a similar analysis might work for Indus Kohistani lee and also might account for the fact that its use to mark attributed utterances is not obligatory.

3.6.4 The Indus Kohistani marker lee: activator of the argumentative module

In section 3.5.1 I had noted that the use of the marker lee is not obligatory when reporting someone else’s utterances. In my data there are also many instances of lee being used in utterances that are already recognizable as reported speech by a complement-taking predicate such as “X said …”, thus seemingly being double-marked. Here I want to suggest a possible explanation for this selective use of lee, building on Unger’s analysis of the Estonian quotative and on the more general claims of Wilson (2011) that procedural markers indicating logical or evidential relations may be analyzed as activators of the argumentative module. To say it in Wilson’s words,

“… the function of the procedural expressions in a language is to put
the user of the language in a state in which some of these domain-specific cognitive procedures [i.e. cognitive procedures whose primary functions are not intrinsically linked to inferential comprehension, 2011:12] are highly activated” (Wilson 2011:11).

I claim that the marker lee is such a trigger that activates the addressee’s argumentative module. Here I want to repeat what Unger (2012) said about the input into this module (see section 2.4). “The input […] are claims, that is, assumptions (mental representations) that the audience is not prepared to accept
at face value, and information relevant to its evaluation”. The evidential *lee* provides “the information relevant to its evaluation”, namely the source of information. It follows that an Indus Kohistani speaker will use *lee* in instances where she wants to get past her audience’s epistemic vigilance mechanism (Wilson 2011:23). By activating the argumentative module and by providing the input needed for evaluation, she (i) presents herself as trustworthy by openly declaring her information as second- or thirdhand, and she (ii) wants the hearer to judge for himself whether to accept or reject it, or in other words, she wants the hearer to take some of the responsibility for the proposition’s epistemic assessment. In the following paragraphs I will show with examples from my data how this may work out.

Let us first consider instances where the syntactic placement of *lee* indicates third-hand information as illustrated in example (42).

(42) daakṭar-á man-ããs-e = lee as̀iñ āāci-ōō nazár húm
    doctor-PL say-PST.IPFV.M-PL.M = REP 3SG.PROX.POSS eye-PL.OBL sight.M also
    niií thú
    NEG be.PRS.M.SG

‘The doctors were saying that he also cannot see’ (conversation 22.6.2013)

The person talked about in this utterance was a small baby that had been born with several visible anomalies. After the baby boy had been seen by a doctor his mother reported the results to the speaker of the utterance, who in turn told me. So this is a case of thirdhand information. The speaker has already made this evident by using the complement-taking matrix clause “the doctors were saying”. I suggest that by adding the marker *lee*, the speaker is activating the addressee’s cognitive evaluation/argumentation module, indicating “this information I have from hearsay” and “judge for yourself if the information from such a source is reliable” and thereby not taking full responsibility herself for the truth of the proposition expressed.

The next two examples (43) and (43) may be analyzed on a similar line. The background of (43) is as follows. My language consultant told me about the previous night when her family had been woken
up by loud voices. She had asked one of her sons what the shouting and commotion was all about and he answered her,

(43) sā̃̀ĩ kaabulìi thé gí guzur-a thé i-íthe
    3PL.DIST Afghan be.PRS.M.PL what Gujjar-PL be.PRS.M.PL come-PRS.PRV.M.PL

    man-àant-ø = lee če zàři bakår puli-a-áthe
    say-PRS.M-PL.M = REP COMP 1PL.POSS.F goat.F hide-CAUS-PRS.PRV

    'It is those Afghans or Gujjar; they have come and said that someone has taken away their goats’ (conversation 3.9.2012)

Note that the speaker of the reported utterance (the son) as well as my language consultant is reporting information for the truth of which they cannot vouch. By using the marker lee the hearer’s argumentative module is activated, he is informed about the source of information, i.e. hearsay, and he has to decide for himself whether he accepts the reported speakers’ claims.

The utterance in example (43) is not explicitly marked as containing thirdhand information; the marker lee follows the quotation. The original source of the quotation is “people”.

(44) khē hī xálak man-àant če hindû-ōō qaannuun
    DEVM now people say-PRS.M COMP Hindu-GEN.PL custom

    ās = lee
    be. PST.M = REP

    ‘So now people say that (a woman’s complete covering of the face) is a Hindu custom’ (A mother’s advice #93)

Here again, I argue, the marker lee is used to trigger the activation of the argumentative module. In this specific example it seems that the speaker makes no commitment to or judgment about the truth of the proposition expressed but leaves this task to the hearer. However, I think it is not part of the semantics of lee to express doubt about a proposition marked by it. If we follow the analysis outlined above then the notion of “reduced commitment/doubt” is a contextual effect, resulting from the handing over of responsibility of assessment to the addressee. What lee as an activator of the argumentative module basically conveys is a speaker’s laying open her sources of information in order to gain the addressee’s trust.
In example (45) below, there is no doubt about the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed, but here, too, *lee* is being used to activate the speaker’s argumentative module, such that the hearer should judge for herself. The utterance in (45) is part of a conversation between my language consultant and her mother-in-law. The former had gone to her youngest sister-in-law to ask her to help her to cut grass. Now she reported to her mother-in-law, what her youngest sister-in-law had replied.

(45) ‘She said to me, “I have to clean the house *lee*, I have to do the dishes *lee*, I have to do ...

*lee*, I have to do ...

*lee*”; so I said, “Then we are not able to go today”’

(field notes conversation 23.9.2011)

The expected answer of a younger woman to the request of her elder would be to comply. Here this is not the case, her answer is rather unusual. The use of *lee* following every clause is conspicuous. It is as if, by using *lee*, the speaker is telling her mother-in-law, “judge for yourself if what she said is right”, thereby activating the hearer’s argumentative module.

The last example is from the earthquake narrative, an overview of which I presented in section 3.5.1 as Table 1, repeated here.
Table 1. Occurrences of *lee* in The Earthquake narrative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1. happenings before the earthquake, conversations with husband and daughter-in-law; <em>lee</em> used once as speech verb replacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>the earthquake, conversation with daughter-in-law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>immediately after the earthquake: conversations with daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, husband, visitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>arrival of and conversation with first son: <em>lee</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>arrival of and conversation with second son: <em>lee</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>arrival of and conversation with third son: <em>lee</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>the first day and night after the earthquake, conversations with family members, relatives, other people about household goods, cattle, where to sleep etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>talk about what caused the earthquake, what people think</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>recount of a visit to the town B. which had been destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>report of the story of the madrassah student: <em>lee</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As I have already noted, *lee* is used sparingly in this narrative that contains plenty of reported utterances. Apart from two other instances, we find *lee* only in the three conversations between the speaker and her three sons after their safe arrival, and in the report about the madrassah student at the end of the narrative (see examples 29 a-i). I suggest that here, too, the use of *lee* is connected with the activation of the hearer’s argumentative module. It is a rather unusual event, the survival of someone buried under a building (29 a-i) and reported as thirdhand information, that is marked by *lee*; likewise the three encounters with the speaker’s sons when they come home alive and well. The function of *lee* in all these instances may be, as Wilson puts it, “to display the communicator’s competence, benevolence and trustworthiness to the hearer” by getting the information sources right (Wilson 2011:24), whereas “[i]gnoiring evidentiality in a language with evidentials gets you marked as unreliable or a liar”, to quote Aikhenvald (2004:344) again. In each of the above mentioned instances the presence
of *lee* indicates that the speaker is reliable and that the hearer should judge for himself whether to trust the indicated source(s) of information.

Leaving the use of *lee* in folk tales aside, such an analysis could be applied to all instances of *lee* in my data. The fact that *lee* seems not to be used to mark echo questions per se or ironic utterances (see subsection 3.6.2.5) would support the interpretation of *lee* as an activator of the argumentative module. Also, this would explain why *lee* is not used when quoting sayings of God, as within Kohistani culture and religion, any epistemic vigilance regarding God’s words would be considered unnecessary, even sinful. Of course more data and research will be needed to confirm (or disprove) my hypothesis.

### 3.7 Summary: The Indus Kohistani marker *lee*

In this chapter I have introduced the Indus Kohistani marker *lee* as an evidential “reported” marker, using Aikhenvald’s classification of evidentials. After giving a brief overview of reported evidentials in the wider geographic context I have then described the uses of *lee*. It marks reported utterances that are speech complements, thereby distinguishing between secondhand and thirdhand information. *Lee* is also used to mark reported information that is otherwise not recognizable as such i.e. that syntactically is not a speech complement. Furthermore, *lee* may replace the speech verb of a complement-taking matrix clause. In conversation as well as in narratives the use of *lee* is not obligatory. A distinction has to be made between *lee* marking reported information in conversation and narratives of someone’s experiences on the one hand and its use in folk tales on the other hand. In the latter category of narrative its main function is not indicating reported information. Rather, it seems to be used as a marker of background material.

I have then briefly reviewed some aspects of current analyses of evidential markers by Palmer (2001), Aikhenvald (2004) and Johanson (2000). I have introduced the notion of interpretive use in Relevance Theory and the analysis of “reported” markers within this theoretical framework as first demonstrated by Blass (1990). I have argued that Indus Kohistani *lee* may likewise be analyzed as a procedural indicator of interpretive use albeit of a more restricted range than that shown by Blass for the
Sissala marker *re*. The marker *lee* is one of several such interpretive use markers in Indus Kohistani, indicating attributed utterances only.

Finally, I have proposed a possible answer to the question as to why the use of *lee* is not obligatory in marking attributed utterances. Building on Wilson’s claims that procedural indicators not only guide and constrain a hearer’s search for meaning but also may be activators of the addressee’s cognitive mechanisms relating to epistemic vigilance, I suggested that such an analysis may work well for *lee*. According to this interpretation, *lee* would be used in instances where a speaker wants her addressee to take over responsibility of evaluating the information himself by laying open its sources. This would also explain why *lee* does not mark every attributed utterance and why it is not used to mark echo-questions proper and ironic utterances per se.
The Indus Kohistani marker \textit{karee}

The Indus Kohistani marker \textit{karee}, a grammaticalized form of the verb \textit{kar-} ‘do’, has a variety of uses: as a quotative\footnote{As defined by Aikhenvald (2004:394): “verbal form or a participle introducing a verbatim quotation of what someone else has said.”}, as complementizer, as a marker of purpose and reason clauses, and as marker of naming and of similarity constructions. Considering this particular combination of functions the marker \textit{karee} can be grouped together with other similarly grammaticalized markers many of which have developed from speech verbs (Lord 1993; Bashir 1996; Güldemann 2008 among others).

In the first part of this chapter I introduce the source of \textit{karee}, a converb, and the grammaticalized marker with its phonological and syntactic properties. As the marker \textit{karee} has a lot to do with quotations, a short overview of sentential complementation in Indus Kohistani follows. In section 4.3 I describe the different uses of \textit{karee}.

Section 4.4 presents a brief overview of relevant literature concerning grammaticalization in general and of quotatives specifically. In section 4.5 I propose an analysis of \textit{karee} within the framework of Relevance Theory as a procedural indicator, more specifically, as a metarepresentation marker of utterances and thoughts. By indicating an utterance as the metarepresentation of another utterance or thought, \textit{karee} constrains the addressee’s interpretation process. In cases where the utterance marked by \textit{karee} is not embedded within a speech or “think” matrix clause, \textit{karee} guides the addressee towards the construction of a higher-level explicature such as “the speaker says, ‘I/someone else said/thought that …’”. I argue that such an analysis can provide a satisfactory explanation for all the different uses. Section 4.5.3 provides some thoughts on how my analysis of the marker \textit{karee} might
be relevant for other similar grammaticalized quotatives; and section 4.6 presents a summary of this chapter.

4.1 **The converb kareé and the metarepresentation marker karee**

In the following sections I describe the Indus Kohistani converb *kareé* and the marker *karee*. Both, converb and marker, are used extensively and may occur together in one sentence.

4.1.1 **The converb kareé**

The Indus Kohistani marker *karee* is the grammaticalized form of the converb *kareé* ‘having done’, developed from the verb *kar*- ‘do’. This verb is a generic performance/action verb (Güldemann 2008:306); it is mostly used as the verbal component of conjunct verbs, constructions that consist of a nonverbal word (often a noun) and a finite form of the verb ‘do’, for instance *kàam karàant* (work.N is.doing) ‘is working’, or *qasá karàant* (story.N is.doing) ‘is telling’. Such conjunct verbs are a well-known feature of Indo-Iranian languages. The converb *kareé* ‘having done’, a perfective adverbial participle, and other such converbs in general, are often also referred to as conjunctive participles within the Indian subcontinent language area (Masica 1991:399).

Indus Kohistani converbs of intransitive regular verbs are built by adding the suffix *-ií* to the verb root. The converb suffixes for regular transitive verbs are *-eé* or *-aá*. In the case of the verb *kar*- ‘do’, the *-eé* suffix is used: *kar-eé*, the accent of the word being on the last mora of the suffix.

In Indus Kohistani, as in other Indo-Aryan languages, converbs are used frequently in the construction of adverbial clauses. A dependent clause containing a converb, or a string of such clauses, is followed by the main clause containing the finite verb form. Example (46) shows a typical use of such adverbial clauses. The speaker of (46) is talking about what people do when there is a funeral. The adverbial clauses of this and the following example are in square brackets.

\[(46) \text{tèe [hàa dhay] [dawàa kar-eé] tèe riz-àant-ø} \]
\[
\text{then hand hold.CVb prayer do-CVb then dispersePRS.M-PL.M} \]

‘Then (the people) hold up hands, pray and then disperse’ (Death, burial #38)
Example (47) contains a string of adverbial clauses with converbs, followed by the main clause with the finite verb.

(47)  
\[ \text{kukóó} \quad \text{maar-éé} \quad \text{sugàa} \quad \text{bhaáat} \quad \text{lad-éé} \quad \text{ghiíl} \quad \text{gal-éé} \quad \text{bút} \]
  chicken.PL  kill-CVB  good.M.SG  rice.M  cook-CVB  ghee  pour-CVB  all

\[ \text{só} \quad \text{xálkí} \quad \text{góli} \quad \text{de-ént} \]
  3SG.DIST  people.SG.DAT  bread  give-PRS.M

'(He) kills chicken, prepares tasty rice, pours ghee (on it) and serves the meal to all the people’  
(About deqani # 29)

In addition to the above described converb form, there is a second construction using the verb _gal_-‘put/pour’. Here the verb stem is followed by the converb _gal-éé_ ‘having put/poured’, for instance _kará-gal-ee_ 12 ‘having done’, or _ií-gal-ee_ ‘having come’. So far, I have not been able to determine the exact differences in use and meaning between the two forms. My main language consultant uses both forms but more frequently the _V-éé_ form. In texts of another language consultant the _V-á-gal-ee_ form is found nearly exclusively. It is mentioned here because both forms may be used as metarepresentation markers.

4.1.2 _The metarepresentation marker kareé_

Both converb forms introduced in the previous section are also used as quotation marker, complementizer and in several other functions which will be described in the following sections. That these two forms have undergone grammaticalization can be observed as follows: (i) the markers have lost their accent. (ii) Perhaps as a consequence of losing the accent, the converb ending –éé is frequently being dropped, resulting in the forms _kar_ and _karagal_. (iii) The semantic content of the converb which was rather generic in the first place has been lost.

Syntactically, the marker _kareé_ and its second form _karagalée_ follow the clause-final finite verb, whereas the converb _kareéé_ / _karagalée_ takes the place of the clause-final verb in an adverbial clause.

As this chapter will mainly be concerned with reported speech and thought, I first want to present a brief overview of sentential complementation in Indus Kohistani in the following section.

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12 Note that in this construction the pitch accent is on the stem, not on the last mora of the converb.
4.2 Sentential complementation in Indus Kohistani

Noonan defines sentential complementation as “the syntactic situation that arises when a notional sentence or predication is an argument of a predicate” (Noonan 2007b:52), whereby the said argument may function as subject or object of the predicate. This definition includes the whole range of complementation, from sentence-like speech complements to nonfinite complements; here the complement is seen as dependent, a constituent of the matrix clause, that is the main or independent clause.

There are other approaches to analyze complements of verbs of speech, perception and cognition in particular, see for example Güldemann who proposes to analyze these not as sentential subordinate complement clauses but as syntactically autonomous clauses, with the matrix clause functioning as a kind of tag on the quote (Güldemann 2008:231). One reason for him to adopt this analysis is the fact that quotation clauses can occur without a matrix clause but not matrix clauses without quotation clauses, or in other words, the quote can be without the tag, but not the tag without the quote. Furthermore, the matrix clause of such complements may in many languages in fact not be a clause at all but consist of just a quotation marker or be otherwise reduced. Güldemann therefore uses the terms “Reported Discourse” (RD in short) in place of complement, and “Quotation Index” (QI) in place of matrix clause. Thompson’s analysis within the framework of Emergent Grammar goes into a similar direction in that she sees such matrix-clause-and-complement constructions as independent clauses (complement) within “epistemic/evidential/evaluative frames” (matrix clause) that consist of frequently used “phrasal fragments” (Thompson 2002:142). It seems to me that for the analysis of Indus Kohistani sentential complements of verbs of speech, cognition and perception, Güldemann’s analysis is more satisfying as quite often what is called the matrix clause simply consists of a quotation marker, a kind of tag on the quoted utterance or thought. However, to make things no more complicated than necessary I will continue to use the conventional terms “complement” and “matrix clause”.

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13 Two instances of such a reduced matrix clause have been described in chapter 3 section 3.4.3 where the matrix clause is just a “reported” marker (example (8)), and in chapter 3, section 3.4.7 where the matrix clause consists of a pronoun referring to the speaker plus a “reported” marker (example (24)).
4.2.1 Form of reported speech and thought in Indus Kohistani

In Indus Kohistani, all quotations are reported as direct speech, that is: pronouns and indicators of temporal and spatial deixis all refer to the original speaker of the quote. Thoughts are quoted in the same way in that they are presented as “mental” or “inner” direct speech. So far I have not come across any instance of indirect speech that takes the reporter’s perspective concerning time, pronominal reference and deixis. Example (48) will illustrate this fact.

Example (49) was uttered when my language consultant was asked where her son was.

4.2.2 Sentence-like complementation strategies

In Indus Kohistani we find both sentence-like complements and nonfinite complements. In this study I will be concerned only with the former type for the formation of which there exist several strategies illustrated in the following sections. The complements of all examples are in square brackets.

4.2.2.1 Juxtaposition

One complementation strategy in Indus Kohistani is juxtaposition. Here the matrix clause is followed by the complement without any complementizer or other clause linker. This strategy is used only when man- ‘say’ is the complement-taking predicate. Example (50) shows such an instance.
Occasionally, the matrix clause may follow the quotation instead of preceding it, as seen in example (51). This is possible only when, in the course of the preceding conversation, the identity of the quoted speaker has already been established. The speaker of the utterance in (51) had told me about a visit to the doctor and finished by reporting the doctor’s last remarks.

(51) [čàa hapt-őō paťyō gatá wā] man-āthe
three week-PL.OBL later again come.down.IMP.2SG say-PRS.PFV

“‘Come back after three weeks”, he said’ (conversation 6.4.13)

The hearer already knows from the conversation immediately preceding this utterance that the quoted speaker is the doctor. The default order is nevertheless matrix clause – complement.

4.2.2.2 Use of the complementizer če

By far the most frequently used strategy is that of inserting the complementizer če between main clause and quote. This complementizer will be the topic of Chapter 5; here I just want to give an illustration of its use in reporting speech or thought, as shown in example (52).

(52) abàa-e kōu kar-āthe [če hǐāl wā-īgee kāa]
father-ERG shouting do-PRS.PFV COMP avalanche come.down-PFV2.F who

amāā bač-aa-h-aánt khē bača-áj)
REFL escape-CAUS-POT-PRS.M SUB escape-CAUS-IMP.2PL

‘The father shouted, “An avalanche is coming down, save yourselves if you can”’ (Avalanche story #62)

The complementizer can also replace the complement-taking predicate as can be seen in the following example (53).

(53) khē doōm čēčs [če sās màaš xabār kar-ā
then Dom send.PST.IPFV.M COMP 3SG.DEM.DOM man news do-IMP.2SG

sās màaš xabār kar-ā]
3SG.DEM.DOM man news do-IMP.2SG

‘Then (the family) used to send the Dom, (saying) “Inform this man, this man, … (about the wedding),”’ (About the Dom tribe #10)

Chapter 5 will further illustrate the use of če as a complementizer occurring with complement-taking predicates other than speech, cognition and perception verbs.
4.2.2.3 Uses of the marker *karee*

Together with the complementizer *če* or on its own, the marker *karee* is used in complement constructions as the next examples will illustrate. Contrary to *če*, the marker *karee* follows the complement. In (54) both markers are present.

(54) \[
\begin{array}{llllllll}
\text{mī̃} & \text{asĩ́} & \text{tal} & \text{dāad} & \text{nĩ́} & \text{th̃́} & \text{[če} & \text{ú} \\
1\text{SG.GEN} & 3\text{SG.PROX.OBL} & \text{on} & \text{belief} & \text{NEG} & \text{be.PRS.F} & \text{COMP} & 3\text{SG.PROX}
\end{array}
\]

\[
dũːalš̃̃í ĩ-šányt karee\]
\[
twelve.ORD come-FUT.F MRM
\]

‘I don’t believe her that she will come on the twelfth’ (conversation 29.10.2012)

The following example is a self-quotatation of an earlier utterance, without the complementizer *če*.

(55) \[
\begin{array}{llllllllll}
má & \text{man-āhs} & \text{nĩ́} = ã́a [Q-āā] & \text{ék} & \text{pu-č-ẽ́} & \text{dũ-ū} & \text{ghariṹú} \\
1\text{SG} & \text{say-PST.IPFV.F} & \text{NEG} = Q & \text{name.F-GEN.M} & \text{one} & \text{son-ERG} & \text{two-GEN.F} & \text{wife}
\end{array}
\]

\[
a-áthe karee\]
\[
\text{bring-PRS.PFV MRM}
\]

‘I was saying, wasn’t I, that one of Q’s sons has taken a second wife’ (conversation 27.8.12)

Here, too, the complement clause follows the matrix clause but the marker of the complement clause *karee* is clause-final.

4.2.2.4 Use of the “reported” marker *lee*

The marker *lee* may be used in addition to the complementizer *če* to mark reported speech; however it may also be the only indicator of a speech complement. Chapter 3 treats this marker in more detail; here I want to give just a few examples of its typical uses. Example (56) shows a quotation preceded by the matrix clause and followed by *lee*.

(56) \[
\begin{array}{llllllll}
xawánd-e & \text{man-il} & [tú} & \text{č} & \text{naĩ́} = lèe\]
\text{husband-ERG} & \text{say-PFV1} & 2\text{SG} & \text{come.IPFV.2SG} & \text{NEG} = \text{REP}
\end{array}
\]


The marker *lee* following the quote indicates that the speaker herself heard the original utterance (secondhand report).
In example (57) the “reported” marker follows the speech verb of the matrix clause, marking the following quotation as a thirdhand report. Matrix clause and complement are juxtaposed, the strategy that may be used if the complement-taking predicate is the verb *man-* ‘say’.

(57) \( \text{khē} \quad \text{sayōō} \quad \text{man-áthe} = \leɛ \quad [\text{bé} \quad \text{šā́} \quad \text{meewá} \quad \text{khaá̃nt-ø]} \)

\[ \text{DEVM} \quad 3\text{PL.DIST.ERG} \quad \text{say-PRS.PFV} = \text{REP} \quad 1\text{PL.EXCL} \quad 3\text{PL.DEM} \quad \text{fruit} \quad \text{eat.PRS.M-PL.M} \]

‘Then they said, “We are eating this fruit”’ (more about sin #7)

In example (36), repeated here, the second clause is a reported speech clause, recognizable as such only because it is followed by *lee*.

(36) \( \text{tést} \quad \text{kar-i-aáíl} \quad \text{khē} \quad [\text{nií} \quad \text{thú} = \leɛ] \)

\[ \text{test} \quad \text{do-CAUS-PFV1} \quad \text{SUB} \quad \text{NEG} \quad \text{be.PRS.M.SG} = \text{REP} \]

‘When (I) had the (blood sugar) test done (the doctor) said that it is not (diabetes)’ (conversation 24.12.2012)

The addressee of this utterance has to infer the identity of the quoted speaker from the immediate context.

In example (58), *lee* replaces the speech verb; here the matrix clause consists of a pronominal reference to the speaker and the marker *lee*. This use is limited to instances when the reported speaker has already been introduced and is activated in the minds of the audience. The following example is taken from the report of a conversation between the speaker and her son.

(58) \( \á = \leɛ \quad [\text{má} \quad \text{sút} \quad \text{áås}] \)

\[ 3\text{S.PROX} = \text{REP} \quad 1\text{SG} \quad \text{asleep} \quad \text{be.PST.M} \]

‘He said, “I was asleep”’ (Dreams and their interpretation #85)

To summarize this section, Indus Kohistani uses a variety of complementation strategies for reporting speech and thought such as juxtaposition, the complementizer *če*, the marker *karee*, the “reported” marker *lee*, and a combination of these strategies (*če* plus *karee*, *če* plus *lee*). All complements – reported speech and thought likewise – have to be presented as direct speech.
4.3 Uses of the marker *karee*

The development of SAY verbs\(^{14}\) or verba dicendi via a grammaticalization process to quotatives, complementizers and subordination markers is well known and has been described by Lord (1993), Güldemann (2008), Bashir (1996), Hopper and Traugott (1993) and many others. As we will see, the Indus Kohistani marker *karee*, although its source is not a SAY verb, obviously has taken a similar grammaticalization pathway. I therefore adopt this approach in describing the different uses of *karee*, starting with its function as a marker of reported speech or, as often termed, a quotative.

4.3.1 *Indus Kohistani* *karee* as marker of reported speech

Indus Kohistani has two explicit markers of reported speech: the “reported” marker *lee* (see Chapter 3) and the marker *karee*. As we have seen in Chapter 3, *lee* is used only for reporting utterances of sources other than the speaker herself whereas *karee* has a number of other functions besides that as a quotative. Looking at the frequency of occurrences of both markers in my data it is quite obvious that *karee* as a quotation marker is used less than *lee*. Further differences are noticeable when comparing quotations marked by *lee* with such marked by *karee*: (i) Whereas *lee* marks quotations of an addressee and of third persons only, *karee* is also used to mark quotations of a speaker’s own previous utterances (self-quotation). (ii) Most of the quotations marked by *karee* contain questions, imperatives, or express volition, intentions, or thoughts about something. That implies (iii) that instances of quotations containing descriptions of states of affairs are rather scarce; (iv) hypothetical/not realized quotations, for instance “why didn’t you tell him ‘Come tomorrow’?” may be marked by *karee* but not by *lee*. In the following sections I will illustrate each of these points.

4.3.1.1 *karee* as marker of second- and thirdhand report

As already mentioned in section 4.2.2.3, the marker *karee* always follows the quotation. In example (59) below, *karee* is not the only indicator of reported speech: the quoted utterance is preceded by the matrix clause verb “had called” and the complementizer *če*.

---

\(^{14}\) SAY verb stands for the semantic field of verbs of saying.
(59) raál zhaaw-ií telfún kar-álaas [če má boó dhiptiío at.night brother-DAT phone do-PST.PFV COMP 1SG up duty.OBL

man thú kar]
in be.PR.S.M SG MRM

‘(My son) had called his brother at night, saying, “I am up here on duty”’ (conversation 5.10.2012)

In the next example, the original speaker of the quoted utterance is not mentioned.

(60) bé bilàal xabár ho-óthe [sā̀i wa-íthe karee] 1PL yesterday news become-PRS.PFV.M.PL 3PL.DIST come.down-PRS.PFV.M.PL MRM

‘Yesterday we got the news that they have come down’ (conversation 8.6.2012)

Matrix clause and quote are juxtaposed, the quote is following the complement-taking predicate.

Example (61) is an instance of a quotation that is identifiable as such only because of the presence of karee.

(61) [ú tasií míl bhèet thí karee] 3SG.PROX 3SG.DIST.OBL with sitting be.PR.S.F MRM

‘(X. said that) she is living with him’ (conversation 21.5.2012)

This quotation is not preceded by a matrix clause with an utterance predicate.

The quotation in example (62) is that of a question. Speaker A. had heard B. talking on the phone to her brother-in-law and had asked, “What does he say?” The answer was as follows.

(62) [gulá thí kar] where be.PR.S.F MRM

‘(He is asking) “where is (Beate)?”’ (conversation 5.10.2012)

Example (63) is an instance of a quotation of a reported intention, taken from a narrative about a flash flood.

(63) khé sayǒó man-áthe [khaṣàa wa-int háá bé]
then 3PL.DIST.ERG say-PRS.PFV flash.flood come.down-PRS.F and 1PL

dee-wiž karee]
flee-SBJV.1PL MRM

‘Then they said, “A flash flood is coming down; let’s get away”’ (The torrent #92)

In my data, the majority of such quoted utterances marked by karee does not contain descriptions of states of affairs but rather expresses assumptions, questions, intentions and requests.
The quoted utterance in example (64) below contains a command. The background to it is as follows: One of my language consultant’s daughters-in-law came into the room where we were sitting and said something to her. As I did not understand her I asked my language consultant, what she had said. She replied,

\begin{verbatim}
(64) ū  man-àyn [miigeé  man-áthe [é karee]]
    3SG.PROX  say-PRS.F  1SG.DAT  say-PRS.PFV  come.IMP.2SG  MRM
\end{verbatim}

‘She is saying that (her father-in-law) told her to come’ (conversation 6.9.2013)

Note that this utterance contains a quote within a quote, both of them in square brackets: the father-in-law’s reported speech is embedded in the daughter-in-law’s quote. It is not clear if both of them or only the former one is marked by *karee* because in either case *karee* has to be the sentence-final element. However, considering the fact that most of the clauses marked by *karee* do not contain descriptions of states of affairs but thoughts, intentions, assumptions, requests etc. (see the introduction in 4.3.1), *karee* probably marks just the last clause, the quote of the father-in-law’s utterance.

### 4.3.1.2 *karee* as marker of self-quotations

As already mentioned above, *karee* may also mark quotations of a speaker’s own previous utterances, as example (65) below illustrates. With very few exceptions, the instances of self-quotations marked by *karee* in my data contain not descriptions of states of affairs but intentions, assumptions, requests, and directives. One of these exceptions is example (65).

\begin{verbatim}
(65) má  man-ãĩs  nii=aa  ěe  sú  W-ãã  pu\u{c}
      1SG  say-PST.IPFV.F  NEG = Q  COMP  3SG.DEM  name-GEN.M  SON
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
maar-áthe  karee
kill-PRS.PFV  MRM
\end{verbatim}

‘Didn’t I tell you that (they) killed the son of W?’ (conversation 25.6.2012)

The proposition marked by *karee* in this example is the description of a state of affairs. Note, however, that the speaker uses the tag question *nii=aa* which could mean that she was not quite sure if she did tell me about the killing of W’s son. In fact, the other two instances of self-quotations containing descriptions of states of affairs are similar to this example in that the speaker introduces the quote by saying “Didn’t I tell you…?” At this point it is not clear to me if (i) the speaker uses *karee* just because
she quoted herself or (ii) the speaker uses *karee* because she is not sure if she really had quoted the marked utterance or only thought that she had quoted it.

The following examples contain quotations that are not descriptions of states of affairs.

(66)  
\[
\text{khẽ} \ \text{mẽ̀ẽ} \ \text{màayn} \ [\text{bígi} \ \text{ho-șát} \ \text{kar}]
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{DEVM} & \quad \text{1SG.ERG} & \quad \text{say.PFV} & \quad \text{something} & \quad \text{become-FUT.M} & \quad \text{MRM} \\
\end{align*}
\]

‘Then I said, “There will be something (= she will be pregnant)”’ (conversation 1.2.2014)

The speaker’s own quotation contains an assumption, a thought about the possible condition of another person.

The quote in the next example (67) expresses an intention.

(67)  
\[
\text{mẽ̀ẽ} \ \text{man-álaas} \ [\text{má} \ \text{tií} \ \text{mil} \ \text{çe-ěnt} \ \text{karee}]
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{1SG.ERG} & \quad \text{say-PST.PFV} & \quad \text{1SG} & \quad \text{2SG.OBL} & \quad \text{with} & \quad \text{send-PRS.M} & \quad \text{MRM} \\
\end{align*}
\]

‘I had said that I will send (the girls) back with you’ (conversation 20.7.2012)

The last example (68) of this section shows the self-quotation of a request.

(68)  
\[
\text{mẽ̀ẽ} \ \text{man-álaas} \ [\text{aá} \ \text{kar}]
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{1SG.ERG} & \quad \text{say-PST.PFV} & \quad \text{bring.IMP.2SG} & \quad \text{MRM} \\
\end{align*}
\]

‘I had said, “Bring (the patient record)”’ (conversation 12.10.2012)

4.3.1.3 *karee* as quotation marker of hypothetical/not realized utterances

Quite a number of the *karee*-marked quotations in my data are instances of hypothetical speech such as (i) quotations of utterances that someone is told not to say, (ii) quotations of utterances that someone might say in the future, and (iii) quotations of utterances that were never said, for instance such rhetorical questions as “who told you to do such a thing” where both speaker and addressee know that in fact no-one had told any such thing. Example (23), repeated below, is an instance of a quotation of a potential future utterance. The speaker of (23) quotes what his wife will in all probability say to him if he brings home the wrong size of pan.

(23)  
\[
\text{tẽe} \ \text{mũ} \ \text{ghariũ} \ \text{man-ásit} \ [\text{čẽ} \ \text{mũ} \ \text{kira} \ \text{lák}]
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{then} & \quad \text{1SG.GEN} & \quad \text{wife} & \quad \text{say-FUT.F} & \quad \text{COMP} & \quad \text{1SG.GEN} & \quad \text{for} & \quad \text{small.M} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{pateelá} \ \text{a-áthe} \ \text{karagal}]
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{pan.M} & \quad \text{bring-PRS.PFV} & \quad \text{MRM} \\
\end{align*}
\]

‘Then my wife will say to me, “you have brought a small pan” (although I was supposed to bring a big one)” (Akbar Badshah #50)
In this example, the form karagal (shortened form of karagalee) is used as well as the complementizer če.

In example (69) the speaker is instructing his addressees what not to say.

(69)  wál  talá  bazií  șeé  nií  man-ií  če  zōó
but  there  go.CVb  such  NEG  say-IMP.2PL  COMP  1PL.ERG

c̣aal-áthe  kareee]
find-PRS.PFV  MRM

‘But when you gone there don’t say that you have found (the baby)’ (How they found the baby # 57)

Example (70) is a rhetorical question, addressed to young men who dare to voice their opinion in the presence of their elders.

(70)  tèe  bé  man-àant-ø  če  lakeer-õò  kẽẽ  man-áthe
then  1PL  say-PRS.M-PL.M  COMP  young-one-PL.DAT  who.ERG  say-PRS.PFV

[baal-i-á  man-ií  kareee]
word-F-PL  say-IMP.2PL  MRM

‘Then we say, “Who has told young people to speak up (in the presence of their elders)?”’
(Adab, good manners #60)

The answer to this question is, as both speaker and addressees know, that no-one would say such a thing in this particular cultural context.

4.3.1.4 Summary: karee as marker of reported speech

We have seen so far that karee marks reports of speech uttered by persons other than the speaker as well as quotes of a speaker’s own previous utterances. The majority of the latter ones, namely self-quotations, contain intentions, assumptions, requests and directives. More natural data will be needed to find out if self-quotations of descriptions of states of affairs too may be indicated by karee, that is, if instances such as example (65) are marked by karee just because they are quotes of a speaker’s previous utterance, or because the speaker was not quite sure if she had really done the previous telling. In addition, karee is used to indicate hypothetical or potential reported speech. Looking at the kind of speech in all these utterances it is remarkable that the majority of them do not contain descriptions of states of affairs but rather expressions of intentions, requests, commands, and questions. It follows that
*karee* is by no means a default reported speech marker. In my data, quotes within a construction involving the complementizer *če*, and reported speech marked by the “reported” marker *lee* (see Chapter 5) occur much more frequently. A further point to note is the fact that *karee* and the complementizer *če* are not mutually exclusive, as has been shown in examples (59), (23) and (70).

### 4.3.2 The complementizer *karee*

Literature about grammaticalization of SAY verbs shows that quotation markers often develop into complementizers that not only occur together with utterance verbs but also with verbs of cognition and perception, and with other complement-taking predicates (Bashir 1996; Güldemann 2008; Hopper and Traugott 1993; Lord 1993). Following this grammaticalization path, I describe and illustrate the use of *karee* as a complementizer.

#### 4.3.2.1 *karee* as marker of non-speech complements

According to my data, *karee* occurs as a marker of complements of a whole range of complement-taking predicates such as *think*, *know*, *believe*, *wish*, *understand*, *hope*, *fear*, and *pretend*. The following examples illustrate this function. Remember that *karee*, a clause-final marker, is also the last element in a complement, whereas the complementizer *če* is always clause-initial. Example (71) shows *karee* marking a hypothetical thought.

(71)  
\[
\begin{array}{cccccccc}
\text{waleé} & \text{suuče} & \text{nií} & \text{i-thi} & [\text{če} & \text{baá-o} & \text{paátyo-on} & \text{khašàa} & \text{wa-sayt} & \text{karee}]
\\
\text{but} & \text{3SG.DEM} & \text{thought-F} & \text{NEG} & \text{come-PRS.PFV.F} & \text{COMP} & \text{behind-ABL} & \text{flash.flood} & \text{come.down-FUT.F} & \text{MRM}
\end{array}
\]

‘But (they) did not think that the flash flood would come down from behind the house’ (The torrent #37)

In this example, the complement is marked by both the complementizer *če* as well as the marker *karee*. According to my language consultant, the use of *če* in such matrix clause – complement constructions is not obligatory. They are equally grammatical.

The next example (72) shows a complement of the verb *grasp*, *understand*, again both, *če* and *karee*, are present.

80
As already pointed out in section 4.2.1, not only reported speech but also thoughts and feelings are presented in direct speech form, as is demonstrated in this example.

Example (73) is an utterance expressing a wish.

(73) \[ \text{khẽ píruú be-ént tǐ́ hiíu ho-ónt [če} \]
\[ \text{DEVM to.over.there go-PRS.M 2SG.Poss heart become-PRS.M COMP} \]
\[ má tā́ yā́ paš-áṣit karee\] \[1\text{SG REFL.Poss.M mother see-FUT.M MRM} \]
\[ \text{‘Then, when you go over there (to Germany) it is your wish to see your mother’ [lit. ‘... that I will see my mother’] (conversation 22.6.2012)} \]

The next example (74) shows a complement of the verb hope.

(74) \[ ṣás kar-ágil khẽ umèen kar-áú ás-e [maasúm zàn} \]
\[ 3\text{SG.Dem.Dom do-PFV2 SUB hope do-PST.IPFFV.M-PL.M child alive.M} \]
\[ dhar-áṣat karee\] \[stay-FUT.M MRM} \]
\[ ‘(They) did this and then hoped that the child would stay alive’ (More old traditions #8) \]

The complement in example (75) is expressing a hope that someone did no longer entertain.

(75) \[ mítí umèen nií áás [če má zàn dhar-ií} \]
\[ 1\text{SG.Poss hope NEG be.PST.M COMP 1SG alive.M stay-CVB} \]
\[ waapás tāá baa-i ba-ṣát karee\] \[back REFL.Poss.M house-DAT go-FUT.M MRM} \]
\[ ‘I had no hope of staying alive and coming back home’ (conversation 27.4.2013) \]

In the examples seen so far the complement always follows the matrix clause. When the complementizer če is not used then the placement of the complement is variable, as shown in (76) below where it precedes the matrix clause. In this example, the speaker is wondering why a certain event does not happen.
‘I wonder why she is not menstruating’ (conversation 4.2.2013)

Here the marker karee indicates that the first of the two clauses is not just a question but the complement of an (omitted) “think” predicate.

The next two examples (77) and (78) are instances of expressions of a belief someone entertains.

‘I believe/think that H. is at home’ (elicited 18.3.2013)

The speaker of (78) is telling what she does not believe to happen.

‘(We) don’t believe that they will stay here in our house’ (conversation 19.10.2012)

Examples (79) and (80) below contain complements of the verb know. Almost all instances of such constructions in my data are expressions of what someone does not know. (79) is taken from a folk story. At one point one of the main characters, the king, has to state that he does not know the whereabouts of his youngest daughter.

‘That daughter has disappeared; I don’t know where she is’ (The king’s daughter #145)

In example (80), the speaker is quoting someone else.

‘(She) is saying about you that she did not know that you have come up’ (conversation 21.5.2012)
The complement in example (81) fills in the subject slot of the matrix clause, “it” being a dummy subject.

(81)  
\begin{align*}
\text{pakàar} & \quad \text{thú} & \quad [\text{če} \quad \text{tú} \quad \text{ukèè} \quad \text{karee}] \\
\text{necessary} & \quad \text{be.PRS.M.SG} & \quad \text{COMP} & \quad 2\text{SG} & \quad \text{go.up.SBJV.3SG} & \quad \text{MRM}
\end{align*}

‘It is necessary that you come up’ (conversation 27.4.2013)

Examples (82) and (83) below illustrate the use of karee as a marker of complements of the predicate pretend, make believe. (82) is taken from a narrative, (83) is elicited. Note that this utterance also contains an adverbial clause with the converb kareé.

(82)  
\begin{align*}
\text{ɡát} & \quad \text{khaçáp} & \quad \text{kar-eé} & \quad \text{ṣée} & \quad \text{kar-áthe} & \quad [\text{šàa} \quad \text{kar-àynt} \quad \text{karee}] \\
\text{again} & \quad \text{grabbing} & \quad \text{do-CVB} & \quad \text{such} & \quad \text{do-PRS.PFV} & \quad \text{spinach} & \quad \text{do-PRS.F} & \quad \text{MRM}
\end{align*}

‘Again she did like this, grabbing, pretending to gather spinach’ (How they found the baby #36)

Another way to translate would be “Again she did like this, grabbing, making (others) believe that she was gathering spinach”.

In example (83), the complement is embedded within the main clause.

(83)  
\begin{align*}
\text{ṹ} & \quad [\text{sút} \quad \text{thú} \quad \text{karee}] & \quad \text{ñoól} & \quad \text{kar-àant} \\
3\text{SG.PROX} & \quad \text{asleep} & \quad \text{be.PRS.M.SG} & \quad 3\text{SG.REFL} & \quad \text{deceiving} & \quad \text{do-PRS.M}
\end{align*}

‘He is pretending to sleep’ (elicited 16.3.2012)

Here too, an alternative translation is “He deceives (others) by making them believe that he is sleeping”.

In the following paragraphs are some more examples of complement clauses marked by karee that are less frequent. The complement-taking predicate in (84) below is the verb show. A king’s daughter who had been abandoned by her father gains a kingdom and then invites her father but decides not to reveal her true identity.

(84)  
\begin{align*}
\text{sú} & \quad \text{dhií} & \quad \ldots & \quad \text{pulí-gal} & \quad \text{bheč̣̂iil} & \quad \text{thí} & \quad \text{amàà} & \quad \text{paša-aínt} \\
3\text{SG.DEM} & \quad \text{daughter} & \quad \text{hide.CVB-throw.CVB} & \quad \text{sitting.ADS.F} & \quad \text{be.PRS.F} & \quad \text{REFL} & \quad \text{show-PRS.F}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{nañi} & \quad [\text{če} \quad \text{só} \quad \text{má} \quad \text{thí} \quad \text{karagal}] \\
\text{NEG} & \quad \text{COMP} & \quad 3\text{SG.DIST} & \quad 1\text{SG} & \quad \text{be.PRS.F} & \quad \text{MRM}
\end{align*}

‘This daughter … she is sitting there having disguised herself; she does not reveal that she is the one (the king is talking about)” (The king’s daughter #140)

Note that in this example, the second form of the marker karee, karagalee, shortened to karagal, is used.

The verb look in example (85) is used in the sense of find out.
So far, we have seen that most of the complements marked by *karee* are extra-posed, with the exception of (76) where the complement clause is pre-posed, and (83) with an embedded complement. In most of them we also find the complementizer *če* (though not in (77) and (84)), although, according to my language consultant, its use with such complements is not obligatory; they would be equally acceptable without *če*.

### 4.3.2.2 *karee* as marker of “think” complements

The examples of sentences with “think” complements that I will present in this section are different from the ones seen so far in that, with only a few exceptions, they do not contain an explicit complement-taking predicate *think*, nor is the complement necessarily extra-posed. In example (86) below the “think” complement is embedded within the main clause. As there is no explicit mention of *think*, it is only the presence of *karee* that indicates that the embedded clause is not a description of a state of affairs but an interpretation of a thought.

(86) khẽ sá́̃ gharimaa-ôó zúno-zuno [maasúm mar-èel thú]
DEVM 3PL.DIST woman-PL.OBL quickly~REDUPL child die-ADS.M be.PRS.M.SG

*karee]/ [karápu náy kar-éé] maasúm piiruú gal-ágil
MRM cutting umbilical.cord do-CVB child over.there put-PFV2

‘Then the women, thinking that the baby is dead, would quickly cut the umbilical cord and put the baby aside’ (Conception, birth #229)

Note that in this example, the word *karee* occurs twice: as the grammaticalized marker following the “think” clause in square brackets, and as the converb ‘having done’ in the following adverbial clause, also in square brackets.

In example (87), the “think” complement is pre-posed. Here again, the presence of *karee* is the only indicator that the preceding clause is not a description of a state of affairs but someone’s thought.
The next example (88) was uttered during a conversation with my language consultant, when a hen was sitting on a pile of bedding. My language consultant said to someone else in the room,

(88) pií šás ḥalíz-ø tal dé ta [ú]
over.there 3SG.DEM.OBL young.hen-OBL on give.IMP2SG DM 3SG.PROX

salá gar-àynt karee]
there.DEM defecate-PRS.F MRM

‘Throw something at that hen over there (to chase her away), she will defecate there!’ (conversation 9.11.2012)

My language consultant told me that another way of saying would be the following (89).

(89) pií šás ḥalíz-ø tal dé ta má suučí
over.there 3SG.DEM.OBL young.hen-OBL on give.IMP2SG DM 1SG thought

kar-àynt [ú] salá gar-àynt karee]
do-PRS.F 3SG.PROX there.DEM defecate-PRS.F MRM

‘Throw something at that hen over there (to chase her away), I think she will defecate there!’ (conversation 9.11.2012)

So in (89) the speaker explicates that what is marked by karee is her own quoted thought.

In example (90) the speaker talks about her intention or thought to talk to her husband.

(90) laá [má tāā xawànd-i man-àm karee] [če
upto.now 1SG REF.L.POSS.M husband-DAT say-SBJV.1SG MRM COMP

tëčë zeetií yòor neer-il. sâr gí hàal
2SG.ERG later.on enquiry do.not-PFV1 3PL.POSS what condition

ho-ít]. gatá má os-íthi
become-PRS.F again 1SG forget-PRS.PFV.F

‘Up to now I intended/thought to talk to my husband such as “You have not enquired (after their health) after (they left hospital). How are they?” but I forgot (to do it)’ (conversation 25.3.2013)
This utterance contains a “think” clause marked by *karee* and expressing an intention of the speaker, and a speech complement marked by ĉe (also in square brackets).

In the next example (91) the clause marked by *karee* may express a thought, an intention or a purpose.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(91)</th>
<th>má</th>
<th>amã́́</th>
<th>rač-âant</th>
<th>karee</th>
<th>dhaý</th>
<th>aá</th>
<th>amã̀ã</th>
<th>gee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SG</td>
<td>REFL</td>
<td>raise-PRS.M</td>
<td>MRM</td>
<td>hold.CVB</td>
<td>bring.CVB</td>
<td>REFL.OBL</td>
<td>with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*rač-ålaas*
raise-PST.PFV

‘Thinking that/intending to raise her himself he had taken her, had brought her (to his family) and had raised her’ (A’s family #35)

In this section I have presented “think” clauses marked by *karee* that have no overt “think” verb as a complement-taking predicate. The syntactic position of such a clause within the main clause seems to be quite variable: the complement may precede or follow or be embedded within the main clause. As we will see in the next section, these constructions are very similar to purpose clauses marked by *karee*.

### 4.3.3 The marker *karee* in purpose and reason clauses

When SAY verbs (and other categories, see Güldemann 2008) that develop into quotatives and then complementizers, grammaticalize further, another function to develop on the grammaticalization pathway or cline is that of purpose and reason clause marker. In this section I describe and illustrate the use of *karee* as such a marker. It is obvious that such clauses are very similar to the “think” clauses presented in the previous section. In fact, I argue in section 4.5 that there is no clear distinction between the two categories; Indus Kohistani purpose and reason clauses marked by *karee* are similar to “think” clauses in that both are reported thoughts.

#### 4.3.3.1 *karee* as marker of purpose clauses

As a first example of a purpose clause construction marked by *karee*, consider example (92) below, taken from a narrative. The main character of the story is picking apples in a tree for his son, when he sees another boy taking the apples. His reaction is described in (92).
Having climbed down (from the tree) he raised his hand to hit the boy [lit.: ‘Having climbed down he “I will hit the boy” karee raised his hand’] (Hair parting story #21)

As already pointed out, this construction is similar to the “think” complements. The purpose is still expressed as a thought that is reported as “mental” direct speech: the verb give is marked for first person singular. The purpose clause is embedded within the main clause.

In the next examples, too, the purpose is presented as a thought from the perspective of the thinker.

(B: moomaá gulú bazíthu)

uncle where.to go.PR.S.F.SG

A: [gay-ī̂ rupāy çeele-aám kar] bazíthu

cow-GEN.F money.F deliver-SBJV.1SG MRM go.PR.S.F.SG

‘B: “Where has uncle gone to?”  A: “He went to hand over the money for the cow”’ [lit.: “I will hand over the money for the cow” kar he went’] (conversation 7.1.2013)

Here too, the purpose is expressed as direct speech that precedes the main clause.

In example (94), the purpose clause follows the main clause; again the purpose is presented as an utterance in direct speech form.

(X-ā̂ĩ yàa tèe zhaa-tuú žhaazāy i-ilaas-ơ [boó]

name-GEN.F mother and brother-DIM sister.in.law come-PST.S-F.PL.M up

bās hō-iž kar]

appearing become-SBJV.1PL MRM

‘X’s mother and her brother and his wife had come to see (Y) up there’ [lit.: ‘X’s mother and her brother and his wife had come, “let’s appear up there” kar’] (conversation 5.7.2013)

Example (95) shows an embedded purpose clause.

(95) sā́ [phaý kha-ýnt-ơ karee] rōor-an muniń bazíthi

3PL.DIST fig eat-PRS.F-PL.F MRM road-ABL downwards go.PR.S.F

‘They went down below the road to eat figs’ (How they found the baby #2)
As the (co-referential) subject of the dependent clause in (95) has been omitted and the verb is not marked for person, the direct-speech character of the purpose clause is not obvious, as in the examples seen so far.

In the following examples (96) to (98) the subjects of main clause and purpose clause are not co-referential.

(96) ṣã̃́ šulũĩ-tsha-án tsha-ánt-ø [sugàa ho-sát karee] tsha-ánt-ø

3SG.DEM pebble-PL place-PRS.M-PL.M nice become-FUT.M MRM place-PRS.M-PL.M

‘(We) put these big pebbles (on the grave). (We) put (them there) so that (the grave) looks nice’

(Graves, graveyard #73-4)

In the second clause, the subject of the main clause and of the purpose clause are different albeit both of them have been omitted. The clause marked by karee precedes the verb of the main clause.

The next example consists of a whole string of clauses. Here each clause is in square brackets.

(97) [cháp kíir khẽ] [sã̃́ kimát-ø kha-ánt karee] [tsim]

throwing do.PFV1 SUB 3PL.DIST worm-PL eat-PRS.M MRM fish

muuthú hún khẽ [ã̀ĩ-ø man śú kundá bazígaa]

ahead become.PFV1.M SUB mouth-OBL in 3SG.DEM hook go.PFV2.M.SG

‘When (they) throw in (the fishing line), when the fish comes forward to eat the worms, the hook gets stuck in its mouth’ (More about fishing #5)

Here, the first clause is an adverbial clause of time (‘when they throw in the fishing line’), the second one is the purpose clause followed by another adverbial time clause (‘when the fish comes forward (intending) “I will eat those worms”’) which is then followed by the main clause (‘the hook gets stuck in its mouth’).

In example (98) the purpose clause follows the main clause.

(98) tèe sã̃́ baṭá tãl tsòor kar-éé awál diúr

then 3PL.DIST stone.PL on below do-CVB first gravel

peeṣ-ã̃s-e [baáṭ sám hòo karee]

grind-PST.IPVF.M-PL.M stone neat become.SBJV.3SG MRM

‘Then, having put the (mill-) stones one on top of the other, (they) first grinded fine gravel so that the mill stones become smooth’ (Watermills #82)
Note that in this example *karee* occurs twice: first as the converb *kareé* ‘having done’ in the adverbial clause “having put the (mill-) stones one on top of the other”, then as purpose clause marker *karee*.

In this section I have shown that purpose clauses marked by *karee* are similar to “think” complements in that the dependent clause is reported as direct speech (“mental” or “inner” speech), from the quoted agent’s perspective. Such clauses may precede, be embedded within, or follow the main clause.

4.3.3.2 *karee* as marker of reason clauses

Like purpose clauses, reason clauses may be embedded within, precede or follow the main clause.

In example (99) the reason clause is post-posed, and the reason is presented in direct-speech form.

(99) *miiɡeé* *ɡulii* *waal-á = *loo.* *ā́í* *meešwaalá*
1SG.DAT pills bring.down-IMP.2SG = DUM 3PL.PROX menfolk

*nheel-àant-ø* *naií* [zâí] *laáž* *di-ínt* *karee*
take.out-PRS.M.-PL.M NEG 1PL.POSS.F embarrassment.MF give-PRS.F MRM

‘Tell her to bring medicine for me. The men do not buy it because it is embarrassing for them’,
[lit.: ‘...the men do not buy it, “It is embarrassing for us” *karee*’ (conversation 20.4.2013)]

This and the following examples show that syntactically reason clauses are similar to the purpose clauses seen in section 4.3.3.1; both are marked by the same indicator *karee*, in other words, there is no linguistic element, such as *because* in English that helps to distinguish reason from purpose clauses. The hearer of such an utterance has to infer from the context which way the clause marked by *karee* has to be interpreted.

Example (100) below is taken from a folk story. Here the reason clause precedes the main clause.

The main character of the story encounters giants and pretends to be a messenger sent by God to get their hides. He presents the reason like this:

(100) *[diw-ó́ó]* *tsám* *pák* *ho-ónt-ø* *karee*] *xdaepàak-e* *müí*
giant-PL.GEN hide.PL robust become-PRS.M-PL.M MRM God-ERG 1SG.DOM

boolàá *séé* *če-éthe*
from.above such send-PRS.PFV

‘God has sent me from above (to get your hides) because giants’ hides are robust’ (G’s story 1#78)
In example (101), the reason clause follows the main clause. The utterance is taken from a conversation about one of my language consultant’s sons who recently had lost his job as a driver.

(101) *màas-e* eyt *kar-i-aáthe* [miigée pèes nií thé]*

man-ERG abandoning do-CAUS-PRS.PFV 1SG.DAT money NEG be.PRS.M.PL

*karee]*

MRM

‘The man made him lose (his job) because he had no money (to pay an employee)’

(conversation 19.11.2013)

In this particular example, the second clause could also be translated as a reported speech; however, looking at the context, interpreting the clause as providing a reason for the man’s behavior makes more sense.

In example (102), the reason clause looks like a complement clause preceded by the complementizer *če*, but it is also marked by *karagalee*, the allomorph of *karee*.

(102) áí bhíil-ōō nií i-thí [če sū lambár]*

3PL.PROX fear-OBL.PL NEG come-PRS.PFV.F COMP 3SG.DEM number.M

*nií mil-āṣat karagalee]*

NEG obtain-FUT.M MRM

‘They have not come for fear/because (they) fear that (they) will not get this\(^{15}\) number (to be seen at the hospital)’ (conversation 31.12.2012)

In this example, the third person plural subject is omitted in the reason clause. The hearer has to infer the subject from the immediate context, that is: the preceding clause. As here the complementizer *če* is present, the reason clause has to follow the main clause. In Chapter 5 we will see that the complementizer *če*, too, may be used to mark purpose and reason clauses. This example might then be an instance of “double” marking.

The next example (103) shows again a reason clause that is preceding the main clause. The reason is presented in form of a thought, reported as direct speech.

\(^{15}\) Indus Kohistani is partially pronoun-dropping (pro-drop) in that it allows subject pronoun deletion. The demonstrative adjective *sū* ‘this’ in this example belongs to the head noun *lambár* ‘number’.
They were two women (who went to see the doctor). Because (the woman who was ill) did not speak the language she had taken her (the second woman) along with her’ (conversation 10.5.2013)

Literally this example would be translated as ‘They were two women. “I don’t speak the language karee” she took (the other woman) with her’.

The context of the last example (104) of this section is that of a meal that the family of my language consultant prepared for relatives and friends, following a car accident. I had asked if the meal was related to the accident. My language consultant answered with the following utterance.

‘Yes, because they have escaped unharmed’ (conversation 17.5.2013)

Here the reason clause stands independently; the main clause “We made this meal” has to be inferred from the preceding discourse.

To summarize, like purpose clauses, reason clauses marked by karee may precede, be embedded in, or follow the main clause. Similar to reported direct speech, such clauses are presented from the perspective of the main clause subject as far as deixis, pronominal and time reference is concerned. Both types of clauses may additionally be marked by the complementizer če, but compared with reported speech and other complement clauses shown above, the majority of which have both markers, in purpose and reason clauses it is rather the exception. In my corpus of data, less than 30% of purpose clauses marked by karee also contain the complementizer če; for reason clauses, it is less than 10%.

Section 5.2.2 will deal with če as a purpose and reason clause marker. It seems that there is a gradual progression from “think” complements as seen in section 4.3.2.2 to purpose and reason clauses.

Furthermore, the addressee has to infer from the context if a particular clause has to be interpreted as a purpose or as a reason clause.
4.3.4 Further uses of the marker karee

So far I have described the marker karee as marker of reported speech, as complementizer of complements of speech, cognition, and perception verbs, and as marker of purpose and reason clauses. Such markers may further grammaticalize and, in Güldemann’s words, “encroach on other functional domains”. Güldemann lists such markers as occurring in naming constructions, indicating illocution reinforcement, similarity and manner, internal awareness and functioning as clause linkers (Güldemann 2008:397). Other authors describe similar developments (Bashir 1996; Chappell 2008; Lord 1993 among others).

In this section I present examples of two further uses of karee that are found in my data. In examples (105) and (106) below, karee follows a name. In this particular use karee indicates “is called” or “they say”; this function of grammaticalized quotative markers is referred to as naming. The background to (105) is a conversation about a man the family of my language consultant had had some dealings with. She described him to me with the following words.

Example (105) is taken from the description of a hotel that was destroyed in an earthquake.

These two examples are the only instances of the naming function found in my data but my language consultant assures me that this particular construction is often used in conversation. The next examples demonstrate the use of karee when expressing the notion “x is like/similar to y”. Example (107) is a sentence fragment from my field notes. It is the only instance of this use in my data.
‘When there are young girls, like E, like D …’ (field notes 6.9.2013)

Example (108) has been elicited.

Example (109) of this section was uttered when my language consultant explained to me the concept of using *karee* to indicate similarity or likeness. She had reminded me of a woman I had introduced to her a few days earlier and said, “You would say like this to me”:

So far I have no evidence of other uses of *karee* than those mentioned above. Collection and analysis of more natural data may show that the marker has even more uses than those presented here.

In section 4.3 I have described and illustrated the uses of the marker *karee*, originally a converb, as marker of reported speech, both others’ and one’s own, its use as complementizer with complement-taking predicates of speech, cognition and perception, furthermore as marker of purpose and reason clauses, and as a marker indicating “naming” and the notion of being “similar to/like X”.

### 4.4 Literature review

In this section I give a brief overview of relevant literature on grammaticalization in general and of grammaticalization of quotation markers in particular.
4.4.1 *What is grammaticalization?*

Hopper and Traugott define grammaticalization as “the process whereby lexical items and constructions come in certain linguistic contexts to serve grammatical functions, and, once grammaticalized, continue to develop new grammatical functions” (Hopper and Traugott 1993: XV). In other words, categories such as nouns, verbs and adjectives (or constructions built of such words) over time may develop into words with grammatical content such as prepositions, complementizers, adverbs, and auxiliaries which may further grammaticalize into affixes (McMahon 1994: 160). The term grammaticalization itself has first been used by Meillet (1912).

Seen from a diachronic perspective, this process is gradual, along a grammaticalization pathway or cline. The grammaticalization of the noun *back* in many languages exemplifies this cline: a noun that stands for a body part will at some point be used to describe a spatial relation such as “at the back of”, then may develop into an adverb and further in an apposition or even a case affix (Hopper and Traugott 1993: 6). In the course of this process, the item being grammaticalized undergoes semantic, syntactic, morphological and phonological changes, such as loss of semantic content, what Givón (1975) called “semantic bleaching” (gradual change of specific semantic content towards one that is generalized and reduced and may eventually be lost completely); syntactically, such words or constructions become increasingly fixed and may end up in a morphologically changed or reduced form such as a clitic or affix; this may be accompanied by a change in phonological properties, for instance loss of accent.

Examples of typical grammaticalization paths described in literature are main verbs developing into auxiliaries, postpositions into case markers, demonstratives and verbs of speech, action, and verbs encoding similarity into quotatives, complementizers and clause linkers, and constructions with the verb *go* into future markers, to name just a few (Campbell 2006: 294-6).

Concerning possible motivations for grammaticalization, Hopper and Traugott note among other enabling factors (child language acquisition, and different types of linguistic contact within communities) that “grammaticalization … is motivated by speaker-hearer interaction and communicative strategies” (1993: 66), or, more specifically, is motivated by the desire to maximize informativeness of the communicated content on the one hand and to economize mental effort on the
other hand. They further point out the role of inference in grammaticalization, showing that in its early stages, conversational implicatures (using Grice’s terms) frequently become conventionalized (1993:75).

LaPolla defines grammaticalization as “the fossilization of constraints on interpretation” (LaPolla 1997:1). Drawing on Relevance Theory, on work on contextualization cues by Gumperz, and on his own work on Sinitic languages he argues that as all communication, and all aspects of linguistic communication, are based on inference, grammaticalization, and indeed all grammar, has to be seen as evolving through discourse as a means to make a speaker’s intention more explicit and less costly in terms of processing effort on the addressee’s side. In other words, the function of grammar is to constrain the inferential process of interpreting discourse. Grammaticalization, then, starts with a fully lexical form of a linguistic item that is used frequently in a particular context and whose implicatures in that context, and other aspects of interpretation, may become fixed over time, or, in LaPolla’s words, “fossilized”. Such a form ends up containing procedural information and making these implicatures explicit, thereby constraining the interpretation process, that is, the search for relevance. In this view, grammar is not “a priori” or fixed but a constantly evolving and developing set of conventions resulting from discourse. All languages have such sets of conventions aimed at constraining the search for relevance but they differ in what functional domains and to which degree such constraints develop.

4.4.2 Grammaticalization of quotation markers

Hopper and Traugott (1993:14) mention the development of SAY verbs into complementizers and further grammatical markers as a “well-known example of grammaticalization”. Multifunctional markers such as the Indus Kohistani karee have been described in many languages, such as West African languages (for example Lord 1976, 1993; Güldemann 2008), languages of the South Asian linguistic area (Bashir 1996; Saxena 1995 among others), and Sinitic languages (Chappell 2008). Out of the large amount of literature on this particular grammaticalization path, both in individual languages and crosslinguistically, I want to mention only a few sources that are relevant for the analysis of karee.

Lord (1976, 1993) was the first to note that in many West African languages that complementizers have historically developed from SAY verbs (although she also mentions verbs such as be like as
possible historical source in several languages) and display many similarities in the range of their functions. She describes the typical path of development of such verbs as follows:

\[
\text{SAY verb} > \text{marker of speech} > \text{marker of thought} > \text{marker of compliments of verbs of cognition and perception} = \text{complementizer}
\]

From there, such a marker may further develop into a marker of dependent clauses such as purpose, reason, result and conditional clauses; but the process may as well stop much earlier, leaving a marker that indicates speech and thought only (Lord 1993:209). Generalizations drawn from Lord’s description of this particular grammaticalization cline have then influenced further studies of this phenomenon in other languages. Within literature about “quotation complex” grammaticalization (a term used by Güldemann 2008) it is generally assumed that SAY verbs are the most likely sources; likewise there seems now to be a general consensus about what the most typical grammaticalization pathway looks like:

\[
\text{Original form} > \text{quotation marker} > \text{complementizer} > \text{purpose-clause linker} > \text{reason-clause linker} > \text{conditional-clause linker} > \text{naming marker} > \text{marker used with onomatopoeic words/ideophones} > \text{comparative marker} > \text{mirative marker}
\]

Further uses mentioned in literature are listing constructions marker, topic marker, clause-final discourse particle expressing self-evident assertions, warnings and echo questions, and clause-initial discourse marker for exclamations (Chappell 2008:5; see also Bashir 1996; Güldemann 2008; Lord 1993).

This list does not necessarily reflect the order in which a particular form grammaticalizes, neither does it imply that a form, once on this particular cline, will go through all stages.

**4.4.3 Grammaticalized SAY verbs on the Indian Subcontinent**

Grammaticalized SAY verbs are by no way uncommon on the Indian subcontinent. Bashir (1996) looks at complementizers developed from SAY verbs in languages of Northern Pakistan and compares them with other such grammaticalized markers in languages of the Indian subcontinent. In South Asian languages, complementizers derived from a SAY verb are quite widespread (Masica 1991:402-3); they
are usually clause-final whereas other complementizers are clause-initial. Terms used for such complementizers are “quotative particle”, “SAY complementizer”, “SAY quotative”, or just “quotative” (Bashir 1996:192-3). On the Indian subcontinent, SAY complementizers are extensively found in Dravidian languages in the South, in other South Asian languages such as Dakhkhini Urdu, Marathi and Bengali (Bashir 1996:194), as well as in some of the Dardic languages of northern Pakistan, but not in standard Urdu and Hindi. Bashir lists many more functions of such grammaticalized markers: they may be used with onomatopoetic expressions, when introducing or naming a person, as a story starter, they may be used to convey deliberateness, as meaning clarifier, as introducer and so on. Her list of functions of SAY complementizers in Dravidian and in several Northern Pakistan languages can be found in Bashir (1996:215-23).

She also raises the question of how SAY complementizers in the Dardic group of languages developed. SAY complementizers with similar functions have been described in many different language families and geographical areas. The emergence of SAY complementizers from speech verbs can be observed in creole languages (Lord 1993:202). This suggests that there is a “universal tendency” in the way and direction of the development of SAY complementizers and that this is a language-internal process. On the other hand, such markers may diffuse and emerge (or disappear) into neighboring languages through intensive contact, as Aikhenvald notes for evidentials in general (Aikhenvald 2004:271). So, according to Bashir, the emergence of SAY complementizers in Dardic languages may be due to either language-internal development or/and influence from proto-Dravidian languages, Turkic languages of Central Asia or Tibeto-Burman languages, all of which are known as having grammaticalized SAY verbs.

Finally, she notes that in a small cluster of Northern Pakistan languages, i.e. in Shina, Palula and Domaki, the source of such a complementizer is the “unusual” (her term) DO verb\(^\text{16}\) (Bashir 1996:205). These three languages are related in so far as Palula is a Shina variety, and Domaki a language enclave within a Shina speaking area. However, according to Liljegren, the Palula quotative marker \textit{thani} is the

\(^{16}\) DO verb stands for the semantic field of generic performance or action verbs.
converb form of the verb *thane* ‘say’ (Liljegren 2008:334). Furthermore, the source of the quotative marker *theé* in Shina Kohistani, another Shina variety, is the verb *thoón* ‘to do, to say’ (Schmidt and Kohistani 2008:225), see also Radloff (1998:28) for the Shina of Gilgit. For Domaki I have no further information. Bashir does not mention the Indus Kohistani marker *karee* that has as source a DO verb.

To my own knowledge, further in the West, one of the Nuristani languages of Eastern Afghanistan, Waigali, does have a DO complementizer (Buddruss 1987); and Strand mentions a DO quotative for Kamviri, another Nurestani language (Strand 2012).

4.4.4 Güldemann’s survey of quotative indexes in African languages

Güldemann (2008) in his extensive survey of what he calls quotative indexes (= matrix clauses of complements of speech, cognition and perception verbs) in African languages raises several questions concerning the general perception of the SAY verb grammaticalization path presented in much of the literature. Besides showing that in the case of African languages quite often the SAY verb origin of such complementizers is less than clear, he points out that the cline “SAY verb > quotative > complementizer > other” is not necessarily the default scenario for this particular grammaticalization path. He shows that there are several other sources of grammaticalized complementizers besides those originating in speech verbs. As lexical sources, attested in the languages surveyed by him, he notes verbs of equation, of inchoativity, verbs of action and of motion, markers of similarity and manner, pronominal items referring to the quote as well as ones referring to the speaker, and markers of focus, presentation and identification.

Concerning the syntactic classification of clauses of speech verbs, verbs of cognition and verbs of perception as sentential complements, Güldemann proposes to treat all of them as independent clauses in their own right. Firstly he claims that such clauses are conceptually all quotes in a very general sense, as in the following definition.

Reported discourse in the representation of a spoken or mental text from which the reporter distances him-/herself by indicating that it is
produced by a source of consciousness in a pragmatic and deictic setting that is different from that of the immediate discourse (2008:244).

He then points out that quotes in this sense (“speech complement” in traditional grammar) can be without matrix clause but the latter cannot occur without the quote; in other words, the “dependent speech complement” (traditional grammar) is syntactically autonomous whereas the matrix or main clause of a speech complement construction is not, but functions rather like a tag or a dispensable appendix (2008:231-3). Hence he proposes to treat such quotes as distinct from other sentential complements.

As to grammaticalized forms of SAY verbs or elements of other origin, Güldemann shows that they are not only used to mark quotes in the widest sense but they also appear in connection with a number of other types of expressions, namely with non-linguistic sound imitations (such as the imitation of an animal sound), with ideophones17 and similar linguistic signs, and with representational gestures, a fact he demonstrates with data from African languages for at least ideophones and non-linguistic sound imitation. In other words, he claims that like quotes, such expressions/gestures have to be “inserted” into discourse, and furthermore that often the same means is used to do this, namely, grammaticalized complementizers that index quotes also index such expressions. In the literature about grammaticalization of the quotation complex, such functions are commonly seen as secondary, due to semantic bleaching, or as the result of an expansion into the non-speech domain (2008:285). Güldemann proposes instead an alternative account of markers of these functions, arguing that the one (for instance, marking ideophones) is not derived from or secondary to the other (marking speech quotes). Instead, all four constructions indexed by the same grammaticalized marker are instances of mimesis and belong to the same domain, speech quotes just being one of them. The term mimesis, “imitation, representation, mimicry” is used by Güldemann to define the common ground of all four abovementioned constructions; in his own words,

17 Definition by Doke (1935:118): “A vivid representation of an idea in sound. A word, often onomatopoeic, which describes a predicate, qualificative or adverb in respect to manner, colour, sound, smell, action, state or intensity”
The behavior of the speaker is such that (s)he PERFORMS the communicated state of affairs rather than linguistically describing it, as if the unmarked employment of the signs of language failed to achieve the particular communicative goal. The speaker attempts to demonstrate, to re-instantiate, to imitate, to replay the event as close to the purported original as is desired in the context and as human means of expression allow him/her to do so (2008:286).

This description includes non-linguistic sound imitation, representational gestures, ideophones as well as quotation of speech. Each of them is a representation of either a quotation or a demonstration.

Güldemann further claims that within this account, it is not necessary that a linguistic form on the grammaticalization cline has to start out as a speech quotation marker and then expand into further categories. It might as well start as a marker of, for example, ideophones, or representational gestures and later on develop into a quotation marker as it will all be within one common domain.

Concerning further functions of grammaticalized items beyond that of complementizers marking clauses of speech, cognition or perceptive verbs, Güldemann notes that in the literature about SAY verb grammaticalization, there is a tendency to over-generalize not only the SAY-verb-to-speech/cognition/perception-verb-complementizer grammaticalization process but also the subsequent development into clause linkers and other functions. He casts doubt on the claims put forward by Saxena of there being a “unidirectional chain of stages which must be passed through by a language-specific element in order to reach a later stage, as well as an implicational hierarchy of possible grammaticalizations” (Güldemann 2008:445; Saxena 1995) that implies that if for instance a particular language has a grammaticalized form X as marker of purpose clauses then the same form is also found marking complement clauses and speech/thought clauses, but it need not be the other way round. In essence, he shows that the grammaticalization of quotation markers is by no means only one of SAY verbs, as there are many more sources; quotation markers are not only sources but may themselves be the product of a grammaticalization process; furthermore, subsequently developing functions such as clause linkage, naming and so on are the “result from the context extension of RD [reported discourse]-
constructions as a whole and not just of individual linguistic elements” (Güldemann 2008:523), a point I will come back to in section 4.5.2.

In this section I have briefly defined the term grammaticalization as described in literature, and presented current views on grammaticalization in general. I have then looked at the particular grammaticalization path of SAY verbs as first described by Lord, followed by a brief overview of Bashir’s study on SAY complementizers in the South Asian language area (to which Indus Kohistani belongs). Finally I have reviewed Güldemann’s study that offers alternative analyses of the processes that are commonly subsumed under the term “SAY verb grammaticalization path”.

4.5 Indus Kohistani karee: a metarepresentation marker

In this section I propose an analysis of the Indus Kohistani marker karee within the framework of Relevance Theory as an indicator of metarepresentations of both utterances and thoughts; within this approach all seemingly diverse functions of karee can be accounted for. Furthermore, looking at “speech verb channel” (Güldemann’s term, 2008:265) grammaticalization in general I offer some thoughts on how the analysis of karee might be relevant for other such grammaticalized markers.

In her study on metarepresentations in linguistic communication Wilson defines metarepresentation as “a representation of a representation: a higher-order representation with a lower-order representation embedded within it” (Wilson 2012:230), the lower-order representation being the description of a (desirable or actual) state of affairs and the higher-order representation an interpretation of the former one (Sperber and Wilson 1995:232). In Chapter 2, I have described different types of metarepresentations and have also mentioned that languages differ in what kind of metarepresentation they encode, whether the encoding is conceptual or procedural, and what is left to the hearer to infer. Where in languages such as English or German the addressee may have to infer if a particular utterance is the representation of a state of affairs or the interpretation of another utterance or thought, in Indus Kohistani the latter is encoded linguistically by a metarepresentation marker, thus reducing processing effort and time on the addressee’s side by making explicit what would otherwise have to be inferred. In
LaPolla’s words, the use of a particular lexical item for marking reported speech has “fossilized” (LaPolla 1997); the metarepresentation marker karee is now part of the Indus Kohistani grammar.

It follows that in Indus Kohistani, the presence of metarepresentations of (self-) attributed utterances and thoughts has to be made explicit by using the linguistic device karee (or one of the other Indus Kohistani metarepresentation markers that are the topic of this study) together with such constructions. What distinguishes karee from the Indus Kohistani “reported” marker lee (see Chapter 3), is the fact that karee, in addition to indicating reported speech, also marks attributed thoughts of persons other than the speaker’s as well as self-attributed speech and self-attributed thought, whereas lee marks only utterances attributed to persons other than the reporting speaker.

As to the particular range of functions of karee I show that all constructions marked by it are metarepresentations, be they public or mental. So the analysis of karee as metarepresentation marker can account for all its uses. Furthermore, the grammaticalization of the “reported speech” marker towards a clause linker, naming construction marker, and similarity construction marker can be explained as an extension from being the marker of one kind of metarepresentation to including the marking of other kinds of metarepresentations. The following sections present evidence to support this claim.

4.5.1 karee as marker of metarepresentations of attributed and self-attributed speech

The first stage on the grammaticalization cline of SAY verbs and other sources of this particular grammaticalization path is typically that as a quotative or reported-speech marker. At this point, I want to underline Güldemann’s claim that in such cases, the source does not have to be, in fact, often is not a SAY verb, the Indus Kohistani karee being an instance of a marker having as its origin another linguistic item, namely the verb do. How the converb form of this verb came to mark reported speech is something I can only speculate about. In my data there are very few instances of a form of the verb kar- ‘do’ being used as a SAY verb. I have found just one instance, example (110) where the verb do is used as a speech complement-taking verb. The speech complement is in square brackets.

(110)  iliškaal šárla pučōō tsåy as kar-álaas = lee [če
   this.year fall.OBL son.PL.ERG much.F 3SG.PROX.DOM do-PST.PFV = REP COMP]
‘This year in fall the sons had often said this (to their father), “Let’s go down”’
(Avalanche story #232)

However, according to my language consultant this use of the verb do is an instance of the below mentioned expression baaliá karõṍ ‘to speak, talk’, where baaliá ‘words’ has been omitted.

One other use of kar- ‘do’ where it is used like a speech verb is the following expression in example (111).

(111)  
\[\text{tas̃̀ĩ} \quad \text{kira} \quad \text{tsiinõõ} \quad \text{khasār} \quad \text{khasār} \quad \text{kar-āās-ø} \]

\[3SG.DIST.POSS \quad \text{to} \quad \text{lovingly baldie baldie DO-PST.IPFV.M-PL.M} \]

‘(They) called him lovingly ‘baldie’’ (G. story 1 #4)

This seems to be a fixed expression consisting of the verb kar- ‘do’ and the reduplicated name. It is, as far as I know, used to tell a person’s nick name. Furthermore there are expressions such as baál karõó ‘to speak’, literally ‘to do word’ and qasá karõó ‘to tell’, literally ‘to do story’ but in nowadays’ Indus Kohistani of Pattan, the default SAY verb is manõó ‘to say’.

Nevertheless, the grammaticalization of karee ‘having done’ resulted in the typical stages along the cline that are seen in the “speech verb channel” grammaticalization process. It is not so much the source of the grammaticalized marker that determines its development of multiple functions as the fact that it is at some point used to mark metarepresentations of attributed utterances. The context extension of such reported-speech constructions determines the subsequently developing additional functions. Seen from a relevance-theoretic perspective, the marking of one kind of metarepresentation by expansion leads to indicating other types of metarepresentations as well. In the case of karee, I argue, it is the extension from marking metarepresentations of speech to marking such of thought (in a sense which implies cognition in general and perception).

In section 4.3.1 we had seen examples of karee marking reported speech of both speakers other that the reporter and of self-reported speeches. Example (60), the reported utterance of someone not specified is repeated here.
Here, the speaker metarepresents an utterance attributed to someone other than herself or the addressee, this metarepresentation is made linguistically explicit by both the complement-taking predicate “to get the news, hear” and by employing the marker karee.

Example (112) is a self-reported quotation. The speaker of the utterance wanted to remind me of what she had said earlier on a particular topic.

(112) má man-āïs níī = aa IQ őôó ek puč-eč du-ţi ghari ū
1SG say-PST.IP.FV.NEG=Q Name.F.GEN.M one son-ERG two-GEN.F WIFE

a-āthe karee] bring-PRS.PFV MRM

‘Didn’t I say that one of Q’s sons has taken a second wife?’ (conversation 27.8.2012)

Here the question arises: does a quotation of one’s own previous utterance as in this example count as a metarepresentation of an attributed utterance? I think yes. Here, too, part of the speaker’s actual utterance, namely the part “one of Q’s sons has taken a second wife” is the representation (or metarepresentation) of a representation that had been uttered at some time in the past. The actual metarepresentation is not identical with the original; it resembles it to some degree or, in other words, is an interpretation of the original utterance. So this self-attributed quotation fulfills the same criteria as any quote that is attributed to someone other than the speaker, that is, it is a metarepresentation of an earlier utterance of the speaker’s, a fact that is indicated by the use of the marker karee.

Many of the instances of reported speech in my recorded texts that are marked by karee are actually hypothetical speeches, as already described in section 4.3.1.3. These include quotations of possible future utterances, utterances that were considered but never actually uttered, utterances that someone is being told not to produce, and quoted utterances within the frame of a rhetorical question, where both speaker and addressee know that the quoted speech is purely fictional. What distinguishes such quotations from the ones that were actually uttered is an extra layer of representation. Example
(23), repeated here, is an instance of a quotation of a potential future utterance. The speaker of (23) quotes what his wife will in all probability say to him if he brings home the wrong size of pan.

(23) \( \text{tēc mū ghariū man-āṣit [cē mū kira lāk pateelá} \)
\( \text{then 1SG.POSS wife say-FUT.F COMP 1SG.POSS for small.M pan.M} \)
\( \text{a-āthe karagal]} \)
\( \text{bring-PRS.PFV MRM} \)

‘Then my wife will say to me, “you have brought a small pan” (although I was supposed to bring a big one)” (Akbar Badshah #50)

Here, the speaker is not quoting or, in relevance-theoretic terms, interpreting, what his wife said at some point in the past but what he thinks she might say in the future under certain circumstances. That is, the speaker does not interpret the representation of a state of affairs entertained and uttered by another person; it is his own thought about a possible attributed representation of a state of affairs. In other words, there is an additional layer of representation in the form of mindreading or more generally, thought, involved. This extra representational layer is present in all instances of hypothetical quotes. Take for instance example (113), a case of an utterance that was not said.

(113) \( \text{[bēetus bīk karee] baačë́ puç-é́ man-āthe naā] \)
\( \text{IPL.INCL go.SBJV.1PL MRM king.GEN.M son-ERG say-PRS.PFV NEG} \)

‘The king’s son did not say, “Let’s go”’ (Prince and fairy #43)

Here again, the story teller’s utterance is not the metarepresentation or interpretation of an utterance actually uttered but of a thought the story teller entertains about a possible but not realized utterance.

As in these examples there is an additional layer of thought involved, I am not quite sure if hypothetical quotes should not rather be grouped together with marked metarepresentations of thought, a development further along the grammatical cline which will be treated in the next section.

4.5.2 karee as marker of metarepresentations of attributed and self-attributed thoughts

Lord (1993) among others describes the typical further development of a quotation marker as a progression from marking reported speech to marking reported thoughts and beliefs and subsequently also marking of complements of other verbs of cognition and verbs of perception. The further
development of such an element into a clause linker, as noted in subsection 4.4.1, may include marking of purpose, reason, and conditional clauses.

According to Güldemann there are four essential triggers that may cause a complementizer to grammaticalize into a clause linker: (i) the meaning of a lexical item i.e. of the quotation marker, (ii) the meaning of a construction, (iii) inferential processes in clause linkage, and (iv) the combination of a subordinator and a semantically explicit item (Güldemann 2008:447). Here I will argue that it is point (ii), the meaning of a construction that triggers the development of the reported speech marker karee into a complementizer and a clause linker, and that also allows a unifying analysis of the multifunctional marker. More specifically, it is the construction “reported speech” being a metarepresentation that underlies the functional extension of karee.

Within Relevance Theory, there is no basic distinction between reported speech and reported thought: both are metarepresentations, or interpretations, of a public representation in the case of speech, and of a mental representation in the case of thought. So, from this point of view, the development mentioned above is just an extension from marking metarepresentation of public representations only to including metarepresentations of both public and mental representations.

In my data many instances of attributed thoughts marked by karee occur in the form of a complement clause that follows a complement-taking verb such as think, believe, know, hope, wish, grasp, see in the sense of find out, wonder, attempt to and so on. Example (73), repeated here, is exemplary for other such constructions.

```
(73)  khē   piiruú   be-ént   tīῆ   hiu  ho-ónt   [če
 DEV.M to.over.there  go-PRS.M  2SG.POSS  heart  become-PRS.M  COMP

mā   tāī   yāa   paś-āsít   karee]
1SG  REF.L.POSS.F  mother  see-FUT.F  MRM
```

‘Then, when you go over there (to Germany) it is your wish to see your mother’ (conversation 22.6.2012)

As already noted before, the wish or thought is expressed as a kind of “mental speech” in regard to deixis, pronominal and time reference. It seems then that in Indus Kohistani, thought is perceived and reported as speaker-internal speech. And just as the presence of metarepresentations of (self-) attributed
utterances is made explicit by using *karee* so is the presence of metarepresentations of (self-) attributed thoughts.

Example (82), repeated here, is an interesting example in that there is no verb of cognition or perception involved; *karee* is the only indicator that the marked clause is a thought.

(82)  ɡát khaçáp kar-će šé ké kar-áthe [šàa kar-áyet karee]
again grabbing do-CVB such do-PRS.PFV spinach do-PRS.F MRM

‘Again, grabbing, she did like this, pretending to gather spinach’ (How they found the baby #36)

Another translation would be, ‘… giving the impression of gathering spinach’ or ‘… making (onlookers) believe that she was gathering spinach’. In this particular example *karee* indicates a metarepresentation and, in the absence of a complement-taking matrix clause, constrains the addressee to construct a higher-level explicature such as “The speaker said, ‘Again, grabbing, she did like this: someone believes that she is gathering spinach’”. In more detail: the basic explicature of this utterance would be, “The speaker said, ‘Again, grabbing, she did like this: she is gathering spinach *karee*’”. The higher-level explicature of the *karee* clause is “Someone entertains the thought (thinks/believes) that she is gathering spinach”. Note that the need to construct the higher-level explicature is indicated by *karee* whereas the identity of “someone” has to be inferred. In this case, it is clear from the context that “someone” is anyone who passes by and might see the woman grabbing down toward the spinach. So, in the same way as the “reported” marker *lee* may induce the construction of a higher-level explicature such as “X said, ‘[quote]’”, the marker *karee* constrains the hearer toward the construction of a higher-level explicature such as “X entertains the thought ‘[quote]’”. In matrix clause – complement constructions that contain a verb of speech, cognition or perception, this higher-level explicature “X entertains a thought” is already linguistically encoded and part of the explicature of the utterance.

A last example of a reported thought is (86), repeated here.

(86)  khẽ sài gharimaas-ȭ do-zúno [maasúm mar-èel thú]
DEVM 3PL.DIST woman-PL.OBL quickly~REDUPL child die-ADS.M be.PRS.M.SG

*karee* karápu này kar-će maasúm piirúú gal-ágil
MRM cutting umbilical.cord do-CVB child over.there put-PFV2

‘Then the women, thinking that the baby is dead, would quickly cut the umbilical cord and put the baby aside’ (Conception, birth #229)
Here again, the basic explicature of the marked clause is “The baby is dead karee”; the presence of karee indicates that it is a thought and that a higher-level explicature such as “the women entertain the thought that the baby is dead” has to be constructed.

Looking at my data it seems that there are two quite distinct strategies to express reported thought in the sense used here: one is the complement strategy, consisting of a complement-taking predicate of cognition or perception followed by the complementizer ěč and the complement clause plus karee, the other strategy is a clause followed by karee that precedes, follows or is embedded in another clause. This latter “think” clause could be considered an independent clause but for the presence of karee. With the information available at this point I can only guess that the latter strategy seems to be the older one and that it is gradually being replaced by the more recently introduced complement strategy (the complementizer ěč is a later addition to the Indus Kohistani lexicon). I will come back to this question in section 4.5.3 and Chapter 5.

4.5.2.1 Purpose and reason clauses

There is no distinct difference between “think” clauses marked by karee, and purpose and reason clauses. The latter clauses are really thoughts or “inner speeches” expressing the intentions or reason for the state of affairs represented in the main clause. Where the subjects of main and purpose or reason clause are co-referential it will be similar to a direct speech in that the clause marked by karee is presented from the main-clause subject’s perspective (first person) as shown in examples (114) and (115). Example (114) is the answer to the question “Why did your son quit his job?”

(114) [miigeé ruusí hoónt karee] bás kar-āthe
1SG.DAT angry.INCH become.PRS.M MRM stop do-PRS.PFV

‘(He) quit because (his employer) was angry with him’ (conversation 28.9.2013)

The literal translation of this example is “‘(He, the employer) is angry with me karee (he, the speaker’s son) quit”. The pronoun miigeé ‘to me’ in the reason clause refers to the main clause subject “he (the speaker’s son)” that has been omitted (subject pro-drop). The marker karee indicates that the clause marked by it is the interpretation of an attributed thought and therefore a metarepresentation. As described in the previous section, karee also constrains the addressee to construct a higher-level
explicature such as “The speaker says that her son quit his job because he (the son) thinks/says that his employer is angry with him”.

Example (115), a purpose clause, is similar in this aspect; it is the answer to the question “Why had your mother gone to Y’s house?”

(115) pií [Y-āī šíd kar-ām karee] bazílis
    over.there  Name.F-GEN.F news do-SBJV.1SG MRM go.PST.PFV.F

‘(She) had gone over to enquire about Y’s health’ (conversation 11.3.2013)

As in (114) and in the examples shown in section 4.3.3.1 and 4.3.3.2, the purpose of the visit is expressed in the form of a mental or inner speech, the person marking on the verb kar- ‘do’ reflecting the direct speech character. Again, karee indicates the presence of a metarepresentation (it is left open if it is one of an attributed utterance or of an attributed thought) and triggers the construction of a higher-level explicature.

We can therefore say that purpose and reason clauses in Indus Kohistani are clauses of reported or attributed thoughts; intentions in the former, and reasoning thoughts in the latter kind of clauses. In fact, both - complements marked by karee - and purpose and reason clauses are instantiations of what is called internal awareness (Güldemann 2008:422), awareness attribution (Longacre 1976:145-9) and inner speech by other authors. These terms refer to the fact that in languages of which Indus Kohistani seems to be an instance there is no structural difference between reported speech constructions marked by karee on the one hand and such constructions as treated in this section on the other hand. Güldemann therefore argues that both “reported speech” and “internal awareness” should be seen as one functional domain, implying that there is no need to assume a grammaticalization process leading from the former to the latter constructions. Seen from a relevance-theoretic standpoint, what unites both kinds of constructions in one domain is their being metarepresentations of attributed representations (public or mental).

But what about purpose and reason clauses in languages where thought is not reported as direct “inner speech”? Would such clauses still be regarded as metarepresentations of an agent’s thoughts? I think, yes. In her study of metarepresentations in linguistic communication Wilson (2012) notes that
such metarepresentations need not be linguistically encoded (for instance as “direct speech”). The fact that one of the two clauses in a purpose or reason construction has to be interpreted not as a description of a state of affairs but as a quote of an attributed utterance or thought has to be inferred by the addressee. Wilson’s example to illustrate this point is cited here as (116) (example (18) in 2012:248).

(116)  
\[a. \quad \text{The grass is wet, because it’s raining.} \]
\[b. \quad \text{It’s raining, because the grass is wet.} \]

Both (116a) and (116b) are reason clauses but they are interpreted differently. The speaker of (116a) describes two states of affairs, “it rains” and “the grass is wet”, and then indicates their causal relation by using the word because: the rain causes the grass to get wet. (116b) on the other hand has a different interpretation. The speaker expresses that she believes it to rain; this belief is caused by the state of affairs at hand, i.e. the fact that the grass is wet. Here the causal relation is that between a state of affairs (“the grass is wet”) and a belief or, more general, a thought (“if the grass is wet then it must be raining”).

An Indus Kohistani speaker would express (116a) as follows in (117) and (118).

(117)  
\[\text{ghaá bilz-íthu àž de-ént} \]
\[\text{grass get.wet.PR.S.FV.SG rain give-PRS.M} \]
\[\text{‘The grass is wet; it is raining’ (elicited), or} \]

(118)  
\[\text{ghaá bilz-íthu àž-āī wāž-ø hin} \]
\[\text{grass get.wet.PR.S.FV.SG rain-GEN.F reason-OBL with} \]
\[\text{‘The grass is wet because of the rain’ (elicited)} \]

(116b) in Indus Kohistani would be marked by karee as seen in (119).

(119)  
\[\text{ghaá bilz-íthu [àž de-ént karee]} \]
\[\text{grass get.wet.PR.S.FV.SG rain give-PRS.M MRM} \]
\[\text{‘It is raining, because (the speaker reasons) the grass is wet’ (elicited)} \]

Wilson’s illustration answers both questions asked above: firstly, metarepresentations may or may not be overtly marked as such. In the English example it is the order of the clauses, not a word that marks the difference between (116a) and (116b). In Indus Kohistani it is the marker karee that indicates the presence of a metarepresentation, that is the representation of a (self-) attributed thought. Secondly,
not every reason or purpose clause is a reported thought; see the English example (116a). I assume that in Indus Kohistani only such purpose and reason clauses are marked by *karee* that are metarepresentations of (self-) attributed thoughts whereas utterances such as (116a) and (117), where each clause is a description of a state of affairs, will not be marked by *karee*.

4.5.2.2 Self-attributed thoughts

Similarly to self-reported speech that is marked by *karee* we may expect self-reported or self-attributed thought that is indicated in this way. Wilson (2012:247) notes that expressions such as “I say …”, “I think …”, “I fear …” etc. are self-attributive or self-quotative counterparts of expressions used to quote others; all of them indicate that what is following is a metarepresentation. Example (88), repeated here, is an instance of a self-attributed thought; it was uttered during a conversation with my language consultant, when a hen was sitting on a pile of bedding.

(88) \(\pi\dot{\text{i}}\text{ṇ} \ s\dot{\text{ā}}\text{s} \ \text{ẓhālīz-} \ θ \ \text{tal} \ \text{dē-} \ θ \ t\text{a} \ [\ddot{\text{ū}}]
\)
\text{over.there} \ 3SG.DEM.OBL \ young.hen-OBL \ on \ give-IMP.2SG \ DM \ 3SG.PROX

\(\text{ṣalā} \ \text{gar-} \dot{\text{āynt}} \ \text{karee]}
\text{there.DEM} \ defecate-PRS.F \ MRM

‘Throw something at that hen there (to chase her away), she will defecate there!’ [lit.: … I think she will defecate there!]’ (conversation 9.11.2012)

In this utterance, as well as in the next example (120), *karee* is the only indicator that marks the clause as being a thought, not a description of a state of affairs. The context of (120) is as follows: I heard the wind causing the door to rattle and asked if this happened also at night. My language consultant replied, “Yes, when there is wind” followed by (120).

(120) \([\dot{l}h\dot{u}\dot{s} \ c\text{-}θnt \ karee]} \ h\dot{ār} \ h\text{o-} \ θnt-\ θ
\text{thief} \ come-PRS.M \ MRM \ awake \ become-PRS.M-PL.M

‘We wake up thinking that a thief is coming’ (conversation 1.12.2012)

It follows that in both (88) and (120), *karee* constrains the addressee towards the construction of a higher-level explicature such as “the speaker thinks/assumes that …”.

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The second way to express self-attributed thoughts is by employing a complement-taking predicate plus complement. The majority of such constructions in my Indus Kohistani data are of the kind “I don’t know” followed or preceded by a complement, as seen in example (121).

(121) [ḥ̃̀ĩ katyûk mar-îthe gí ho-ôthu kar] šû
        now how.many die-PRS.PFV.M.PL what become-PRS.PFV.M.SG MRM 3SG.DEM

  laá pát nií thí
  yet knowledge NEG be.PRS.F

‘Now how many died, what has happened, this we don’t know yet’ (conversation 28.9.2012)

In this example, too, *karee* indicates the presence of a metarepresentation but whereas in (120) the addressee has to construct a higher-level explication (“the speaker assumes that …”) the self-attributed expression “we don’t know” is part of the explication.

Example (122) is an utterance that I started and my language consultant completed for me.

(122a) B. umèen thu [će] ------
        hope be.PRS.M.SG COMP

(122b) A. i-ṣát kar] = aa
        come-FUT.M MRM = Q

‘B: “I hope that ---- (my visa)” A: “---- will come, you think?”’ (conversation 28.9.2013)

The clause that expresses my hope, in other words, my thought, is marked by *karee*. The complementizer *će* is not obligatory here; according to my language consultant the clause would be as grammatical without it.

Looking at all instances of self-attributed thoughts marked by *karee* in my data, it is obvious that most of them (in the case of *know* nearly all of them) are negated, that is, the speaker does “not know”, “not believe”, or “not understand”. Here we have to ask if *karee* marks only such negated propositions. However, (122) is a counter-example where the speaker’s hoping is being asserted. Furthermore, many elicited examples show that *karee* is also used in constructions of the pattern “I know that …” as example (123) shows.

(123) hû miigeé pát thí [șá] zhùuk pît-ûû
da 1SG.DAT knowledge be.PRS.F 3SG.DEM pain gallbladder-GEN.F
This utterance would be said in a context where the speaker had previously assumed another reason for her pain but now has learned what really causes it. The speaker is using this construction to point out the shift from “not or wrongly knowing” to “knowing”. I assume that the default scenario for the “know” construction in Indus Kohistani is as follows: what is known will be told simply as a description of a state of affairs, that is, there is no representation of a representation involved, except in cases such as (123) above. However if a speaker tells what she does not know, it is no longer a description of but the speaker’s thought about a state of affairs and has therefore to be marked as a metarepresentation.

Another observation when looking at the data is that all clauses expressing what a speaker does not know are embedded questions such as “I don’t know whether …”. Within Relevance Theory, interrogatives are seen as metarepresentations of their relevant answers (Sperber and Wilson 1995:252). So is it possible that such constructions are marked not because they represent a thought of the speaker but because they are questions? What distinguishes interrogative metarepresentations from the ones we are looking at in this chapter is that the former ones are non-attributed whereas the latter ones are attributed: to someone other than the speaker or to the speaker herself. The next (elicited) examples (124) and (125) show that it is indeed a metarepresentation of a (self-) attributed thought that is marked by karee, not the non-attributive metarepresentation of a relevant answer. (124) is a simple question.

(124) \[ asíí gí čhál thú \]
\[
3SG.PROX.DAT \quad \text{what} \quad \text{matter} \quad \text{be.PRS.M.SG}
\]
‘How is he doing?’ (elicited)

(125) \[ má sunčí kar-āynt [asíí gí čhál thú karee] \]
\[
1SG \quad \text{thought} \quad \text{do-PRT.F} \quad 3SG.PROX.DAT \quad \text{what} \quad \text{matter} \quad \text{be.PRS.M.SG} \quad \text{MRM}
\]
‘I am thinking about how he is doing’ (elicited)

Indus Kohistani interrogatives per se cannot be marked by karee (124); however, if the question is being formulated as a (self-) attributed thought (or utterance) then the use of karee is grammatical.
The question remains to be answered: are all clauses relating to verbs of cognition, perception, of propositional attitude, of verbs expressing emotions … marked by karee? This is not the case.

In Chapter 5 we will see that the complementizer če quite often is the only marker of complements of such complement-taking predicates; neither does karee have to be used in constructions with a parenthetical comment such as shown in (126).

(126) aáz mĩi yaqin çayôô diis thû tasií gee
today 1SG.POSS belief three.ORD day be.PRS.M.SG 3SG.DIST.OBL with

‘Today it is the third day (with the baby), I believe’ (How they found the baby #120)

Let me summarize: the marker karee may but does not have to be used to mark the complement of a complement-taking predicate of the kinds mentioned above. The presence of the complement-taking predicate/matrix clause makes it already explicit that the complement is an attributed utterance or thought. In Chapter 5 I will further argue that the complementizer če is taking over functions of karee as a marker of metarepresentations. If karee too is employed in such a case we could speak of a double (če plus karee, or karee plus verb of speech, cognition or perception) or even triple (če plus karee plus verb of speech, cognition or perception) marking. Example (127), taken from a conversation, is such an instance where both verbs of speech and the marker karee, occur. The speaker is talking about a relative who had been ill, and what had caused the illness.

(127a) bé man-ã̀ãs-ô [pári i-ínt kar]
1PL.EXCL say-PST.IPV-PL.M fairy/jinn come-PRS.M MRM

‘We were saying that she is possessed by a jinn’ [lit.: …a jinn comes (into her body)]

(127b) moholàa-e màayn [sã̃́ pári-ô nií thí bígi]
maulana-ERG say.PV.1 3PL.DIST fairy-PL.F NEG be.PRS.F some.or.other

bímaarii thí]
ilness.F be.PRS.F

‘The religious scholar said that it is not the jinns, it is some kind of illness’ (conversation 12.7.2013)

In both (127a) and (127b) there is a matrix clause with a speech verb and speech complement. The first of the two is additionally marked by karee; the second has no such marking (complements of the verb man- ‘say’, as above, may be juxtaposed, that is, are without complementizer). As it is already clear
from the speech verb that the complements are reported utterances one wonders why *karee* occurs in (127a). Is it just a case of double or redundant marking? One other suggestion would be that (127a) has been marked by *karee* because the reported utterance is not the description of a state of affairs; rather it is the representation of an assumption, a thought that was entertained by the speaker and her family at some time in the past. In other words, the presence of *karee* in such a construction would indicate another layer of representation, namely that of a thought (in the sense which includes assumptions, beliefs, doubts, hopes, fears, intentions and so on). If this suggestion is true then it might explain why *karee* marks the first reported utterance but not the second one. Whereas the first utterance in (127a) is really an assumption, the religious scholar’s utterance is presented as a representation of a state of affairs. He is the expert and is able to prove or rule out what the speakers of (127a) had assumed.

When we look at the distribution of the marker *karee* and the complementizer *če* (see Chapter 5) within Indus Kohistani reported or (self-) attributed speech and thought (in the widest sense), the following picture emerges: (i) the majority of reported speech has the form of a speech complement that is preceded by the complementizer *če*, but some instances of reported speech are marked by *karee*, (ii) many of the “reported thought” clauses are marked by *karee*, but some of them are marked by *če*, or by both, *karee* and *če*. That is, there are two co-occurring “reported speech and thought” markers with an uneven distribution. In the next chapter I will argue (section 5.3.1) that the more recently acquired complementizer *če* is in the process of replacing *karee* as a marker of reported speech and, increasingly, as a marker of reported thought. This process has been described by Bashir for Kalasha, another language of the area, where the Persian complementizer *ki* is replacing the older grammaticalized SAY marker *ghōi* (Bashir 1996), and this would explain the particular distribution of *karee* and *če*.

One possible outcome of this process might be that the marker *karee* is on the way to become a marker of reported thought only.
4.5.2.3 Naming and similarity

The functions of *karee* not considered so far are those of marking naming and similarity constructions. In this section I show that the analysis as marker of metarepresentations of (self-) attributed utterances and thoughts also works for these two uses of *karee*.

The grammaticalization of a quotative into a marker of a naming construction is quite common and has been described in many languages (for a list see Güldemann 2008:398), for instance in languages of the South Asian linguistic area. As an example of a naming construction, example (105) is repeated here.

(105) गुज़र ठु [Z xान karee]. घेगरा मास ठु
Gujar be.PRS.M.SG [name.M Khan MRM elder man be.PRS.M.SG

‘(He) is a Gujar named Z Khan. He is an elder’ (conversation 7.1.2013)

As already mentioned above, another translation of the element marked by *karee* would be ‘called Z Khan’ or ‘people say Z Khan to him’. This makes the nature of “Z Khan”, a reported quote, “what people say”, more obvious and fits in with other reported utterances. Güldemann notes that reported speech and naming/labeling are both quotations: of an utterance in the former, and of a name in the latter case. More specifically, the name in the example above and in naming constructions in general does not refer to a person, an entity in the object world, but to an entity of the linguistic world, a “label”; so this is a case of mention, to be distinguished from a case of use as for instance in “They asked Z Khan to come to a meeting”, where “Z Khan” refers to a person, an entity in the object world (2008:399). A similar analysis of such naming constructions can be found in Noh (1998:113). It has to be noted that such “mention” use is not attributive metarepresentative use, of the kind we have seen so far. In naming constructions the metarepresentation is that of a non-attributed abstract entity. Its implication is that by marking naming constructions, *karee* is no longer just a marker of (self-) attributed but also of non-attributive metarepresentations. That is, underlying the development from quotative, complementizer and purpose/reason clause marker into a marker of naming constructions is the extension from marking attributive metarepresentations only to also including non-attributive ones.
As for the occurrence of grammaticalized quotatives in similarity constructions, this use, too, is quite common. In literature, often such “likeness” markers are said to have developed from SAY verbs, although Lord mentions that the “speech verb channel” grammaticalization path may have as sources verbs such as resemble and be like (Lord 1993:210).

What I want to emphasize again is the fact that it is not the meaning of the source element that leads to the extended use as simulative marker (it would be difficult to establish such a connection for Indus Kohistani karee) but its use as a quotation marker or, in the terms of Relevance Theory, as a marker of metarepresentations of (self-) attributed utterances. So, utterances containing a similarity construction marked by karee should also contain a metarepresentation. I claim that this is indeed the case. The following examples (108), repeated here, and (128), where karee is employed to mark a notion of similarity between two items and two persons respectively, can be analyzed as a case of a (hypothetical) attributed or self-attributed utterance or such a thought.

(108) sùá baá [zàá múùt baá kar] atiáá
3SG.DEM house.M 1PL.POSS.M former.M house.M MRM this.kind.M

thú
be.PRS.M.SG

‘This house is similar to/like our former house’ (elicited 18.10.2013)

We could also translate, “This house is, one could say, like our old house” or “This house is, let’s say, like our old house” or “This house is, I think, like our old house”.

(128) múí lák zhàa-tòô lák puúc [R kar]
1SG.POSS small brother-DIM.GEN.M small son name.M MRM

atiáá thú
this.kind.M be.PRS.M.SG

‘My younger brother’s small son is just like, let’s say, R’ (elicited 18.10.2013)

Here I want to point out that in constructions such as these karee does not encode the notion of similarity, that is, its meaning is not “like x”. As we can see in (108) and (128), this is done by atiáá ‘like this’, ‘this kind’. In fact, in Indus Kohistani there are several other ways to express the likeness
between the two persons in example (128), as illustrated in examples (129) to (131). These do not have to employ *karee*.

(129)  ū R só thú
     3SG.PROX name.M 3SG.DIST be.PRS.M.SG

‘He is like R’

(130)  ū R lak thú
     3SG.PROX name.M -ish/like be.PRS.M.SG

‘He is like R’

(131)  ū R sīi thú
     3SG.PROX name.M like be.PRS.M.SG

‘He is like R’ (elicited 4.1.2014)

This confirms my claim that in similarity constructions, *karee* does not encode itself the meaning “like, similar to” but indicates the presence of a metarepresentation. It follows that a speaker will employ *karee* only when she wants to make explicit what she *thinks* concerning a particular similarity between two entities. In all other cases *karee* will be left out.

The same can be claimed for naming constructions. Indus Kohistani has other ways to say “X’s name is …” that are used frequently, as seen in the following example (132), taken from a story.

(132)  pučāā nāa āās šeexčelī
     son.GEN.M name be.PST.M Sheekhceli

‘The son’s name was Sheekhceli’ (A.’s story #9)

Another construction that has already been mentioned in section 4.5.1, used to tell someone’s nickname, is illustrated in (133).

(133)  asī ghariāā kira D D kar-áant-ø
     3SG.PROX.Poss wife.GEN.M to name.F name.F do-PRS.M.-PL.M

‘(They) call his wife “D”’ (conversation 4.1.2014)

This seems to be a fixed expression, with the nickname repeated once. Although the verb *kar-‘do’* is used here, it is a finite verb form, not the metarepresentation marker *karee*.

So we see that the naming expression using *karee* is neither the only nor the default construction. A speaker will use *karee* when she wants to make explicit that *people* call someone something, that is,
when she quotes people. In the other cases the naming construction is just a description of a state of
affairs.

I conclude that karee is used to mark both naming and similarity constructions when a speaker
wants to convey not so much a proposition of a state of affairs such as “his name is X”, “this is like
Y”, than what she herself or someone else says/thinks, as in “he is called X”, “this is, I think, similar
to Y”. In the former case karee indicates the representation of a (self-) attributed representation, in the
latter one a non-attributive representation, or in other words, a metarepresentation.

4.5.3 Other functions of grammaticalized quotation markers

So far, I have not encountered other uses of karee apart from the ones described above. In the
literature about grammaticalization of quotation markers a number of other functions have been
mentioned. These include the marking of conditional clauses, of causal clauses, the occurrence together
with onomatopoeic words, the functions as topic marker, as mirative marker, as discourse marker for
exclamations and as “discourse particles expressing self-evident assertions, warnings and echo questions
(different construction types)” (Chappell 2008:5). Güldemann (2008) and Bashir (1996) among others
provide similar lists. I cannot comment on these functions as apparently they are not found in Indus
Kohistani. However, a look at them shows that most if not all of them could be subsumed under the
basic function of marking metarepresentations. For instance conditional clauses: Hopper and Traugott
present the following example (134) (example(21) in Hopper and Traugott 1993:14).

(134)  If Say the deal falls through, what alternative do you have?

Their intention in presenting this example is to show that the use of a SAY verb form to mark a
conditional clause is less exotic than it seems on first sight. That does, however, say nothing about what
motivates the development of a quotative marker into a conditional marker. But there seem to be
explanations for this use. In the example above, the antecedent could be interpreted as a representation
of a (hypothetical) utterance or, if assume is used instead of say, an attributed thought of the addressee
which would justify the use of a metarepresentation marker in such a construction. Noh (1998:242-287)
shows that certain kinds of conditional clauses are best analyzed as containing metarepresentations, that
is, representations of attributed utterances or thoughts (antecedents, consequents or both). In such cases it would make sense in a given language to use an already existing metarepresentation marker for indicating conditionals as well. It is beyond the scope of this study to look at conditionals in more detail but it would be interesting to see which kinds of conditionals are being indicated by grammaticalized quotative markers.

Onomatopoeic words are by nature imitations or interpretations of another representation namely that of a sound. That is, they qualify as metarepresentations of another representation; so the use of a metarepresentation marker would be appropriate.

As to other functions mentioned above: warnings such as “I warn you, there will be consequences” are instances of self-quotation which is metarepresentational. Echo questions and exclamatives are both analyzed as metarepresentations (the former attributed, the latter non-attributed) within the framework of Relevance Theory.

At this point I claim that Indus Kohistani karee, a grammaticalized quotative marker, should best be analyzed as a metarepresentation marker as this can account for all its uses. The grammaticalization path has been such that the marker has extended its function of marking metarepresentations of (self-) attributed speech to marking of metarepresentations of (self-) attributed thoughts and non-attributive metarepresentations in the case of naming constructions. The question whether my analysis may also be applied to grammaticalized quotation markers of other languages, and whether it can also account for other functions of such markers, remains a topic for further studies.

4.6 Summary: the metarepresentation marker karee

In this chapter I have described the Indus Kohistani grammaticalized marker karee that originates in the converb form of the verb kar- ‘do’. It is used to mark reported and self-reported utterances, complements of verbs of cognition and perception, “think” clauses other than complements, and purpose and reason clauses. Furthermore karee occurs in naming and in similarity constructions. Considering its range of uses the marker karee is a typical instance of what is described in literature as grammaticalized SAY quotative or SAY complementizer (Bashir 1996).
For my analysis of *karee* I used the framework of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995) and drew on research by Güldemann (2008) and LaPolla (1997). Within Relevance Theory, the marker *karee* is analyzed as a marker of representations or interpretations of (self-) attributed representations, or in short, as a marker of metarepresentations. At the beginning of the grammaticalization process these may have been attributed representations of utterances only, but now they also include (self-) attributed representations of thoughts and non-attributive representations of names (“mentions”).

Indus Kohistani *karee* marks clauses that are complements of verbs of speech, of cognition and of perception; it may also be the only indicator of a (self-) reported speech or thought, thereby triggering the construction of a higher-level explicature such as “X is saying/thinking …”.

This analysis can account for all uses of *karee*; it also sheds light on why such a marker develops along this particular grammaticalization path. In the case of *karee*, the function of marking metarepresentations of attributed utterances gradually extended to other forms of metarepresentations such as self-attributed utterances, (self-) attributed thoughts and non-attributive “mention”.

Within this analysis, *karee* is seen as an indicator that, by making explicit the presence of a metarepresentation, constrains the addressee’s search for relevance and thereby reduces processing effort and time. In this sense, the Indus Kohistani metarepresentation marker *karee* is a “fossilized constraint” on utterance interpretation (LaPolla 1997).
Chapter 5
The Indus Kohistani marker čē

In this chapter I am concerned mainly with the Indus Kohistani marker čē in its functions as a replacement for the marker kāree, that is, as a complementizer and marker of purpose and reason clauses. The full range of uses of čē is much wider: it may mark relative clauses, conditional clauses, adverbial clauses of time; it is found as clause linker in dependent clauses that describe a quality mentioned in the main clause, and in constructions where the main clause consists of a question that is answered in the dependent clause. It may even introduce independent clauses. Although I briefly illustrate these uses, a thorough description and analysis of all its functions goes beyond the topic of this study and deserves further research in its own right.

In the following sections I describe the complementizer and introducer of purpose and reason clauses čē and illustrate its various uses; then I compare it with the metarepresentation marker kāree (see Chapter 4). I show that čē, a later addition to the Indus Kohistani lexicon, is on its way to replace kāree as a quotative, complementizer and marker of purpose and reason clauses. In these uses, čē may, like the marker kāree, be analyzed as a procedural indicator of (self-) attributed public and mental metarepresentations, that is, of quoted speech and thought. As a procedural marker of attributed representations it constrains an addressee towards the construction of a higher-level explicature. The data used in this chapter are mainly taken from recorded oral texts as described in section 1.5; only a few examples have been taken from recorded conversations.
5.1 The marker ċe: origin, definition, properties

5.1.1 Origin

The marker ċe seems to be a borrowing from Pashto ċe. Pashto, belonging to the Eastern Iranian languages group, is one of the languages of wider communication in the area. The Pashto marker’s entry is as follows.

“conj. Because, whether, or that, as, whereas, etc” (Raverty 1860:378).

Neighboring Shina Kohistani has a similar marker ċe ‘that’, introducing subordinate clauses (Schmidt and Kohistani 2008:253). A similar, multifunctional conjunction, the Persian ki (or ke), is found in many languages of the Indian Subcontinent, due to several centuries of Persian influence. Urdu ki is one such instance. Its entry as conjunction includes

“That, in order that, to the end that, so that, for that, in that, because, for; if; and; [illegible]; whether; namely, to wit, saying, thus, as follows [...] ; lest; when; but even” (Platts 1911/1994:866).

In the North of Pakistan, Kalasha ki (Bashir 1996:206) and Palula ki (Liljegren 2008:334) are instances of such Persian borrowings. At present, I do not know if Pashto ċe and Persian ki are related at all; a look at their respective uses, however, shows many similarities. The entry in the Indus Kohistani dictionary (Zoller 2005:181) is as follows.

“ċeʰ(J, G18) conj. (introducing a nominal clause) ‘that; whatever, whichever’ (Ur. ki, joki). Psht. ċe.”

What seems to be sure is that both ċe and its Persian counterpart ki are more recent additions to several languages of Northern Pakistan that have SAY complementizers, due to the influence of surrounding languages. I will discuss this further in section 5.3.1.

---

18 J = Jijali variety of Indus Kohistani, G = Gabaar variety of Indus Kohistani
5.1.2 Definition

It is already obvious from the introductory words above that it will be difficult to define the Indus Kohistani marker ċe. The most frequent use is that as a complementizer, but a definition of ċe as a complementizer would not account for its other uses such as subordinator and relativizer. In this study, I use the terms marker, complementizer, and clause linker.

5.1.3 Properties

In Chapter 4 I have discussed the metarepresentation marker karee, a particle that always follows the clause marked by it. Its syntactic property, namely being a clause-final marker, is typical for verb-final languages. The clause-linker ċe, on the other hand, is a clause-initial marker. As to their placement within a clause, the two markers are in complementary distribution and it is not possible for them to “swap” places. This has consequences for the placement of complements and dependent clauses within a sentence.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the position of clauses marked by the clause-final karee within the matrix or main clause is not restricted: they may precede, follow or be embedded within the main clause. Clauses with the initial marker ċe are much more restricted in this aspect; they are always postposed, following the finite verb of the main clause. The one exception to this generalization is the case of relative clauses marked by ċe, to be discussed in section 5.2.3. This difference, that is, the restricted placement of complements with clause-initial markers versus less restricted placement of complements with clause-final markers, holds true for all languages of the Indian subcontinent that have such constructions (Subbarao 2012:218-23).

5.2 Uses of the marker ċe

In this section I describe the uses that ċe shares with the marker karee, namely as complementizer, as indicator of speech and “think” clauses and as marker of purpose and reason clauses. I also briefly illustrate other functions of ċe such as being a relativizer, occurring in conditional clauses, introducing several other types of subordinate clauses and introducing independent clauses.
5.2.1 The complementizer če

The most frequent use of the Indus Kohistani marker če is that as a complementizer, introducing speech and other sentential complement clauses. In the previous chapter, I have already introduced the metarepresentation marker karee as a complementizer. When comparing the frequency of occurrences of karee and če in complement constructions it is obvious that the overwhelming majority of sentential complements is marked by če, and furthermore that the range of semantic classes of complement-taking predicates marked by če is wider than that marked by karee. It can therefore safely be said that če is the default and unmarked member of the two Indus Kohistani complementizers. If we find in Indus Kohistani the same process of replacing an older SAY complementizer by a more recently acquired loan complementizer as has been described by Bashir for Kalasha (Bashir 1996:206), another Northern Pakistan language, then this particular distribution of če and karee makes sense.

In the following sections I want to describe and illustrate the function of če in complement clauses as they occur in natural data. As in the previous chapters, the clauses marked by če are in square brackets.

5.2.1.1 The complementizer če as marker of complements of verbs of saying, perception and cognition

In section 4.2.2.1 I mentioned that one Indus Kohistani complement strategy is that of juxtaposition; this is found only with the complement-taking predicate man- ‘say’, and is optional. Most speech complements, whether containing the verb man- ‘say’ or another utterance predicate, however, are marked by če, as the following examples show. In (135), the speech verb used is man- ‘say’. The complementizer če is always the first element in the complement clause.

(135) sā́ī baačāã nookar-ō̂ man-ágil [če tús gulá]
3PL.DIST king.GEN.M servant-ERG.PL say-PVF.2 COMP 2PL where.to

be-ént-o]
go-PRS.M-PL.M

‘The king’s servants said, “Where do you go to?”’ (Prince and fairy #23)

The three following examples show complements of shout, announce, and preach.
'The father shouted, “An avalanche is coming down, save yourselves if you can”’ (Avalanche story #62)

The speech complement in this example contains two clauses: the first is the description of a state of affairs (“an avalanche is coming down”), the second one is a conditional clause, indicated by the clause-final subordinator *khẽ* (“save yourselves if you can”).

Note that the postpositional phrase “through the radio” in this example is added to the matrix clause as an afterthought, therefore it follows the verb ‘give’.

Recall that Indus Kohistani has no indirect speech; in all these examples the complement is in direct speech form.

The complementizer *če* also introduces complements of predicates of perception; example (139) contains the predicate *look for*, example (140) the verb *see*.
(140) kasī̄-́i ba-á-ό man mēč nií paš-áthe [če go-ō ́]
who.POSS-also house-OBL in 1SG.ERG NEG see-PRS.PFV COMP yarn

sand-áynt-ój
make-PRS.F-PL.F

‘I have not seen in anyone’s house (women) making/spinning yarn’ (Sheep #74)

The next example (141) contains a complement of hear.

(141) bë so-áant-ó kàlkal [če zâă watan-á man ́]
1PL.EXCL hear-PRS.M-PL.M sometimes COMP 1PL.POSS.M country-OBL in

sée màas-e iich maar-ágil]
such man-ERG bear kill-PFV.2

‘Sometimes we hear that in our area a man killed a bear in such a way’ (Hunting in Kohistan #115)

The following examples show complements of predicates of cognition, marked by če. Example (141) contains the propositional attitude predicate believe.

(142) mëi yaqìin thú [če xodaepàak míí haž-ií har-áṣat] ́
1SG.POSS belief be.PRS.M.SG COMP God 1SG.DOM hajj-DAT take-FUT.M

‘I believe that God will take me for Hajj’ (Men’s duties #99)

The complement of example (143) expresses someone’s thought. The utterance is taken from a conversation about beggars entering buses and asking passengers for money.

(143) khë tëe áí sučëi kar-áant-ó [če má ́]
DEV.M then 3PL.PROX thought do-PRS.M-PL.M COMP 1SG

saphar-á tal be-ént khë miigeé pèes thé́]
journey-OBL on go-PRS.M SUB 1SG.DAT money be.PRS.PL.M

‘So then they (the passengers) consider that as they are travelling they have money with them’ [lit. ‘So then they consider that “When I am going on a journey then I have money with me’”] (Beggars, begging, charity #25)

Note again that the thought is expressed as direct reported speech.

Example (144) below is an instance of a complement of a commentative predicate. Such predicates provide a comment such as a judgment, an evaluation of or an emotional reaction to the complement proposition (Noonan 2007b:127).

(144) hâă tëe bë sáx xušâal ho-ónt-ó [če zâă]
and then 1PL.EXCL very happy become-PRS.M-PL.M COMP 1PL.POSS.F
And then we are very glad that our buffalo cow has calved' (About cattle #67)

The next examples are utterances containing predicates of knowledge and acquisition of knowledge, such as *know, discover, find out, realize, and dream.*

(145)  
\[ ayõõ \ paš-ágil \ [če \ mû \ sû \ gharú \ yaá \ mû \ ] \]
\[ 3PL.PROX.ERG \ see-PFV2 \ COMP \ 1SG.POSS \ 3SG.DEM \ wife \ or \ 1SG.POSS \]
\[ sû \ žhaazà \ šás \ màaš-ø \ mil \ haraamtuup \ kar-àynt] \]
\[ 3SG.DEM \ sister-in-law \ 3SG.DEM.OBL \ man-OBL \ with \ adultery \ do-PRS.F \]

‘Suppose they (husband, or brother-in-law) see (come to know) that his wife or his sister-in-law is committing adultery with this man’ [lit.: ‘… that my wife or my sister-in-law …’] (Feuds #76)

Here again, the complement is presented in direct speech form, as if spoken by the agents of the matrix clause although it represents a mind-internal process, a conclusion the agents have come to. In example (146), the complement expresses what someone learns by dreaming.

(146)  
\[ kâá \ sùû \ paš-àant \ [če \ sù \ màaš-áï \ sugây \]
\[ someone \ dream \ see-PRS.M \ COMP \ 3SG.DEM \ man-GEN.F \ fine.F \]
\[ gâaadii \ thî] \]
\[ car.F \ be.PRS.F \]

‘Someone dreams that this man has a fine car’ (Dreams and their interpretations #56)

Example (147) shows a complement of the predicate *know.*

(147)  
\[ hîí \ tasií \ pât \ nií \ thî \ nhaal-á \ [če \ ú \]
\[ now \ 3SG.DIST.DAT \ knowledge.F \ NEG \ be.PRS.F \ look-IMP.2SG \ COMP \ 3SG.PROX \]
\[ mû \ abâa \ àås \ gi \ mút \ kâá \ pičhàa \ àås] \]
\[ 1SG.POSS \ father \ be.PST.M \ what \ other \ some \ uncle \ be.PST.M \]

‘Now he does not know, look, if he (the deceased) was his father or someone else, an uncle’ [lit.: ‘Now he does not know, look, if “he was my father or someone else, an uncle”’] (About inheriting #131)

Example (148) is another instance of a predicate of knowledge acquisition, with the complement in direct reported speech form.
‘When […] the husband finds out that (his wife’s) child) is not his own …’ [lit.: ‘… that the child is not mine’] (Feuds #91)

The following example (149) contains a predicate of fearing.

(149) hū̀ mā bhi-íthi [če boó tālan batá
now 1sg fear-PRS.PFV.F COMP up downward rock.PL.

wa-ṣāt-o]
come.down-FUT.M-PL.M

‘Now I was afraid that rocks would come down from above’ (The earthquake #39)

In example (150), the complement expresses someone’s hope, again in direct speech form.

(150) umèen ho-ónt baadeadam-āá nhaal-á [če má zànd
hope become-PRS.M human.being-GEN.M look-IMP.2SG COMP 1SG alive.M

ho-ṣāt má gāt i-ṣāt tāā baí]
become-FUT.M 1SG again come-FUT.M REFL.POSS.M house.DAT

‘(When leaving for a long travel) it is man’s hope, look, that he will be alive and come back to his house’ (Prayer #216)

The manipulative predicate order in (151), too, induces direct reported speech form of the complement.

(151) tèe xodaepàak mulaaki-ōō áḍar de-ént [če šás
then God angel-PL.OBL command give-PRS.M COMP 3SG.DEM.OBL

wáxt-a man šás sazàa as̃̀ĩ kira muqarár
time-OBV in 3SG.DEM.DOM punishment 3SG.PROX.POSS to appointed

kar-iij]
do-IMP.2PL

‘Then God orders the angels to assign such a punishment at such a time (for the deceased)

(129)
In this section I have illustrated the use of če as a complementizer of complements of speech, perception and cognition predicates. All complements of this class of complement-taking predicates are presented in direct speech form.

5.2.1.2 The complementizer če as marker of other complements

The complement-taking predicates of utterance, perception and cognition seen so far all take sentential complements with the clause-initial complementizer če. For modal predicates, this is not the only complementation strategy available. Example (152) shows a sentential complement with če, whereas the complement in (153) is of the non-finite type.

(152)  ek  màaṣ-e  atshàk  kar-ágil  khē  mut  màaṣ-i  pakàar
      one  man-ERG  bad.M  do-PFV2  SUB  other  man-DAT  necessary

\(\text{thī} \ [\text{če} \ \text{sábur} \ \text{kar-á}]\)

\(\text{be.PRS.F} \ \text{COMP} \ \text{patience} \ \text{do-IMP.2SG}\)

‘When one man did something bad then it is necessary for the other one (who was wronged) to be patient’ [lit.: ‘… then it is necessary for the other one that “you be patient”’] (More about sin #93)

Example (153) shows a non-finite complement clause embedded within the matrix clause, without the complementizer če.

(153)  şás  wáxt-a  man  şás  gharū́  tal  xawànd  tal
      3SG.DEM.OBL  time-OBL  in  3SG.DEM.OBL  wife.OBL  on  husband.OBL  on

\(\text{ɣúsul} \ \text{de-ó} \ \text{pháraz} \ \text{thű}\)

\(\text{ritual.bath} \ \text{give-INF} \ \text{obligation} \ \text{be.PRS.M.SG}\)

‘At that time the woman and the husband have the obligation to take a (ritual) bath’ (Women’s duties #130)

We see again that the sentential complement of (152), introduced by če, has utterance form, that is direct reported speech form whereas this is not the case in example (153) where če is not used and where the complement does not consist of an “inner speech”.

Complements of achievement predicates may be of the sentential type and are introduced by the complementizer če; as example (154) illustrates. Note the direct reported speech form of the complement.
Again, there is an alternative complement construction used with achievement predicates such as try, as is shown in (155). The non-finite complement, a verbal noun, is embedded within the matrix clause.

Concerning predicates of immediate perception, verbs such as see and hear in my data generally have the meaning of “come to understand” and “reported”, respectively. The following examples of complements of immediate perception predicates are elicited. Besides the će strategy, other complement types may be employed which I show here to complete the picture. Example (156) shows a sentential complement introduced by će.

Again, there is an alternative complement construction used with achievement predicates such as try, as is shown in (155). The non-finite complement, a verbal noun, is embedded within the matrix clause.

Concerning predicates of immediate perception, verbs such as see and hear in my data generally have the meaning of “come to understand” and “reported”, respectively. The following examples of complements of immediate perception predicates are elicited. Besides the-ce strategy, other complement types may be employed which I show here to complete the picture. Example (156) shows a sentential complement introduced by ce.

In (157) and (159), the complement is finite, embedded within the main clause but without a complementizer. The complement in example (158) contains an inflected verbal noun with postposition,
again embedded within the main clause. At this point I am not able to tell which of these strategies is the one used most frequently with such predicates.

The last examples of complements presented in this section are complements of the predicate *wait*. In main clauses with the verb *intezàar kar-* ‘wait’, what the agent of the clause is waiting for may be the content of a subordinate clause introduced with *če*, as example (160) shows.

(160) ás wáxt-a man só deeqàan intezàar kar-àant
3SG.PROX.OBL time-OBL in 3SG.DIST tenant waiting do-PRS.M

[če h̃̀ĩ sṹ makày m̃̀ĩ ɡhã̃́ ho-ṣaýt]
COMP now 3SG.DEM corn 1SG.POSS big.INCH become-FUT.F

‘At that time the tenant is waiting for his corn to grow’ [lit.: ‘… is waiting that “now my corn will become big”’] (About deqani #32)

The direct reported speech in the subordinate clause expresses the tenant’s internal speech, as seen from the waiting person’s perspective. The notion of waiting for a person is expressed in a different way, whereby *če* is not used, as example (161) shows.

(161) ũ tāā xawànd-āā intezàar kar-àynt
3SG.PROX REFL.POSS.M husband.OBL-GEN.M waiting.M do-PRS.F

‘She is waiting for her husband’ (elicited)

Here, not a complement but a possessive construction is used: “she does her husband’s waiting”.

In this section I have shown that there are several complementation strategies available for complements of predicates other than those of speech, perception and cognition. The complementizer *če* is used when the complement expresses an “inner speech/cognitive process”; this is always presented as direct speech.

5.2.1.3 The complementizer *če* replacing the complement-taking predicate

In section 4.3.2.2 I described clauses marked by *karee* that are reported thoughts or “think” complement clauses although such constructions do not contain a “think” complement-taking predicate. I also mentioned that it may be difficult to differentiate such clauses from purpose and reason clauses marked by *karee* for two reasons: (i) the “think” as well as the purpose and reason clauses are always in
direct reported-speech form, (ii) there is no syntactic difference between such “think” clauses on one hand and purpose and reason clauses on the other hand.

Looking at clauses marked by če we find a similar use: constructions consisting of a main clause and a dependent clause that contains a reported speech or thought in direct-speech form, but without a corresponding complement-taking utterance- or predicate of cognition. Here, the complementizer če indicates, without the presence of a complement-taking predicate, that the following clause is a reported speech or thought. The direct speech form aids in interpreting such clauses correctly as what they are.

In this section I present some instances of this use. In example (162) below the subordinate clause cannot be the complement of the main clause verb show or cause to see; the (omitted) complement-taking predicate has to be a verb of saying.

(162) tèe bé daakṭar-ií paša-ânt-ọ [če tú nhaal-á ta ú gí thú]  
then 1PL.EXCL doctor-DAT show-PRS.M-PL.M COMP 2SG look-IMP.2SG DM 3SG.PROX what be.PRS.M.SG  
‘Then we show (the boil) to the doctor (and ask him) to look at it and find out what kind it is’ [lit.: ‘Then we show (the boil) to the doctor COMP “Look at it, what is it?”’] (About boils #25)

The subordinate clause in (163) contains a command which presupposes the actual saying of the command.

(163) khẽ doóm čēčs-ọ [če šaš màaš xabár kār-ọ šaš màaš xabár kār-ọ ... ]  
DEVM Dom send.PST.IPFM.M-PL.M COMP 3SG.DEM.DOM man news do-IMP.2SG 3SG.DEM.DOM man news do-IMP.2SG  
‘Then (they) used to send a Dom (a member of the Dom tribe), telling him to inform this man, that man …’ [lit.: ‘Then (they) used to send a Dom COMP “Do inform this man, do inform this man …”’] (About the Dom tribe #11)

However, there is another way to translate this utterance, namely ‘then (they) used to send a Dom to inform this man, that man, …’ In such a construction the clause in square brackets is a purpose clause. This example demonstrates that there is no clear distinction between clauses where če stands in place of a verb of speech or thoughts, and purpose and reason clauses.
Example (164) is from the same text; če indicates that the following clause is a reported speech.

\[
\begin{align*}
(164) & \text{tēc} & \text{yārak} & \text{rupāy-ọ} & \text{sās} & \text{ząb-an} & \text{sā́} & \text{rupāy-oon} \\
& \text{then} & \text{plenty} & \text{rupee-PL} & \text{3SG.DEM.OBL} & \text{bride.price-ABL} & \text{3PL.DEM} & \text{rupee-ABL.PL}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{če} & \text{do} \text{m-àā} & \text{kira} & \text{dèē-s-ọ} & [\text{če} & \text{̣́} & \text{ụ́} & \text{̤í} \\
& \text{send.CV} & \text{Dom-GEN,M} & \text{to} & \text{give.PST,IPFV,M-PL,M} & \text{COMP} & \text{3PL.PROX} & \text{2SG.POSS}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{sịs} & \text{waal-il} & \text{rupāy-ọ} & \text{tí} & \text{ụ́} & \text{har-á} \\
& \text{head} & \text{bring.down-ADS.F} & \text{rupee-PL} & \text{be.PRS.F} & \text{2SG} & \text{take-IMP.2SG}
\end{align*}
\]

‘Then (they) sent plenty of money, of this bride-prize money, and gave it to the Dom (member of the Dom tribe) (saying) “This money is the money for the head-shaving; take it”’ (About the Dom tribe #17)

Example (165) is another instance of če standing in for a predicate of utterance.

\[
\begin{align*}
(165) & \text{khē} & \text{bēetus} & \text{hisàab} & \text{kar-āsát-ọ} & \text{nhaal-á} & [\text{če} & \text{tēc} \\
& \text{then} & \text{1PL.INCL} & \text{calculation} & \text{do-FUT,M-PL,M} & \text{look-IMP.2SG} & \text{COMP} & \text{2SG.ERG}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{m̃́ĩ} & \text{atyúk} & \text{màaṣ-ọ} & \text{maar-āthe} \\
& \text{1SG.POSS} & \text{this.many} & \text{man-PL} & \text{kill-PRS.PFV}
\end{align*}
\]

‘Then we (we and you) will count (the men killed in the feud), look, (and say), “You have killed this many men of my family”’ (Feuds #158)

In example (166) the complement contains a thought; the omitted complement-taking predicate is one of knowledge acquisition, something like find out.

\[
\begin{align*}
(166) & \text{talāá} & \text{ayóó} & \text{hī} & \text{bhīlōō} & \text{hà} & \text{muuθhú} & \text{neer-āthe} \\
& \text{from.there} & \text{3PL.PROX.ERG} & \text{now} & \text{fear-PL.OBL} & \text{hand} & \text{forward} & \text{not.do-PRS.PFV}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
[\text{če} & \text{̣́} & \text{gí} & \text{tsīiz} & \text{thú} \\
& \text{COMP} & \text{what} & \text{thing} & \text{be.PRS.M.SG}
\end{align*}
\]

‘After that, now, out of fear they did not dare to put out the hand (toward the bundle of clothes) to find out what it was’ [lit.: ‘After that, now, out of fear they did not dare to put out the hand (toward the bundle of clothes), COMP “What is this thing?”’] (How they found the baby #15)

The final two examples of this section are again ambiguous ones; the clauses preceded by če may be interpreted either as reported speech or as reason (167) and purpose clause (168). The background of (167) is the fact that although in Islam women are entitled to inherit a share of their father’s property, in Kohistan it is the custom for women to hand over their share to their brothers. In exchange the brothers will look after their sisters as long as they live and help in times of illness etc. If however a woman
does take her share as is her right (for instance because she does not have a brother) then people may make the following remark.

(167) \textit{tèe hasàant-e /[cè ayöö tàà abààî miràas} \\
then laugh-PRS.M-PL.M COMP 3PL.PROX.ERG REFL.POSS.M father.GEN.F inheritance

\textit{kha-áthe] eat-PRS.PFV}

‘Then (people) use to laugh (at the women) (saying) “They have eaten up their father’s inheritance”’ (About inheriting #31)

But an equally appropriate translation of this example is “Then (people) use to laugh (at the women) because they have eaten up their father’s inheritance”; in this interpretation the clause preceded by \textit{cè} is a reason clause.

In example (168), likewise, the clause preceded by \textit{cè} may be interpreted either as reported speech or as a purpose clause. As in all previous examples, it is in direct reported-speech form.

(168) \textit{maasúm dììu kaál-ø huúgaa khé tèe bé tasìì} \\
child two year-PL become.PFV2.M.SG SUB then 1PL.EXCL 3SG.POSS

\textit{sàs dachòò hàa muná gòli-ø man de-ént-ø} \\
3SG.DEM.DOM right hand down bread-OBL in give-PRS.M-PL.M

\textit{[cè tù sàs tàà dachòò hatoó hin} \\
COMP 2SG 3SG.DEM.OBL REFL.POSS.M right hand.M.DIM.OBL with

\textit{gòli khá] bread eat.IMP.2SG}

‘When a child is two years old then we put his right hand down to the food (and say), “Eat the food with your right hand”’ or ‘When a child is two years old then we put his right hand down to the food so that he eat the food with his right hand’ (Food, meal times #121)

In this section I have described and illustrated the use of \textit{cè} in such subordinate clauses that seem to be speech or “think” complements but where the complement-taking predicate is absent. I have also shown that such clauses may be ambiguous in that both an interpretation as speech or “think” complement and an interpretation as purpose or reason clause is possible. Structurally there is no difference between these two types of subordinate clauses. In both cases, what is reported as said or
thought, or as purpose or reason, has the form of direct reported speech. There is no clear distinction
between clauses treated in this section and purpose and reason clauses that will be the topic of the
following section.

5.2.2 The marker če in purpose and reason clauses

In this section I present more examples of clauses marked by če that seem to be reported speech or
thought clauses because of the use of direct reported speech but for which interpretations as purpose and
reason clauses are more appropriate. In example (169) the clause marked by če is one of purpose.

(169) hāā má boolāā asií waat bazīthi baaltī-ø waat
      and 1SG from.up 3SG.PROX.OBL for go.PRS.PFV.F pail-OBL for

bazīthi [če gaá doóm]
go.PRS.PFV.F COMP cow milk.SBJV.1SG

‘…and I went from up there for it, I went for the pail in order to milk the cow’ (The evil eye #141)

The speaker of the following example (170) talks about people’s reasons to get a charm. One of
those reasons is that at times, men do not find a job and so they acquire a charm for the purpose of
getting employment.

(170) ás wáxt-a man gát taawiiz kar-i-aánt-ø [če
      3SG.PROX.OBL time-OBL in again charm do-CAUS-PRS.M-PL.M COMP

miiecé mazduurii hōo miiecé pēes hōo]
1SG.DAT labour become.SBJV.3SG 1SG.DAT money become.SBJV.3SG

‘At that time again (men) get made a charm so that they may get work, may get money’ (The
evil eye #168)

Note that as in the examples of the previous sections, the clause preceded by če is in direct speech form,
taking the perspective not of the actual speaker of this utterance but of the men who go to get a charm.

In the next example (171) the speaker talks about a daughter-in-law’s duties when her mother-in-
law is elderly and frail.

(171) khē asií kūzoó man wīi har-ée čaarčubii-ø man
      DEVM 3SG.PROX.DAT water.jar.OBL in water take-CVB bathroom-OBL in
Again, both purpose clauses are in direct reported speech form, the respective verbs being marked for second person imperative.

The following example (172) contains a reason clause. The speaker explains why in the past, young fathers did not take up their infant children.

(172) hāā maasūm nií dhay-āās buí kar-eé [če mīī] and child NEG hold-IPFV.PST.M up do-CVB COMP 1SG.POSS

laáz di-іnt] embarrassment give-PRS.F.

‘And (the husband) used not to take up and hold (his) child because he was embarrassed’ [lit.: ‘… COMP “embarrassment gives to me”’] (A mother’s advice #64)

In example (173), again, the purpose clause is reported as from the perspective of the agents, in direct speech form.

(173) khē kālkal raál amāā dhay-āās-e [če oktá] DEVM sometimes at.night REFL wash.IPFV.PST.M-PL.M COMP in.the.morning

Sōur iΣoΣ mií paΣ-άΣat-e yáa yàa abàa mií paΣ-άΣat-e] parents.in.law 1SG.DOM see-FUT.M-PL.M or parents 1SG.DOM see-FUT.M-PL.M

khe kùi bariùu nikaý raál amàā dhay-aá bazií DEVM husband.and.wife come.out.CVB at.night REFL.POSS wash-CVB go.CVB

sút bêčs-ø to.sleep go.IPFV.PST.M-PL.M

‘Sometimes (a husband and wife) used to take a bath at night because (if taking a bath) in the morning the parents-in-law would see them or the parents would see them, so husband and wife used to get up at night time to take a bath and then went to sleep’ (Housing in the past #29)
As already noted, there is no structural difference between purpose and reason clauses. The hearer of such an utterance has to infer from the context if a particular clause should be interpreted as expressing a purpose or a reason. Often the verb form helps to disambiguate between the two, as in the last example (174) of this section.

(174) tēe kukoó maar-āās-e maar-eé būt xaandaan ŭul
    then chicken.PL kill-IPFV.PST.M-PL.M kill-CVB all family together

huú gólî khāās-e | ṇe āz ē ġā tāā
    become.CVB bread eat.IPFV.PST.M-PL.M COMP today 3SG.PROX.ERG REFL.POSS.M

pučāā sīs waal-āthe]
    son.GEN.M head bring.down-PFV.PRS.

‘Then (they) used to kill a chicken, having killed the chicken all the family would gather and have a meal because that day (the father) had shaved his son’s head’ (More old traditions #14)

The verb of the reason clause is marked for past tense; this would not fit in with an interpretation as purpose clause where often (but not always) the verb has irrealis marking, for instance subjunctive such as in examples (169) and (170), or imperative as in (171). Thus the verb marking helps the hearer to arrive at the correct interpretation.

So far, the uses of čē have been similar to that of the metarepresentation marker karee. In all the examples seen so far it would be possible to replace čē with karee. In the following sections I will briefly describe other uses of čē where it cannot be substituted by karee.

5.2.3 The marker čē in relative clauses

In the previous sections, I have described the uses of the marker čē as a complementizer, as a marker of (self-) reported speech and thought, and as clause linker in purpose and reason clauses. In this section I present a brief overview of Indus Kohistani relativizing strategies and then describe čē as a marker of relative clauses, or relativizer.
5.2.3.1 Indus Kohistani relativizing strategies

Indus Kohistani has several relativizing strategies available which I briefly describe here, following Payne’s outline (Payne 1997). The first relative clause construction is a prenominal relative clause that may be participial or finite and that is externally headed, as illustrated in examples (175) and (176).

(175) [kùl-Ø bhay-aa-z-èel] zòṛ
bead-PL sìt-CÄUS-PASS-ADS.M clothes.M

‘Clothes that are trimmed with beads’ or ‘clothes trimmed with beads’ (field notes)

The relative clause is participial and precedes the head of the clause. This kind of relative clause might also be analyzed as an adjective phrase whereas the next example (176) can only be interpreted as a relative clause construction.

(176) khẽ ã̃́₃ pií [sã́̂ ħàt-i e-ént-Ø] maasmá
then 3PL.PROX over.there 3PL.DEM hand-DAT come-PRS.M-PL.M child.PL

dhày-gal säs kh̀ŋ nika-íthe
grab-CVB 3SG.DEM.OBL side come.out-PRS.PFV.PL.M

‘So they grabbed the children who were within reach over there and came out this side’ (The avalanche #76)

The verb of this prenominal relative clause is finite. With this relativizing strategy neither relativizer nor relative pronoun are used, as the above examples show.

The second relativizing strategy that is available is again a prenominal construction. This prenominal finite relative clause contains as relativizer the marker čë and the relative pronoun kãã́ ‘who’, which refers to the head noun, as can be seen in example (177). Here and in the following examples, the relative clause is left-dislocated.

(177) hâa [sò qiàa-dít-Ø maz čë kãã́ áãs-Ø] sáí
and 3SG.DIST car-OBL in COMP who be.PST.M-PL.M 3PL.DIST

dùu mäaş-oøn ék mäaš rùuy muts-íthu
two man-ABL.PL one man well become.free-PRS.PFV.SG.M

‘And one of the two men who were in the car got away unhurt’ (A car accident #56)

The head of the relative clause is the noun phrase ‘one of the two men’; its co-referent within the relative clause is the question word and relative pronoun kãã́ ‘who’. Here the marker čë that sets off the
clause in square brackets as relative clause is not clause-initial as it is in complement clauses but clause-
internal, preceding relative pronoun and copula of the relative clause. The position of the relativized
noun phrase within the relative clause is that as a subject hence the zero case-marked relative pronoun
kāā ‘who’. In the next example (178) the relative pronoun is marked for ergative case.

(178) tēe ḏūā baā-ø man ḍārān šāriāp če kēč
then 1PL.POSS.M house.M-OBL in quran noble COMP who.ERG

par-āthe] šās ḍā̃ā-i bē man-āant-ø ...
read-PRS.PFV 3SG.DEM.OBL man-DAT 1PL.EXCL say-PRS.M-PL.M

‘Then we say to that man in our house who has read the Quran, “…”’ (Traditional treatments #96)

In example (179), the relativized noun phrase in the relative clause is a possessor. Again, both če
and a relative pronoun are used; the relative pronoun is marked for genitive case.

(179) ḏēt če [sō ḏōol če kasā thū] sō
DEVM then 3SG.DIST field COMP who.POSS be.PRS.SG.M 3SG.DIST

maalāk man-āant če amā khā
owner say-PRS.M COMP REFL eat.IMP.2SG

‘Then the owner to whom the field belongs says “You eat!”’ (How to cook maize #26)

In this example the marker če occurs twice: first as relativizer and then as complementizer introducing a
speech complement. In all three examples of such prenominal relative clauses with če, we have seen
that če is not clause-initial but clause-internal, preceding the relative pronoun and verb/copula and
following an object or adjunct phrase.

A third relativizing strategy is that of a postnominal finite relative clause. Within this construction,
head noun and relative clause are always left-dislocated; in the main clause the head noun is referred to
by a pronoun or a full noun phrase. In such postnominal clauses the relativized NP always takes the
subject position in the relative clause, therefore the relative pronoun kāā ‘who’ may be omitted as there
is no need for case marking. The following example (180) shows a relative clause marked by če and
kāā ‘who’.

(180) [gharimādš če kāā helecēk thūl-i thīl] tāš
woman COMP who a.bit plump-F be.PRS.F 3SG.DIST.OBL
Both head and relative clause are left-dislocated; in the following main clause the head noun is again referred to by the full noun phrase “to that woman”, the indirect object of the main clause. The relativized noun within the relative clause “the woman” takes subject position.

The majority of Indus Kohistani postnominal relative clauses are “empty” or seemingly superfluous relative clauses such as shown in example (181).

(181) khẽ [sã́ mãäs-ø če kãã́ ţãs-ø] āĩ
DEVM 3PL.DEVM man-PL COMP who be.PST.M-PL.M 3PL.PROX

zã̀ã saká ţãs-ø
1PL.POSS.M relatives be.PST.M-PL.M

‘As for these people, they were our relatives’ [lit.: ‘These people who were, they were our relatives’] (Avalanche story #6)

Here, the pronoun āĩ ‘they’ in the main clause refers to the left-dislocated head of the relative clause.

Example (182) contains a similar ‘empty’ relative clause.

(182) khẽ [só ék gharĩ̃́ na če ţãs] nií = aa
DEVM 3SG.DIST one wife.OBL from COMP be.PST.M NEG = Q

tas̃̀ĩ kira tsinõõ khasãr khasãr kar-ţãs-ø
3SG.DIST.POSS to lovingly baldie baldie do-PST.IPFV.M-PL.M

‘As for him, (son) of the one wife (of two co-wives), (they) lovingly called him “baldie”’ [lit.: ‘He of the one wife who was, (they) lovingly called him “baldie”’] (G. story 1 #4)

Note that in this example, the head of the relative clause só ‘he’ and the referring pronoun tas̃̀ĩ kira ‘to him’ in the main clause fulfill two different grammatical roles: the former is a subject whereas the latter is an indirect object. The left-dislocated head plus relative clause are not really part of the main clause.

This kind of relative clause cannot be translated literally without sounding odd. It does not contain information but gives thematic prominence to the head noun. Such “empty” relative clauses are used to reactivate a participant in a discourse. They are also found in other languages of the Indian
subcontinent. In colloquial Urdu one can often hear the phrase *jo hai* ‘that/who is’ following the mention of a name or entity. Gojri, another Indo-Aryan language, has the same construction (Fast 2008:24). It seems that this particular type of left-dislocated relative clause is used as a topic construction whose function is to “allow the speaker to activate a referent without including it into the scope of assertion (or another illocutionary operator) i.e. to separate reference to an entity from the act of assertion” (Maslova and Bernini 2006:69).

On the whole, relative clauses are not very common in Indus Kohistani. The most frequently used ones are the “empty” relative clauses, followed by the prenominal sentential and participial constructions. To summarize, the operator če is used to mark the former two of these three types. Often we also find the question word kāā ‘who’ as a relative pronoun; it is obligatory where the relativized noun phrase takes a position within the relative clause other than subject.

5.2.3.2 Characteristics of relative clauses marked by če

As we have seen above, there are several relativizing strategies available in Indus Kohistani, among them the prenominal strategy that uses neither relativizer nor relative pronoun. At this point I assume that this was the default strategy before the adoption of the marker če into the Indus Kohistani lexicon. In Gilgiti Shina, the neighboring language to the North, this strategy is the only one up to today. Not incidentally, Gilgiti Shina does not have a clause-initial complementizer either; that is, the Persian *ki* did not make it into the Gilgiti Shina lexicon as it did in other languages of the area. Both languages show SOV order which typologically goes along with prenominal relative clauses as well as clause-final complementizers. So I think that, as the clause-initial marker če is on its way to gradually replace the clause-final marker *karee* in complements and purpose and reason clauses, a process which entails the change from embedded to right-extraposed (dependend) clauses, in the same way the marker če might encroach on Indus Kohistani relative clause constructions so that we have now a mixture of prenominal and left-dislocated relative clauses.

As far as I can see, all Indus Kohistani relative clauses are restrictive; they are used to identify the entity represented by the head noun. What is interesting is that all the relative clauses marked by če do
not only identify someone or something but at the same time function as a reminder to the hearer that the entity in question has been mentioned previously, or that it is shared knowledge. This is especially true of the seemingly empty relative clauses such as examples (181) and (182), shown above. One could translate such clauses with “X [head noun] that I mentioned earlier” or “recall X” or “X, you know” or “as for X”. The other relative clauses marked by če that are not “empty” work in the same way: the information given in the relative clause helps the hearer to identify and reactivate the entity represented by the head noun.

5.2.4 če in clauses that answer a question asked in the main clause

This kind of construction is very common in Indus Kohistani discourse. The main clause has the form of a question albeit without the intonation of a question; its function is to arouse interest in an answer or, in other words, to offer information which is then given in the subsequent subordinate clause introduced by če. Examples (183) and (184) below illustrate such question-answer clauses.

(183) khē só gi̊ kàam kar-åās duruzgår [če só] hoól sand-åās]
devm 3sg.dist what work do-pst.ipfv.m carpenter comp 3sg.dist

plough make-pst.ipfv.m

‘As for his, the carpenter’s occupation: he used to make ploughs’ [lit.: ‘What work did he use to do, the carpenter, he used to make ploughs’] (Tribes and their occupations #12)

In the next example, the answer to the question posed in the main clause starts in the subordinate clause and goes over the following couple of utterances.

(184) khē asī̊ xoraák gulā̊ be-ént [če muúṭyō] mii geé pát nií̊ åís]
devm 3sg.prox.poss food where.from go-prs.m comp before

1sg.dat knowledge neg be.pst.f

‘As for where the food (for the fetus) comes from: I did not know it before’(But you have said that there is the companion [placenta]; from the companion through the umbilical cord into the child’s tummy the food is passing) (Conception, birth #43)

In example (185), the answer to the question raised in the main clause is just a noun phrase introduced by če.
The overwhelming majority of these question-answer constructions are found in texts describing people, events, procedures or things in general, as the above instances illustrate. In (183), the speaker is talking about carpenters in general; in (184) about any fetus, not a specific one. Example (186) below is taken from the narrative of a mud slide and is one of the few instances where this construction is used to describe a specific event.

(186) zând káá nika-íthe máz-an [če dùu tsințoó]
alive who come.out-PRS.PFV.M.PL in-ABL COMP two boys

lák~lak háá dùu šáí gharimaas-á]
small~REDUPL and two 3PL.DEM woman-PL

‘As for those that came out alive: two boys, small ones, and these two women’ (The torrent #82)

Here, too, it is just noun phrases that constitute the answer and that are marked by če.

### 5.2.5 če in clauses that describe a quality mentioned in the main clause

In this section, I present another often used construction of main and dependent clause where the latter is introduced by če. In a way, this construction is similar to the “question - answer” ones we have seen in the previous section. As Baart notes in his description of such clauses in Kalam Kohistani, they are used “to describe a quality that is mentioned in the main clause. This can be a property of a person or a thing, but also a property of a situation or event” (Baart 1999:146) . But instead of a question word, a demonstrative in the main clause points towards the description given in the dependent clause. Let me give an example (187).

(187) kálkal sú húm ho-int nhaal-á [če káá xálak]
sometimes 3SG.DEM also become-PRS.F look-IMP.2S COMP some people

abáa baí çe-ént naii
father.GEN.M house.DAT send-PRS.M. NEG

‘Sometimes this, too, happens, look, that some people do not send (the bride) to her father’s house’ (A mother’s advice #49)
The demonstrative ṣ́ṽ ‘this’ functions as a dummy subject of the main clause, standing in for the explanation that is given in the subordinate clause introduced by če. Technically, the second clause is a subject complement, that is, it replaces the subject of the main clause. However, the subordinate clause is not always a complement (an argument of the main clause) as example (188) shows.

(188) waleé ṣás wáxt-a bài [če tsōó kāā]
but 3SG.DEM.OBL time-OBL go.IMP.2PL COMP 2PL.DOM any

meešwaál páš-ce naíi]
man see-SBJV.3SG NEG ‘But go at such a time when no man can see you’ ((Graves, graveyard #59)
The main clause is intransitive, the subordinate clause contains a specification of “such a time”, itself an adjunct in the main clause.

In example (189) the speaker explains the nature of one particular sin.

(189) ék gunàa séc thú [če tú baazaar-ií bée]
one sin such be.PRS.M.SG COMP 2SG market-DAT go.SBJV.2SG

šišlútió hòo] bareheaded become.SBJV.2SG

‘sOne sin is this, that you go to the market with your head uncovered’ (About sin #6)

Another common use of this construction is illustrated in (190).

(190) xawànd-áā kira ṣú pháraz thú [če niwàaz-ǎí]
husband-GEN.M to 3SG.DEM duty be.PRS.M.SG COMP ritual.prayer-GEN.F

baari-á man ghariàa kira baali-á mán-ee] turn-OBL in wife.GEN.M to word-PL say-SBJV.3SG

‘The husband has this duty that he talk to his wife (teach her) about the ritual prayer’ (Men’s duties #124)

(191) sáí khusí-á attí hôíís-ο [če gáž]
3PL.DIST sleeve-PL this.much.F become.PST.IPfv.F-PL.F COMP yard

‘Those sleeves used to be this [deictic] wide: one yard’ (Music, singing, dancing #86)

In the last example of this section, the clause introduced by če is a reported direct speech.

(192) asíí xawànd tal háq sand-z-àant [če tús]
3SG.PROX.POSS husband.OBL on right make-PASS-PRS.M COMP 2PL
It is her claim on the husband [and on the son] that they take her to the hospital’ [lit.: ‘… that “you take (me) to the hospital”’] (Men’s duties #28)

In this section I have shown dependent clauses introduced by če that describe a quality mentioned in the main clause, a construction that Indus Kohistani speakers use very frequently.

5.2.6 če in conditional clauses

Conditional mood in Indus Kohistani conditional clauses is indicated by the verb suffix -uú that is added to the perfective verb stem, as in (če) kar-il-uú ‘if (he) does’. Another way to signal a condition-consequence relationship between two clauses is the use of the subordinator khẽ, as seen in example (193) (the protasis clause is in square brackets).

(193)  khẽ  neék  man-àant  če  [tú  xúš  thú]  khẽ
        DEVM  landowner  say-PRS.M  COMP  2SG  pleased  be-PRS.M.SG  SUB

  gatá  mĩř  dòol  kam-á
again  1SG.POSS  field  cultivate-IMP.2SG

‘Then the landowner says, “Cultivate (my) field again if you like”’ (About deqani #87)

The conditional clause construction in this example is a speech complement introduced by če.

There are a few instances in my data where the marker če occurs in a conditional clause. Examples (194) and (195) illustrate this use.

(194)  pàat  alùuz  xaandàan  man-àant  [če  kanaý  má]  tìe
       next  other  family  say-PRS.M  COMP  enmity  1SG  then

  xátam  kar-áṣat  áś  kanaý  [če  měč]  tũ
stop  do-FUT.M  3SG.PROX.DOM  enmity  COMP  1SG.ERG  2SG.POSS

màaṣ  maar-il-uũ]
man  kill-PFV1-COND

‘Next the other family says, “I will end the enmity only then, if/when I have killed a man of yours’” (A way to end a feud #3)
Here, too, the conditional construction is a speech complement introduced by če. Therefore če occurs twice: first as a complementizer, then it introduces the protasis. Note that the clause containing the condition in this as well as in the next example is marked as such by the verbal conditional suffix -uú.

\[(195) \begin{array}{llllllllll}
 khẽ & sêẽ & man-áthe & [če & pičàa & hāa & gõli & má \\
 DEVM & 3SG.DIST.ERG & say-PRS.PFV & COMP & uncle & and & bread & 1SG
\end{array} \]

tiigeč tèe di-ínt [če têē qasá kar-il-uú]]

2SG.DAT then give-PRS.F COMP 2SG.ERG story do-PFV1-COND

‘Then she said, “Uncle, I will give you a meal on the condition that you first tell a story”’

(Prince and fairy #115)

I conclude that, as in these examples, the marker če is present in addition to the conditional verb form, it does not indicate conditional mood as such, it must have some additional function about which at this point I am not able to comment.

5.2.7 Other uses of the marker če

There are a number of other constructions introduced by če that do not fit in either of the above described categories. Here I want to present some examples in order to give a more complete picture of the uses of če. As these examples have to be seen in the wider context I use the translation only.

Example (196) is from a text about people’s clothes.

\[(196) \begin{array}{llllllllll}
 (a) & ‘Men wear socks.’ \\
 (b) & To them we say muuzii, muuzii. \\
 (c) & You were saying that you have seen (men) wearing socks made of leather. \\
 (d) & če to them we say muuzii. \\
 (e) & Only men wear the gaiters made of leather’
\end{array} \]

(About clothes #29-32)

In this example clause (196c) introduced by če seems to be a repetition of clause (196b).

In example (197), če introduces an independent clause\(^{19}\).

\(^{19}\text{The decision to term such clauses as independent is based on the intonation of the preceding clause and length of pause between the two clauses.}\)
(197)  (a) ‘On the shirt front we sew buttons.

(b) These (buttons) are there in all colors and shapes, up in our country; we used to fix them (on the shirt front) in this way, fixing (a lot of them).

(c) Now the Maulvi Sahib is displeased, he does not allow to wear them.

(d) It is a bad thing (to wear clothes adorned in this way); it (wearing them) will be punished in the grave.

(e) će now we sew simple clothes, we sew simple clothes.’

(About clothes #78-82)

Here, će might be translated as either “so” or “for this reason”.

In the next example, će again introduces an independent clause.

(198)  (a) ‘Sometimes (the female jinns) do not leave (the patient).

(b) Then the patient won’t become well.

(c) Then what can we do?

(d) We sit and watch (her) and do not let her bake bread.

(e) And we do not allow her to go outside after sunset.

(f) We will sit and watch (her), će when she gets a seizure then she will be in trouble.

(g) There will be much trouble for the other people in the house.

(h) će we have to wait (with) her (for a seizure ?)’

(About seizures and jinns #38-41)

In clause (199f), će seems to introduce a reason clause. In (199h), an independent clause, će might be translated as “for this reason”, or it might indicate a reformulation of what has been said in the preceding utterances.

So far I have described and illustrated the different uses of će: as a complementizer in complements of utterance, perception and cognition predicates, as complementizer in complements of other predicates, as a marker of complements of utterance and cognition predicates but where the predicate is absent, as marker of purpose and reason clauses, and as marker of relative clauses. Furthermore, će can occur in conditional and other subordinate clauses and may introduce independent clauses.
5.3 Analysis of the marker če

In this section I present an analysis of the marker če that is limited to its uses as a replacement of the marker karee. I leave aside the use of če as a marker of relative and conditional clauses and of other clauses that are neither complements nor purpose or reason clauses as this would go beyond the scope of this study.

5.3.1 The marker če replaces karee

In section 4.5.2.2 I already noted that the functions of the two markers karee and če seem to be overlapping a good deal. In this section I want to take a closer look at the distribution of both markers and offer a possible explanation for the particular distribution pattern.

Let me recall the typical grammaticalization path of SAY verbs as quoted in section 4.4.2:

Original form > quotation marker > complementizer > purpose-clause linker > reason-clause linker > conditional-clause linker > naming marker > marker used with onomatopoeic words/ideophones > comparative marker > mirative marker,

We have seen in Chapter 4 that karee is used as quotation marker, as complementizer, as purpose and reason clause linker, and in naming constructions. However, occurrences of karee are not distributed evenly along this path. In my data, the frequency of karee as a quotation marker is rather low, as is its occurrence as a complementizer. On the other hand, the complementizer če is used much more frequently; it seems to be the default marker of utterance and other complements. When looking at purpose and reason clauses, what I can gather from my data is that karee is the marker used more often; examples with če as an indicator of such clauses are scarce. As to naming constructions, only karee can be used as naming marker. What causes this particular distribution of karee as well as of če?

Recall that karee is the older marker whereas če is a later borrowing, most probably from Pashto. Bashir (1996) offers an explanation by looking at a similar pattern of two such markers in Kalasha, another language of Northern Pakistan, but from a diachronic perspective. Kalasha has two co-existing complementizers, the older SAY complementizer ghōi and the more recently borrowed ki (Persian via Khowar/Urdu).
Bashir notes that where predicates can take either of the two markers, complements with the SAY complementizer *ghōi* are semantically more marked, emphasizing “specific intentionality and emotional commitment”, whereas complements with *ki* are neutral in this aspect (1996:207-8). Furthermore, *ki* seems to follow the SAY verb grammaticalization path in that *ki* starts to appear in purpose and reason clauses. Bashir concludes by saying that the more recent marker *ki* seems to become the default complementizer with unmarked predicates of saying, that is, it is mostly found on the left end of the quotative - complementizer - purpose/reason clause marker path, but at the same time follows this path, as its occasional use in purpose/reason clauses shows. On the other hand, *ghōi* is found more frequently towards the right end of this path.

In Indus Kohistani, the picture is somewhat similar, as I have pointed out above. On the left end, most utterance predicates take *če* as complementizer. Towards the right end, that is, in purpose and reason clauses, both markers may be used but *karee* is more frequent. As in Kalasha, clauses marked with *karee* are more marked in that intentionality is emphasized, *karee* being used especially in complements/clauses where thoughts and intentions (metarepresentations of thoughts) are expressed. That is, in Bashirs words, we have a “bottom-truncated” hierarchy (1996:208) where complements of utterance predicates constitute the bottom, with *če* as the default marker, and purpose/reason clauses, naming constructions etc. are found on the higher end, with *karee* as the default marker.

The fact that *če* seems to follow *karee* on this particular path has implications for its analysis which will be the topic of the following section.

### 5.3.2  *če*: a metarepresentation marker where it replaces *karee*

In Chapter 4 I have analyzed *karee* as a marker of metarepresentations of (self-)attributed speech and thought. In this section I propose the same analysis for the complementizer *če* where it follows in the “footsteps” of the marker *karee*, that is: as a complementizer with predicates of utterance, perception and cognition (section 5.2.1.1), as a complementizer with other predicates (section 5.2.1.2), in cases where *če* is the only indicator of reported speech or thought (section 5.2.1.3), and as a marker
of purpose and reason clauses (section 5.2.2). Such an analysis of a complementizer has been suggested by Blass for the English complementizer *that* (Blass 1990:123).

The following examples from these sections will illustrate my claim. Example (135), repeated here, shows *če* as complementizer of a speech clause.

(135)  sā́  baačã̀ã  nookar-õõ̀  man-ágil  [če  tús  guhí  be-ént-ø]
     3PL.DIST  king.GEN.M  servant-PL.ERG  say-PVF.2  COMP  2PL  where.to
     go-PRS.M-PL.M

‘The king’s servants said, “Where do you go to?”’ (Prince and fairy #23)

Here *če* indicates that what follows is the metarepresentation of someone’s speech. As the utterance predicate *man-* ‘say’ is also present in this construction, this is a case of double marking.

Example (154), repeated here, contains a predicate taking complements other than of utterance, perception and cognition, namely the verb *koošìiš kar-* ‘try to’.

(154)  bazií  koošìiš  kàr-àant-ø  [če  šás  icháni-ø  tal  guzàar  kàr-ìž  às  hìnda-áìž]
     go.CV  attempt  do-PRS.M-PL.M  COMP  3SG.DEM.OBL  bear.F.OBL  on  shot/bullet  do-SBJV.1PL  3SG.PROX.DOM  drive.away-SBJV.1PL

‘Having gone (they) try to shoot at the female bear, to drive her away’ [lit.: ‘Having gone (they) try that “let’s shoot at the female bear, let’s drive her away”’] (Hunting in Kohistan #97)

Here again, *če* indicates that the clause introduced by it is a metarepresentation - in this case it may be of a speech or of a thought. Note that the complement clause has direct speech form; this is another hint that the complement does not contain the proposition of a state of affairs but the metarepresentation of someone’s speech or thought. As we have seen in section 5.2.1.2, the predicate *koošìiš kar-* ‘try to’ does not always take a sentential complement introduced by *če*, see example (155), repeated here.

(155)  phòož-e  [ás  dhay-ìì]  koošìiš  kiìr
     army-ERG  3SG.PROX.DOM  grab-NMLZ.GEN.F  attempt.F  do.PVF

‘The army attempted to get hold of him’ [lit.: ‘The army did the attempt of getting hold of him’] (Q.’s story #28)
This example is simply the proposition of a state of affairs, someone tried to do something, as seen from an outsider perspective. Example (154) on the other hand describes a case of trying to do something from an insider perspective, as an intention or thought.

I suspect that in such cases, where there are several complementation strategies possible for one particular predicate, the sentential complement option with če is chosen when the speaker wants to emphasize the intentional aspect of the notion that the predicate is expressing. In such a case, the complement will contain the metarepresentation of a thought in the widest sense. With other complementation options such as shown in (155), the content of the complement is presented as the proposition of a state of affairs.

Example (162), repeated here, is an instance of an obvious speech complement introduced by če but without the respective speech predicate.

(162) tēe bé daaḳtar-ii̯ paša-ánt-o [če tú nhaal-á ta
then 1PL.EXCL doctor-DAT show-PRS.M-PL.M COMP 2SG look-IMP.2SG DM

ú gí thú]
3SG.PROX what be.PRS.M.SG

‘Then we show (the boil) to the doctor (and ask him) to look at it and find out what kind it is’

[lit.: ‘Then we show (the boil) to the doctor COMP “Look at it, what is it?”’] (About boils #25)

Here both the presence of the complementizer če and the direct speech form of the complement help the hearer to interpret the complement as the metarepresentation of an attributed speech.

If my analysis is correct then the presence of če on its own, in a complement where the direct speech form is not obvious, will indicate the metarepresentation of a speech or thought. In the following example (199), the clause introduced by če cannot be recognized as direct speech as such.

(199a) khē xálak gatá xušal huú khàn tal bhay-âas-e
DEVM people again happy become.CVB mountain.OBL on sit-PST.IPFV.M-PL.M

[če hī yaráz atyúk hū de-ént naíí.
COMP now meaning this.much snow.M give-PRS.M NEG
‘So the people were happy (because there had not been much snow in the past years) and were staying up the mountain, saying, “nowadays there is not much snow. Let’s stay up the mountain”’ [lit.: ‘… were staying up the mountain COMP nowadays there is not much snow Let’s stay up the mountain’] (Avalanche story #9-10)

Note that in clause (199a) there are no pronouns that would indicate a direct speech form, neither does the verb form give any indication. It is the presence of the complementizer če that marks this clause as the metarepresentation of someone’s speech or thought. Only in the following sentence (199b) the verb form bhayíž ‘let’s stay’ is an additional indicator of the complement being a reported speech. In such a case, če is not just an indicator of a metarepresentation, it also constrains the hearer to construct a higher-level explicature such as “the people say/think that nowadays, there is not much snow”.

Purpose and reason clauses marked by če are similar in that če may be the only hint that the clause introduced by it contains someone’s reported thought/intention. Example (169), repeated here, is a purpose clause.

‘…and I went from up there for it, I went for the pail in order to milk the cow’ (The evil eye #141)

Here the marker če as well as the verb form used in the subordinate clause (subjunctive 1SG) help to identify it as a reported thought/intention.

In this section I have proposed to analyze the complementizer če as a marker of metarepresentations of (self-) reported speech and thoughts. These include complements of utterance, perception and cognition predicates, other sentential complements of predicates such as try and wait, complements where the respective predicate is missing, and purpose and reason clauses.
5.3.3 Other uses of ěe

In the previous section, I have proposed an analysis of the marker ěe where it is used as a complementizer and marker of purpose and reason clauses. But what about ěe as marker in relative clauses, in conditional clauses, and in clauses such as the ones described in section 5.2.7? At this point, I am not able to offer an analysis that would include all the uses described above. Such an undertaking would go beyond the limits of this thesis.

It seems that on the Indian subcontinent and beyond, ěe is not the only complementizer with such diverse uses. The similarly multifunctional Persian subordinator/complementizer ki (a “relative” of ěe?), has made its way into many languages of the area, such as Urdu, Kalasha and Khowar, as described by Bashir (1996), Balochi (Farrell 2005), Palula (Liljegren 2008), and also Turkic among other languages. I know of one study that analyzes Balochi ķi as an interpretive use marker (Farrell 2005). However, it seems to me that “indicator of interpretive use/metarepresentation” may be just one aspect of its meaning and does not cover all its uses. As already pointed out, such an analysis that includes all functions of ěe would go beyond the scope of this thesis.

5.4 Summary: the marker ěe

In this chapter I have looked at the Indus Kohistani multifunctional marker ěe, as far as its uses overlap with those of the marker karee: as quotative and complementizer, and as marker of purpose and reason clauses. I have also briefly illustrated its further uses. The clause linker ěe has most probably been borrowed from Pashto and seems to be on its way to gradually replace the older marker karee. Whereas karee is a clause-final marker, ěe is positioned clause-initial; clauses introduced by it are postposed, that is, they follow the clause-final verb of the main clause, with the exception of relative clauses.

The marker ěe is most frequently used in complements; it is the default complementizer in complements of speech predicates. It also occurs in complements of perception and cognition predicates and of others that take sentential complements. It marks complements where the complement-taking utterance or “think” predicate has been omitted. It functions as clause linker in purpose and reason
clause constructions. Further uses that have not been treated in-depth in this chapter include marking relative clauses, conditional clauses, adverbial clauses, and introduction of independent clauses.

I have then compared *karee* and *če* in their distribution and have followed Bashir (1996) in suggesting that the more recently acquired complementizer *če* is on the way to replace the older marker *karee*. This would account for *če* being the default complementizer in complements of utterance predicates, whereas *karee* rarely occurs in such complements. On the other end of the grammaticalization path of quotative > complementizer > purpose/reason clause marker, it is *karee* that is used more frequently, with a few occurrences of *če*.

Like *karee*, the marker *če* indicates metarepresentation in those instances where it is used like *karee*. However, this can be only part of its meaning; further research will be needed to find the meaning that covers all uses of *če*. 
Chapter 6  
The Indus Kohistani marker *loo*

In this chapter, I introduce and describe the Indus Kohistani discourse marker *loo*, the last of the four metarepresentation markers investigated in this study. Like *lee*, *karee*, and *če*, this marker has so far not been described in the literature. However, Buddrus (1959:21) in his notes on texts of Kanyawali (see section 1.4) mentions verb forms ending in -lō̃, for instance *harálō̃* which he translates as ‘er möge nehmen’ [‘he may take’], at the same time noting that he is not sure as to how to classify these forms.

In the following sections I give a definition and describe the syntactic properties of *loo*. Then I illustrate its two main uses in detail: *loo* as marker of utterances that a speaker wants her addressee to say to a third person, or, in other words, *loo* as marker of desirable utterances, and secondly, *loo* as marker of third person imperative utterances. In the last section I show that Relevance Theory allows for an analysis that can account for all uses: both, utterances that a speaker wishes her addressee to convey to a third person, and directives aimed at a third person (third person imperative) are metarepresentations of desirable utterances; it follows that *loo* is best analyzed as a procedural indicator of such metarepresentations of desirable utterances.

6.1 Definition of *loo*

The Indus Kohistani marker *loo* is a discourse marker with a seemingly twofold function. First, it marks utterances that a person A wants her addressee B to reproduce to a person C. An English example illustrates this use. Person A tells person B, “Tell person C that **tonight I will be at home after five**

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20 Translation into English by the author.
"o’clock". The part in bold of person A’s utterance is the part that she wants to be reproduced; and this is the part that is marked by loo in Indus Kohistani.

In its second function, loo seems to indicate third person imperative. In such a clause marked by loo, the subject is a third person singular or plural; the verb has a second-person singular or second-person plural imperative suffix and is followed by loo. The meaning conveyed by such a construction is “he/they should do s.th.” (command), or “she/they are allowed to/may do s.th.” (permission/agreement).

As in both cases the clause that is marked by loo is part of or constitutes an utterance, loo can be described as a speech marker. In both uses a person A wants a person C to do or know something. But whereas in the former kind of utterance, a person B is asked to reproduce person A’s utterance to person C, in the latter kind, person A’s uttered command or permission does not necessarily require a person B as a conveyor. I will show in section 6.4 that both cases are instances of metarepresentations of a desirable utterance. Throughout this chapter, loo will be glossed as “desirable utterance marker” or DUM.

### 6.2 Syntactic properties of loo

Like the “reported” speech marker lee, loo is an enclitic that follows the final element of a clause which usually is the verb. loo may precede or follow other clause-final clitics such as negation marker and question marker. Phonologically too, loo behaves like the clitic lee; it is dependent on its host and forms a phonological unit with it. loo has no accent of its own; neither does the accent of a host shift to the clitic. If the host word ends in a short vowel then this short vowel may be lengthened (see also lee, section 3.3), for instance if the host is a verb with a second person singular imperative ending, the imperative suffix -á may be lengthened to -áa. The accent remains on the first mora of the now long vowel so that phonetically, the lengthened vowel seems to have a falling accent.
6.3 Uses of the marker *loo*

In this section I describe and illustrate the two above mentioned uses of *loo*, i.e. *loo* marking clauses that a speaker wants her addressee to convey to a third person, and *loo* marking third person imperative clauses.

6.3.1 *loo* as marker of utterances that a speaker wants her addressee to convey to a third person

In Indus Kohistani discourse, *loo* marks such utterances that a speaker wants her addressee to pass on to a third person. In this study I use the terms “speaker A”, “addressee B”, and “addressee, or recipient C” to describe such a situation. In utterances of this kind, speaker A may or may not explicitly ask her addressee B to pass on her utterance to recipient C. In the following section I look at instances where the speaker makes explicit her wish to convey her utterance to recipient C. Such clauses marked by *loo* will be in square brackets.

6.3.1.1 *loo* marking a speech complement

To repeat, a speaker A marks such an utterance with *loo* that she wants addressee B to convey to a person C who may or may not be present. Often such utterances are of the form “tell person C that …*loo*”, that is: the utterance is the complement of a matrix clause with a speech verb in imperative form. Example (200) illustrates this use. A girl had been sent by her mother to find out if my language consultant was at home; and upon finding her there she got the following answer.

(200) \[ \text{tú} \; \text{bá} \; \text{tàř} \; \text{yàa-i} \; \text{man-á} \; \text{če} \; \text{f[má] \; bád-ø} \]

\[ \text{2SG \; go.IMP.2SG \; REFL.POSS.F \; mother-DAT \; say-IMP.2SG \; COMP \; 1SG \; house-OBL} \]

\[ \text{man \; thí=loo]} \]

\[ \text{in \; be.PRS.F = DUM} \]

‘Go; tell your mother that I am at home’ (conversation 20.2.2012)

My language consultant told me that the addressee of the utterance in (200) would then tell her mother as follows in (201):
‘The older sister has said that she is at home’ [lit.: ‘The older sister has said, “I am at home”’]
(elicited)

Note that in both examples, the utterance in the complement clause has direct speech form, as Indus Kohistani does not use at all indirect speech. The marker karee in (201) indicates reported speech (see also section 4.3.1).

The context in which the next example (202) was uttered was such that person A, the speaker, her addressee B, and the addressee C were present. The mother of a toddler gave her son a cookie for me and told him what to say.

‘Go over and give (the cookie) to Bajii (Older Sister); tell her to eat it’ [lit.: ‘Tell her, “Eat!”’] (conversation 4.6.2012)

And a while later, when the little boy was scribbling with a pen on a piece of paper, the mother uttered the following (202):


The first utterance to be reproduced in (202) contains a command, the second one in (202) the description of a state of affairs. In all three examples the clause that the speaker wishes to be reproduced is the complement of a speech verb, and addressee B is explicitly told to whom to convey the utterance.

6.3.1.2 loo marking clauses that are not overt speech complements

Utterances that a speaker wishes to be reproduced by the addressee do not have to be explicitly framed by a complement-taking predicate such as a speech verb. The next example (204) is again taken from a conversation between mother and her toddler son. I had greeted the little one and asked how he was. The mother then said to him:

‘(Say), “I am fine. How are you?”’ [lit.: ‘(I) am fine loo. How are you?’] (conversation 8.6.2012)
Here the mother is uttering just what she wants her son to say. The command “say/tell her” is not expressed by a speech verb; it is indicated by the presence of the marker loo alone. Note that in this utterance, loo follows only the first of the two clauses that the mother wants her son to reproduce, however, from the context it is clear that she wants him to utter both clauses.

The next example was uttered while I was working with my language consultant. In another room of the house, a TV was blaring away. My language consultant called one of her daughters-in-law who was in sight and told her (205):

(205) oó D khún kā̃̃ thú
VOC name.F inside who be.PRS.M.SG

\[sás \text{ awàaz kám kar-ì ì juicy = loo}\]
3SG.DEM.DOM voice less do-IMP.2PL = DUM

‘Oh D, who is inside (the room with the TV)? Tell them to turn down the volume’ [lit.: ‘Oh D, who is inside (the room with the TV)? Turn down the volume loo’] (conversation 29.10.2012)

The information that her daughter-in-law should tell to whoever was watching TV is conveyed by the marker loo alone, without making the command to tell explicit.

A final example of this use is shown in (206). A had told one of the children to return to G a few children’s clothes that G had lent for her daughter’s children who were visiting. She said:

(206) ã̃́ ṣa-áthe naií = loo
3PL.PROX wear-PRS.PFV NEG = DUM

‘Tell G that (the children) have not worn them (= the clothes are clean)’ (conversation 24.8.2012)

Here again, the request to tell has not been made explicit by the use of a speech verb. The presence of loo alone is sufficient to indicate the speaker’s wish “tell G that …”.

6.3.1.3 The marker loo in questions

A speaker may ask her addressee to convey to a third person any kind of utterance: commands, descriptions of states of affairs, questions. Following is an example where a mother tells her son to ask me a question (207).
In this utterance, the marker *loo* is following the question marker *aa*, itself an enclitic that follows the clause-final element. This indicates that the question marker is within the scope of the marker *loo*, in other words, the utterance to be reproduced is a question.

Example (208) is another illustration of the use of *loo* in questions. It is an exchange between speakers A and C that happened when someone outside was rattling the street side door of the house.

(208a) A: *maasmá thé bás hoó ta C*

child.PL be.STM appearing become.IMP.2SG DM name.F

‘There are children. Come, C!’

(208b) C: *maasmá thé oó kuú*

child.PL be.STM.M VOC older.sister

‘These are children (rattling the door), Older Sister’

(208c) A: *[gií kar-ànt-ø = loo] alá*

what do-PRS.M-PL.=DUM there

‘Ask them what they are doing there’ [lit.: ‘What are (you) doing *loo* there?’] (conversation 4.2.2013)

The utterance in the scope of *loo* is a wh-question “What are you doing?” There is no overt complement-taking predicate. The presence of the marker *loo* is enough to indicate the only possible interpretation of utterance (208c) namely that C should ask the children “what are you doing?” The adverb *alá* ‘here’ in this clause is following the marker *loo* because it is an afterthought.

In the next example (209) below, a yes-no question, the sequence of question marker and marker *loo* is reversed; the marker *loo* is preceding the question marker. The context of this utterance is as follows: I had brought medicine for one of my language consultant’s sons. She then asked me,

(209) *[äß khaá baari-aá = loo] = aa*

3PL.PROX eat.CVB finish.off-IMP.2SG=DUM=Q

‘Should I tell him to finish them (pills/medicine)?’ [lit.: ‘Do you wish me to tell him, “Finish them (pills/medicine)!”’] (conversation 14.12.2012)
As in the previous example, *loo* is the only indicator that the utterance should be reproduced. But in contrast to example (207), the question marker is outside the scope of the marker *loo*; the utterance to be quoted is a simple command “finish them all”. What is questioned here is whether the speaker should reproduce this utterance or not, not the utterance itself.

### 6.3.1.4 The marker *loo* and negation

Like commands, descriptions of states of affairs, and questions, utterances containing a negation may be marked by *loo*. The default negation marker in Indus Kohistani is *niū* ‘not’, it precedes the clause-final verb. Example (210) shows such an utterance.

(210) \[\text{man-á če [uskēčí niī bíž = loo]}\]
\[\text{say-IMP.2SG COMP now NEG go.SBJV.1PL = DUM}\]
\[\text{rupāy hùn khē bíž = loo}\]
\[\text{rupee become.PFV1 SUB go.SBJV.1PL = DUM}\]

‘Tell (your mother), “let’s not go now, right? Let’s go when we have money”’ (conversation 2.4.2012)

The first utterance marked by *loo* contains the negated proposition “let’s not go now”.

There is a second Indus Kohistani negation marker *naū* ‘not’, used to convey more emphasis on the negation. This negation marker follows the verb. Example (206), repeated here, contains such a marked negation.

(206) \[\text{[ā́ sa-āthe naū = loo]}\]
\[\text{3PL.PROX wear-PRS.PR1 NEG = DUM}\]

‘Tell G. that (the children) have not worn them (= the clothes are clean)’ (conversation 24.8.2012)

In this example, the marker *loo* follows the negation marker *naū*, thereby including it in its scope. The utterance that the speaker wishes her addressee to convey to a third person contains a negation.

In the next example (211), *loo* is preceding the negation marker. My language consultant told me what her son had said concerning my visiting them.

(211) \[\text{AB man-āãs če tíí tíš [ū béetsōo gee}}\]
\[\text{name.M say-PST.IPVF.M COMP 2SG.OBL about 3SG.PROX 1PL.INCL.OBL to}\]
This utterance seems to be ambiguous in regard to what is negated, because the negation marker is following \textit{loo} and therefore could be thought of as not being within the scope of \textit{loo}. So another possible interpretation might be “don’t tell her to come to us”, assuming that the negation marker has the implied command “tell her” in its scope. However, according to my language consultant, the only possible interpretation is the former one “tell her \textbf{not to come to us}”. Why is the latter interpretation not possible? The next examples (212) and (213) will illustrate that only utterances that the speaker \textit{wants} to be reproduced by the addressee can be marked by \textit{loo}. Utterances that she commands \textbf{not} to say have to be marked differently as we will see in example (212). Previous to the utterance in (212), the addressee’s husband had left the house for work. The addressee was in need of sandals but had not asked her husband to bring her some from the bazaar. Her mother-in-law, the speaker, then said to her:

\begin{verbatim}
(212) éqaa tú L-i man-ãís gín naí [miïgeé tsaplia

oh! 2SG name.M-DAT say-PST.IPFV.F why NEG 1SG.DAT sandal.PL

aá kar]

bring.IMP.2SG MRM
\end{verbatim}

‘Oh! Why didn’t you tell L to bring you sandals?’ (conversation 18.5.2012)

In this example, the scope of the negation marker is unambiguous: it is the speech verb \textit{man-} ‘tell’ that is negated, not the utterance that should have been conveyed to the addressee’s husband. However, the speaker did not use \textit{loo}; it is the marker \textit{kar} (shortened form of \textit{karee}, see Chapter 4) that is employed here.

The next example (213) below is a further illustration of this point. The context of the utterance is as follows: During one of my visits, the family of one of my language consultant’s daughters-in-law called and wanted to meet me at her house. As they did not live nearby my language consultant decided that it would be too late that day. She instructed her daughter-in-law to call her family and tell them that they should come next week “when Beate would be here”, giving the impression that I was not present at the time of their call.

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Here, again, the utterance the speaker does not wish to be conveyed is marked by karee whereas the utterance that the speaker wants the addressee to reproduce is marked by loo. Utterances that are only hypothetical, that are not to be realized, cannot be marked by loo; the appropriate marker for such utterances is karee, the marker for thoughts and hypothetical utterances (see Chapter 4).

Coming back to example (211), it is clear that if the interpretation “do not tell her to come to us” had been intended then the speaker would have used the marker karee instead of loo. Furthermore, in such a case the command “tell not” will be made explicit in which case the negation marker is preceding (naí NEG) or following the speech verb (naí NEG), not the utterance to be conveyed. So the position of the negation marker naí in relation to loo (preceding or following) has no influence on the interpretation of the utterance. In this regard, negation marker and question marker are distinct (see section 6.3.1.3).

### 6.3.1.5 The marker loo in utterances that the speaker herself will reproduce

Can a user use the marker loo to mark her own utterances that she intends to reproduce later to another audience? In this section, I show that this is possible only under certain conditions. If loo is an indicator used to mark utterances that should be reproduced by either addressee B or speaker A then it should be possible to mark utterances such as “I will tell my mother that I will visit her next week loo”, said in a conversation with my sister. According to my language consultant, this is not possible. Such utterances cannot be marked by loo. Neither is there any such instance in my data to be found.

Let me give another example. Suppose my language consultant has been ill for a time but now is again well. I am mentioning that I intend to call my mother, and I say to her “I will tell my mother that you are again well”. Here, too, I cannot use loo to mark this utterance that I intend to reproduce to my mother. However, if my language consultant explicitly asks me to tell my mother that she has recovered
then I can say “I will tell my mother that you are well loo” or, fully explicit, “I will tell my mother that you said to tell her ‘I am well’”. Because my language consultant wishes me to tell my mother that she is well I can use loo in my utterance that I myself will reproduce. In other words: My utterance marked by loo is a repetition of my language consultant’s original utterance ‘tell your mother that I am well loo’; I am addressee B who conveys the desirable utterance to a third person. Remember that in the uses of loo seen so far there are usually three parties involved: speaker A who wishes her utterance to be conveyed to a third person, addressee B who will do the conveying, and addressee or recipient C for whom the utterance is intended. To take my above mentioned example “I will tell my mother that I will visit her next week”: here there is the speaker (I), the addressee (my sister), and the recipient of my intended utterance (my mother), but there is no wish that someone else apart from the speaker reproduce the utterance, therefore, loo cannot be used.

Example (209), repeated here, is a question my language consultant asked me concerning medicine I had brought for her son.

(209) [ā́  khaá  baari-aā = loo] = aa
     3PL.PROX  eat.CVB  finish.up-IMP.2SG = DUM = Q

‘Should I tell him to finish all the medicine?’ (conversation 14.12.2012)

In the light of the definition of loo arrived at above the more precise translation of this utterance is “do you wish me to tell him to finish all the medicine?” In this case, the one who wishes to convey the utterance is Beate (myself), the conveyor of the utterance is the actual speaker of the utterance, and the recipient is her son who is not present. It follows that in contrast to the previous example above (my sister and I), the use of loo is correct.

Example (214) is another illustration of this point. It is taken from a conversation between my language consultant and one of her daughters-in-law. My language consultant was getting ready to visit her oldest daughter. One of the younger daughters-in-law wanted to accompany her and asked:

(214) [kuá  bhay= loo] = aa
     older.sister  sit.IMP.2SG = DUM = Q

‘Do you want me to tell Older Sister to stay here?’ (conversation 11.5.2012)
Here again, the speaker of the utterance is only repeating an utterance that she thinks (or wishes) that her mother-in-law wants to be conveyed to Older Sister. The one that is thought to wish to convey an utterance is the mother-in-law, the one who should convey the utterance is the younger daughter-in-law, and the intended recipient of the utterance is Older Sister.

So far we have seen examples with three parties involved: speaker A, addressee B and recipient C. Above I pointed out that an utterance that speaker A says with the intention to later repeat it herself to recipient C cannot be marked by \textit{loo}. But what about the following scenario where speaker A says an utterance to addressee B asking him to repeat/say this utterance back to speaker A? I do not have any instance of this use in my data. But if my analysis of \textit{loo} as a marker of metarepresentations of desirable utterances is correct then such an utterance, too, should be marked by \textit{loo}, see section 6.4 and especially example (239), where we find exactly the same situation, namely speaker A produces an utterance that he requests addressee B to repeat back to him.

In this section I have shown that the marker \textit{loo} cannot be used to mark utterances that a speaker A herself wants to reproduce at some later time to another audience. The use of \textit{loo} seems to imply that an utterance marked by it has to be passed on by a person other than speaker A who wishes it to be conveyed.

6.3.1.6 The marker \textit{loo} in reported utterances

Not only the speaker of an utterance that she wishes her addressee to convey to a third person may use \textit{loo}. The direct addressee B of such an utterance as well as the intended third-person recipient C or any other person may report what the original speaker said, using the marker \textit{loo}. The following examples will illustrate this use.

The first example is a case of the addressee B reporting the utterance of speaker A to recipient C.

\begin{verbatim}
(215) así̄ yàa-e bilaāl miigeé miná̄̄ kar-álaas só
 3SG.PROX.POSS mother-ERG yesterday 1SG.DAT request do-PST.PRF 3SG.DIST

man-áynt mir šú surát pats-íthi miigeé
say-PRS.F 1SG.POSS 3SG.DEM private.parts be.sore-PRS.PFV.F 1SG.DAT
\end{verbatim}
Yesterday her mother asked me for a favour; she said, “I am sore; tell Beate to bring some pills for me”’ (conversation 20.4.2013)

Here, the speaker A of the conveyed utterance is asî! yàae ‘her mother’; the addressee B, my language consultant, is reporting the utterance to me, the recipient C. The marker loo in this utterance again indicates that the original speaker wished my language consultant to pass on the request. By using loo it is not necessary for the original speaker A to explicitly say, “tell her…” nor does the addressee B, when reporting the utterance, have to make explicit to recipient C that the speaker told her “tell her…”; the marker loo on its own indicates the telling.

In example (216) below, recipient C is reporting the utterance of speaker A to someone else. The original speaker of the reported utterance was a daughter of my language consultant who lived far away from her mother. At one time, she had sent some clothes material to her mother via a third person X, who then conveyed to my language consultant the message her daughter had asked her to pass on. Sometime later, my language helper told me about this and quoted her daughter, using the marker loo.

Example (217) is a report of utterances marked by loo, where the person reporting is neither speaker A nor addressee B nor recipient C.

She said (to X who brought the cloth), “tell her not to give the clothes material to anyone else but to put it into J’s wife’s wedding gift box”’ (conversation 27.8.2012)

Like in the previous example, the presence of the marker loo clearly indicates the wish of the original speaker to have her message conveyed to the recipient, that is my language consultant, without the need of a speech verb to make it explicit.

Example (217) is a report of utterances marked by loo, where the person reporting is neither speaker A nor addressee B nor recipient C.
She is making phone calls (to the place) up-valley, to her grandmother, saying "Tell father to come down. Tell him to take me home. Tell father to come down. Tell him to take me home." (conversation 19.10.2012)

Here again, *loo* is the only and sufficient indication that the caller on the phone wishes her grandmother to convey her message to her father. There is not one speech verb in this quoted utterance. Nevertheless, the utterance is not ambiguous. The complementizer *če* stands in place of a predicate-taking speech verb, see section 5.2.1.3.

In this section I have shown that the marker *loo* is not only used by a speaker who wants her addressee to convey an utterance. Speaker A, addressee B and recipient C as well as any other person reporting such an utterance may use *loo* to mark it as one that the original speaker wished to be passed on by someone else.

6.3.1.7 The marker *loo* in utterances that are to be conveyed to a fourth person

So far we have seen that *loo* is used to mark utterances that a speaker A wishes the addressee B to convey to a third person, the recipient C. In this section I want to look at some examples that illustrate the use of *loo* in utterances that speaker A wishes to be passed on to a recipient D, a fourth person. The third person in this chain is addressee or conveyor C, not the recipient. The pattern of such an utterance is “A tells B, ‘Tell C to tell D that …’” as demonstrated in example (218).

(218)  
\\[asií \[man-á = loo\] [S-f \[man-á = loo\] \[če \[miigeé = loo\]]
\\3SG.PROX.DAT say-IMP.2SG name.F-DAT say-IMP.2SG = DUM COMP 1SG.DAT
\\
\\seé \[man-áthe \[búruš \[dé = loo\]]
\\such say-PRS.PFV brush give.IMP.2SG = DUM

‘Tell her to tell S, “(A) has asked me to tell you ‘give us the brush’”’ (conversation 29.6.2012)

This example contains two utterances that have to be conveyed. The first one starts with “tell S”; this is intended for recipient C and is marked by *loo*. The second utterance, to be passed on to recipient D is
“She has said, ‘give us the brush’”; this utterance, too, is followed by *loo*. The first utterance is a command to speak which is the reason why *loo* follows the complement-taking speech verb.

The elicited example (219) below shows the same pattern. It assumes that I have brought some medicine for my language consultant’s sister-in-law who is living elsewhere. I give the medicine to my language consultant with the words:

(219) \(\begin{array}{cccccccc}
2SG & name.M-DAT & say-IMP.2SG & name.F-DAT & say-IMP.2SG = DUM & COMP & 3SG.DEM & \\
\end{array}\)

dawáí hár dis ēk ťiimb-á tal khá = loo]

medicine every day one time-OBL on eat.IMP.2SG = DUM

‘Tell T to tell U, “take this medicine once every day.”’ (elicited 4.5.2013)

In both the above examples, the speaker wishes her utterance to be conveyed to a recipient D, with the help of addressee B and conveyor C.

Example (220) is another instance of the pattern “tell C to tell D that …”, but here the actual speaker of the utterance is addressee B who passes on speaker A’s utterance to recipient C, and he in turn to D.

(220) \(\begin{array}{cccccccc}
talá & gàa & khē & man-á & [če] & undá & beaatè & man-áthe = loo & \\
there & go.PFV2.M.SG & SUB & say-IMP.2SG & COMP & here & Beate.ERG & say-PRS.PFV = DUM & \\
\end{array}\)

[če piiráá mêč ēk xàas bootál lukh-i-aáthe

COMP from.over.there 1SG.ERG one special bottle ask.for-CAUS-PRS.PFV

maṭõ̀õ kira = loo]

boy.GEN.M for = DUM

‘When you go there then say that Beate here has said (to tell you) “I have ordered a special baby bottle from abroad, for the baby-boy …”’ (conversation 18.5.2012)

Again, there are two different utterances that the speaker wishes to be conveyed: the first one is “Beate here has said” which is speaker B’s own utterance to be passed on; the second one is Beate’s utterance “I have ordered a special baby bottle…” Both utterances have been marked by *loo.*
A further elicited example (221) shows the same pattern of “addressee B tells conveyer C to tell recipient D that speaker A has said …”. The context is the same as that of example (219). After I have given instructions to my language consultant as to what to tell conveyer C she passes them on to him.

(221) \( \text{sás} \) \( U-i \) \( dawáf \) \( dë \)  
3SG.DE-loss.DEM name.F-DAT medicine give.IMP.2SG

\( \text{tú} \) \( \text{man-á} \) [\( ř\text{e} \) \( \text{beaatèe} \) \( \text{man-áthe} = \text{loo} \) [\( \text{sás} \) \( \text{dawáf} \)  
2SG say-IIMP.2SG COMP Beate.ERG say.PRL.PFV = DUM 3SG.DE-loss.DEM medicine

\( \text{dis-ø} \) \( \text{man} \) \( \text{ék} \) \( \text{wàar} \) \( \text{kha-ó} \) \( \text{thú} = \text{loo} \) ]  
day.OBL in one time eat-IMP be.PRL.M.SG = DUM

‘Give this medicine to U. Tell her that Beate has said to take this medicine once a day’ (elicited 4.5.2013)

In all these examples, we find the pattern “speaker A tells addressee B to tell conveyer C to tell recipient D that …” What differs is who in the chain of communication is actually uttering the utterance to be passed on: in examples (218) and (219) it is speaker A, in examples (220) and (221) it is addressee B who speaks and passes on the utterance.

In this section I have shown that \( \text{loo} \) is not only used to mark utterances that a speaker A wishes addressee B to pass on to recipient C. The communication chain may include one more conveyer or addressee C to reproduce the desirable utterance to a recipient D.

So far, I have described and illustrated the use of \( \text{loo} \) in marking utterances that a speaker wishes her addressee to convey to a third or fourth recipient. In the next section I will discuss the use of \( \text{loo} \) as what seems to be a third person imperative marker.

6.3.2 The marker \( \text{loo} \) as third person imperative marker

In this section I briefly introduce the Indus Kohistani imperative verb forms and then proceed to show how \( \text{loo} \) is used to mark utterances that contain directives intended for a third person.

Indus Kohistani has a morphologically marked imperative for second person singular and plural. For second person singular, a suffix \(-\text{a}\) is added to the verb root; the root accent will then shift to the suffix. The root of the verb ‘do’ is \( \text{kar-} \), the singular imperative ‘do!’ is \( \text{kar-á} \). The imperative form of
the verb paša-'show' is paša-á 'show!'. Other verbs ending in a vowel, such as kha- ‘eat’ have no suffix at all for second person singular imperative. The second person plural imperative of ‘do’ is kar-íi ‘you (pl) do!’; that of ‘show’ is paša-ái ‘you (pl) show!’; that of ‘eat’ is kha-ái ‘you (pl) eat!’.

Quite often, the second person singular imperative suffix -a is omitted, leaving the bare root, as in kár ‘do!’

To convey a third person imperative meaning, the marker loo follows the verb marked for second person imperative in a clause with a third person subject, for instance ũ kar-á = loo ‘he/she do (2SG) loo’, and sáí kar-íi = loo ‘they do (2PL) loo’. In light of the use of loo seen so far this might be translated as “tell him, ‘Do!’” and “tell them, ‘Do!’”, but often a more appropriate translation is the following “He/she should do”, “let him/her do”, “he/she may do”, and “they should do; let them do; they may do” respectively. Note that although such a construction has a third person subject the verb is marked for second person imperative. In the following sections I will describe in more detail the differences as well as the similarities of both uses; here I just want to mention the two main points that distinguish the third person imperative use from the use seen above, (i) third person imperative clauses usually have a third person subject, the addressee C of the directive, and (ii) there is no mention of a specific person B that should convey the directive to addressee C.

But first let me clarify some terms. Imperative is a collective term that may include several other terms such as jussive, hortative, permissive, or optative. Different authors use different terminology. Palmer uses the term “jussive” for first and third person imperatives and “imperative” for second person imperative (Palmer 2001:81). The term “hortative”, used by some authors, conveys the same notion as that of second person imperative, namely a speaker’s wish about a future state of affairs and her appeal to another person to bring the change about. It differs from second person imperative in that the person who is told to bring the change about is not the addressee but a third person as in “let him do the job”, or it includes the speaker besides the addressee as in “let us do the job” (van der Auwera, Dobrushina and Goussev 2013). Permissive signals the speaker’s permission for the actions of a third person; the term “optative” is used to express a speaker’s wishes or hopes for a second or third person (Loos et al. 2003).
The term jussive has been defined as follows: “Jussive mood is a directive mood that signals a speaker’s command, permission or agreement that the proposition expressed by his or her utterance be brought about. Jussive mood is typically applicable in the first and third person” (2003). I prefer this term to the term hortative as its meaning seems to be broader, including agreement and permission besides command. Indus Kohistani imperative verb forms followed by the marker loo may express any of the three notions: the speaker’s command, permission or agreement. On the other hand, whereas jussive includes both third person and first person imperative, the marker loo marks only third person imperative clauses. In the following sections such clauses are referred to as containing a third person imperative which may express any of the three notions subsumed under the term jussive. As an aside, the marker loo cannot be used to indicate first person imperative. If Indus Kohistani speakers want to say, “should I/we do?” or “may I/we do?” then the subjunctive verb form is used, such as in má karàm = aa ‘I do.SBJV.1SG = Q’, ‘should/may I do?’; and in bé karíž = aa ‘we do.SBJV.1PL = Q’, ‘should/may we do?’.

6.3.2.1 The marker loo indicating third-person command, permission and agreement

Most of the examples of the third person imperative use of loo are of the permissive kind, but there are some instances where imperative verb marking plus loo clearly has a commanding meaning. Example (222) is taken from a recorded text about tuberculosis, addressed to people waiting in a village clinic. The speaker exhorts his addressees as follows.

(222) ɡí wáxt khàaŋ iil-uú [só muútyōó tàā hàa] what time cough come.PFV-COND 3SG.DIST in.front REFL.POSS.M hand

tshá = loo yaá bígi zör dhay’ = loo] place.IMP.2SG = DUM or some clothes hold.IMP.2SG = DUM COMP 3SG.DIST. cough

pií mút màas-âa kira nií ríŋg-e love there other man-GEN.M to NEG attach-SBJV.3SG

‘If he (the TB patient) has to cough then he should cover his mouth with his hand or with some piece of cloth so that the cough (the droplets) does not reach others.’ (TB text #32)
An equally adequate translation would be “Tell him (the TB patient), ‘If you have to cough then you should cover your mouth with your hand or with some piece of cloth so that the cough (the droplets) does not reach others’”, that is, *loo* in this utterance is used exactly as in the examples seen in section 6.3.1. Note however that although the verb carries second person imperative ending, the subject of this utterance is the explicitly mentioned third-person pronoun *so* ‘he’. This refers not to a specific individual, rather to a hypothetical person, anyone among the listeners or among their families or acquaintances who has contracted tuberculosis. Furthermore there is no mention of a specific addressee B that should pass on this utterance to the (unspecified) TB patient.

Following are some more examples to illustrate this use. Example (223) is taken from the same talk about tuberculosis.

(223) *ghën* *mariz* *tiibũ* *dawain* *istem̄aal* *kar-àant* *tās* *bā̄a*
who patient TB.GEN.F medicine use do-PRS.M 3SG.DIST.OBL house.GEN.M

*mút* *xálk.ōō* *kira* *hūm* *šū* *pakāar* *thī*
other people.PL.GEN for also 3SG.DEM necessary be.PRS.F

[če *sā̄i* *daakţár-ō* *gee* *bat̮=loo*] [yaá *mariz* *daakţár-ō*
COMP 3PL.DIST doctor-OBL to go.IMP.2PL=DUM or patient doctor-OBL

ggee *har-ĩ=loo*] [ao *tāa* *tiibi-āa* *muainā* *kar-ĩ=loo*]
take-IMP.2PL=DUM and REF.L.POSS.M TB-GEN.M examination.M do-IMP.2PL=DUM

‘For a patient who is taking TB medicine it is necessary that the other people in his house should go to the doctor, or other ill persons in his house should be taken to the doctor and should be checked for TB’ (TB text #34)

Again, an equally adequate way of translating the utterance would be “for a patient who is taking TB medicine it is necessary to tell the other people in his house, ‘Go to the doctor…’”. As already mentioned for example (222), the verbs *go*, *take*, and *do* are marked for second person plural imperative, the subject of these directives, on the other hand, is the third person plural pronoun *sā̄i* ‘they’, and no specific person is mentioned that should convey this utterance to recipient C.

Next I will describe the use of the marker *loo* in clauses with third person imperative meaning where the notion conveyed is one of permission. Example (224) below is taken from a folk narrative.
The main character is a man considered stupid by the other villagers because he had burned their forest. One day they told him that they would kill his cow because she had eaten their crops. The man called by the others stupid said, “Go ahead and kill my cow, but give me the hide”. The villagers’ reaction was a follows:

(224) xálkoō man-dgíl thík thí gìnče masìu bétus kha-sát-ø
people.PL.ERG say-PFV2 right be.PRS.F because meat 1PL.INCL eat-FUT.M.PL.M

ao tsàam-o hin ū gí kar-àlant [amẫ̃ har-á = lloo]
and skin-OBL with 3SG.PROX what do-PRS.M REFL take-IMP.2SG = DUM

‘The people said, “That is alright, because we will eat the meat; what can he do with the hide! Let him take it.”’ (A Kohistani story #44)

From the context it is clear that the villagers answer a request in the positive and give permission to take the hide. The use of the third person imperative construction suggests that this utterance was not addressed to the so-called stupid man himself but to one another, and its implication is that either one of the villagers will go to inform the stupid man of their decision or that they will just leave the hide for him to take, a kind of tacit permission. A translation of the clause marked by lloo as “tell him ‘take the hide’” is still possible but, I think, less felicitous. The third-person subject in the clause marked by lloo has been omitted because its referent has been mentioned explicitly in the preceding clause.

Example (225) below is another illustration of this use, taken from a reported conversation. A told me that one of their neighbors had had to flee because another neighbor had threatened to kill him. Blood feuds are common in this area, but then usually both parties know for what reason they are enemies. This man, however, said that he had no idea why the other one wanted to kill him. He reasoned as reported by A:

(225) só = lee mì mísu=tstu maasmá thé
3SG.DIST = REP 1SG.POSS small—REDUPL child.PL be.PRS.M.PL

‘He said, ‘I have small children …’

há̃á mèč asíi kar-átthe khõ má asńi ghariàá
and 1SG.ERG 3SG.PROX.DAT do-PRS.PFV SUB 1SG 3SG.PROX.POSS wife.GEN.M
The speaker of this utterance cites legitimate reasons to kill someone and gives permission to his enemy to kill him if any such reason might be found. However, a translation of the clauses marked by loo as “tell him, ‘Kill your wife; kill me too’” does not sound right here. As in example (224), the third-person subject of the clauses marked by loo has been omitted; it refers to the same person, namely the enemy, as the object of the preceding clause “if I have done any such thing against him”.

The next example, again conveying permission, contains an explicit third person subject. The utterance is taken from an explanatory text about how people handle enmities. The speaker had described to me that when something has happened that may cause an enmity, for instance person A has hurt another person B, then person A will move to a friend’s house and ask him for protection. The friend will offer protection for a limited period of time during which mediators will try to come to a peaceful settlement. The family of the hurt person will accept this limited period of negotiations and allow their enemy to move freely during this time by saying (226).

(226) khẽ  ámba  khulàa  til-á = loo
-devm  3sg.prox  open  move-imp.2sg = dum

‘Let him move freely/he may move freely’ (A way to end a feud #110)

Here the third person subject is explicitly mentioned. As in all the examples seen so far, the imperative verb suffix indicates second person imperative.

Of the three directive terms command, permission and agreement, the last one is the weakest. In the following examples, it is often not in the power of the agreeing one to change the state of affairs. An imperative verb form followed by loo is often used to indicate such an agreement to or acceptance of circumstances one cannot change. The first example is taken from a folk story about an evil fairy that has snatched away a princess’ husband. The princess goes on a long search for her husband and finally...
manages to find the fairy, get her imprisoned and set her husband free. In example (227) the fairy resigns herself to the loss of the prince.

(227) sêê man-áthe hî tsôô miî bând kar-ágil. xawàand
3SG.DIST.ERG say-PRS.PFV now 2PL.ERG 1SG.DOM closed do-PFV2 husband

min bazíga. [waleé har-á = loo]. h̃̀ ĩ kar-àm
1SG.ABL go.PFV2.M.SG but take-IMP.2SG = DUM now what do-SBJV.1SG

‘She said, “Now you have imprisoned me. The husband went away from me. But let (the princess) take (him). What can I do now” ’ [lit.: ‘She said, “Now you have imprisoned me. The husband went away from me. But take him loo” ’] (Prince and fairy #202-4)

There is nothing left to command or permit for the speaker of this utterance, only to accept what has happened. Note that the verb of the clause marked by loo has second person imperative marking, the subject of this clause has been omitted. From the context we know that it must be the princess who was not present when this was uttered, that is, if the subject would be mentioned explicitly it would be a third person subject. A translation such as “Tell (the princess), ‘Take him’” sounds odd because the fairy is in no position to tell other people what to do.

In the next example (228), the speaker of the utterance marked by loo is not quite as helpless as in (227). This conversation started when I brought some wool that the women of A’s household had asked me to buy for them.

(228) C: goô sax sug-àa a-áthe
tyarn.M very fine-M.SG bring-PRS.PFV

‘(She) has brought very nice wool’

A: má man-áynt heleék tiiz thú
1SG say-PRS.F a.bit bright be.PRS.M.SG

‘I say, it (the color) is a bit bright’

C: goô = aa
tyarn = Q

‘The yarn?’ (clicks with tongue, indicating that she does not agree)
A: \([\text{hó} = \text{loo}] = \text{aa}\)
\begin{align*}
&\text{become.IMP.2SG} = \text{DUM} = Q \\
\end{align*}

‘Let it be then? [lit.: ‘You become \text{loo}’]’ or a more free translation, ‘Should we take/accept it then?’

C: \(\text{ɡõ̀ sáx sugàa thú}\)
\begin{align*}
&\text{yarn.M very fine.M.SG be.PRS.M.SG} \\
\end{align*}

‘The yarn is very nice’ (conversation 7.9.2012)

A could have disagreed but was overruled by C. The phrase \(\text{hó} = \text{loo} ‘let it be’\) indicates her acceptance of A’s opinion that the wool is fine enough to keep it. A translation of the clause marked by \text{loo} as “tell (the yarn) ‘become’” does not make any sense; in such a context only the jussive meaning “let it be” is appropriate.

In the next example, too, a “tell C, ‘[directive]’” translation fails. The utterances are from a conversation about blood transfusion. Some people are afraid that when they give blood to someone they themselves may die of weakness. The speaker explained this concept to me.

\((229)\) \(\text{bé man-àant-ø raát nií dii}\)
\begin{align*}
&\text{1PL.EXCL say-PRS.M-PL.M blood NEG give.IMP.2PL} \\
\end{align*}

‘We say “Do not give blood.”’

\([\text{saatã́ ēk màaṣ mar-á = loo}]\)
\begin{align*}
&\text{in.the.end one man die-IMP.2SG} = \text{DUM} \\
\end{align*}

‘In the end one person (the patient in need of blood) may die/let him die.’ [lit.: ‘In the end one person “you die” \text{loo}’]

\(\text{mút màaṣ-āā raát nheel-éé pií nií dii}\)
\begin{align*}
&\text{other man-GEN.M blood.M take.out-CVB over.there NEG give.IMP.2PL} \\
\end{align*}

‘Do not take another man’s blood and give it (to the patient) over there’

\(\text{gínče tèe so-í mar-ásat}\)
\begin{align*}
&\text{because then 3SG.DIST-also die-FUT.M} \\
\end{align*}

‘Because then he too (the one who gave blood) will die’ (Conception, birth #485-8)

Again, translating the second of these clauses as “in the end tell one person, ‘You die!’” does not at all convey what the speaker intended it to do. Instead, “let him die” or “he may die” makes much more sense.
The expression \( hó=\text{loo} \) ‘become.IMP.2SG=DUM’ or ‘let it be’ is frequently used to signal agreement to or acceptance of persons, matters or circumstances. Example (230) is an utterance of a mother whose daughter has been married off and has not been allowed to visit her parents so far. The mother worried about her daughter’s wellbeing, but once she heard from others that her daughter is doing fine she said the following utterance.

(230) \[ \text{man-àynt mī́ dhií xuśàal thí [hó=\text{loo}]} \]

\[ \text{say-PRS.F 1SG.POSS daughter happy be.PRS.F become.IMP.2SG=DUM} \]

‘(She) says, “When my daughter is happy then let it be so (that she is not allowed to visit us)”’

(A mother’s advice #45)

In other words: As long as the mother knows that her daughter is happy she accepts the situation as it is.

Example (231) shows that the expression \( hó=\text{loo} \) ‘let it be’ may have an explicit third person subject. Context is a description of what people do during winter to keep themselves warm. The speaker tells that in the cold season, people build an open fire place inside the house, quoting them as “Let the (inside of) the house become blackened, but our children are kept warm”.

(231) \[ \text{baá kis̃́ hó=\text{loo}} \]

\[ \text{house black.INCH become.IMP.2SG=DUM} \]

‘Let the house become black’ (Preparations for winter #111)

Here \( \text{baá} \) ‘house’ is the third person subject; the verb is marked for second person imperative. Here, too, it would make no sense to translate “tell (the house) ‘You may become black’”.

The last example in this section is taken from my language consultant’s narrative about an earthquake. Parts of her house had been damaged badly. The sons of the family were trying to get the pots and pans out of the house when their father said, “Never mind (the pots and pans)” and went on:

(232) \[ \ddot{\text{u}} \text{ baá sæar thá=aa [hói=\text{loo}]} \]

\[ \text{3SG.PROX house intact be.PRS.M.SG=Q become.IMP.2PL=DUM} \]

‘Is the room intact? Let (the things) be (or: remain there)’ (The earthquake #118)

Like in the preceding examples, the use of \( hó=\text{loo} \) or in this case \( hóí=\text{loo} \) signals agreement or acceptance to states of affairs or circumstances.

In all examples seen so far, the verb preceding \( \text{loo} \) is marked for second person imperative whereas the subject of the clause is a third person subject when not omitted, as for instance in the \( hó=\text{loo} \)
clauses. For some of the examples seen in this section a translation of *loo* with “tell X ‘[directive]’” is possible; in some other cases a third person imperative/jussive meaning “let X do/X may do” is the only appropriate translation. What I wanted to show in this section is the fact that there is a distinct third person imperative use of *loo*, not just instances where both ways of interpretation are possible.

6.3.2.2 What distinguishes third-person imperative use from other uses of *loo*?

In this section I point out in more detail what distinguishes the third-person imperative use of *loo* from that as a marker of desirable utterances that the speaker wishes to be reproduced by someone else. The main difference, on a syntactic level, is the use of a third-person subject as the addressee of the directive in the third-person imperative use (remember that the verb ending is that of second person imperative). This third person subject may be explicitly mentioned, or there may be ellipsis. Furthermore, there is no explicit command to an addressee B to tell (reproduce) the speaker’s utterance to a third person, i.e. the third-person directive is not embedded in a speech clause. In this section I show examples of both, the “tell X ‘[utterance]’” and the jussive use to illustrate these points.

First let me compare two examples containing a command, (222), repeated here, and (233). (222) is taken from a talk aimed at patients and attendants in a busy clinic.

(222) ᵁ(rotation) ⁠wáxt⁠ ⁠khàañ⁠ ⁠iil-uú⁠ ⁠fsó⁠ ⁠muùtyóō⁠ ⁠ṯàñ⁠ ⁠ hàà⁠ ᵁ(rotation)

*What time cough come.PFV1-COND 3SG.DIST in.front REFL.POSS hand*

*tshá = *loo*] [yaá⁠ bígi⁠ ẕòr⁠ dhay = *loo*] če⁠ só⁠ khàañ

*place.IMP.2SG = DUM or some clothes hold.IMP.2SG = DUM COMP 3SG.DIST. cough*

*píí⁠ mút⁠ màaš-āā⁠ kíra⁠ níí⁠ ríng-ec*

*over.there other man-GEN.M to NEG attach-SBJV.3SG*

‘If he (the TB patient) has to cough then he should cover his mouth with his hand or with some piece of cloth so that the cough (the droplets) does not reach others’ or ‘Tell him (the TB patient), “If you have to cough then you should cover your mouth with your hand or with some piece of cloth so that the cough (the droplets) does not reach others’” (TB text #32)

In (233), the speaker talks to her daughter-in-law who is washing clothes.

(233) oó⁠ D⁠ ẕòr⁠ tá⁠ níí⁠ mand-á⁠ [hàññ]

*VOC name.F clothes 2SG NEG beat-IMP.2SG and*
On first sight, these examples look very similar. Both contain a directive aimed at a third person. In both clauses containing the imperative, there is an explicit third-person subject: “he” in (222) and “E” in (233). But they differ in another aspect. In (233), there is the contextual implication that the speaker wishes her addressee D to tell E, “Wash the clothes”, E being nearby and both speaker and addressee being aware of it. In (222), on the other hand, there is no request to a specific addressee to convey the speaker’s utterance, neither is there a definite and specific recipient of the command. The addressees are a big group of people the speaker does not know, neither does he know who among them or their families has contracted tuberculosis and hence to whom his directive will be aimed at and relevant. So, in (222), I cannot translate “You, X, tell Y, ‘Cover your mouth when you cough …’” The only possible other way of translation would be “Whoever of you that has TB or knows someone who has TB, tell such a person, ‘If you have to cough then you should cover your mouth …’”.

Now consider example (234), taken from a conversation about medicine. A asked me in the presence of her daughter-in-law who was ill, at what time she, the patient, should take a certain medicine.

(234) \[sās \ dawāį \ aāž \ bīlāl̄i \ khā =\textit{loo}\] 3SG.DEM.DOM medicine today in.the.evening eat.IMP.2SG = DUM or now eat.IMP.2SG = DUM

“Should she take this medicine tonight or now?” or ‘Should I tell her, “Take this medicine tonight” or “take it now”? (conversation 4.6.2012)

Again, on first sight, this looks exactly like a third-person imperative. In this example, the subject of the clause containing the imperative has been omitted as is often the case in Indus Kohistani. However, there is no doubt about the identity of the subject – it can only be the daughter-in-law. On the other hand, there is also no doubt about how the expressed third-person command will be conveyed to its recipient as the second translation option above shows. Like in all examples of section 6.3.1 the conveyor of the desirable utterance is a specific person, namely A.
Next, let me compare two examples that contain a permission directive. Example (224) from the previous section is repeated here.

(224) xákō̱ man-ágil thiík thí gínčë masùù béc'us kha-šát-ø
people.PL.OBL say-PFV2 right be.PRS.F because meat 1PL.INCL eat-FUT.M-PL.M

ao tsàam-ø hin ú gi kar-àant [ámǻ̱ har-á̱ = loo]
and skin-OBL with 3SG.PROX what do.PRS.M REFL take-IMP.2SG = DUM

‘The people said, “That is fine, because we will eat the meat; what can he do with the hide! Let him take it.”’ (A Kohistani story #44)

Example (235) below is taken from a conversation between my language consultant and me. I was expecting two guests, and one of them had asked if she might come with me to visit her. I passed on the request and she, my consultant, answered,

(235) [é̱ = loo] [é̱ = loo] bhaizdá waal-á
come.IMP.2SG = DUM come.IMP.2SG = DUM both bring.down-IMP.2SG

‘She may come, she may come. Bring both (of them) down (to us)’ or ‘Tell her, “Come”; tell her, “Come”; bring both (of them) down (to us)’ (conversation 10.9.2012)

Comparing the two utterances, we note that in (224), the subject of the imperative clause is omitted in that clause but mentioned in the preceding clause. The utterance in (235) does not contain a subject. But from the context it is clear that the subject of the directive clause is that one of my guests who had asked to accompany me on my visit.

What distinguishes the two utterances is again the absence of a specific conveyor of the directive in (224) and the presence of one, namely I myself, in (235). There is no other way for my guests to know if they are allowed to come other than by my conveying to them A’s permission. As I already noted above, a translation of example (224) as “tell the stupid man, ‘You may have the hide’” is slightly awkward because there is no specific addressee mentioned who is asked to do the conveying. There may or may not be someone who will tell him; it is simply left open.

The last example (236) in this section is a further illustration of this point. The utterance is taken from a narrative about what happened to some relatives. The speaker reported that the second wife of a certain husband planned to visit relatives. Her co-wife’s oldest son wanted to go with her. So she asked her husband.

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Like (233), this utterance looks like the third-person imperative utterances described in this section but belongs into the category “speaker A wishes addressee B to reproduce her utterance to recipient C” because it is clear from the context that the addressee of the utterance is supposed to convey the permission.

One other point of distinction between the uses seen in section 6.3.1 and what I call “third person imperative use” is the fact that in the latter use a translation as “Tell X, ‘[utterance]’” sometimes sounds awkward or inappropriate whereas a translation as “X should/may do…” captures the meaning of such utterances much better, see for instance examples (226) to (230).

In this section, I have compared third-person-imperative utterances with utterances where loo indicates the speaker’s wish to have her addressee convey her utterance to a third person. I have shown that what distinguishes the former ones from the uses described in section 6.3.1 is the absence of a specific conveyor (addressee B) of the command/permission/agreement. Furthermore, clauses belonging to the third-person imperative group have an explicit third-person subject (which may be omitted when occurring in a preceding clause) whereas utterances of other uses may but often do not have a third-person subject. Lastly, a translation of loo as “Tell person X, ‘[utterance]’” works always for the uses described in section (6.3.1) but not always in the third person imperative use. It follows that although there are distinctions between the two uses they are not clear-cut. In the next section, I will briefly examine two possible analyses of the marker loo.
6.3.2.3 \textit{loo}: Discourse marker? Third person imperative marker?

So far, we have seen that the marker \textit{loo} has two functions, (i) to mark utterances that a speaker A wants her addressee B to convey to a third person C. Such utterances may be statements, questions, directives or suggestions, among others; (ii) to mark utterances that contain a third-person imperative or jussive. In the first mentioned use, \textit{loo} seems to be some kind of speech marker whereas the second use suggests that \textit{loo} is a third-person imperative marker. In this section I want to look briefly at both of these possible interpretations.

The marker \textit{loo} may be analyzed as a speech marker of one special kind of speech, namely such a speech that the speaker wishes her addressee to convey to a third person. To my knowledge, there are no such markers in other languages. Furthermore, this analysis would leave out the use as third-person imperative marker, at least those instances where the translation of \textit{loo} as “Tell (person X that …)” does not work.

On the other hand, an analysis of \textit{loo} as third-person imperative marker would not cover the speech marker use, or in other words, there would have to be two distinct markers \textit{loo}. Even if that would be the case there are several objections to such an analysis which I will point out in this section.

As a reminder see example (237), a typical instance of the use of \textit{loo} discussed in the previous section. Previous to this utterance the speaker had mentioned that when her children are not obeying her she sometimes tells them that they will not get any food until they listen to her. But then she had second thoughts.

\begin{verbatim}
(237)  má  man-áynt  naí  mĩ́  kám  lak  oolàat  thí
       1SG  say-PRS.F  no  1SG.POSS  few  -ish  offspring  be.PRS.F

  khẽ  má  ā́i  xapàa  neer-ām
   DEV.M  1SG  3PL.PROX  annoyed  not.do-SBJV.1SG

[ā́i  amá́i  góli  kha-ā́i = l0o]
  3PL.PROX  REFL  bread  eat-IMP.2PL = DUM

'I say, “No, I have only a few children. I do not want to make them upset. Let them eat food.”’
\end{verbatim}

(Children’s duties #80-1)
There is no doubt that the mother’s utterance “let them eat food” has an unambiguous jussive meaning. What I will question here is not whether such utterances have third-person imperative meaning, but rather whether *loo* is a genuine third-person imperative marker. There are several reasons for disfavoring such an interpretation:

(i) Indus Kohistani has a morphologically marked imperative, as outlined in section 6.3.2. One might expect that in a language that has a morphologically marked second-person imperative, the jussive would be expressed by the same means, in our case by suffixing. However, the marker *loo* is a clitic that behaves quite differently from a suffix such as the second person imperative marker.

(ii) In languages with a morphologically marked jussive, the suffixes for second-person and third-person imperative will be distinct. In Indus Kohistani jussive examples, however, we find the regular second-person imperative suffix in addition to the marker *loo*.

(iii) Although there are differences, there is no clear distinction between the two functions of *loo*, namely marking desirable utterances and marking third-person imperative. It seems that often the context determines in which way an utterance has to be interpreted, as has been illustrated in examples (224) and (234), repeated here.

(224) *xálkōo* *man-ágil* *thiik* *tí* *gínče* *masùu* *béetus* *kha-šát-ø*

people.PL.ERG say-PFV2 right be.PRS.F because meat 1PL.INCL eat-FUT.M-PL.M

*aö* *tsàam-ø* *hin* *ú* *gó* *kar-áant* *[amá̃̄* *har-á=loo]*

and skin-OBL with 3SG.PROX what do-PRS.M REFL take-IMP.2SG = DUM

‘The people said, “That is alright, because we will eat the meat; what can he do with the hide! Let him take it.”’ (A Kohistani story #44)

(234) *sée* *tāā* *xawánd-i* *tapús* *kar-áthe* *če* *ú* *man-áant*

3SG.DIST.ERG REFL.POSM husband-DAT question do-PRS.PFV COMP 3SG.PROX say-PRS.M

*ma-ї* *e-enties* *kar* *hāā* *[é=loo]=aa*

1SG.also come-PRS.M MRM and come.IMP.2SG = DUM = Q
In both examples, we have a command/permission intended for a third-person subject which is omitted in the actual clause but which was mentioned in the preceding one. Although (224) and (234) are similar syntactically, in (224) the marked clause has been translated as “let him take it”, a jussive, whereas the meaning of the relevant clause in example (234) is “tell him, ‘Come’”. The reason has to be inferred from the context: In example (224) the speakers and addressees are a group of people, talking among themselves. The narrator left it open if the permission (“let him take it”) will actually be passed on to the recipient or if it remains tacit. In example (234) there is one speaker A, one addressee B and one recipient C. In short, it is the context that determines which way an utterance has to be interpreted. Looking at the syntax of both kinds of utterances, the differences between them tend to become blurred.

In this section I have argued that an analysis of *loö* as a third-person imperative marker leaves several questions still to be answered. Besides, an analysis that cannot account for all uses of *loö* remains unsatisfactory. In the next section, I will analyze the marker *loö* within the framework of Relevance Theory as a marker of one kind of metarepresentations namely desirable utterances. I will further show that the analysis of *loö* as marker of desirable utterances also applies to the third person imperative use.

6.4 *loö*: a metarepresentation marker of desirable utterances

In this section, I suggest an analysis of *loö* within the framework of Relevance Theory that provides an explanation for the full range of the data so far presented. First I review the notion of metarepresentation, especially the concept of metarepresentation of desirable utterances. I then argue that *loö* is a marker of metarepresentations of desirable utterances, and will apply this analysis to the data.
6.4.1 Metarepresentations in Relevance Theory

In Chapter 2 I already introduced the concept of metarepresentation as used within Relevance Theory. A metarepresentation “is a representation of a representation: a higher-order representation with a lower-order representation embedded within it” (Wilson 2012:230). The lower-order representation may be an attributed utterance (public representation) or an attributed thought (mental representation). Wilson also mentions non-attributive, more abstract representations such as in example (233) (her example (6a.) in 2012:232).

(238) ‘Dragonflies are beautiful’ is a sentence in English

Such abstract representations may be sentence types as in the above given example, names, words, propositions or concepts (2012:232).

Other types of non-attributive metarepresentations are regular (that is, not attributed to someone else) interrogatives and exclamations: they represent desirable thoughts or desirable information. Regular negations and disjunctions are seen within Relevance Theory as metarepresentations of possible thoughts or possible information. And finally, utterances may be metarepresentations of desirable or possible utterances (2012:253-7). It is these last ones that I want to look at now. Wilson gives several examples of this type of metarepresentation; one of them I want to present here (example (37) in 2012:255).

(239) VICAR [to bride]: I, Amanda, take you, Bertrand, to be my lawful wedded husband.

BRIDE: I, Amanda, take you, Bertrand, to be my lawful, wedded husband.

In this example, the speaker’s (vicar’s) utterance is a metarepresentation of the utterance he wants the addressee (bride) to produce, in other words, of a desirable utterance.

Example (240), taken from Noh (example (65) in Noh 1998b:273) illustrates another desirable utterance.

(240) MARY [to Peter, as door bell rings]: If that’s John, I’m not here

Here, Mary wants Peter to say, “Mary is not here” in case it is John that has rung the door bell; in her utterance, she is metarepresenting the desirable utterance “Mary is not here”.

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I propose that Indus Kohistani utterances marked by *loo* are just that: instances of metarepresentations of desirable utterances. I further claim that *loo* is a procedural indicator that encodes constraints on higher-level explicatures (Wilson 2012:166).

In this section I have reviewed the concept of metarepresentation and introduced different metarepresentation types, in particular metarepresentations of desirable utterances. In the next section, I will analyze *loo* as a device for marking metarepresentations of desirable utterances.

### 6.4.2 The marker *loo* as metarepresentation marker of desirable utterances

As already mentioned in section 2.3, Blakemore was the first to analyze certain discourse markers such as *so, therefore, and after all* as encoding procedural meaning and acting as constraints on the inferential phase of the comprehension process (Blakemore 1987). The purpose of such procedural indicators is to assist the hearer in his search for relevance by reducing processing effort. Constraints may be applied to different levels of the comprehension procedure: The above mentioned discourse connectors such as *so, therefore, and after all* help a hearer to arrive at the intended implications of an utterance, in other words, they encode constraints on implicatures. In addition, there are procedural expressions that encode other kinds of constraints: pronouns can be analyzed as constraints on explicature; they guide the hearer’s search for the intended referent (Wilson 2012:166) when constructing the explicature of an utterance. “Hearsay” particles (Blass 1990) and illocutionary force indicators (Wilson 2012:166) encode constraints on the inferential construction of higher-level explicatures. So, procedural constraints are employed in each stage of the interpretation process: in recovering explicatures, in constructing higher-level explicatures, and in arriving at the intended implicatures.

I propose that *loo* should be analyzed as a procedural indicator encoding procedural constraints on higher-level explicatures. When processing an utterance marked as “metarepresentation of a desirable utterance” the addressee in his comprehension process is guided towards the construction of a higher-level explicature of the kind “speaker X wishes someone to say ‘…””. Consider the following example (241). A told C who was sitting with us:

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The explicature of the utterance is a simple command, “make tea”. The marker *loo* does not encode a concept and does therefore not contribute to the explicature. But it indicates that the utterance “make tea” is the metarepresentation of a desirable utterance, or, in other words, it guides the addressee towards the construction of a higher-level explicature such as “A wishes someone to tell someone else ‘make tea’”. A in this example does not make explicit whom to tell to make tea. The hearer follows the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure (as outlined by Sperber, Cara and Girotto 1995:51) which goes as follows:

(i) Follow a path of least effort in constructing an interpretation of the utterance (and in particular in resolving ambiguities and referential indeterminacies, in going beyond linguistic meaning, in supplying contextual assumptions, computing implicatures, etc.).

(ii) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.

That is, the hearer knows that the speaker wants her to say to someone else “make tea”. The indeterminacy of whom to tell is solved by accessing contextual information such as “tea is made in the kitchen” and “my sisters-in-law are already in the kitchen” and arriving at the conclusion “A wishes me to tell my sisters-in-law to make tea”. Thus the referential indeterminacy is solved and the hearer’s expectations of relevance are satisfied.

Or consider example (242); a toddler boy was greeting me by shaking my hand. His mother, watching us, then said to him (242a):

(242a)  

\[ \text{tú} \quad \text{rùuy} \quad \text{thì=} \text{aa} = \text{loo} \]  

2SG  well  be.PRS.F = Q = DUM

‘Say “Are you well?”’

Whereupon the boy said to me (242b):

(242b)  

\[ \text{tú} \quad \text{rùuy} \quad \text{thì=} \text{aa} \]  

2SG  well  be.PRS.F = Q

‘Are you well?’ (conversation 3.9.2012)
The explicature of (242a) is “are you well?”. Without *loo* this would be a simple question that the mother is asking her son; and the boy’s answer would most probably be “I am well”. The presence of *loo* in (242a), however, constrains the search for relevance towards the construction of a higher-level-explicature of the kind “my mother wishes me to say, ‘Are you well?’”. Contextual information such as “I am shaking hands with Beate” and “when greeting another person we ask, ‘Are you well?’” help the little boy to come to the conclusion “my mother wishes me to say, ‘Are you well?’” to Beate, while processing utterance (242a). And therefore the boy’s answer is his asking me, “Are you well?”.

In this section I have analyzed *loo* as a marker of metarepresentations of desirable utterances and have shown that *loo* constrains the hearer of such an utterance towards the construction of a higher-level explicature of the kind “speaker wishes addressee to say, ‘…’”. It follows that *loo* is a procedural indicator encoding constraints on higher-level explicatures. In the next sections, I will apply this analysis to the data presented above and will show that it can account for all uses of *loo*.

### 6.4.3 Desirable utterances embedded in “tell X …” clauses, and others that are marked with just *loo*

In my data there are quite a number of instances of the use of *loo* where the speaker explicitly says “tell X, “… *loo*” as shown in example (200), repeated here. The addressee of this utterance is a small girl that had been sent by her mother to find out if A is at home and available.

(200) *tú* bá *tàři* yàa-i *man-à* ěc *[má baá-o]*

> *man* *thí=loo ]*

> in *be.PRS.F = DUM*

‘Go; tell your mother that I am at home’ (conversation 20.2.2012)

A makes explicit (by saying, “Tell your mother”) that what follows is a desirable utterance, and at the same time uses the marker *loo*. So this is an instance of “double marking”. In such cases, the construction of the higher-level explicature does not require the same amount of pragmatic inference as was demonstrated for examples (241) and (242), but costs the hearer some additional linguistic processing effort by processing the phrase “tell your mother”. Considerations of relevance will
determine how much a speaker will make explicit and how much she will leave to the hearer to infer. In this particular case, the speaker may have thought that the explicit command “tell your mother” will help the addressee to achieve optimal relevance. Although the addressee had to take some additional effort to process this phrase, at the same time it saved efforts to figure out who the recipient of the desirable utterance would be.

About half of such double-marked instances in my data are utterances addressed to children. One can easily imagine an adult talking to a child and embedding the desirable utterance in an explicit speech clause in order to make it easy for the addressee to recover the intended meaning. Consider, however, example (243), a short conversation between a toddler, his mother and me.

Mother to toddler:

(243)  hàa milaá beaatàa-ø mil hàa milaá

   hand join.IMP.2SG Beate-OBL with hand join.IMP.2SG

   ‘Shake hands, shake hands with Beate’

Author to toddler:

assalaam alaikum tàí ãí hàal thí

   assalam alaikum 2SG.POSS what condition be.PRS.F

   ‘Assalaam alaikum. How are you?’

Mother to toddler:

[ruuy thú = loo] àí ãí hàal thí

   well be.PRS.M.SG = DUM 2SG.POSS what condition be.PRS.F

   ‘Say, “I am fine. How are you?”’ (conversation 8.6.2012)

Here the mother does not embed the desirable utterance “I am fine. How are you” within a speech clause in order to help her son. The reason for the omission is, I assume, that the addressee already knows whom to tell the desirable utterance. There are no ambiguities of reference to be solved; the addressee of the desirable utterance has already been established; there are no other potential addressees around.

On another occasion, the same toddler, his parents and a number of other people were present. The father told his son (244):

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Here the context is different: There are lots of people around; and without making explicit “tell F” the toddler would not be able to find the intended addressee of the desirable utterance. Trying to infer the meaning with the help of contextual information alone would be too costly in terms of processing effort, or might be impossible at all for the toddler. Knowing this, the speaker (the father) has made the addressee of the desirable utterance explicit.

The next example (245), too, illustrates that considerations of relevance determine the use or omission of an explicit speech clause “tell X”. Again, several people were around when A told one of the boys the following utterance.

In this instance, the speaker considered that her utterance would be more relevant (and less costly to recover its meaning) if she makes explicit who the addressee of the desirable utterance is.

I conclude that it is not by chance whether a speaker uses just loo or an explicit complement-taking speech verb phrase in addition to loo to mark a desirable utterance. Rather, considerations of relevance determine how explicit an utterance is. A speaker, in order to make her utterance as relevant as possible for her audience, may make more information explicit (by embedding the desirable utterance in a speech clause) when it would be too difficult and costly to infer it from the context. Or the speaker makes her utterance less explicit (by using loo only) because the necessary information can easily be recovered from the context; if made explicit it would be redundant and would cause unnecessary processing effort.
In any case, the marker *loo* reduces processing effort by making explicit or more explicit that the marked utterance is the metarepresentation of a desirable utterance, thereby helping the hearer to construct the appropriate higher-level explication.

In this section, I have shown that considerations of relevance determine whether a desirable utterance is marked by *loo* only, or whether it is embedded in a speech clause.

### 6.4.4 Third person imperative utterances marked by *loo*

In this section I argue that the analysis of *loo* as a marker of metarepresentations of desirable utterances also applies to its use in instances of what seems to be jussive utterances described in section 6.3.2. But first I need to make clear the difference between what is termed “desirable utterances” in Relevance Theory and utterances containing regular imperatives. Within Relevance Theory, imperatives are seen as representing a desirable state of affairs. To cite Wilson, “Someone who utters an imperative indicates that she is thinking about a state of affairs which she regards as desirable from someone’s point of view” (Wilson 2012:254). In short: imperatives are representations of desirable states of affairs. Desirable utterances, on the other hand, are metarepresentations of another representation, for instance if a desirable utterance contains an imperative then the speaker of this utterance is *(meta-)*representating a representation of a desirable state of affairs; there is an additional level of representation involved.

So far, we have seen that *loo* is used to mark a speaker’s own desirable utterances that she wishes to be produced by her addressee; or to mark desirable utterances that the speaker was asked by a third person to pass on to her addressee. On first sight, the function of *loo* in what I have called so far third person imperatives seems to be distinct from the examples analyzed in the previous section. In fact, as long as I relied on recorded texts (monologues) in my analysis of Indus Kohistani, I assumed that *loo* is a third person imperative marker because instances of this use were the only examples I had in my data. It was only after I had started to pay more attention to mother tongue speakers’ discourse that I became aware of the second and more common use as a marker of desirable utterances.
Let me recapitulate here the main differences and similarities between the third person imperative use of *loo* and that of marking desirable utterances (see section 6.3.2.2): (i) clauses containing third person imperatives always have a third person subject whereas desirable utterances usually do not. (ii) Clauses containing third person imperatives are not embedded in a matrix clause with a complement-taking speech verb such as “tell C that …”. There may be, but there is often not, an obvious addressee that is supposed to forward the utterance to the recipient of the directive. Desirable utterances, in comparison, are often but not necessarily, embedded in such a speech clause. Nevertheless, in some of the examples seen so far, there is no difference in the syntax of the two kinds of utterances; what guides the addressee to interpret such utterances as desirable utterance that he is asked to reproduce, or as a third person imperative that does not necessarily imply him, is the context. It seems to me that there is no clear dividing line between the two uses, rather a gradual transition from “speaker A wishes addressee B to reproduce her utterance to recipient C” to “speaker A wishes her command or permission or agreement to be made known to recipient C”, in which case a conveyor B may or may not be specified or even existent. What is common to both is that speaker A wishes her utterance to be communicated to a third person via someone else, in other words: that her utterance marked by *loo* is a desirable utterance.

In light of this I propose that the third person imperative function of the marker *loo* is just a special case of the basic function as a marker of desirable utterances. Indus Kohistani does not have a morphological and genuine third person imperative marker. Instead, the concept of “metarepresentation of a desirable utterance” is used to express this notion. In the following section, I will further lay out my claim.

6.4.5 *Indus Kohistani third person imperative: a special case of desirable utterances*

In section 6.4.2 I defined *loo* as a procedural marker of metarepresentations of desirable utterances that constrains the addressee towards the construction of a higher-level explication of the kind “speaker A wishes me to produce her utterance to addressee C”. In this section I want to argue that Indus Kohistani third person imperative utterances are really second person imperatives that are also instances
of metarepresentations of desirable utterances and thus the addressee of such an utterance will arrive at a similar higher-level explicature such as “speaker A wishes someone (specified or unspecified) to tell recipient C, ‘You … (command/permission/agreement)’”.

As we have seen in section 6.3.1, the metarepresentation of a desirable utterance is an utterance that a speaker A wants her addressee to produce to a recipient C. Such an utterance may be a description of a state of affairs, a question, a wish, or a command. Speaker A may explicitly ask her addressee to produce her metarepresentation of the desirable utterance to person C. In another scenario, the request to produce the desirable utterance is not made explicit linguistically other than by using loo, which constrains addressee B to construct a higher-level explicature while processing speaker A’s utterance. The fact that addressee B is the one that should do the telling has often to be inferred as for instance in example (241). In yet another case, there is no appeal, neither explicit nor implicit, to addressee B to be the one to produce the desirable utterance. Nevertheless, the speaker’s utterance containing a third person imperative metarepresents an utterance that she, the speaker, wishes or would wish to be addressed to person C. There is no basic difference between metarepresentations of desirable utterances as described in subsection 6.3.1 and third person imperatives discussed in subsection 6.3.2. Rather, there is a continuum, starting with utterances where speaker A explicitly asks an addressee B to produce her metarepresentation of the desirable utterance, and ending with third person imperative utterances where the person supposed to convey the desirable utterance remains unspecified or unmentioned. But in both cases, what speaker A utters is a metarepresentation of a desirable utterance that she wishes to be conveyed to recipient C. The next examples will illustrate this continuum, (243) representing its “explicit” end.

(246) tú sayōō kira man-á če /kùl-ōō kàam
2SG 3PL.DIST.GEN to say-IMP.2SG COMP bead-GEN.PL work

mutsa-áí = loo
finish-IMP.2PL = DUM

‘You tell them, “Finish the bead work’” (conversation 3.10.2011)
Here, the speaker explicitly tells her addressee to reproduce her utterance containing a command to a group of people known to both of them. Such an instance represents the explicit end of the continuum.

Further along are utterances such as example (247) below. I had talked to my language consultant about one of my colleagues who wanted to start a biogas project so that people who own cattle would be able to produce their own gas for cooking. My language consultant then said:

(247) \[awál \ mĩĩ \ kira \ saná = loo\]

\text{first 1SG.POSS for make-IMP.2SG = DUM}

‘First (he) should make one (biogas installation) for me’ or: ‘tell him, “First make one for me’” (conversation 27.4.2012)

In (247), my language consultant did not make explicit her wish that I tell my colleague “First make one for me” by saying “you tell him …”. Nevertheless there was no doubt that I was expected to pass on her utterance.

In this example, the imperative clause has no subject. The most obvious interpretation would be a second-person subject that has been omitted as is often the case in imperative clauses. But according to my language consultant, one could as well say \[awál ù mĩĩ kira sanda = loo\] ‘First he make (IMP.2SG) one for me’, using an explicit third person subject in the imperative phrase.

At the far end of the explicit–implicit continuum are utterances such as examples (225) and (230), repeated here.

(225) \[só = lee \ mĩĩ \ tsú-tsu \ maasmá \ thé\]

\text{3SG.DIST = REP 1SG.POSS small=REDUPL child.PL be.PR.S.M.PL}

‘He said, “I have small children …”

\[hāā \ mčč \ asíí \ kar-áthe \ khē \ má \ asīī \ ghari-ââ\]

\text{and 1SG.ERG 3SG.PROX.DAT do-PRS.PRF SUB 1SG 3SG.PROX.POSS wife-GEN.M}

\[tsúr \ thá \ khē \ [tâ\] \ ghariúú \ maar-á = loo\]

\text{lover be.PR.S.SG SUB REFL.POSS.F wife kill-IMP.2SG = DUM}

\[mii-\acute{\text{i}} \ maar-á = loo\]

\text{1SG.DOM-also kill-IMP.2SG = DUM}

‘and if I have done any such thing against him, such as being the lover of his wife then he should kill his wife; he may kill me too”’ (conversation 18.5.2012)
The speaker of this utterance is talking about someone who wants to kill him and from whom he is hiding. Neither does he explicitly ask a person to tell his enemy “Kill your wife, kill me if I have done anything wrong” nor can such a person be inferred from the context. He wishes to say this to his opponent but cannot in the circumstances. And the best and most economical way to express his wish is by using a second person imperative phrase and the marker loo, thus making the utterance the metarepresentation of a desirable utterance that he wishes someone would tell his enemy. It is not necessary that his wish come true.

In example (230), repeated here, a mother accepts a situation where her newly married daughter is not allowed to visit her parents about hearing that she is happy in her in-laws’ house.

(230) man-åynt mii dhii xušal thí [hó = loo]
say-PRS.F 1SG.POSS daughter happy be.PR.S.F become.IMP.2SG = DUM

‘(She) says, “When my daughter is happy then let it be so (that she is not allowed to visit us)”’
(A mother’s advice #45)

The imperative phrase hó = loo is ambiguous in that it is not clear if it refers to her daughter (“you daughter be (there)”), or to the in-laws (“you in-laws be (as you are)”), or to the situation (“you situation be (as it is)”). But in either case, the mother’s utterance is the metarepresentation of a desirable second person imperative utterance that she would wish someone to say.

At the end of this section let me return to my claim that Indus Kohistani has no genuine third person imperative and therefore the “desirable utterance” concept has to be used to express third-person imperative meaning. There are other ways for a speaker to convey to her addressee that she wants a third person to do something. The speakers of example (224) might have said (245) instead of (249).

(248) bé ižaazá de-čnt-o če ú tsām hár-ce
1PL.EXCL permission give-PRS.M-PL.M COMP 3SG.PROX skin take-SBJV.3SG

‘We give permission that he take the hide’

However, (249) is much more economical than version (248).

(249) [amá] har-á = loo]
REFL take-IMP.2SG = DUM

‘He may take the hide’ or literally ‘we wish to convey to him (by someone) “take the hide”’
The addressee of (249) requires less processing effort because there is less linguistic material to decode, less ambiguities and reference indeterminacies to resolve and because the use of *loo* constrains the interpretation of the utterance towards the desired interpretation, thus saving the addressee’s time and effort. My data confirm that the marking of a second person imperative phrase with *loo* is the standard way of expressing third person directives.

### 6.5 Summary: the marker *loo*

To summarize this chapter, I have introduced and described the marker *loo* in section 6.1 and 6.2 and illustrated its uses as a marker of desirable utterances in section 6.3.1. In the following section I have presented examples of third person imperative utterances that are marked by *loo* and have highlighted the similarities and differences between the two kinds of utterances. In section 6.3.2.3 I have shown that the analysis of *loo* as a speech marker of a special kind of utterances on the one hand and as a third person imperative marker on the other hand would require assuming that there are two different markers *loo*. Section 6.4 offers an analysis of *loo*. Within the framework of Relevance Theory, *loo* may be analyzed as a marker of one particular kind of metarepresentations i.e. of metarepresentations of desirable utterances. Furthermore, I have argued that the so-called third person imperative use of the marker *loo* is just another instance of its use as metarepresentation marker of desirable utterances. As Indus Kohistani grammar has no genuine third person imperative marker, the use of *loo* is the standard way of expressing third person imperative meanings.
Chapter 7
Conclusion

7.1 Summary

Four markers of Indus Kohistani: the evidential marker *lee*, the marker *karee*, an instance of so-called quotatives, the complementizer *če*, and the desirable-utterance marker *loo* have for the first time been described in detail in this thesis.

The marker *lee* is a “reported” evidential, marking the contents of a clause as second- or thirdhand knowledge. It occurs in complements of utterance predicates but may also be the only indicator of the proposition marked by it being a reported speech. Only reported speech of persons other than the actual reporter are marked by it. The position of *lee* within a complement construction indicates whether the marked clause contains secondhand or thirdhand report: in case of a secondhand report *lee* follows the complement; a thirdhand report is indicated by *lee* following the complement-taking predicate. The exact source of the quoted speech marked by *lee* may or may not be known. Not every reported speech has to be marked by *lee*.

The marker *karee* is the grammaticalized converb of the verb *kar-* ‘do’, in its uses comparable with grammaticalized forms of SAY verbs. It indicates reported and self-reported speech but also reported and self-reported thoughts. Furthermore *karee* is a marker of purpose and reason clauses and occurs in naming and in similarity constructions. The position of *karee* is clause-final; clauses marked by it may be preposed, embedded within the main clause, or postposed.

The uses of the complementizer *če*, borrowed most probably from Pashto, considerably overlap with those of *karee*. It is a clause-initial marker; subordinate clauses introduced by *če* are always following the main clause. Besides introducing complements of utterance-perception-cognition predicates and other complement-taking predicates, it marks such clauses that have no complement-
taking predicate as complements of speech and thought. It also occurs as clause linker in purpose and reason clauses. Unlike the marker *karee*, *če* also functions as relativizer in relative clauses, occurs in conditional clauses, in subordinate clauses that describe a quality mentioned in the main clause, in answers to questions raised in the main clause, and as introducer of independent clauses. In this study, I have looked in detail only at those uses of *če* that both markers share. I have further commented on the distribution of the older *karee* and the more recent *če* marker; the latter seems to be in the process of replacing *karee* as marker of reported speech.

The marker *loo* has two main uses: it marks utterances that a speaker wants her addressee to say to a third person, and it is used to indicate third person imperative. Clauses marked by *loo* may be complements of speech predicates or may be independent. In both uses the marker is positioned clause-finally.

Central to my analysis of these markers is the notion of metarepresentation within Relevance Theory. Some utterances contain the description of a state of affairs; they are a representation of this state of affairs. Others contain not the description of a state of affairs but the description of another utterance or thought: they metarepresent or interpret that utterance or thought or, in other words, a public representation (utterance) and a mental representation (thought) respectively. In both cases what is metarepresented is an attributed representation. Besides such attributed metarepresentations, non-attributive representations such as possible thoughts (negations), desirable thoughts (questions), and desirable utterances and thoughts may be metarepresented.

In this thesis I have proposed that what all four markers indicate is metarepresentation: a clause marked by any one of them does not contain the description of a state of affairs, that is, a representation, but the representation of a representation or, in other words, a metarepresentation. The “reported” evidential *lee* marks metarepresentations of speech other than of the speaker herself and at the same time activates the hearer’s argumentation module in order to get past his epistemic vigilance. Both *karee* and *če*, in the uses they share, indicate that the clause contains the metarepresentation of the speaker’s own or someone else’s speech or thought. Finally, the marker *loo* indicates the metarepresentation of a desirable utterance. In this case what the speaker utters and what is marked by *loo* is the
metarepresentation of what she wishes her addressee to say. So what unites all four markers is their meaning “procedural indicator of metarepresentation”. What distinguishes them is the kind of metarepresentation they indicate: 

- *lee* marks metarepresentations of attributed public representations,
- *karee* and *če* both indicate metarepresentations of attributed and self-attributed public and mental representations, and
- *loo* marks metarepresentations of non-attributive public representations. Each of these markers may be used in two different settings: in utterances where the “saying”, “thinking”, or “wishing to say” is part of the explicature, and in utterances where the marker is the only indicator of it being a metarepresentation and so constrains the hearer towards the construction of a higher-level explicature such as “X says/thinks/wishes to say…”.

Languages differ widely in whether and how they mark metarepresentations. These may not be marked at all; the hearer has to infer whether an utterance is the representation of a state of affairs or of another representation. Its explicit marking helps the addressee of such an utterance to save processing effort in the search for relevance. Evidentials, occurring in many languages, are one means to indicate attributed metarepresentations. Quotatives and complementizers are often used to mark both public and mental attributed metarepresentations. Indus Kohistani *loo* marks metarepresentations of desirable utterances; to my knowledge, this is the first instance of such a marker being recognized.

My analysis of the four markers not only confirms the proposed distinction in Relevance Theory between representations of states of affairs (utterances that are used descriptively) and metarepresentations of states of affairs (utterances that are used interpretively), as Blass’s analysis of the Sissala marker *rɛ̀* does (Blass 1990:123). The existence of a marker such as Indus Kohistani *loo* supports and confirms the theoretical distinctions between several types of non-attributive linguistic metarepresentations (see 6.4.1), namely that there is a marker to specifically indicate metarepresentations of desirable utterances.

### 7.2 Further research

The Indus Kohistani markers *lee*, *karee*, *če*, and *loo* have been described in detail for the first time in this study. The data used here are from one particular extended family (mostly female members) and
village, representing one of the two main dialects of Indus Kohistani. More data from more diverse sources will be necessary to confirm or question my findings.

Concerning the “reported” marker lee, more folk stories will be needed to study and analyze its particular functions in such narratives.

In Chapter 4 I have suggested that underlying the particular grammaticalization path of karee may be an extension of its function as metarepresentation marker: from marking metarepresentations of attributed public representations only to metarepresentations of attributed and self-attributed public as well as mental representations. It would be interesting to look at other grammaticalized markers developed from SAY verbs or other such sources whether this explanation would apply to them as well.

The complementizer če merits much more attention than I have given it in this thesis. Again, an in-depth study of all uses of če, of the similar marker in Pashto, and of Persian ki within the framework of relevance theory might show if there is one unifying meaning after all. In particular, where Indus Kohistani has two different complement options for complement-taking predicates, one a sentential complement introduced by če and one a reduced complement (as for instance in examples (154) and (155)), a comparison of the two types might confirm or disprove my assumption, namely that če-marked complements contain information presented from an “insider” perspective whereas in reduced complements, the same information is presented as viewed from outside. Similarly, a comparison of purpose and reason clauses marked by karee and če with purpose and reason clauses without these markers will be needed to provide more evidence for my claim in 4.5.2.1, or to disprove it.
APPENDIX

Typological features of Indus Kohistani Grammar

Here I give a brief overview of the grammatical features of Indus Kohistani as seen from a typological perspective.

1. Morphology

On the morphological level, languages are classified with the help of the indexes of synthesis and of fusion. The index of synthesis indicates whether and to which degree a language consists of isolated morphemes or of words composed of several morphemes, i.e. root and affixes. In Indus Kohistani, we find words built up of a root and one or several affixes, as examples (1) to (3) show.

(1) \textit{kutsùr-a}
dog-PL
‘dogs’

(2) \textit{kar-h-aánt-e}
do-POT-PRS.M-PL.M
‘are able to do’

(3) \textit{kam-zùur}
little-strength
‘weak’

There are, however, many words consisting of just one morpheme so that Indus Kohistani is not a purely synthetic language but rather somewhere in between isolating and synthetic.

The index of fusion distinguishes between languages where the morphemes of a word can easily be separated (agglutinative languages) and languages where morphemes have merged together to such a degree that they are no longer separable (fusional languages). Indus Kohistani is partly agglutinative; the most common plural suffix can easily be separated from the noun as can suffixes indicating gender,
most of the case markers and verb suffixes. This is demonstrated in examples (4), (5), and example (2) above.

(4) \( \text{baal-}i\text{-a} \)
\hline
word-F-PL
\hline
‘words’

(5) \( \text{måaṣ-}i \)
\hline
man-DAT
\hline
‘to the man’

In (4) both gender and plural marker are distinct morphemes; in (5) it is the case marker morpheme that can easily be separated from the noun stem.

On the other hand, there are words where root and gender- or plural-indicating morpheme have merged and are no longer separable, as is illustrated in examples (6) and (7).

(6) \( \text{atshâk} \)
\hline
bad.M

(7) \( \text{atshìk} \)
\hline
bad.F
\hline
‘bad’

In example (8), too, it is not possible to separate a plural morpheme from the noun stem.

(8) \( \text{khàan} \quad \text{khàn} \)
\hline
mountain.SG \\
mountains.PL
\hline
‘mountain’ vs. ‘mountains’

Plural in this case is indicated by a shortening of the noun stem vowel.

So while many suffixes in Indus Kohistani can easily be separated from the stem and from one another, there are also instances of fusion and therefore, Indus Kohistani is, to some extent, a fusional language.

2. **Basic constituent order**

The basic constituent order in Indus Kohistani is subject - object - verb (SOV). Almost all clauses are verb-final; in pragmatically unmarked clauses, the subject, and where present, the object precede the verb, as shown in examples (9) and (10).
(9) ék dís màaṣ = uk i-ígaa  
one day man=INDEF come-PFV2.M.SG  
‘One day a certain man came’ (More about sin #5)

(10) tèe meešwaal-á só makày mand-áṣat-e  
then menfolk-PL 3SG.DIST corn thresh-FUT.M-PL.M  
‘Then the menfolk will thresh the corn’ (About deqani #66)

In both examples, the verb is clause-final; in (10) the subject meešwaalá ‘menfolk’ and the object makày ‘corn’ precede the verb.

The verb of a main clause may be followed by a complement clause as in example (11). The complement clause is indicated by square brackets.

(11) hīř mūt-ōō man-áthe [ràal kar-iž]  
now other-PL.ERG say-PRS.PFV night do-SBJV.1PL  
‘Now the others said, “Let’s spend the night (here)”’ (Prince and fairy #64)

The order of constituents may be changed because of pragmatic factors.

In the Indus Kohistani noun phrase, the head noun is usually the right-most element. Adjectives, numerals, demonstrative adjectives, the indefinite marker ék ‘one’ and possessors precede the noun.

Example (12) shows a typical noun phrase.

(12) mūī sāī dūu lák zhaa-țoó  
1SG.POSS 3PL.DEM two small brother-DIM.PL  
‘my two younger brothers’

The demonstrative adjective and the numeral may precede or follow each other. The possessive pronoun always precedes other elements of the noun phrase, the exception being a pragmatically marked clause where the possessive pronoun may follow the head noun. Another exception is the Indefinite Specific marker =uk, an enclitic that follows the head noun. Example (9) above shows an instance of this marker.

Relative clauses, too, are modifiers of noun phrases. In Indus Kohistani we find both, prenominal relative clauses where the relative clause precedes the head noun, and left-dislocated postnominal relative clauses. For examples and discussion of relative clauses I refer the reader to chapter 5, section 5.2.3.
Consistent with the SOV order of constituents, adpositions in Indus Kohistan always follow the noun as can be seen in (13) and (14).

(13)  khàn  
      tal  
    mountain.OBL  on

   ‘on the mountain’

(14)  màaṣ-āā  
      kira  
    man-GEN.M  for

   ‘for the man’

As for the order in verb phrases, when Indus Kohistani uses constructions consisting of two verbs, then the first verb is the main verb expressing the meaning whereas the second verb is semantically empty and carries the markers for tense, aspect, gender and number, an example of which is given in (15).

(15)  mà  
      tií  
      dáz-  
      de-ént  
      naí  
1SG  2SG.DOM  burn  give-PRS.M.  NEG

   ‘I don’t let you burn’ (Miscellaneous #46)

The first verb used in this construction, daz- ‘burn’, carries the meaning and consists of the root only whereas the second verb deént ‘give’ is marked for tense/aspect and gender. The construction as a whole conveys the meaning “let someone do something”.

Another, very frequently used complex verb construction consists of a semantically bleached verb such as do, give, or become plus a noun or noun-like word. Here again, the verb is always in second position, as shown in (16).

(16)  sã̃́  
      čány  
      de-ént-e  
3PL.DIST  wail  give-PRS.M-PL.M

   ‘They are wailing’

In Indus Kohistani negated clauses, the negation particle is usually placed directly preceding the finite verb, as example (17) illustrates.

(17)  sã̃́  
      čány  
      nií  
      de-ént-e  
3PL.DIST  wail  NEG  give-PRS.M-PL.M

   ‘They do not wail’
When special emphasis is put on the negation (pragmatically marked) then the negation particle *nā́i* ‘no’ follows the finite verb; example (15) above being such an instance.

In Indus Kohistani yes - no questions, the question particle *=aa* follows the finite verb (18).

(18) \[ \text{tú} \quad \text{oktá} \quad \text{uk-áśit} = \text{aa} \]
\[ 2\text{SG} \quad \text{tomorrow} \quad \text{come.up-FUT.F} = \text{Q} \]
‘Will you come up tomorrow?’

The question word of a content question is usually positioned directly before the verb phrase, but again this word order is not rigid and can be different in a pragmatically marked clause.

3. **Encoding of grammatical relations**

In Indus Kohistani noun and postpositional phrases, grammatical relations are marked on the dependent or modifying constituent. One such group of modifiers is adjectives. Indus Kohistani adjectives may be of the invariable kind that cannot be inflected and therefore do not display agreement, or they are variable adjectives that show agreement with the head noun for gender, a subgroup of these also for number. Examples (19) to (21) show one adjective of the last mentioned group.

(19) \[ \text{kīṣõ̀õ} \quad \text{kutsùr} \]
\[ \text{black.M.SG} \quad \text{dog.M} \]
‘black dog’

(20) \[ \text{kīṣ̃̀ĩ} \quad \text{kutsùr-i} \]
\[ \text{black.F} \quad \text{dog-F} \]
‘black bitch’

(21) \[ \text{kīṣèē} \quad \text{kutsùr-a} \]
\[ \text{black.M.PL} \quad \text{dog-M.PL} \]
‘black dogs’

The adjective ‘black’ in (19) - (21) above agrees in gender, and in number if the head noun has masculine gender.

In possessive constructions, too, the possessor, the dependent constituent, will be marked. When the slot of the possessor is filled by a noun this will have genitive case marking and will agree with the
gender of the head noun. Examples (22) to (24) show such instances of both agreement and case marking on the dependent constituent.

(22) māaṣ-āā puūć
    man-GEN.M  son
    ‘the man’s son’

Here, the possessor noun is marked with a fused genitive case and gender agreement marker: the masculine gender marker agrees with the head noun puūć ‘son’, whereas in the following example (23), the fused genitive/gender marker is feminine, agreeing with the head noun dhií ‘daughter’.

(23) māaṣ-āī dhií
    man-GEN.F  daughter
    ‘the man’s daughter’

(24) māaṣ-ōō maasmá
    man-PL.GEN child.PL
    ‘the men’s children’

If the possessor is plural-marked as in (24) then there is no gender distinction like in (22) and (23); the suffix -ōō is used for both masculine and feminine possesses.

In postpositional phrases, too, the dependent element, the noun, is marked as illustrated in (25).

(25) gharimaas-ā mil
    woman-OBŁ  with
    ‘with the woman’

Here, the dependent element gharimaas ‘woman’ is marked by oblique case.

At the clausal level, there are grammatical relations between the verb as head and its arguments; case marking shows one such syntactic dependency. Indus Kohistani uses several case systems to mark grammatical relations in a clause: a nominative case marking system for intransitive clauses and transitive clauses with imperfective aspect, ergative case marking for transitive clauses with perfective
aspect, differential object marking\(^{21}\), and dative, genitive or oblique case marking for experiencer clauses. In the following paragraphs I give examples of each of these strategies.

In all intransitive and in transitive clauses with imperfective aspect, S\(^{22}\) and A\(^{23}\) respectively are similarly treated in that they have no marking at all. This is demonstrated in the following two examples (26) and (27).

(26)\[ \text{ṹ ɡatá baazaar-íí bazíthu} \]  
\[ 3\text{SG.PROX} \text{again market-DAT go.PRS.PFV.M.SG} \]  
‘Again he went to the market’ (A.’s story #21)

In this intransitive clause, the subject is unmarked, as it is in example (27), a transitive clause with imperfective aspect.

(27)\[ \text{phày màazãã zòṛ mand-ãís} \]  
\[ \text{old.woman of.other clothes beat-PST.IPFV.F} \]  
‘The old woman used to wash other people’s clothes’ (A.’s story #5)

The second argument in a transitive clause, the direct object (DO), may or may not be marked. Masica states that Indo-Aryan languages (among them Indus Kohistani) do not have accusative case. However, the DO may still be marked, depending on its position in the Animacy/Definiteness hierarchy: a DO high on this scale is more likely to be marked. For instance in Urdu, it is obligatory for a human DO to be marked by dative case whereas other DOs are unmarked. In Indus Kohistani, only 1\(^{st}\), 2\(^{nd}\), and 3\(^{rd}\) person singular, and 1\(^{st}\) and 2\(^{nd}\) person plural pronouns in DO position are marked, this being the very top of the Animacy/Definiteness Hierarchy scale. Example (28) shows DOM marking of a 3\(^{rd}\) person singular pronoun; example (29) shows that there is no DOM marking on a 3\(^{rd}\) person plural pronoun.

(28)\[ \text{só tás paš-ãant} \]  
\[ 3\text{SG.DIST} 3\text{SG.DIST.DOM see-PRS.M} \]  
‘He is seeing him’

\(^{21}\) In languages with differential object marking (DOM), the case marking of a direct object is dependent on its position on the scale of the Animacy/Definiteness hierarchy. DO high on the scale are marked, DO low on the scale are unmarked (Aissen 2003).

\(^{22}\) S = subject; it is used as term for the sole argument of an intransitive clause.

\(^{23}\) A = the most actor-like argument in a transitive clause.
To mark the DO, the oblique form is used with the exception of 3rd person singular (as in example (28)) which has a distinct DO pronoun form.

The third argument in a transitive clause is marked with dative case; other cases are oblique, genitive, ablative, and ergative which I will treat next.

In transitive clauses with perfective aspect, the case marking for A switches to an ergative system, where the agent or actor is marked for ergative case. This is split ergativity as it applies only to transitive clauses with perfective aspect. One would expect that now the subject of an intransitive clause and the second argument O would be grouped together and both have zero marking (A vs. S & O). This is not so in Indus Kohistani: S has zero (nominative case) marking, A has ergative case marking, and O shows the same differential object marking as in imperfective transitive clauses. Another aspect of the difference between S in intransitive clauses and O in transitive perfective-aspect clauses is that the verb does not agree with O in the latter kind of clause. Examples (30), (31), and (32) show the ergative case marking of the agent and differential object marking on O.

(30) màaṣ-ce ás  paš-áthe
    man-ERG  3SG.PROX.DOM  see-PRS.PFV

    ‘The man saw her’

(31) gharímaas-ee ás  paš-áthe
    woman-ERG  3SG.PROX.DOM  see-PRS.PFV

    ‘The woman saw her’

(32) màaṣ-ōō ás  paš-áthe
    man-ERG.PL  3SG.PROX.DOM  see-PRS.PFV

    ‘The men saw her’

---

24 O stands for the not most actor-like second argument of a transitive clause.
All three examples also demonstrate that there is no agreement marking between O and verb. Ergative case marking occurs with all transitive verb forms marked for perfective aspect, this includes the conditional verb form.

Experiencer or dative-subject constructions are found in many Indo-Aryan languages (Masica 1991:346). In such clauses the most likely candidate for subject position is marked with dative case (some languages also use genitive case). Semantically, this “subject” is not an agent but an experiencer; such constructions are used to express “physical sensations and conditions, mental states, wanting or needing, and obligations” (1991:347-9). The less subject-like argument in such clauses will be marked with nominative case (zero marking) and will agree with the verb in gender and number. A more detailed discussion will have to be the topic of future studies; suffice to say that Indus Kohistani makes extensive use of this construction. Not only dative case but also genitive and oblique case (plus locative postposition) may mark the experiencer subject. Examples (33) and (34) below are given to illustrate such constructions.

(33) \[\text{màaś-i niiž i-ínt} \]
man-DAT sleep.F come-PRS.F

‘The man is sleepy’ [lit.: ‘Sleep comes to the man’]

(34) \[\text{màaś-ãĩ laáž di-ínt} \]
man-GEN.F embarrassment.F give-PRS.F

‘The man is embarrassed’ [lit.: ‘The man’s embarrassment gives’]

Example (33) contains a dative experiencer subject; in (34) the experiencer subject has genitive case marking. Note that in both examples, the verb agrees in gender and number with the unmarked, less subject-like second argument.

In the examples presented so far we have already seen that in Indus Kohistani, in intransitive clauses and in transitive clauses with imperfective aspect the verb agrees with the subject in gender and number (examples (26) to (28)). This is a case of head marking as the verb is the head of the clause.

Exceptions are the just mentioned experiencer clauses (examples (33), (34)) where the less subject-like argument agrees with the verb, clauses with verbs other than finite, clauses with verbs in irrealis mood, and clauses where A is marked with ergative case (examples (30) to (32)). In these latter
constructions, the verb does not agree with either of the arguments; a gender- and number-neutral form is used.

In clauses with irrealis verb forms such as imperative and subjunctive, the agreement between subject and verb is not in gender and number but in person and number.

4. **Tense, aspect and mood**

Indus Kohistani verbs are marked for both tense and aspect. Masica notes about verbs in Indo-Aryan languages that “… paradigms are made up of various combinations of inherited-synthetic, neo-synthetic/agglutinative, and so-called analytic (discrete) elements” (1991:257). The basic elements are often participles and auxiliaries. This seems to be true also for Indus Kohistani verbs. The observations in this subsection as well as those above are work in progress; a comprehensive description of the Indus Kohistani verb system still waits to be written.

The finite verb pattern can be described as follows in (35), taken from Masica (1991:258):

\[(35) \quad \text{VERB STEM} + \text{ASPECT MARKER} + \text{AGREEMENT} + \text{TENSE OR MOOD MARKER} + \text{AGREEMENT}\]

The aspect marker is the innermost suffix, followed by an agreement marker (not always) and tense marker (again not always). Mood and tense marker exclude each other. Tense and agreement markers may have fused to one suffix.

Indus Kohistani has morphological Present, Past, and Future tense marking. The following example (36) shows the pattern of the Present tense verb form.

\[(36) \quad \text{kará-} \quad a- \quad nt- \quad e \]
\[\text{do.IPFV,PTCP-} \quad \text{M-} \quad \text{PRS-} \quad \text{PL.M} \]

‘are doing’

The stem of this construction is the imperfective participle kará ‘doing’; its aspect is, as the term says, imperfective. This is followed by the agreement marker -a- (M) and the tense marker -nt- (PRS); the fused agreement marker -e (PL.M) is the outermost suffix. The following Table 1 and Table 2 show the Indus Kohistani past tense forms of the transitive verb kar- ‘do’ and of the intransitive verb til- ‘move’.

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Table 1. Past tense forms of kar- ‘do’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>kar-áthe</th>
<th>‘did, has done’</th>
<th>PRESENT PERFECTIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kar-álaas</td>
<td>‘had done’</td>
<td>PAST PERFECTIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>karíl</td>
<td>‘did’</td>
<td>PERFECTIVE 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kar-ágil</td>
<td>‘did, would do’</td>
<td>PERFECTIVE 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kar-áás</td>
<td>‘was doing, used to do’</td>
<td>PAST IMPERFECTIVE, SG, M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Past tense forms of til- ‘move’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>til-ítha</th>
<th>‘moved, has moved’</th>
<th>PRESENT PERFECTIVE, SG, M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>til-flaas</td>
<td>‘had been moving’</td>
<td>PAST PERFECTIVE, SG, M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>til-íl</td>
<td>‘moved’</td>
<td>PERFECTIVE 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>til-ígaa</td>
<td>‘moved’</td>
<td>PERFECTIVE 2, SG, M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>til-áás</td>
<td>‘was moving, used to move’</td>
<td>PAST IMPERFECTIVE, SG, M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The terms “Present Perfective” and “Past Perfective” (“Perfect” and “Pluperfect/Past Perfect” in Hallberg 1999) are a working reference term for the time being; I am aware of the fact that especially “Present Perfective” is somewhat misleading. It is not a typical Perfect; in the Pattan variety of Indus Kohistani it is the default Past tense verb form used in narratives. A more appropriate term for it might be “Near Past”, and “Remote Past” instead of Past Perfective.

Perfective 1 is a simple Perfective, not marked for tense. An event described using this verb form is seen as complete but not necessarily as having occurred in the past.

The Perfective 2 is a marked Perfective which for instance is being used when describing events that are hypothetical, happening in a possible world. The study of this verb form is still ongoing.

Both Present and Past Imperfective are used to convey habitual as well as continual aspect. The Past Imperfective form is also used to describe actions that were intended but never achieved.

Indus Kohistani has three verb forms expressing morphological mood: imperative, subjunctive, and conditional. Imperative and subjunctive verb forms differ from indicative verb forms in that they are not marked for tense, aspect or gender-number agreement. Instead, the verb stem is followed by a person-
number agreement suffix. For instance, the 2nd person singular imperative verb form consists of the root and the suffix -ā; for 2nd person plural imperative the suffix -i follows the root.

The subjunctive paradigm for the verb man- ‘say’ is presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Subjunctive paradigm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>person and number</th>
<th>root - suffix</th>
<th>translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st person sg</td>
<td>man-ām</td>
<td>‘I may say’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd and 3rd person sg</td>
<td>màn-ce</td>
<td>‘you/he/she may say’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st person pl</td>
<td>man-īž</td>
<td>‘we may say’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd and 3rd person pl</td>
<td>màn-āā</td>
<td>‘you/they may say’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The conditional verb forms of intransitive, transitive and causative verbs are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Conditional verb form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>form</th>
<th>verb</th>
<th>meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>intransitive</td>
<td>tilil-uú</td>
<td>‘if move/s’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transitive</td>
<td>karil-uú</td>
<td>‘if do/es’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>causative</td>
<td>pašaal-uú</td>
<td>‘if show/s’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The conditional verb form has perfective aspect marking; transitive conditional verb forms induce ergative case marking of the agent.

5. **Summary: Indus Kohistani typology**

From a typological viewpoint, Indus Kohistani is a fairly consistent OV language. Table 5 shows the following correlations found in pragmatically neutral Indus Kohistani clauses as compared with Lehmann’s constituent order correlations for OV languages (Lehmann 1973).
Table 5. Indus Kohistani constituent order correlation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indus Kohistani word order correlation</th>
<th>Lehmann’s OV languages word order correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>noun - postposition</td>
<td>noun - postposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>genitive - head noun</td>
<td>genitive - noun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adjective - head noun</td>
<td>adjective - noun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relative clause - head noun and head noun - relative clause</td>
<td>relative clause - noun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>question words: non-initial</td>
<td>non-initial question word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>morphology: suffixes</td>
<td>suffixes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>main verb - auxiliary verb</td>
<td>main verb - auxiliary verb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comparison: standard - quality</td>
<td>standard - comparative adjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adverb - verb</td>
<td>adverb - verb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative marker - verb</td>
<td>verb - negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subordinator - clause and clause - subordinator</td>
<td>clause - subordinator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Or, in terms of Dryer’s Branching Direction Theory (Dryer 1992), Indus Kohistani is a left-branching language: phrasal (branching) categories precede non-phrasal (non-branching) categories, as for instance in an Indus Kohistani verb phrase, the branching object noun phrase precedes the non-branching verb.
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